

DR. J. J. POORTMAN

VEHICLES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

II





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OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
THE CONCEPT OF HYLIC PLURALISM
(OCHĒMA)

by

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PREFACE

Several reviewers of Volume I (Part I and the first sections of Part II) of this work have said that they looked forward with special interest to the *last* part of it, in which, after the general introduction (Part I) and the various accounts of the occurrence of the theme of fine materiality in the *history* of human thought (Part II), the *sense*, the *truth* of hylic pluralism would be discussed (Part III).

Partly because of this, I decided to write this last part, Part III (Volumes II, III and IV), first, that is, at a time when the remainder of Part II—that is, the originally planned Volume III (Hylic Pluralism in Ancient Greece and Rome), Volume IV (Hylic Pluralism in Israel, Christianity and Islam) and Volume V (Hylic Pluralism in the Modern Age) of the Dutch edition¹—had not yet been written, but simply consisted of detailed notes and material.

It is, of course not the first time that a later part of a work consisting of several parts has been written before the intervening parts which either logically or chronologically precede it. This anomaly is due, in this case, to two reasons. In the first place, the reviewers of Volume I, as I have hinted, correctly emphasised the importance of the *quaestio iuris*. In the second place, any account of the “sense” of hylic pluralism is bound to include such a personal view—one which cannot be built up from notes so easily as historical surveys—that I decided to deal with this as soon as possible. In the meantime, however, I have tried to correct the error of this *husteron pröteron* of the sequence of the work by preceding my discussion of the problem of the truth of hylic pluralism by summaries of the historical parts, especially of those historical elements that have not yet been fully elaborated in Volume I. It is these *historical summaries* which are contained in this volume, Volume II. These historical summaries are followed by *cross-sections* through the material—phenomenological cross-sections, according to the content—covering the themes that are subordinate to the main subject. These cross-sections, which are contained in Volume III, form a transition between the historical summaries and the sections dealing with the meaning proper of hylic pluralism.

The sense or the truth of hylic pluralism is closely associated with the problems raised by the science of *parapsychology*, a science which is not yet entirely free from controversy. Parapsychologists are, after all, concerned with the study of strange or so-called occult phenomena and the theme of fine materiality is clearly one of these. Any one wishing

1. Volume I of the English edition of this work corresponds to Volumes I and II of the original Dutch edition.

to demonstrate the correctness of hylic pluralism is bound to use parapsychological methods and considerations. On the other hand, it is also possible to ask whether "hylic pluralism" may perhaps serve as a theory to explain the results of parapsychology, perhaps completely, but otherwise at least partly. I have long been convinced that I had to discuss these problems in detail—so convinced, in fact, that it might almost be possible to give this book the sub-title "An Attempt to Explain the Results of Parapsychology". It became apparent, however, that hylic pluralism could not provide a complete "foundation theory" for parapsychology and for this reason the content of this work grew to some extent beyond the original plan. All the same, I hope that, on the one hand, the "sense of hylic pluralism" has nonetheless come into its own. On the other hand, as far as the foundations of parapsychology are concerned we can agree with G.N.M. Tyrrell when he wrote: "What Psychical Research chiefly needs in the present stage of its development is new explanatory ideas".¹ What has also become apparent is that the explanatory principles which parapsychology needs are most closely connected, precisely at the point where hylic pluralism as such fails to provide an explanation, with what may be called the deepest background of hylic pluralism—"noic monism".

At the end of this work, that is, at the end of Volume IV, after discussing the truth of hylic pluralism, I have elaborated the results of the preceding considerations in various directions under the heading of "Some Perspectives" in which these results are viewed in a wider philosophical context.

As I already indicated in the Preface to Volume I, I should like to mention a number of people and institutions from whom or which I have received help in writing this work. This help has varied from considerations in detailed letters, permission to include illustrations and research in libraries to short bibliographical notes and various observations and, of course, all kinds of assistance in between these two extremes. I am indebted to all those individuals and institutions whose names are listed below. Alas, some of those whose names follow and whom I thank for their help are now no longer with us.

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¹ See B 266 p. 14.

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A. HISTORICAL SUMMARIES

51. HYLIC PLURALISM IN GENERAL AND RECAPITULATION

The view that a species of finer matter occurs of which the human soul especially is believed to consist is referred to as *dualistic materialism*.¹ The Stoics, among other ancient philosophers, took this point of view. What is particularly striking, however is this. Neo-Platonism also had a doctrine concerning fine materiality in connection with the soul, but the neo-Platonic teaching was different—the soul itself was, according to this school, immaterial, but it also possessed a vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter. Since the term "materialism" is used for the doctrine that matter (whether ordinary visible matter or another kind of matter) is the highest existing reality, it is clear that a sharp distinction must be made here. According to the metaphysical teaching of neo-Platonism matter is *not* the highest reality and this teaching therefore cannot be called materialistic. That is why, in the General Introduction

1 See, for example, G. Heymans, B 68, p. 103; B 151, p. 266.

Part I¹ of this work, in Volume I, I suggested giving a wider name to the doctrine of fine materiality, especially insofar as this is connected with the human soul—the name of hylic pluralism. By “hylic”, I meant materiality in the general sense, including also possible more subtle variations of matter. By “pluralism” I meant that, according to these views, more than one species of matter (especially in this particularly pregnant sense of being connected with the soul) occurs. Since this finer matter is not thought of as one variation of ordinary matter, but is often even assumed to occur in different densities, in several variations and at various levels, it is better to speak, not of hylic *dualism*, but rather of hylic *pluralism*.²

It is, for example, important to be very careful with a term such as “materialistic psychology”. If by this is meant that the soul is nothing more than ordinary matter, a kind of epiphenomenon of matter, then what we have is ordinary or monistic materialism. If, on the other hand, what is meant is that it consists of a *finer matter*, as in the teaching of the Stoics, then we really do have dualistic materialism. If, however, the soul *expresses* itself by means of a vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter, while it is itself immaterial, then what we are concerned with is not dualistic materialism, but another form of hylic pluralism, which I have, in the absence of a currently accepted term, called the “delta standpoint”.³

It is therefore necessary to differentiate and this is not always done. The well-known philosopher, who was for many years a professor at Oxford and then became President of India, S. Radhakrishnan, wrote in his *Indian Philosophy*, “The Buddhists, along with Indian psychologists in general, believe in the material or organic nature of mind or *manas*”.⁴ This leaves the way open for the explanation that the traditional Indian psychology may simply be materialistic, regarding matter as the highest reality. This is, however, not so. Apart from dualistic materialism, the other forms of hylic pluralism—the delta standpoint and also what I have called the gamma and the zeta standpoints⁵—also occur frequently in Indian thought. The *sūkṣma-śarīra*, the fine body

1 As far as the division of this work is concerned, a distinction should be made between “Parts” and “Volumes”. Volume I of the English edition of *Ochēma* includes Part I, the General Introduction and much of Part II, the History of Hylic Pluralism. The remainder of Part II has still to be written (Hylic Pluralism in Ancient Greece and Rome, in Israel, Christianity and Islam and in the Modern Age). The present volume, Volume II, contains the third part of the work, Part III, the Sense of Hylic Pluralism, and this part will be continued in Volumes III and IV. In the Dutch edition, Part III is contained in Volumes IV-A, VI-B and VI-C.

2 See Part I, 2.

3 See Part I, 10 and 14.

4 B 124, I, p. 400; see also Part II, p. 181, 234.

5 See Volume I.

of the soul, is, for example, a typical doctrine of the important *darśana* or school of the Vedānta, which at the same time teaches that the highest reality is not matter, but the one Self or Ātman.¹ In Buddhism, there is reference to factors of the soul, *dharmas* or *skandhas*, which are once again regarded as consisting of fine matter,² although matter certainly does not have the last word in Buddhism.³ Yet Radhakrishnan writes so loosely about the faith in India in the material nature of *manas*—he does not differentiate sufficiently. It would appear that his long contact with Western thought made him insensitive to these ideas that are so characteristic of Indian thought.⁴

One is also conscious of something rather similar in some of the historical considerations of Western thought. It is, for example, certain that, in the first centuries of Christianity and even for a time during the Middle Ages, what I have called "hylic pluralism" was rife not only among ecclesiastical writers of lesser importance, but also among those authors who were officially declared to be "Fathers of the Church". In Part I, I distinguished six metaphysical standpoints which could be adopted with regard to fine materiality.⁵ The alpha standpoint or monistic materialism and the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism are explicitly opposed to hylic pluralism. At the moment, we need not concern ourselves with these two standpoints or with the last of the six standpoints, the so-called zeta standpoint which, as the counterpart to monistic materialism or the alpha standpoint, takes as its point of departure the irreality of all matter. The other three standpoints, however, are met with regularly in the works of the early Christian writers. Thus, the delta standpoint, which regards the soul as immaterial, but nonetheless teaches that there is something consisting of fine matter connected with the soul, is found, for example, in the teachings of Augustine. I shall return to this later.⁶ In the meantime, what is the difference between the other two, the beta and the gamma standpoints, which also amount to typical forms of hylic pluralism? This becomes most clear if they and the others are seen as phases in an increasing *spiritualisation*, according to which the six standpoints are distinguished and numbered. The first, the alpha standpoint or monistic materialism almost entirely rejects the immaterial element. Every is matter of the ordinary kind. There is

1 See Part II, pp. 190-191, 218-219.

2 See Part II, p. 238.

3 See Part II, pp. 254-255.

4 See Part II, pp. 181-182.

5 See Part I, 10 ff.

6 See below, Section 67.

a degree of change or refinement in the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism, according to which there is, in addition to ordinary matter, also a fine matter or *pneuma*, as taught, for example, by the Stoics. There is, however, nothing, according to this standpoint, which is higher than matter, not even God, if he is accepted. The gamma standpoint goes an important step further, teaching that there is something that is purely immaterial, but that this refers exclusively to God. The whole of creation is material or of fine matter. According to this view, the world, plurality, is matter and, to find immaterial being, the pluriform world must be transcended. The delta standpoint, which follows the gamma standpoint, extends the range of the immaterial, regarding the soul as well as immaterial. The soul is therefore not matter, but it is in possession of a vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter or something of a related nature. This, is, however, rejected by the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism—the soul is purely immaterial and is sharply contrasted with the body of ordinary matter. There is no room in this dualism—which was taught, for example, by Descartes—for a vehicle of fine matter. The zeta standpoint goes furthest of all in the direction of spiritualisation—everything is immaterial and all matter is unreal, an illusion.¹

In this context, it is well worth noting that all three forms of hylic pluralism, the beta, gamma and delta standpoints, occur in the writings of early Christian authors. The delta standpoint is to be found not only in Augustine, but also in latter Christian authors, insofar as they recognise hylic pluralism. The relatively extreme beta standpoint, which regards all being as material, occurs in the work not only of a less prominent writer such as Macarius the Egyptian, but also of Tertullian (160-222), an author about whom a great deal has been written, even though he is not generally regarded as a Father of the Church. Tertullian regarded God also as a *corpus* or body.² He, therefore, did not regard God as the only immaterial being and the whole of creation as material. On the contrary, apart from the last, God too was matter according to Tertullian. The influence of the Stoics is obvious here, but in any case the point of view taken by Tertullian (as also by Thomas Hobbes much later) was not the gamma, but the beta standpoint. The gamma standpoint also occurred very regularly in the writings

1 See Part I, 10-16. Remarkably enough, the view that two kinds of matter, a coarser and a finer species, are possible among this purely apparent matter does occur among the adherents of the zeta standpoint. This standpoint may therefore also be a species of hylic pluralism, as opposed to the alpha and the epsilon standpoints, both of which reject hylic pluralism in principle.

2 See, for example, G. Verbeke, B 174, pp. 444-445; B 130, p. 22; Part I, p. 38.

of Christian authors of the very first centuries of our era and it is even to be found later. Church Fathers in the strict sense such as Hilary (300-367) and Ambrose (340-397), the Apologete Arnobius (260-327), very highly regarded figures such as Origen (ca. 185-251) and, much later, Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153) explicitly stated that only God was without a body—according to them, the angels, for example, had bodies and, what is more, subtle bodies.¹ This last-mentioned view occurred very frequently, like the view that the human soul is material (Justin, Irenaeus, Tatian, Lactantius, Athanasius and others).

It is not surprising that, in view of these ideas, there has been reference to the "materialistic psychology" of the early Christian authors. But, as I suggested in the case of Indian psychology, a statement such as this also requires clarification and differentiation. It is not correct to say that these thinkers belong to a standpoint which teaches monistic materialism. Some difference is made by dualistic materialism. This applies even more to the gamma standpoint, which regards the deity as transcendent and immaterial, and even more to the delta standpoint, which also regards the soul as immaterial, but as connected with something consisting of fine matter. If differentiations and distinctions are made in this way, the teachings of the theologians concerned become clearer and one will be less inclined to give way to the temptation to regard them as too absurd or as too primitive for anything to be said about them.

Partly because several reviewers of Volume I of *Ochêma* have asked for the question to be clarified, I feel that a comment about the *concept* of this fine materiality which is connected would be in place here. Some surprise has been caused from time to time by the fact that materiality was so emphasised by the Stoics, who were otherwise so clearly inclined towards religiosity.² On the other hand, they themselves provide what is probably a very useful clue in this context. The Stoic Seneca said *quidquid facit, corpus est*³—everything that acts is a body, corporeal or material. Thus, the whole of *reality* is material (of fine matter). We shall see later just how important this is. Novalis, the German romantic, wrote in his *Fragmente*: "Everything that comes to us by means of the organs is matter".⁴ But, if it is clear that man may perhaps possess unusual organs, more senses than ordinary organs, then everything that is perceived in this unusual way by him, what has

1 See Part I, 38-39, 40.

2 See, for example, Part I, p. 38.

3 Ep. 117, 2; see also Verbeke, B 174, p. 148.

4 See Ringger, B 249, p. 97. See also L. Oken (1779-1828): "As appearance, everything is material" (B 38, p. 515).

an effect on him in this way, must be called material, or perhaps of fine matter. This step was taken by Hornell Hart, the American sociologist who was interested in parapsychology (1888-1967). It was he who investigated the subject of appearances of living beings ("Travelling ESP"). If these appearances are perceived by third parties and they convey some communication or these third parties notice something about them that they cannot know, as in a definite case,¹ then he is inclined to speak of a "projected body" (in contrast to groundless hallucinations). The authenticity of such cases can, for the present, be left undiscussed. Two things, however, are quite clear. If matter is defined by what acts or works, then an effective appearance must also be called material. If, on the other hand, the Stoics, who were without any doubt concerned with what are now regarded as parapsychological phenomena,² placed themselves on the basis of the statement mentioned above, then their use of the concept of materiality can at once be more easily understood. It is clearly because of a failure to distinguish sufficiently, both in their case and in ours, that makes their material soul appear to be so surprising.

It is necessary in general to take very carefully into account the meanings of terms and the context in which they are used, but it is even more necessary to do this in the particular case of hylic pluralism. Is the meaning of "immaterial", "formless" etc. *completely* immaterial, without any body and without any form or is it used only in the *relative* sense, of the absence of *ordinary* matter, of the ordinary body and of ordinary forms? If a careful examination is made, it is clear that these terms are not used, in many cases, in the absolute sense. The vehicle of the soul, consisting of fine matter, is even called, *ahulon*-immaterial in some cases. *Corpus* or body (*Körper*) usually, but not always, refers to the ordinary body, whereas body (*Leib*) can also mean the body of fine matter, especially in the case of "astral body" or "nerve body", for example. In Buddhism, the *arūpa* world is formless compared with the ordinary *rūpa* world, but it is not, apparently, entirely without forms.³

Spiritus, *pneuma* and "spirit" are used indiscriminately for purely immaterial and in the sense of relatively immaterial, consisting of a finer matter. In this work, I use the word "spirit" for purely immaterial only and the word *pneuma* in the sense of consisting of (fine) matter.⁴

1 H. Hart, B 214, pp. 183, 199-200; see also Vol. I, p. 104-105.

2 See, for example, B 96, p. 11; B 76, p. 106.

3 See Part I, p. 17; Part II, pp. 237.

4 See Part I, p. 18.

The terms *pneuma*, *spiritus*,¹ *rūah*² and probably also *ātman*³ have often been used for purely spiritual (to *pneuma hagion*—the Holy Spirit; the one *Ātman*), but originally they had a material significance, especially in the sense of *breath*, *blowing* and *air*. “Breath” and air are therefore very suitable words for expressing what is of relatively fine matter—even in our ordinary environment, this is the case, since the air is felt, but not seen.

In setting all this material in order and in arranging all the statements referring to belief in fine materiality, it is apparent how useful it is to distinguish the various levels at which they may have a bearing. The first level, that of the physical *pneuma*, can hardly be said to refer to fine matter. The pneumatic drill, pneumatic tyres and so on are entirely within the sphere of our ordinary experience. There have, however, been a number of modern discoveries and developments in the sphere of physics and technology, such as radio waves, radar and so on, which clearly belong to “our” world, but are, on the one hand, very effective (one is reminded here, for example, of the guiding of aircraft and rockets by radio) and, on the other hand, also quite subtle or in any case invisible and not directly perceptible by the senses.

All the same, the physical *pneuma* is to be found at a level that does not interest us especially here. There are, however, three further levels which are characteristically hylic pluralistic. The level of the physiological *pneuma* is closely connected with the ordinary body and refers especially to the physiological aspect of man, all though it does to some extent transcend this. It is clearly to this category that views which have persisted for centuries about the “animal spirits”, the *spiritus animales et vitales*, belong, as well as those about the fluid, with the help of which Mesmer, the originator of “animal magnetism (1733-1815), and others more recently have claimed to be able to bring about cures.⁴ Among spiritists and theosophists, there has always been reference to an etheric body or “etheric double” which is closely connected with the ordinary body, but does not survive it for long.⁵ Among the primitive peoples, there is also a “body-soul” which is regarded as a finer breath, as something ethereal or as consisting of subtle matter⁶.

In clear contrast to this, there is also another level, which I have called that of the psychological *pneuma*.⁷ This refers to what makes

1 See Part I, p. 18; Part II, p. 72.

2 B 233, p. 482; B 235, p. 89.

3 See Part II, p. 161.

4 See Part I, 7. Part II, pp. 162.

5 See Part I, p. 25.

6 See Part I, pp. 77-79; Part II, pp. 161, 162, 276-277.

7 See Part I, 8.

an "excursion", to the free soul or the "external soul", which can separate itself from the body and exist after death at least for some time. The primitive peoples regard this too as consisting of fine matter, but they have by no means reached the point where they can distinguish between the material and the purely spiritual.¹ This idea of an external soul of fine matter is, however, certainly not confined only to primitive peoples—it is also met with in more profound philosophies in which the immaterial is also given a place—in neo-Platonism, for example, and in the Indian systems such as, for example, the Vedānta. Here, for example, it is taught that the soul possesses a vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter or an garment, *chiton*, or even several of this species, mutually varying in density, or a *sūkṣma-śarīra*, *linga-śarīra* or *upādhi*. This idea is a central theme in my investigation and it is because of this that I have called this work *Ochēma* and the sub-title History and Sense of Hylic Pluralism has a wider implication, if a hylic pluralism which is not at all or only to a limited extent related to *ochēmata* occurs regularly.² In the case of the psychological *pneuma*, then, we are concerned with what is called a "meta-organism" which the soul is believed to use, especially after death. An ancient—and, in certain circles, popular—term for this is *to ochēma astroeides*, the "astral body".³ What is surprising is the number of times that such ideas recur in the history of philosophy. Cartesian anthropological dualism has made us lose sight of them,⁴ but it will be my aim in the systematic part of this study to ascertain to what extent this has been correct.

Anthropological dualism, the epsilon standpoint, acknowledges the existence of only two factor—the purely spiritual and the corporeal and material. As soon as we cease to think in terms of this standpoint, however, we can leave room for a third factor. We may call this third factor the soul, as opposed to the spirit, the animal soul, bond or *vinculum* between the spirit and the body or something similar. In any case, this intermediate factor is often thought of as consisting of fine matter. Thinkers and schools of thought putting forward a trichotomy rather than a dichotomy are frequently encountered.⁵ In these cases, rather than lumping the soul and the spirit together, a further differentiation takes place.

It remains to be seen whether the factor which is usually named

1 See Part I, p. 83; Part II, p. 166.

2 See Part I, pp. 28-29, 41.

3 See Part I, p. 16 note 4; B 116; B 33.

4 See below, Section 76.

5 See Part I, p. 15 etc.; see also below, Section 92.

first of the three—the spirit—is regarded as purely immaterial or not. Although most of the standpoints accord a place or function somewhere to the purely immaterial factor, this sublime factor is often regarded as consisting of fine matter. I have given the name of sublime *pneuma* to this factor.¹ In the religious context especially, there is reference to a “radiant body”, *augoeides ochēma* diamond body, “robe of glory”, glorified body or *corpus gloriosum* and so on. An exalted radiance or an unearthly light is often mentioned in this context. It is clear that these ideas are at a different level from that of the psychological *pneuma*, the meta-organism pure and simple, which is also said to occur in an unfavourable manner.

A foreshadowing of these “higher” bodies can be found in art—in the halo, for example, of Christ and the Christian saints. What has to be borne in mind here, however, is the extent to which artists, at least originally, took a realistic conception as their point of departure in this case and in similar cases, rather than a purely symbolic conception, even though this reality was not always visible to the ordinary eye.

I introduced another new term into *Ochēma*, Volume I—*psychohylism*. “Are there pure souls?” the well-known phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius asked in one of her recent books. It is questionable whether “spirit-souls should not (that is, after the bond with the ordinary body has been broken or at death) be thought of with a kind of apparent body”.² This is the idea or the theme that I have in mind with “psychohylism”—whether the psyche is not always provided with some form of hyle or matter, even where this would not be immediately expected. Thus, Leibniz said, “Souls never leave their bodies entirely” and Fechner asked, “Can the soul ever completely do without a corporeal bearer?”³ This, of course, is typical hylic pluralism—if the ordinary body of coarse matter is no longer present, another species of materiality is in any case present and effective. This may apply in different degrees—absolutely, in every case of revealed existence, from within plurality, or relatively, only from a certain level downwards.⁴ For the absolute version, it is necessary for the angels, for example, also to possess subtle bodies.

It is obvious that these subtle bodies, the *ochēmata*, if they exist, must be situated in something. “Vehicle of the soul” and “psychohylism” are thought of as personal, psychological or anthropological. The

1 See Part I, 9.

2 *Die Geistseele des Menschen*, Munich, 1960, B 198, p. 26, note 5.

3 B 91, vi, p. 601; B 42, II, p. 201; see also Part I, p. 14.

4 See Part I, 4; Part II, p. 193.

question that arises, then, is what is the framework within which they are situated. This is inevitable, but I indicated, in Volume I of the present work, that my intention was to limit my investigation to the psychological and anthropological aspects.¹ I do not propose to depart from this intention, but it is, of course, impossible to ignore the wider, *cosmological* aspect entirely.

The word matter includes extensiveness and space. If there is perhaps a body of the soul consisting of fine matter, is there also another space, different from the space that is already known to us, a different world, not normally capable of being experienced, or even, in that case, with pluralism, several spaces, several worlds?

There is good reason to differentiate again here. All this was identical in the eyes of the ancients—the visible heaven or sky and heaven as the dwelling-place of the gods and the blessed. The heavenly bodies were, for them, visible bodies of gods, whereas living man was, on the other hand, situated in the “sublunary” sphere of imperfect and capricious movements. The visible heavenly bodies have, however, long since been deprived of their glory. Hardly anyone now listens to the views of Fechner or Heymans, for example, who regarded them as appearances of exalted spirits. Nowadays, man is making rapid progress forward in a universe which he regards as completely material, consisting of a matter which is homogeneous with the ordinary matter that is known to us. Only groups of orthodox believers still cling to the other idea of “heaven”, of another world as the dwelling-place of the dead. This idea is not taken seriously by scientists and many free-thinkers and humanists simply place a question mark after anything that is said about the continued existence after death.²

We have perhaps gone rather too far here in our rejection and have concentrated our attention too exclusively on purely physical continuity. The theme of a *finer* matter or *hyle*, which is more subtle even than, for example, the radio waves which still belong to our ordinary world, may perhaps provide some perspectives here, possibly taken together with the idea of several higher dimensions of space (considered separately from any idea of time).

The English philosopher and parapsychologist H. H. Price (born 1899) considered something of this kind, for example, in an essay on “Survival and the Idea of Another World”³ and spoke about “Haunting and the Psychic Ether”⁴ in his speech as president of the English

1 See Part I, p. 13.

2 See “Immanuel Kant en de Parapsychologie”, B 238, p. 12; B; B 277 p. 20.

3 B 244, 182, Jan. 1953.

4 B 244, 160; summary in B 264, v, 3.

S.P.R. in 1939. Emil Mattiesen (1875-1939), who was rather inclined to favour spiritualism, but who was also appreciated by others because of his sound views, thought that a "future science of the beyond."¹ offered a good perspective here, even though he was quite aware of the difficulties that might arise. These ideas were elaborated, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, by Wilhelm Haas (born 1883), at one time a lecturer at the University of Cologne. In his *Die psychische Dingwelt* (1921), he turned the whole question round and said: the psychical is not in us—we find ourselves, with a "psychical body", in the world of the psychical.²

I cannot go too deeply into all these questions here, in this introductory section, but I should like to point to the following at least. In the history of philosophy, these ideas are connected with the theme of the *ancient elements*. The fifth element, ether or *ākāśa*, is qualitatively different from the others, just as the sphere of the heavenly bodies is different from the "sublunary" sphere. It is said explicitly, not so much in Western antiquity, where we have to begin with all kinds of interpretations, but certainly in Indian thought, that these five elements occur both in the ordinary, coarse form and in a *fine* form, in other words, both respectively as *mahā-bhūtas* and as *sūkṣma-bhūtas*.³ The idea, then is apparently that, just as air or the gaseous represents a relatively fine form of the states of aggregation within the ordinary framework that is known to us, so too must the ordinary, known world with its subdivisions of states of aggregation be seen as a whole as the cosmic element earth or fixed state, which is in turn followed by other worlds or spheres in increasing subtlety and with a repetition of the subdivisions. Clearly this is the same idea as that of the "planes"—the "astral plane" and so on—of the modern occultists, about which the well-known Oxford classical scholar E. R. Dodds remarked that the neo-Platonic term *to platos* is the literal equivalent of this.⁴ Such ideas are clearly associated with the cosmological aspect of hylic pluralism.

In Part I of this work (Volume I), I mentioned a number of thinkers in whose writings the idea of what I have called "hylic pluralism" occurs *in general* and provided a survey of the available books and articles on this subject. I should like to go over what I said then once again now and add a few new facts to it.

1 B 98, III, p. 339; see also Part I, p. 13.

2 B 61, p. 42, 84; see also Part I, p. 65.

3 See Part II, p. 226 (see also p. 281). *sakṣma*, of course, means fine or subtle.

4 B 33, p. 303; see also Part I, p. 13 note 1.

In Part I, I said that F. A. Lange would have done better to call his well-known book on the history of materialism, *Die Geschichte des Materialismus* (1866), a history of "monistic materialism", because, although he mentioned a few doctrines which I would classify under the heading of dualistic materialism or hylic pluralism, he was not alive to the problem as a whole. He by-passed in total silence the typical doctrines of his contemporaries Immanuel Hermann Fichte (the son of J. G. Fichte) and G. T. Fechner concerning the "soul body" or "further body", related ideas in Indian philosophy and the views of a number of early Christian authors which I mentioned earlier in this section. To these last-mentioned views could be added those of a number of Lutheran theologians on "spiritual corporeality" and "intermediate corporeality".¹ The Dutch scholar K.H.E. de Jong (1872-1960), on the other hand, always had a lively interest in hylic pluralism, although principally in the dualistic materialistic form of this teaching. His book, *Die andere Seite des Materialismus*, is one of the few independent works on the subject. The English counterpart to this book—leaving aside A. E. Powell's compilations from theosophical writings²—is G. R. S. Mead's *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition* (1919), but this book deals only with later classical antiquity and with a number of gnostic writers. Mead (1863-1933) does, however, call the doctrine of the soul as consisting of fine matter "one of the oldest persuasions of mankind".³ Although hylic pluralism is characteristically prominent in Indian thought, I do not know of any monographs on the subject (with the exception of part of Volume I of *Ochēma*). In the context of Western antiquity, a number of treatises on the subject of hylic pluralism have, however, been published, although not in the form of separately published writings. Two of the best known are R. C. Kissling's article on "The Ochēma-pneuma of the Neo-Platonists"⁴ and E. R. Dodd's "The Astral Body in Neo - Platonism".⁵ Ralph Cudworth, the well-known seventeenth century Cambridge Platonist (1617-1688), discussed the question of subtle bodies in great detail in a more comprehensive work.⁶ For other books, articles and so on, the reader should consult the survey provided in Part I, Section 18 (Volume I). I should, however, point out here that Mattiesen discussed the theory of the astral body critically, but in some detail

1 See Part I, pp. 3; see also below, Section 222.

2 See B 116-B 119.

3 B 99, p. 145; see Part I, p. 3. See also the publications of Mudloon (B 229) and Crookall (B 202). See also below, Section 250.

4 B 85.

5 B 33.

6 B 21; see also Part I, p. 62-63.

in one of his books, calling the concept "clearly extremely old and very widespread".¹

The theme of hylic pluralism was certainly not unknown in medieval thought—it existed both in the form of the subtle bodies of the angels especially and in the more general form of the *materia spiritualis*. Nonetheless, I have not been able to discover many independent studies. The most striking is a treatise which once again establishes a connection with antiquity—J. Pépin's "Saint Augustin et le symbolisme néoplatonicien de la vêtue".²

The theme of hylic pluralism also plays a part in the literature of modern parapsychology, in which it is sometimes called the "radiation theory" and sometimes not. This theory has encountered a favourable response in parapsychological circles, but also increasing opposition. Later on, I shall have to discuss it more fully, but here I shall only mention a few writers who were generally favourable towards hylic pluralism. One of the pioneers of "psychical research", F. W. H. Myers (1843-1901), speculated, in his attempts to explain the phenomena concerned, about the "matherial".³ I have already spoken about H.H. Price.⁴ In his presidential speech in 1939, he said, for example, that "a man's psychic atmosphere will be a kind of secondary body" and elsewhere he said that it was "logically possible" "that I have several bodies at once".⁵ I have also mentioned Hornell Hart's idea of a "projected body", which is very much in the direction of hylic pluralism even though Hart is not very conscious of the broad outlines of this teaching. The well-known writer C. D. Broad (born 1887), one of the nestors of present English philosophy and very interested in the problems of parapsychology, wrote in his important article "The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy"⁶. "An alternative possibility" (that is, of a psychokinesis that operates directly) "would be that each of us had a kind of invisible, but extended and dynamical "body", beside his visible and tangible body". Most parapsychologists hesitate between acceptance and rejection, however, Quite recently W.H.C. Tenhaeff, professor in parapsychology at the University of Utrecht, said "that it must be regarded as very likely that continued research will eventually do justice to this age-old "belief" (in the existence of a body of fine matter)."⁷

1 B 98, III, p. 157, 189 ff.

2 B 190.

3 *Human Personality* (B 230, p. 9, 166.

4 See above, p. 12.

5 B 219, June 1952, p. 137.

6 *Philosophy*, October 1949, p. 307 (B 196).

7 B 265, XXX, 3-4, May-July 1962, p. 119.

52 THE PLAN OF *OCEMA*, VOLUMES II, III and IV

I have tried, in the preceding section to provide a general survey of the problem of hylic pluralism and have repeated some of the distinctions that I originally made in Volume I of this work. My reason for doing this was to make it possible for anyone who had not previously read Volume I completely to understand this volume, and indeed this third part of the work, consisting of Volumes II, III and IV in the English version. As I said in the preface to this volume, the sense, truth and tenability of hylic pluralism are discussed in the three volumes of Part III. If the reader wishes to realise, however, what is precisely under discussion in this third part, he will have to become familiar not only with a number of concepts and distinctions that have already been introduced (in Volume I), but also, for the sake of clarity, to some extent at least with the historical material to which these concepts and distinctions apply. This is all the more important in view of the fact that I have not yet completed the whole survey that I originally intended to make of the history of hylic pluralism—only the first sections of this historical part, Part II are at present available, in Volume I (p. 115 ff.) The remainder of this historical survey of hylic pluralism that is Part II, dealing with Hylic Pluralism in Ancient Greece and Rome (the originally planned Volume III of the *Dutch* edition), Hylic Pluralism in Israel, Christianity and Islam (the originally planned Volume IV) and Hylic Pluralism in the Modern Age (the originally planned Volume V) has not yet been written. Before going into the sense and truth of hylic pluralism, which is the real theme of this third part of the work (the present Volumes II, III and IV), however, I propose to give a number of *historical summaries* on the basis of the material that I have already collected. Almost the whole of *this* volume, Volume II, will be taken up with these historical summaries, which will, of course, be quite short in the case of the history of hylic pluralism with which I have already dealt at some length in Volume I (Sections 53 and 54, hylic pluralism among primitive peoples and in India and China). In the case of the historical material which I originally planned to discuss in detail in the so far unpublished Dutch Volumes III, IV, and V, I shall, of course, provide much longer summaries (Section 55 ff) Even these summaries are not, however, of equal length—the material concerning the Modern Age (Section 75 ff) is the most detailed.

As a transition to the problem of the truth of hylic pluralism, I propose secondly to give a number of *phenomenological cross-sections*—summaries, according to content and intention, of themes which are

encountered again and again in different periods and which are subordinate to the main subject. These Phenomenological Cross-Sections will be found in Volume III of the English translation of this work. In this volume, the "sense" of hylic pluralism will be discussed in a rather broader sense than "truth" (see Section 116). In any case, these cross-sections will, I believe, be useful as a preparation for the treatment of the *truth of hylic pluralism*, which will follow in Volume IV of the English edition. This Volume IV will also conclude with *some perspectives*, in which an attempt will be made to place what is said under the heading of the truth of hylic pluralism in a wider framework and to work it out in various directions.

53. PRIMITIVE MAN

What sort of views did primitive man have of the soul? Any attempt to answer this question brings us at once face to face with various difficulties. People who are generally known as primitive are above all people who have not reached the reflective or theoretical stage or the point of recording their thoughts in writing. To what extent, then, is it possible to speak of their "views"? It is, of course, true that their thinking and attitude of mind are indirectly expressed in various actions and that they can also be questioned. This is, however, only possible in the case of representatives of primitive peoples who are living today. But who can say with certainty that there is *one* primitive attitude of mind which occurred centuries ago and also prevails nowadays, so that the mentality of contemporary primitive man may be regarded as typical? It is not, however, an entirely hopeless affair, because it would seem that contemporary primitive peoples do have quite a large number of views in common¹ and these ideas can also, remarkably enough, be rediscovered in the earliest stages of many ancient civilisations. Whether or not primitive peoples can be questioned about these views, what is found in these early civilisations is often a beginning at least of a literature, which does not assume abstract theological or philosophical forms, but rather ritually normative or poetically religious forms (as, for example, in the case of the Vedas or Homer) and which in any case contains passages—sometimes even quite a number of passages—dealing with the soul, its being, its fate after death and so on. What is more, the content of these passages is often strikingly similar to the ideas of contemporary primitive man. If, then, the concept "primitive" is thought of in a rather wider context

1 See Part II, p. 71.

in this way, it is possible to find a way out of the problem. It is, moreover, necessary to guard against the attitude that all initial views are simply foolish and to be dismissed.¹ Similarly, there is a tendency in philosophy to speak rather scornfully of "naïve realism". There are, however, several thinkers who have come back to realism, albeit a scientific realism. Thus, whereas many fantastic, unfounded ideas, many of them inspired by fear,² may occur in the views of primitive man they also contain very many essentially correct ideas which we have lost sight of today.

What is remarkable is how many different groups of themes tend to recur among very widely dispersed groups of primitive peoples. I have reproduced the views of the ethnographers³ on this subject in Section 20 of Volume I, "Some Ethnographical Notions". Many of these ideas will also be found in the subdivision C of Part II (Volume I), Sections 22-25, on Hylc Pluralism in a Few Ancient, More or Less Primitive Civilisations, that is, Ancient Egypt, Assyria and Babylonia, Ancient Persia and the Teutons and Kelts. They will also be found in the sections dealing with the early periods in India—the Vedic Period (Sections 29 and 30 in Volume I) and in China (Section 48). I will repeat very briefly the summary of these common views, especially insofar as they are of importance in connection with the problem of hylc pluralism. Either at the time or later, I will also go into similar ideas in the Old Testament and in the Graeco-Roman world, insofar as these have not yet been dealt with in the writing of the last part this work (Volumes II, III and IV).

In all of these groups, the importance attached to the following themes in connection with the soul is most apparent—the breath,⁴ the blood,⁵ the form of the soul in the shape of a miniature human being,⁶ the distinction between a body-soul⁷ which remains with the body and a free soul⁸ which leaves the body either temporarily or for ever and the idea of a winged being and the rising up or at least the movement to another place of the last form of the soul.⁹

Both the body-soul and the free or external soul are often thought

1 See Part II, pp. 168-169, 210-211.

2 See Part II, p. 96-97.

3 See Part II, p. 70-71.

4 See Part I, p. 21; Part II, pp. 161, 271-272 and index.

5 See Part II, pp. 71, 163, 277 and index.

6 See Part II, pp. 80, 163 ff and index (including "mannikin").

7 See Part II, pp. 72, 163, 277 and index.

8 See Part II, pp. 72, 105, 277 and index ("external soul").

9 See Part II, pp. 73 ff, 159-160, 199-200, 282 and index (including "excursion" and "bird").

of as a breeze or vapour¹ or as an exhalation of, for example, the blood² Those who have written about this subject constantly render the primitive views by words such as vaporous, gaseous, fluid and so on.

In any case, it is certainly possible to state that there is no question of primitive man regarding the soul as immaterial. Almost all the scholars who have written about the subject have emphasised that primitive man takes no account of the antithesis between the physical and the psychical factors. In his view, they may be to some extent different, but they are in any case homogeneous or continuous. There is absolutely no trace of anything that even remotely resembles the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism.³

What is the importance of all this to hylc pluralism? I have defined the physiological *pneuma* as an idea of *pneuma* which is very closely connected with the ordinary body, which nonetheless transcends the body to some extent. This idea apparently occurs quite frequently among the primitive peoples⁴ and, as far as the free soul is concerned, it is also connected with ideas that are at the level of what I have called the psychological *pneuma*. In my opinion, we have a case here where it is necessary to differentiate. It is certain that many authors who have written about primitive man and his attitude of mind have drawn attention to the important part played in the primitive mind by ideas of the breath, exhalations of the blood, the nebulous being of the soul and so on, but have, in so doing, thought almost exclusively in contemporary concepts, in other words, they have applied to primitive man what we mean by breath, blood, clouds and so on. Accordingly, they have regarded certain things as extremely "primitive" and one is bound to admire the patience with which they have rendered and enumerated all these untenable and foolish ideas. It may be, however, that what we have here are undifferentiated complexes, from which these modern writers have, in the first place, deduced and differentiated our own ideas, but within which primitive man made no distinction between breath, blood and so on in the modern sense (of which he had, of course, no knowledge) and many other factors which he had in mind.

Our terms "spirit" and "soul" have been rendered by a word which at the same time also meant breath or wind in very many ancient civilisations⁵ and this may point to naivety or to a primitive mentality as

1 See Part II, pp. 72, 161, 277 and index ("breath-soul").

2 See Part II, pp. 70-71, 163.

3 See Part II, pp. 83, 110, 118, 166, 235, 270-271.

4 See Part II, p. 99-100 and index; pp. 162, 179-180, 276-277.

5 See Part I, p. 21; Part II, pp. 71 ff, 161, 271-272; Onians (B 233), pp. 93 (*psuche*), 168 (*anima, animus*), 481 (*nephesh*), 484 (*rûah*), 521 (*hûn*).

well as to a lack of abstract concepts. On the other hand, it may equally well indicate that the spirit or soul was regarded as something consisting of fine matter and that it was therefore obvious to use terms such as breath, wind and so on¹. In this, however, insufficient distinction was made between ordinary air, *aēr*, and a finer kind of air. Or was this distinction perhaps made and was the other kind of air then called *aithēr*?² This would amount to an extension of the states of aggregation of the kind mentioned above.³ In that case, modern scholars may have overlooked the distinctions made by primitive man and may not have situated the views concerned in the place where they should have been situated.

As a rule, however, primitive man was not really capable of making such subtle distinctions. He preferred to speak in general terms of breath, the blood and so on. In my opinion, these distinctions should nonetheless be kept in mind as a background.

It is also possible to point to differences between the renderings of various modern scholars. Some of these scholars approach what I have called hylic pluralism much more closely than others. To use the word employed by children in their games, some are "warmer" than others. The Belgian scholars Franz Cumont (1868-1947) and J. Bidez (1867-1945), for example, came very close to the theme of hylic pluralism and they consequently made a connection between the ideas concerned and those ancient writers who explicitly referred, certainly not in a primitive sense, to a soul of fine matter supplied with a vehicle of fine matter, an *ochēma*, or a garment of fine matter, a *chiton*.⁴ Looking back at more primitive views from this vantage-point, then, these ideas can be seen in a different perspective—since it is certain that the ideas concerned were also adhered to at a later stage of history, the obvious question to ask is whether they were not used in this sense at the earlier stage as well.⁵ In contrast with these and similar scholars, there are others who are in no sense "warm" with regard to our problem. It is even possible to say that these scholars simply display a show-case full of ideas which are either very strange or else quite unfounded. At this stage of my investigation into the occurrence of fine

1 See above, p. 9; see also Part I, p. 19.

2 See Part I, p. 10 ff.

3 See above, p. 13.

4 F. Cumont (B 24), p. 282, note 69; B 23, p. 293 (see also Part II, pp. 86, 88); *Recherches sur le symbolisme funéraire des Romains* (91942), p. 104 ("Les âmes aériennes"), 114, 143, 175 note 3 (see also J. Bidez, *La vie de l'empereur Julien*, p. 329); for Bidez, see also B 12, for example, p. 64.

5 As far as India is concerned, I have already pointed out that finer bodies (*śarīras*) and even finer elements (*śūkṣma-bhūtas*) were certainly accepted by mature philosophies. More primitive Indian thought must, I believe, also been seen in this light.

materiality, however, I am concerned, not so much with the extent to which such ideas of fine materiality have in themselves any truth—I shall attempt to answer this question later—but rather with the question as to the extent to which primitive people themselves believed in the reality of their ideas. It is probably inevitable that any attempt to answer this question and to reproduce the ideas concerned will be influenced by what the scholar in question personally regards as true. A similar situation exists in the case of the attitude taken by ethnologists towards parapsychological themes and their material. This does, after all have a bearing on the special problems involved in our investigation. If the person doing research in this particular field does not, for example, regard it as impossible for the soul to make an excursion from the body and to have certain experiences outside the body (see, for example, the investigations undertaken by Hornell Hart¹), then his attitude towards primitive ideas will be different from that of another scholar who does regard this as impossible. There is therefore a clear contrast between, on the one hand, ethnologists such as Andrew Lang² (1844-1912), who took part in the work of the English S.P.R., and H. T. Fischer, who was ex-chairman of the Dutch S.P.R., and, on the other hand, many others working in the field of ethnology. In the same way, one scholar will draw a different conclusion from the material with which we are concerned here—material based on the findings of ethnologists and specialists in the sphere of the history of comparative religion—from that drawn by another scholar. In his *Phänomenologie der Religion* of 1933, for instance, G. van der Leeuw simply rendered the ideas that occur without going too deeply into the background of these ideas.³ W. B. Kristensen, on the other hand, warned readers in an article in the *Gids* that the ancients had a very different view of the relationship between symbol and reality from ours, seeing less symbol and more reality.⁴ The great advantage of the phenomenological method is that, if it is applied in accordance with its guiding principles, it is bound to reveal the primacy of the ancient belief in reality. The following therefore is apparent. The well-known scholar Erwin Rohde (1845-1898) was undoubtedly “cold” in his search. Occasionally, he was quite scornful in his opinion of these ancient ideas.⁵ Although he had clearly never heard of the phenomenological method, his rendering of these ideas was correct. There was no question of the

1 See Part II, pp. 104-105 and below, Section 100.

2 See Part II, p. 95 etc.

3 See Part I, p. 86.

4 July 1931.

5 See, for example, B 132, II, p. 320, note 1.

title of his major work *Psyche* (B 132) pointing to the soul as an immaterial factor—on the contrary, the soul was, for the majority of the ancient Greeks something “aerial, breath-like”,¹ according to Rohde. It is therefore not possible to construct an antithesis between Rohde’s *Psyche* and my treatment of the subject.² Another example that we can take is R. B. Onians (born 1899), a professor in London. In his otherwise excellent and profound work. *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate* (B 233, Cambridge, 1951, 2nd edn. 1954), he certainly gives no indication that he is at all sympathetically inclined towards the ideas—very often strange ideas, admittedly—which accompanied the origins of European thought. But even he is bound to confirm certain facts. Firstly, the “stuff of consciousness” (Chapter III), such as Homer’s *thumos*, is “something vaporous” and not a function but “a thing” (p. 44). Secondly, he says that thoughts and words are breath (p. 67) in other words, that “*logos* = speech, thought conceived materially as breath, spirit, *pneuma*” (p. 77, note 9). Finally, he also states that man has a “life-fluid”, concentrated especially in the head (p. 226) and that the “vaporous *psuchē* or life-soul” was closely connected with this “life-fluid” (p. 261). I am bound to ask this question here. Did the ancients think of this “materially conceived” thought or *pneuma* and that “life-fluid” completely as a part of the ordinary body, just as the materialistic psychologists of the nineteenth century regarded all the contents of the consciousness basically as changes in the brains? I believe that they did have something in mind which, despite the physiological formulations, went beyond the physiological in the ordinary sense.

It is also possible to point to other scholars who have formulated these primitive ideas more or less clearly in the spirit of hylic pluralism. The well-known missionary and ethnologist, A.C. Kruyt (1869-1949), rendered the belief of contemporary primitive peoples as a belief in a “soul-matter” (see Part II, § 21 167 seq). Another well-known scholar, J. G. Frazer (1854-1941), observed that the members of a tribe whom he had investigated certainly did not regard the surviving soul as “absolutely incorporeal”.³ K. A. H. Hidding also pointed to the distinction made by the Soendanese between the *lelemboetan*, which means the “fine”, and the *pangatjian*, which means the “very finest”, thus indicating a difference in level.⁴ As for Ancient Egypt, G. Maspéro

1 B 132, p. 3.

2 See Part I, p. 8, note 3.

3 See Part II, p. 74.

4 See Part II, p. 85.

has written that the *ka* "was a second copy of the human body composed of less dense matter".¹ N. Söderblom (1866-1931) also wrote a thesis on "Les Fravashis", the souls according to the Ancient Persians, and called the *fravashī* "a being usually invisible, but nonetheless more or less material".² Vedic man, H. von Glasenapp maintained, regarded the *homunculus* or thumbling, the little man inside man, as "of subtle substance".³ J. Gonda also wrote about the Vedic idea of "consciousness" (*manas*) being "represented as of fine substance".⁴ In Chinese thought, the factor of the soul, *ch'i* was regarded, for example, as a "gaseous or aeriform substance",⁵ whereas the well-known concepts *yang* and *yin* were clearly distinguished, but were *both* thought of—in any case according to initial opinion and for a long time afterwards—as a "light, ethereal substance", in other words, as fluids.⁶

A similar situation is found in connection with the concepts used in the Jewish *Old Testament*, in which two terms are used for the soul or for factors of the soul—*nepheš* and *rûah*. There is a certain antithesis between them. *Rûah*, which is generally translated by "spirit", and by *pneuma* in the Septuagint, the translation of the Old Testament into Greek, is, for example, never associated with blood, while *nepheš* is. Despite this relative antithesis, however, they are not essentially different. Both originally meant "breath" and were thought of as "subtle essence". The *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, for example, points out that the spirit, some of which was taken out of Moses and transferred to the seventy elders (Num. 11. 17, 25), was "materially regarded".⁷ Arbman also compared *rûah* with certain Vedic ideas.⁸ Writing about *nepheš* and *rûah*, C. A. van Peursen also claimed that they reflected no dualistic view of the world.⁹

With regard to Homer, we have already seen that *thumos* was regarded as "something vaporous" in the Homeric epic and also that *menos* was "conceived of as material".¹⁰ The *psuchē* of Homer—the original meaning of "breath" should be borne in mind here—was, according to B. Snell, a "half objective organ"¹¹ and in the ordinary Greek dictionary, we find *psuchē* defined as "the life-spirit which the

1 See Part II, p. 111-112.

2 See Part II, p. 121.

3 See Part II, p. 165.

4 B 58, p. 41; see also Part II, p. 159-160.

5 See Part II, p. 270-271.

6 See Part II, p. 273.

7 B 40, XI, p. 786.

8 "Seele und Mana", *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1931, p. 368.

9 B 235, p. 90; see also Onians (B 233), p. 480 ff.

10 Onians (B 233), p. 50, note 4.

11 *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 1955, p. 26.

ancients believed went, at death, to the underworld together with a shadow-body".

It is clear, then, that the soul and the psychical factor were regarded everywhere in the ancient world and among primitive peoples not in the modern way as purely subjective and as simply and above all private, but rather as something objective and material, even though this may have been material in the sense of a different kind of materiality, in other words, a fine matter. This impression is further strengthened if we are prepared to define everything that *acts effectively*, even in the more subtle sense, as material (of fine matter).¹ All these primitive peoples clearly believed quite firmly in the efficacy of these subtle influences.

Leaving aside the question as to whether these ideas are true for the time being, we may therefore conclude that ideas which were closely associated with what I have called hylic pluralism were very widespread in primitive society and in all kinds of civilisations in the early stages of development.

Let me finally comment briefly on the concept of *mana*. I have already considered this in some detail in Part II, where I distinguished two factors in it—a power factor and a factor of fine matter, both of which had a part to play in primitive ideas.² H. Wagenvoort made a special study of certain aspects of the Roman concept of *numen* in a work entitled *Imperium. Studiën over het "mana" begrip in zede en taal der Romeinen*,³ in which he affirms that *mana* was "thought of in the concrete, also as a very fine substance" (p. 11). Once again we note the recurrence of an idea to which we drew attention in Part II of this work as existing at very different times and places and conceived in hylic pluralistic terms or as consisting of fine matter. If the emphasis is laid on the fact that what consists of fine matter is everything that acts effectively, the contrast between a power factor and a factor of fine matter in *mana* becomes less. In the case of ancient Greece, H. J. Rose has written in the same spirit about the occurrence there of an idea which is similar to that of *mana* or *numen*.⁴

With regard to the primitive attitude of mind, it is hardly possible to ask which of the six metaphysical standpoints that I have distinguished in connection with hylic pluralism primitive man assumed, because he was barely capable of making abstractions. Indirectly,

¹ See above, p. 8.

² See Part II, p. 93.

³ Amsterdam, 1941.

⁴ *Ancient Greek Religion*, London, 1947, pp. 21, 157; see also Rose's *Ancient Roman Religion*, 1948, pp. 15, 109.

however, it is possible to make some conclusions regarding the views that he held¹ and thus, by a process of extension, to ascertain the standpoints to which he was closest. He was not in a position to grasp the concept of the immaterial, which rules out the zeta, epsilon, delta and gamma standpoints, which postulate an immaterial deity at least. Similarly, his ideas cannot be called monistic materialistic either, because he accepted far more than ordinary and visible matter, which eliminates the alpha standpoint in his case. He did, however, regard—at least partly and probably on the average—all spirits and souls etc. as consisting of fine matter, which means that he was closest to dualistic materialism or the beta standpoint.²

54. INDIA AND CHINA

In the historical part of this work, Part II, I discussed, firstly, hylic pluralism among primitive peoples (Sections 20 and 21) and, secondly, hylic pluralism in several ancient, *more* or less primitive civilisations (Sections 22-25). Thirdly, I dealt with the occurrence of hylic pluralism in a series of ancient civilisations which have produced a systematic theology or philosophy, which is something that cannot, to the best of my knowledge, be said about Ancient Egypt and Persia, Assyria and Babylonia or the Teutons and Kelts. I spoke in some detail about hylic pluralism in the first two civilisations in which an abstract system of thought was developed in Volume I of the work. These were India (Sections 28-45) and China (Sections 46-50). I have not yet published the results of my investigations into the occurrence of hylic pluralism in other civilisations (Greece, Rome, Israel, Christianity, Islam and the modern world), but since Volume I is obtainable, I can afford to be very brief in my summary of the situation in India and China and a little more detailed in the other historical summaries contained in this present volume, Volume II.

This does not mean, however, that hylic pluralism does not constitute an important factor in Indian thought in particular. On the contrary—although I have not been able to find any work of any real scope which deals especially with this subject,³ hylic pluralism in India is a very important theme and one that was almost taken for granted or silently accepted.⁴ Those who opposed hylic pluralism in Indian philosophy were few in number and not very important.⁵ It was

¹ See above, pp. 17-18.

² See Part II, p. 100-101.

³ See Part I, p. 62; see also above, p. 14.

⁴ See Part II, pp. 200-201.

⁵ See Part II, Section 34.

explicitly stated in the great systems such as the Sāṅkhya¹ and the Vedānta² and in religions such as Buddhism³ and Jainism.⁴ It is therefore not surprising that orientalists such as P. Oltramare and others have called what I have termed hylic pluralism the “common property of all the Hindu theosophies”.⁵ Whereas the well-known author S. Radhakrishnan did not, in my opinion, bring out the theme sufficiently,⁶ Paul Deussen, a philosopher and orientalist of an earlier generation (1845-1929), wrote about it in considerable detail.⁷ Although attempts have been made to represent the occurrence of hylic pluralistic themes in the classical Indian systems as “primitive characteristics”, as a kind of atavism,⁸ it is certainly present in Indian thought, even in the case of very abstract and profound philosophers and schools of thought.⁹ I would personally be so bold as to regard the presence of hylic pluralism—and, what is more, even in connection with my distinction of other forms of hylic pluralism in addition to purely dualistic materialism—as not primitive in the sense of unforgivably naive. On the contrary, the very fact that mature Indian thinkers and schools of philosophy have also come out publicly in favour of hylic pluralism—for example, even in the case of the subtle elements or *sūkṣma-bhūtas*¹⁰—is a convincing reason for accepting the presence of fine materiality in this sphere. It is therefore with these Indian ideas behind them that hylic pluralistic concepts such as astral and other “higher” bodies and planes, commonly accepted in modern theosophy and anthroposophy, have become so widespread in the West that even many lay people have at least heard of them and know something about them. (I do not mean to say by this, of course, that the roots of these concepts in the West itself should or can be ignored).

I do not propose to go more deeply into these Indian ideas about the subtle body or subtle factors of the soul here and will do no more than simply mention *linga-śāstra*, *sūkṣma-śāstra*, the remarkable concept for it—*upādhi* (meaning limitation—without the *upādhis*, the *jīva* would be the one *Ātman*), the *skandhas* of Buddhism, the *gandhabba* as the

1 See Part II, p. 208-209.

2 See Part II, p. 216 ff.

3 See Part II, Section 41-44.

4 See Part II, Section 40.

5 See Part II, p. 184.

6 See Part II, pp. 181-182; see also above, p. 4.

7 See Part II, p. 186.

8 See Part II, p. 210.

9 See, for example, Sankara, *The Crest Jewel of Wisdom*, Sūtras 99-108, 126-139.

10 See Part II, p. 226 ff.

third factor of fine matter which, at fertilisation, is added to the factors provided by the parents and so on.¹

I have the impression that I have not by any means covered the whole field of research in Volume I of this work—after all, there must be very many manuscripts that are still unpublished. Hylic pluralism occurs explicitly, for example, in the *Yogavāsista* as well.² These ideas are to be found in many different forms, including myth—H. von Glasenapp, for example, mentions a Buddhist belief: “At the beginning of such a newly arisen world men . . . are endowed with a radiant body, they hover over the earth’s surface, and they need no physical nourishment”.³ A great deal more material could therefore probably be found.

The Chinese were far less inclined than the Indians to indulge in abstract or systematic reflections,⁴ but hylic pluralism is still found among the Chinese as well in various forms, both more primitive and more reflected. The well-known scholar D. T. Suzuki simply used the term *pneuma*, so common in the West, in order to render their view.⁵ *Yang* and *yin*, the contrasting concepts which play such an important part in Chinese thought, are as a rule both thought of as fluids of fine matter.⁶ What is more, the Chinese were not disposed to accept any sharp dualism.⁷

Buddhism, banished from India, found refuge, among other places, in China and Tibet and became widespread there. Although we have to be careful with the term *yāna*, vehicle, in the names *Hinayāna* and *Mahāyāna* Buddhism and should not read anything like *ochēma* into them (the image is, after all, that of the ferry boat which takes the pilgrim to the opposite bank, that of redemption,⁸ the word clearly has gained the meaning of a body of fine matter, that is, of the “diamond vehicle” in *Vajrayāna* Buddhism.⁹ C. G. Jung also saw it in this light.¹⁰

In any case, hylic pluralism was not an unknown theme to many Eastern thinkers and writers and it was one which continued for many centuries.

1 See Volume I, index. The *kosas* or sheaths form a typical hylic pluralistic concepts as well.

2 See B. L. Atreya in B 262, March 1958, p. 385 ff.

3 *Buddhism and Christianity*, Kandy, 1959, p. 26.

4 See Part II, pp. 268.

5 See Part II, p. 271.

6 See Part II, pp. 272-273.

7 See Part II, pp. 270-271.

8 See Part II, p. 157, note 2 and pp. 236-237.

9 See Part II, pp. 247-248.

10 B 78, p. 185.

55 ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME—THE PRE-SOCRATICS

The real spiritual ancestors of modern Western civilisation are not, of course, to be found in India or China, but in ancient Greece and Rome and, in addition, in ancient Israel and the Christianity that arose from this. As far as *our* classical antiquity is concerned, it is important, in connection with this particular study, to ascertain the extent to which what I have called *hylic pluralism* occurs in these early classics. It does in fact occur quite frequently—in Part I of this work, the general introduction contained in Volume I, I referred repeatedly to ancient authors, there are also books and articles devoted to precisely this subject—and the title of this work, *Ochēma*, is taken from the characteristics view of the neo-Platonists concerning the *ochēma* or vehicle of the soul consisting of fine matter. The question that concerns us here in this section, however, is whether *hylic pluralism* also occurred in much earlier periods of classical antiquity—in this case, for example, in pre-Socratic thought. In the following sections, I shall also investigate the occurrence of *hylic pluralism* in the classical writings of Plato and Aristotle and then in the Epicurean and Stoic schools, before going on to consider its occurrence in neo-Platonism.

As far as the pre-Socratic philosophers are concerned, it is important to point out at once that the title of this work, *Ochēma*, indicates only one aspect of *hylic pluralism*—the subtitle is really more correct and more complete. In other words, I do not mean to suggest that *hylic pluralism* occurs only in the form of the soul, which is in itself immaterial, possessing a vehicle of fine matter. This is, of course, the *delta* standpoint. The soul can, according to certain views, also *consist* simply of *fine matter*. In most cases, this amounts to the *beta* standpoint or dualistic materialism. Put in this way, it is obvious that this form of *hylic pluralism* was the order of the day in the case of the pre-Socratics. Generally speaking, scholars have not surveyed the whole field very comprehensively and have tended to find it strange and, compared with later ideas of the soul which were very spiritualised (in the special sense of “immaterial” because, in itself, *spiritus* or spirit had, originally, the meaning of volatile matter—this is illustrated, for example, in our word “methyated spirits”) backward. As soon as *hylic pluralism* in its diverse forms is, however, accepted, these “primitive” ideas occurring in the work of philosophers of some distinction and of some historical importance can be seen in a rather different light. By

acceptance in this sense, I mean in the first place regarding fine materiality in connection with the soul as real and not simply as a chimera and, in the second place, being alert to the great extensiveness of the species and varieties of this fine materiality, according to which the soul is simply regarded as a kind of fine matter and there is no reflection about any possible immateriality of the soul or of anything that transcends the world.

However little was known about these doctrines, historians of philosophy could only register them and the occurrence of this form of hylic pluralism emerges very clearly indeed from the available data. Let us take as our first example Anaxagoras (ca. 499-428 B.C.). Although it is generally affirmed that the philosophers of this period were not yet really capable of making a clear contrast between the psychical and the physical elements,¹ Anaxagoras has been acclaimed as the first conscious dualist² in laying great stress on the *nous*—the spirit as the principle that is active in living beings.³ Similarly, there is also a tendency to point to the fact that the Jains, who adhered to the ancient religion of India, distinguished between the spiritual and the non-spiritual and this is often acclaimed as a milestone on the way towards spiritualisation. This dualism does not, however, come up to expectations—Jainism, like Anaxagoras, taught explicitly that the factors of the soul consisted of fine matter.⁴ If, then, there is any antithesis in Anaxagoras' teaching between ordinary matter, what we call the physical, and what we call the psychical the element that is contrasted with this ordinary matter is also matter, but very fine matter—the finest, *leptotaton*, of all things.⁵ Windelband therefore called Anaxagoras' *nous* "thought-matter"⁶ and Rohde admitted that it "could hardly be thought of as being without a body".⁷ It is therefore definitely not possible to say that Anaxagoras' point of view was that of anthropological dualism or the epsilon standpoint.⁸

We can also safely say that the other pre-Socratic philosophers were hardly different from Anaxagoras in this respect. Although there is a measure of difference in the terms that they used, the view that the soul consisted of a finer matter also occurred generally in

1 B 128, p. 72; B 8, p. 36, 50; B 132, II, p. 143.

2 See, for example, B Rohde, B 132, II, p. 192; Siebeck, B 155, p. 156; B 170, p. 97.

3 See, for example, B 177, pp. 64-65.

4 See Part II, pp. 230-231.

5 B 176, I, p. 68.

6 B 177, p. 65.

7 B 132, II, p. 194.

8 *Yang* and *yin*, the two terms used in the Chinese dualism, were also, at least for a very long time, regarded as consisting of fine matter. See Part II, p. 272-274.

their teaching. Anaximenes (ca. 585-525) and his disciple Diogenes of Apollonia believed that the soul was *aēr* or air.¹ The "breath-soul"² was a very common doctrine among the philosophers of this period. It should not be forgotten, however, that other thinkers believed that the soul consisted of *aithēr* or ether and that the Stoics, at a later period, made an explicit distinction between ordinary air or *aēr* and *aithēr* as a much finer air.³ Even during the early period of pre-Socratic thought, it was believed that souls dwelt in the ether after death.⁴ According to the early Pythagoreans, the soul was a fragment of the ether.⁵ The Eleatic philosopher Xenophanes (ca. 580-480) taught that the soul was *pneuma*⁶—clearly a fourth way of connecting the soul with something comparable with air. This must be why F. Rüsche dealt with the whole period under the comprehensive heading of "Das Seelen-pneuma" (the "soul-pneuma").⁷ In other words, during the whole of the pre-Socratic period, the substance of which the soul was thought to consist was called by various names, but always regarded as something of the nature of air. In this, "air" should not at once be thought of as what is meant in modern science by air, but rather as something that is *relatively fine*.

I shall not discuss in detail the cosmological aspect of this question, in other words, what these early natural philosophers of the Ionian school meant by their *archai*, their first principles consisting of water, air and so on. All that I will say is that, if Parmenides of Elea (born ca. 540) regarded being as spatial⁸ and another Eleatic philosopher, Melissus of Samos, regarded it not only as spatial, but also as material,⁹ we may therefore ask whether this is not intended hylic pluralistically. The teachings of these early philosophers have to be inferred from limited fragments and it is therefore never possible to be absolutely certain of their intentions, but the basic assumptions with which one approaches the material counts for a great deal.

To conclude my remarks on the pre-Socratic philosophers, I must say something about two important figures of this period—Heraclitus of Ephesus and Democritus of Abdera. Heraclitus (ca. 540-480) called-

1 See B 176, I pp. 9, 83.

2 See B 75, I, p. 201.

3 See Part I, p. 21. The ordinary dictionary gives the definition of "high, fine air" for *aithēr*.

4 See, for example, Rohde, B 132, II, p. 320, note.

5 Diog. Laert. VIII, 28; see also B 153, p. 69; Bidez, B 12, p. 10.

6 Diog. Laert. IX, 19; see also B 132, II, p. 258, note 3.

7 B 137.

8 B 170, p. 81.

9 B 170, p. 90.

the soul—and especially the soul of the wise man—a dry light, *augē xērē*.¹ He regarded what was dry as the higher element and what was damp as the lower, fire occupying a central place in the cosmos. Rüsche has said that this provided the basis for the later "light-pneuma"² and we may ask whether there is not a continuous line running between this and the later radiant vehicle or body, the *augoeides ochēma*. In any case, Heraclitus regarded the soul as a fine, living matter³ and, as far as fire as the first principle is concerned, this is clearly one of those ancient elements which have to be regarded as possibly consisting of fine matter.⁴

Democritus (ca. 460-360), who can hardly be counted among the pre-Socratics from the chronological point of view, because he outlived Socrates, but who did belong to them from the point of view of the climate of his thought, was another very remarkable figure in classical antiquity. Because of his atomist theory, he is regarded as the precursor of later natural scientists and of ordinary materialists—according to him, only the atoms in the void were real. If his teaching is examined more carefully, it becomes clear that he claimed that the soul consisted of small, round and smooth atoms, which were closely connected with the most important element, fire.⁵ This is undoubtedly materialism, but so to speak the prototype of dualistic materialism—⁶ there is nothing but matter, but there are various species of matter, the finer form of which is connected with the soul. According to Democritus, there were also gods, albeit as mortal daemons,⁷ who made themselves known by means of very small images or *eidōla*. These *eidōla* played a part in perception, Democritus taught, not only in ordinary perception, but also in telepathic perception, which was expressed, for example, by means of dreams and visions.⁸ In connection with this doctrine, he also taught that *pleious aisthēreis*, several kinds of perception, existed.⁹ It is hardly necessary to say that these ideas are clearly hylic pluralistic. What is more, it is evident that Democritus was clearly attentive to what were later to become known as occult or parapsychological phenomena.

1 B 170, p. 57; B 174, p. 274; B 176, I, p. 28.

2 B 137, p. 36.

3 B 128, p. 16.

4 See above, p. 13 and below, Section 111.

5 B 177, p. 128.

6 See Part I, p. 1.

7 B 170, p. 108; B 176, I, p. 74.

8 See de Vogel, B 176, I, p. 74; Bidez, B 12, p. 135 ff.

9 B 177, p. 131. This is similar to what G. E. Lessing was to consider much later (see B 172, p. 480).

56. PLATO

Whenever Greek philosophy is mentioned, the names of Plato (428-348) and Aristotle (384-322) are always discussed sooner or later. How did these great thinkers stand with regard to the theme that I have called *hylic pluralism*? The answer to this question must be that, generally speaking, the theme does not emerge so positively or so clearly in their teaching as, for example, in the case of certain neo-Platonists, such as Proclus, of a movement such as the Stoa or of a whole period of philosophy such as that of the pre-Socratics. Having said this, however, the situation with regard to *hylic pluralism* in the case of Plato and Aristotle is better than might be expected. To show its occurrence, it is necessary to turn to subordinate doctrines scattered about their writings or more or less to resort to indirect reasonings. To be able to do this properly is a delicate task presupposing a great knowledge of the many writings of these two philosophers. It is possibly also necessary to go back to passages which have in the past been frequently overlooked. It is hardly possible to accomplish this in a really satisfactory way within the scope of a short and essentially historical summary of the kind that I aim to provide in this volume. This would have to be the subject of an important section or of several sections of the originally planned Volume III of the Dutch edition of the work (the extension of Part II) or even of a special study consisting of one or two theses. It is, however, quite out of the question that the problem of *hylic pluralism* in the thought of these two outstanding philosophers should be completely overlooked and for this reason I should like to point to a number of aspects which arise in this context.

It is sometimes said that it was Plato who discovered the spirit and we can in any case certain accept the following. Even if the neo-Platonists accepted a vehicle of the soul and thought that this consisted of fine matter, they regarded the soul itself as immaterial and were, in this, following in the footsteps of their master, Plato. Is it therefore true that Plato, on the other hand, might have spoken about an aspect of the soul that consisted of (fine) matter?

In connection with this question, reference has sometimes been made¹ to *Phaedo* 81, in which Plato speaks several times of *to somatoeides*, something of the nature of the corporeal which the soul of the departed, still confined to this world, can assume and which then becomes visible, for example, as a shade or ghost haunting the grave. This is, however,

¹ B 75, p. 19; see also B 132, p. 272, note 4.

not very convincing evidence and we would be glad, in this context, to hear about an *ochēma* or a *pneuma* in connection with the soul. What is, however, and, in this study of Plato, to approach the philosopher, probably almost always, from a background of contemporary Western anthropological dualism.¹ In recent years, however, there has been a tendency to regard the gulf between Plato and the neo-Platonists as less great than in the past. Thus, although she was dealing with a different subject, Prof. C. J. de Vogel, for example, wrote in an article "On the Neo-platonic character of Platonism and the Platonic Character of Neo-platonism"² that "Platonism must be understood in a Neo-platonic sense and that Neo-platonism in its essence (is) a legitimate Platonism".³ She also points out that it is possible that "oral teachings" continued to exist in the circle of the Academy.⁴ I am inclined to apply this argument to the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Plato's teachings as well and would like, in this context, to draw attention to two different possibilities. In the first place, it is possible to assume the tacit existence of hylic pluralism in Plato's teachings. We have established this explicitly in the case of the Bhagavad Gītā. Although it is not usual, in the West especially, to interpret the doctrines dealing with all kinds of factors of the soul which are contained in this epic in the sense of fine materiality, it is indisputable that there is every reason for them to be interpreted in this way, especially striking is that the two classical scholars, E. R. Dodds and R. C. Kissling,⁵ who have dealt in particular with hylic pluralism in essays which are especially important in our field of research and who frankly admit the occurrence of doctrines about the *ochēma* and the *pneuma* in later classical antiquity, especially among the neo-Platonists, deny that the same could also be asserted in the case of Plato. Kissling, on the one hand, has said that Plato "never taught" this doctrine⁶ and Dodds, on the other, stated "These casual and unrelated metaphors could not by themselves suggest to the most perverse mind a theory of astral bodies".⁷ It is, however, true—and Dodds also points explicitly to this—that the neo-Platonists themselves appealed to certain places in Plato's works, in which the term *ochēma* occurs, in order to support their theories. The relevant passages are *Phaedo* 113 D, *Phaedrus* 247 B and *Timaeus*

1 At the beginning of the modern age, Ralph Cudworth was, as we have seen, an exception to this general rule; see Part I, p. 62 ff.

2 *Mind* LXII N.S., No. 245, January 1953.

3 p. 54.

4 p. 64.

5 B 33 and B 85.

6 B 85, p. 318.

7 B 33, p. 315.

41 E, 44E and 69 C. Dodds regards these as metaphors, according to his statement quoted above.¹ The tendency to appeal to an authority and to drag this authority in wherever possible does of course occur. On the other hand, however, it is also possible to reason as follows. Even though more than six hundred years separated the neo-Platonists from their master, they were much closer to Plato than we are now. Moreover, it has been habitual in the modern age to be concerned above all with Plato and far less with the neo-Platonists as the teachings of the Sāṅkhya are prominent in the Gītā and fine materiality features regularly as a doctrine in this *darśana*.² We usually overlook this in the West because our point of departure is almost always that of anthropological dualism. In the second place, to assume a hylic pluralistic background in the case of Plato as well is not at all ridiculous and, even though this could not be directly confirmed by quotations from his extant writings, I believe that the assumption can be made plausible in the following way. The doctrine that extensiveness must be attributed to the soul is encountered in the teachings of Speusippus (d. 339)³ and Heraclides Ponticus—a philosopher who lived in the fourth century B. C. and who should not be confused with Heraclitus of Ephesus—defined the soul explicitly as *aithērion sōma*, an etheric body, which is *photoeidēs*, of the nature of light.⁴ These two philosophers, however, belonged to the earliest Academy and were in direct contact with Plato. When Plato undertook his third journey to Sicily, Speusippus accompanied his “master” there, while Heraclides Ponticus was given the task of supervising the Academy in Plato’s absence. When Plato died, Speusippus followed him as the head of the Academy. It is therefore quite certain that hylic pluralistic doctrines were taught in Plato’s direct environment by collaborators whom he valued.

Taking due note of these considerations, we are bound to be careful not to underestimate the connection made by the neo-Platonists between their doctrines about the *ochēma* of the soul and the places in Plato where this term occurred. I do not propose to deal exhaustively with all these passages and hope that it will be sufficient to indicate the following factors. Mention is made in *Timaeus* 41 E⁵ of the concept of *ochēma* in connection with the stars, which are gods. The visible stars are here called the vehicles of the gods. The philosopher Hedwig Conrad-Martius had this to say about these passages in the

¹ *ibid.*

² See Part II, pp. 200-201.

³ See B 36, p. 693; Part I, p. 47.

⁴ See B 176, II, p. 284; B 12, p. 54; B 132, II, p. 320, note 1.

⁵ See B 176, I, p. 266; B 33, p. 320.

Timaeus in connection with Plato's view of the world-soul: "Even in the mythical sphere, it would not have been possible for him to construct the world-soul as strikingly as he has in the *Timaeus*, if he had not had the truly "spatial" aspect of the psychical element in mind".¹ Hedwig Conrad-Martius is, moreover, a thinker who does *not* take anthropological dualism as her point of departure and who is of the opinion that "the soul has its own, most distinctive and indeed *psychical* "spatiality"". ² As soon as one takes a different standpoint from this one, one is bound to interpret Plato differently here. It should, furthermore, also be remembered that Plato also established a close connection between these ideas concerning the star-gods and the souls of men and their origin. This is clear not only from the context in which these passages occur in the *Timaeus*, but also elsewhere. Dodds rejects a hylic pluralistic explanation of the passages in the *Timaeus*, saying that they are, in his opinion, only "casual and unrelated metaphors" and that only a very "perverse" person would interpret them in any other way, but he does go on to say "There is, however, one passage in Plato which does appear to point in this direction (of a theory of astral bodies), viz. Legg, 898 E f. where he discusses the manner in which we may suppose the stars to be guided by their souls, and suggests as one possibility the interposition of a fiery or aerial body as a *tertium quid*".³ Überweg and Prächter also point to his Laws 898-9 as a place where a "connection" can be found "in Plato" for the doctrine of an ethric body or light-body.⁴

In my opinion, we may conclude from all this that hylic pluralism certainly occurs in Plato's thought. To close these considerations, I should like to point two further factors. In the text known as *Epinomis*, it is said that the *daemons* are formed partly of ether and partly of air. This is a typically hylic pluralistic idea and we shall also see that a subtle body was frequently attributed more to the angels or *daemons* than to man. It is not completely certain who the author of *Epinomis* was—Überweg and Prächter assumed that Plato himself was the author,⁵ whereas C.J. de Vogel doubted this.⁶ She, however, added to the rendering of the passage concerned about the *daemons*: "This, too, can be placed quite well in the Platonic view of the universe"

1 *Die Zeit*, 1954, (B 200), p. 111.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 110.

3 B 33, p. 315; B 176, I, p. 297.

4 B 170, p. 629, note 1.

5 B 170, p. 325.

6 See B 176, II, pp. 291-294.

7 p. 294.

So far, we have not considered the *Phaedrus*, a dialogue in which there is, on the one hand, a great deal of discussion of *ta theon ochēmata* the vehicles of the gods,¹ and, on the other, the comparison of the human soul with a winged chariot, *ptēnon harma*.² In this, the gods ride smoothly and without disturbance, but man's chariot is drawn by two horses, one of which has a good disposition, but the other is always threatening to pull him down. In Volume I, I asked, for example, whether, in view of the use made of the concept of *ochēma* by the neo-Platonists, this comparison should not be regarded as more than this—if, in other words, it was not thought of both as an image (as, for example, the soul-bird was elsewhere)³ and at the same time realistically to denote the "vehicle" of the soul consisting of fine matter. In Volume I (Part II, 26), I also made a comparison between the *Phaedrus* and the chariots or *vimānas* of the gods in the *Mahābhārata*, of which the hero Arjūna sometimes made as much use as the gods themselves did. I should like to refer the reader back to what I said then.⁴

It is also possible to raise the question as to whether Plato may perhaps have had something hylic pluralistic in mind in his doctrine of the *anamnēsis*, the recollection in this life of ideas which were beheld in a previous existence (see, for example, the *Menon*). Is this doctrine not related to the teaching of much later occultists about an "akasha chronicle",⁵ a kind of cosmic memory, from which man might possibly be able to draw? This would, however, be entering into the sphere of Plato's doctrine of ideas and it would take us too far if we were to discuss the value of this. What emerges here, however, is what I should like to call, quite explicitly, a *mistake* made by Plato. In my opinion, there is, on the one hand, a relationship of being, which I call "hylic", and, on the other, a whole of relationships according to content, which I have grouped together under the heading of "the eidetic".⁶ Accordingly, ideas or real factors are either *idées forces* or purely abstract contents. If Plato in fact wanted to base a theory of knowledge on memory *in time*, he confused various factors. This mistake had a long aftermath—for example, the theory about the angels in the Middle Ages. The angels were frequently thought of as being of two

1 247 E.

2 246 E.

3 See Volume I, Index, under "Bird".

4 See Part II, p. 139 ff., 204 ff. See also below, Index, "Vehicle".

5 See, for example, R. Steiner, *Aus der Akasha-Chronik*, 1904, 1939.

6 See Part I, p. 32; *Zweeërlei Subjectiviteit* (B 114), § 59-60. The "eidetic" in this sense is therefore very different from the "eidetic" in the sense in which it is used by, for example, Jaensch.

kinds—as real and as abstract and unchanging, and more as species than as individuals.

57 ARISTOTLE

Having discussed Plato, we must now deal with his great disciple and, to some extent, opponent, Aristotle (384-322). The situation is, in one respect, similar here. What is really needed is a far more solid investigation into the possible occurrence of hylic pluralism in Aristotle's thought than anything that can be provided here. On the other hand, however, this philosopher cannot be completely by-passed. In another respect, however, there is also some difference in the situation between Aristotle and Plato. Whereas Kissling asserted, not entirely correctly in my opinion, that Plato "never taught"¹ anything connected with this doctrine about the *ochēma* and the *pneuma* of later thinkers, especially the neo-Platonists, he was rather more positive in what he said about Aristotle. It was, he believed, a doctrine "which the latter (was) incapable of defining intelligibly. . ."² According to Kissling, therefore, something to do with this doctrine *does* occur in Aristotle's philosophy. E. R. Dodds agreed with him—Proclus, he maintained, "claims with somewhat more justice" (that is, than with regard to Plato) "the authority of Aristotle" for the theory of the *ochēma* and the *pneuma*, in appealing to Aristotle in his treatise *In Tim.* III, 238, 20.³ Dodds states that this is concerned with Aristotle's doctrine of the *pneuma* which is the seat of the sensitive soul and of the physiological condition of the *phantasia*. This *pneuma* is also, according to Aristotle, analogous to the element from which the stars are made, that is, the fifth body (*De Gen. Anim.* 736 b 27, ff). This is, Dodds admits, certainly something, but it is also, he adds, far removed from a theory of the astral body, which is the subject of his study. Kissling maintains that the neo-Platonic doctrine under discussion was intended as a reconciliation or synthesis between Plato's teaching about the *ochēma* of the soul—according to Kissling and Dodds, the neo-Platonists, however, appealed wrongly to Plato—and Aristotle's doctrine of the *pneuma*.⁴ In fact, Plotinus also appealed (in his *Enn.* II, 2, 2) to Aristotle's *De Gen. Anim.* B 736 b 29. According to these two modern classical scholars, then, the appeal made by Proclus and Plotinus to Aristotle and Plato is not entirely unfounded.

1 B 85, p. 318; see also above, p. 556.

2 *Ibid.*

3 B 33, p. 315.

4 *Ibid.*

This does not mean that a clear doctrine about an astral body or vehicle is met with in Aristotle's writings, with the result that we have to depend on all kinds of arguments and deductions and that something of a general nature has also to be included. Although his philosophy has exerted a very great influence, especially in the later Middle Ages, it is generally admitted that Aristotle's doctrines—in particular his ideas about profound ("meta-physical") subjects and about the soul—are still far from clear. H. Siebeck called Aristotle's attitude towards the soul "wavering" in his recently reprinted *Geschichte der Psychologie* (1880).¹ C. Bauemker also complained that Aristotle was "wavering" in his view of matter.² Finally, F. Sassen also admitted that Aristotle's theory of the *nous* was "full of obscurity, contradictions and unresolved difficulties".³

Let me be more precise about what is, in my view, the real difficulty with regard to Aristotle. Reacting against Plato's theory of ideas, which included too great a dualism between this world and the world of ideas, Aristotle proposed a different theory.⁴ This may be called the doctrine of correlativism (not, it should be noted, of dualism!) of possibility (*dunamis*) and realisation (*energia*, an important application of which is interrelationship of matter (*hulē*; the *protē hulē*, then, is matter as pure possibility) and form (*eidos*, *morphē*). This, then, is called hylemorphism and this is, according to Aristotle, expressed everywhere—in the clay which the potter moulds into form, in the body of living beings formed by entelechy (*entelecheia*) and also in the case of spiritual things, when it is abstract and immaterial. (An example of the latter is our reference to "the matter of a conversation").⁵ Everything is therefore beautifully interrelated and indeed all the more so because Aristotle added that this correlativism ceases in God—God is especially form without matter, reality without all kinds of changing possibilities, the one who moves everything while remaining himself unmoved.⁶

Within creation or plurality, then, there is, according to Aristotle, a constant interrelationship between form and matter. It is in the more precise elaboration of this interrelationship that the difficulties arise. According to Aristotle, the soul is the form—in this case, called the entelechy—of the body. The body animated by a soul is therefore

1 B 155, p. 124.

2 B 8, p. 247.

3 B 139, p. 99.

4 See, for example, B 177, p. 266 ff; B 139, p. 87 f.

5 This, then, is intelligible matter, the *hulē noētē*; see B 8, p. 291.

6 See, for example, B 177, p. 230. This doctrine may be compared with that of the Sāṅkhya concerning the *puruṣas* which are outside activity; see Part II, pp. 213-214.

a unity, kept together as a whole and striving towards a goal. The question then arises—what happens after death, when this unity clearly no longer functions? The obvious conclusion is that nothing happens and this is the general opinion, namely that, according to Aristotle, there can be no question of any personal existence after death.¹ But there is, according to him, another factor which is different from the human and animal soul, which he preferred to call the animal soul, and which is present especially in the case of man—the *nous*. This *nous* comes from outside, through the door (*thurathen*) and is immortal. It is so abstract and so universal that it is, according to the majority of commentators, not possible to speak here of personal immortality.² This doctrine stirred all kinds of ripples in later centuries—for example, among the Arab thinkers in the Middle Ages, of whom Averroes entirely rejected immortality³ and who, as a whole, thought of the *nous* as having an increasingly impersonal character.

Let us now consider these Aristotelian views in the context of hylic pluralism and everything connected with it. In the first place. I believe that Aristotle also made the error that I attributed to Plato, that is, the mistake of confusing the eidetic or ideal relationships and the hylic or real relationships. This does not mean that I do not think that the correlativism of form and matter within the whole plurality of revealed existence is not an excellent doctrine.⁴ Aristotle was, in my opinion, right in his concept of matter or possibility which was wide enough to include, for example, the matter of a conversation. A distinction must, however, be made between matter as the possibility of contents (or the “eidetic”) and matter as reality existing above all in time. I prefer to confine the term “hylic” to the latter. In affirming that the *nous* comes from outside, that is, in time and clearly with the embryo,⁵ Aristotle is obviously confusing the two or is at least very obscure, since the *nous* is either the purely ideal factor existing from moment to moment (in the sense of being outside time) or it is a “higher” factor expressing itself in reflection, functioning in time and, because of this, never completely pure, but always only approaching the truth and therefore subject to error. The fact that Aristotle did not distinguish clearly between the two is obvious from the statement that the *nous* is so universal that there can be no question of any personal existence after death. In fact, ideal relationships (the “eidetic”) are impersonal

1 See, for example, B 170, p. 387; B 139, p. 99.

2 *ibid.*

3 B 16, p. 206.

4 See my *Twæðrlei Subjectvitelt* (B 114), § 60.

5 See B 176, II, p. 216; B 170, p. 387.

and eternal.¹ They must be related in a special way with the highest principle, the ground of all being, whether this is called—as I call it—*tauton* or the Same or whether it is called something else. On the other hand, the real, temporal relationships (the “hylic”) proceed from the highest principle in a very different way.² The matter of a conversation or the content of a certain theme or of an entire science constitute, as an “intention”, a part of the eidetic. As a concrete content—which is often more or less vague, fragmentary or even wrong—on the other hand they form part of a unity or individual that is actively thinking in time within the real relationship of the hylic. These thinking unities may certainly be at a very high level and they may also have an aspect of fine matter, in which case we arrive at ideas like that of the “radiant body” and so on, which constitute what I have called the “sublime *pneuma*”³ By taking such an abstract and general a view of the *nous*, however, Aristotle precluded the possibility of anything like this or of any personal existence after death in a higher sense. He did not differentiate between these sense-relationships outside time as such and an individual spiritual function at a higher level which is concerned with these sense-relationships, but which continues in principle to be relative and impure. It is clear that there is a continuing influence of Plato’s “mistake” here and of Plato’s sharp contrast between an ordinary and real world and another, eternal and ideal world in which content or intention and their realisation wrongly coincide.

There are also other difficulties in connection with Aristotle’s concept of the soul. He called the soul the entelechy of the body. In this case, this entelechy and the body ought to be purely contrasted with each other as form and matter. This is, however, frequently not so, which is undoubtedly the reason why Siebeck, for example, called his concept of the soul “wavering”. According to Aristotle, a factor consisting of fine matter is also active in connection with the soul—the *pneuma*! It is precisely this doctrine which gave rise to Kissling’s and Dodds’ claim that he was at least to some extent anticipating the teaching of the later neo-Platonic philosophers. This factor of fine matter is not the body itself, even though it is active in the body, for example, in the form of warmth, *to thermon*. It is far more than this—it is a *pneuma* which is, for example, active in fertilisation. As far as

1 Classified according to a scale, from the most general and universal, via the more concrete down to the whole of history; see B 114, § 9 f.

2 See B 114, § 59.

3 In this sense, Ralph Cudworth (B 22, II, p. 570) asked: “Num Aristoteles animae corpus coeleste dederit?”, but affirmed that Aristotle’s *nous*, which could be regarded as perhaps fulfilling this role, did not perform this function. The possibility, however, did exist—see Kissling (B 85), p. 320.

the parents are concerned, it is derived from the father and also a more or less elevated factor, related to the substance of the stars and to the fifth and highest of the ancient elements, the ether.¹ It is, however, generally agreed that Aristotle's teaching about the factor of the *pneuma* that is active in the body—a doctrine which he also connected with the blood²—continued to exist in the doctrine of the *spiritus animales et vitales*³ which became extremely widespread later. This, however, is a rather lowly agent which is directly connected with the physiological aspect, with the result that I have distinguished it as the level of the physiological *pneuma*.⁴ This quintessence (or fifth essence), ether, the element of the stars, is situated, on the other hand, at a completely different level.

In other words, all kinds of aspects of a hylic pluralistic nature occur in the writings of Aristotle, but neither he nor his commentators made enough distinctions in the material concerned. In any case, Aristotle did not insist exclusively on the standpoint that the soul was the immateria form or entelechy of the body—he again and again made use of the *pneuma* as a link between the *nous*, which he was inclined to regard as an immaterial factor, and the body. He called this link the first instrument (*prōton organon*)⁵ and the ordinary body was clearly the second instrument. This, however, amounts to our hylic pluralism—a finer matter plus a coarser matter, with the finer matter on the side of the soul. Aristotle also called this *pneuma* innate, *sumphuton*, and Kissling insisted that there was at least some similarity here between this doctrine and the *ochēma sumphues*⁶ (which also means innate or grown together with) of the later neo-Platonists. We can also draw attention to the fact that, according to Aristotle, the vivid imagination consisted of movement⁷—this certainly has a characteristic appearance of fine matter. None of these examples are in accordance with an idea of the soul as being simply and solely the form of the body. This is therefore the reason why Aristotle's psychology is regarded as so wavering and why Kissling observed that Aristotle was "incapable of defining intelligibly" his doctrine about the *pneuma* (even though this to some extent anticipated the much clearer doctrine of the neo-

1 *De Gen. Anim.*, 736 b; see also B 85, p. 320; B 33, p. 316; B 233, p. 120; B 226, p. 194; see also below, Section 97.

2 See B 136, p. 204 ff.

3 See above, p. 9 and index.

4 See B 174, p. 60.

5 See B 174, p. 14; B 137, p. 10.

6 See B 85, p. 320; B 33, p. 316.

7 See B 155, p. 48 ff; B 33, p. 316.

Platonists about the *ochēma* and the *pneuma*).¹ In my opinion, Aristotle did not realise that there could be at least two factors of fine matter—one which was close to the physiological level and a higher factor which was later to be called *aigoeides ochēma* or radiant vehicle and which could play a part especially in man's continued existence and then, in addition to these, a purely ideal nous, which might be completely impersonal. These obscurities had a long aftermath, especially in the Middle Ages.

It is remarkable too that Aristotle's successor as the head of the Peripatetic School, Theophrastus (ca. 372-288), like Plato's successor, expressed hylic pluralism rather more clearly than his master. Theophrastus accepted a divine body, *theion sōma*, of the soul,² consisting of ether. He also regarded thought as a movement of the soul.³ The Peripatetic teacher Diodorus of Tyre also called the ether the substratum of the soul.⁴

58. THE EPICUREANS AND THE STOICS

Not long after Plato had established his Academy and Aristotle his Peripatetic School, two other schools of philosophy were set up in Athens—by Epicurus (342-271), whose school was known by his name, and by Zeno of Citium (ca. 336-264), who founded the Stoa. Later, all these schools moved elsewhere—to Rome and Alexandria especially. The teaching of the two later schools—Epicureanism and Stoicism—had a pronounced practical and ethical flavour, in which the theme of wisdom was kept very much to the fore, even though the emphasis placed on this theme was different. We shall be concerned here not so much with this aspect as with the theoretical doctrines of these thinkers. In his metaphysics, Epicurus kept very closely to Democritus and both he and the much later Epicurean philosopher, the Roman poet Lucretius Carus (96-55), stressed the atomic doctrine and tended to take a mechanistic view of nature. According to Epicurus, the soul consisted of smooth, fine atoms. He said, moreover, quite explicitly in a letter that it was a body consisting of subtle parts—*sōma leptomerēs*.⁵ In my view, this stem *lepto* (= fine) always points, with very great probability to the hylic pluralistic character of a doctrine. Epicurus also followed Democritus in another respect—he taught the

1 B 85, p. 318; see also above, p. 37.

2 B 182, II, 2, p. 847; see also B 122, p. 129.

3 See B 176, II, p. 238.

4 See B 155, p. 166.

5 See B 170, p. 454; B 176, III, p. 22; B 174, p. 28.

existence of gods who entered into communication with man by means of *eidōla*, but who did not, generally speaking, concern themselves with him at all.¹ According to Epicurus, these gods had fine bodies—this doctrine was handed down by Cicero.²

Lucretius also believed that the soul consisted of fine matter. The seventeenth century Dutch poet, Joost van den Vondel, rendered it thus—Lucretius

Embodies the human soul and lets it perish

And, without a residue, die like the body.³

Again and again, the idea that man only continues to exist after death for a certain time is met with in the work of thinkers who make use of hylic pluralistic themes.⁴

Even more important than the metaphysical teaching of the Epicureans, however, is that of the Stoics, to which must be added their psychological and anthropological doctrines. What is more, the hylic pluralism of the Stoics is so very striking—this movement may be regarded as a model for hylic pluralism—that I shall not pause for very long here, in this historical summary, considering the Stoa and the special doctrines of the Stoic thinkers which followed each other for a period of several centuries.

One is, of course, aware of the fact that many comments have been made about the *materialism* of the Stoics and it is hardly possible to deny this characteristic. It is true that to *lekton*, *content*, occurs in their teaching, and this is very reminiscent of what I am inclined to call the "eidetic", the immaterial content of ideas. They did, however, regard *being* as material—the neo-Platonists, who took the opposite view, engaged in polemics with them about this (see, for example, Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 7, 2–11). The Stoics even extended this view to the deity—Verbeke has, for example, remarked that "there are . . . many (Stoic) texts which bear witness to the material and pneumatic character of the deity".⁵ If my distinction between the gamma standpoint (according to which all pluralistic being is regarded as material, but an immaterial and transcendent deity is also accepted) and the beta standpoint (according to which the existence of an immaterial deity is rejected and, if he is accepted at all, God is regarded as purely material) is applied here, then the Stoics must without doubt be counted among those who adhere to the beta standpoint.

1 See B 170, p. 450 ff.; B 177, p. 290; B 176, III, p. 23 ff.

2 *De Natura Deorum*, I, 18: "Deos . . . corpore tam tenui tamque subtili vestitos"; see also B 62, p. 21.

3 *Bespiegelingen van Godt en Godtsdienst*, IV, p. 43.

4 See Part I, p. 27.

5 B 174, p. 82.

This materialism of the Stoic philosophers has caused surprise in various spheres¹ for the following reason. The Stoics were explicitly inclined towards religion and ethics and religious thinking is not usually accompanied by materialism. Their interest in "divination" and in occult phenomena generally² is also not what one would expect.

It should be easier to understand this characteristic of the Stoics if more emphasis is given to the fact that they were *dualistic* materialists and accepted, in addition to ordinary matter, a finer matter which played a part in all their religious ideas. This is also reinforced by the generally accepted view that, although they did to some extent follow the teachings of Aristotle, the Stoics were in fact far closer to the much earlier teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers and, among these, especially to the doctrines of Heraclitus. Windelband, for example, observed scornfully that "the Stoics were incapable of creating anything new themselves and therefore took up the naive materialism of the pre-Socratic natural philosophers once more".³ But this is precisely the question that concerns us here—have all these so called "primitive" ideas to be rejected from the very beginning?⁴ In addition, if the Stoic Seneca's definition of matter as everything that acts⁵ is accepted, a wider concept of matter, which inevitably loses much of its terror, is obtained.

It is, of course, possible to try to deny the dualistic character of Stoic materialism, but it would be difficult to carry this through to its ultimate conclusion. The Stoics distinguished ordinary fire, *to pur ateknon*, from another fire, creative fire, *to pur technikon* or *noëron*. The second fire was, according to the Stoics, identical with the deity; it was the primordial divine fire from which the world came and to which it returned.⁶ In this, the Stoics were very close to Heraclitus, who taught something very similar. They were also fairly close to Aristotle.⁷ What is more, the Stoics also taught the existence of the five ancient elements and, like Aristotle, they too taught that the fifth or highest element—the so-called "quintessence"—was fire.

Like Aristotle too, they also connected the human soul with this fifth element, which they regarded as "more subtle and more dynamic"

1 Windelband (B 177, p. 272) has said, for example: "Explicitly materialistic metaphysics are combined in an extremely remarkable way with these ethical doctrines in the case of the Stoics".

2 For this and their "religious materialism", see K.H.E. de Jong, B 77, p. 94 ff and B 76.

3 B 177, p. 272.

4 See above, p. 26.

5 See above, pp. 7-8.

6 See B 177, p. 273; B 174, p. 21 ff; B 176, III, p. 53.

7 See B 170, p. 420.

than the other elements¹ and as a consequence of these. Furthermore, they also regularly used the term *pneuma*, air, a somewhat more lowly element and precipitated from fire² both for the world-soul—*pneuma noëron*—and for the human soul. Man's soul was defined as *pneuma enthermon*, warm breeze. The Stoics therefore believed that the soul was composed of matter—a doctrine that an immaterial soul possessed a vehicle or *ochēma* will not be found here—but that this matter was very subtle—*leptomerestaton*.³ They also believed that there was a mantic *pneuma*⁴ which was active in occult phenomena and, on the other hand, a *pneuma* in man was, they taught, connected with exhalations of the blood,⁵ which reveals that the Stoics were in accordance with the schools of ancient medicine here,⁶ also that the later doctrine of the *spiritus vitales et animales* was connected with this Stoic teaching.

As I have said, I do not propose to go into all the various shades of meaning which occur, in connection with our subject, that is, hylic pluralism, in the writings of the most important Stoics. They were, for example, not unanimous in their teachings about man's continued existence after death. A universal Stoic doctrine, however, was that both the world-soul and the individual human soul consisted of *pneuma*. Their doctrine of the *pneuma* was in fact as widespread as the great influence exerted by their philosophy as a whole over many centuries—an influence which is clearly discernible in the Christian teaching of the first centuries of our present era.

59. MISCELLANEA FROM THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

The period following the reign of Alexander the Great (d.323) is known as the Hellenistic period. It was during this time that Greek civilisation spread throughout many countries surrounding the Mediterranean, Sea, although the Greek cities had already lost their independence. As far as philosophy is concerned, the Epicurean and the Stoic schools, which were founded after the death of Alexander, already belonged to Hellenism. The prestige enjoyed by the Stoa in Rome is in accordance with this. The revival of ancient philosophy in the movement known as neo-Platonism towards the end of classical antiquity will be discussed, insofar as it touches on our special subject, in the following

1 See B 174, pp. 59-60.

2 See B 177, p. 274.

3 See B 174, p. 148; see also p. 30.

4 See B 96, p. 11.

5 See B 174, p. 25; B 137, p. 8.

6 See B 174, p. 175.

chapter. But even apart from Stoicism, which I have already discussed in the preceding section, thought was not at a standstill in the ancient world before the emergence of neo-Platonism. It is, however, not possible to deal with all the less important philosophers and schools in connection with hylic pluralism and I shall therefore limit myself to a consideration of two figures—Eratosthenes and Plutarch. What is more, Hellenism is typically the period during which not only a widespread scepticism prevailed, but also all kinds of religious movements made their appearance, movements which were frequently connected with life and thought in the Middle East and which are often very difficult to define as far as their origin and antiquity are concerned. The material relating to these movements, which is often more of a religious than of a philosophical nature, is very comprehensive and it is hardly possible to give a clear survey of the whole field. Nonetheless, it cannot be entirely neglected because hylic pluralism is characteristically revealed in this literature.

At least the following must be said about Eratosthenes. In the study that I have frequently mentioned, Dodds asked where the doctrine of the *ochēma* of the soul occurred *before* neo-Platonism. (As we have already seen, this doctrine did not occur, in his opinion, in the work of Plato). In this connection, he quoted Jamblichus, who attributed to "the school of Eratosthenes and Ptolemy the Platonist" the opinion that the soul permanently has one or another body and is transferred after death into bodies of finer matter (*leptotera*). This Ptolemy, Dodds claims, was probably a contemporary of Galen (ca. 129-199), who refers, apparently for the first time, both to the star-vehicles of Plato's *Timaeus* and to Aristotle's doctrine of the *pneuma* in the same breath. This may therefore be the birth-place, as it were, of the neo-Platonic doctrine of the *ochēma* and the *pneuma*. This doctrine also occurs in Eratosthenes' writings, but there is no agreement among scholars as to which philosopher is meant here. Wachsmuth and Knaack, for example, doubt whether it is from the well-known Eratosthenes of Cyrene (as Hirzel, on the other hand, assumes) that this passage is derived. This Eratosthenes lived during the third century before Christ. If he were the author, Dodds claims, then this is a very early anticipation of the doctrine in question.¹ Although Dodds doubts whether this Eratosthenes was the author, he drew my attention in a letter to an article by F. Solmsen, "Eratosthenes as Platonist and Poet", in which the writer disputes Dodds' assumption that the Eratosthenes of this passage is not the Eratosthenes of the third century B.C.² In view of

1 B 33, pp. 316-319.

2 Trans. Amer. Philol. Ass., 1942, p. 198 ff.

what I have already said about the meaning of the terms *ochēma* and hylic pluralism in general in Plato's thought, it seems to me that it may be possible for Solmsen and Hirzel to be right, in which case the doctrine of the *ochēma* was already formulated, in the positive form in which it was to occur later in neo-Platonism, in the third century B.C.

A great deal could be said about Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 45-125),¹ the priest of the oracle at Delphi who wanted to make this holy place important again during a period of scepticism. I am, however, bound to restrict myself here, although I shall have something to say elsewhere about several of his teachings. Although he was clearly influenced by Stoic teachings, he belonged to the Middle Academy—just as Posidonius (135-51), with whom he liked to be associated, was a Stoic who was influenced by Platonic doctrines. In the case of Plutarch, *pneuma* of fine matter is frequently mentioned—for example, the “mantic” *pneuma* which plays a part in divination.² He made a distinction between the *nous* and the *psyche* and taught that there was second death, in which the *nous* separated itself from the *psyche*. After death, Plutarch maintained, souls began an existence in the sphere of the moon.³

The classical scholar, George Méautis, who was a professor at Neuchâtel, drew attention to what was, in his opinion, a remarkable similarity between a teaching of Plutarch's and a communication of an occultist of the twentieth century, C. W. Leadbeater.⁴ In *De sera numinis vindicta*, published by Méautis under the title of *Des délais de la justice divine*,⁵ Plutarch speaks about the colours of the subtle body and other details and Méautis points to a striking similarity with communications by the visionary of the twentieth century.⁶ I should, however, like to observe, in this context, that it is, strictly speaking, not entirely out of the question that Leadbeater, who was trained as a young man to become an Anglican clergyman, may have been acquainted with the text of Plutarch's.

We must now discuss briefly the predominantly religious literature that I mentioned above. This includes the worship of Mithras, which was widespread throughout the Roman Empire, the so-called *corpus hermeticum*, the magic papyri, the so-called Chaldaean oracles and various ancient writings about alchemy.

1 B 170, p. 532; B 174, p. 260 ff; B 176, III, p. 376 ff; B 113, p. 331; J. J. Hartman, *De Avondzon des Heidendoms*, 1910, 3rd edn., 1924.

2 B 174, p. 267.

3 B 174, p. 262 ff; B 170, p. 538; B 176, III, p. 389.

4 “A Historical Verification of Theosophical Teachings”, B 262, 46, II, August 1932, p. 591 ff.

5 Lausanne, 1935.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 596 and the commentary on *Des délais*, p. 70.

The worship of Mithras originated in Persia¹ and men frequently took part in the Mithraic mysteries in the Roman Empire, in which they had been spread by the Roman legions. In a Mithraic ritual published by A. Dieterich, there is reference to a *soma teleion*, a perfect body, which the candidate invokes as his higher self and with which he tries to come into mystical union,² Dodds refers to a similarity—in his opinion, superficial—with the theory of the *ochêma* and the *pneuma* of the neo-Platonists.³ Air or *pneuma* and light are characteristics of that body,⁴ which is very reminiscent of my “sublime *pneuma*”.

Far more important in connection with my special subject and much more comprehensive is the *corpus hermeticum* or the hermetic literature, which is assumed to have originated, not in Persia, but in Egypt.⁵ There is not general agreement about its antiquity. The hermetic books, like the Mithras liturgy, constituted an expression of non-Christian gnosis. Dodds says that “mists”, *aeres*, are referred to here. These “mists” form the covering or *peribolaion* of the soul, in which *pneuma* the soul is held or carried, *ochētai*.⁶ He points out that this bears witness to the occurrence of the *ochêma-pneuma* doctrine before the emergence of neo-Platonism. The writings of Hermes Trismegistos, the “Thrice Greatest Hermes”, are placed in the first and second century A.D.⁷ Well-known editions of the hermetic books are those by W. Scott, G.R.S. Mead (B 102) and R. P. Festugière (B 44). The text known as Poimandres is a well-known part of this literature.

The predominant idea in these and in many other writings of the same period is that of the descent of the soul through the spheres, during which descent it assumes an increasingly coarse covering or garment. This descent is later—this is connected with the theme of the transmigration of the soul—followed by an ascent, at the end of which the soul is once again “naked” and free from all limitations.⁸ These respective coverings are situated one within the other—Verbeke compared it with a set of “Chinese boxes” enclosing each other.⁹ Something similar, although it takes place on a smaller scale, is found in Plato’s *Timaeus* 30B—the *nous* is situated in the *psyche* and the *psyche*

1 See Part II, p. 121.

2 See B 100, V and VI.

3 B 33, p. 314.

4 B 174, p. 330.

5 See B 174, pp. 314-315.

6 B 33, p. 317. *Ochêma* really means “what carries”.

7 See B 139, p. 162; p. 162; B 160, pp. 514, 522.

8 This should be compared with the term *upādhi* (= limitation), used in Indian thought for bodies of fine matter; see Part II, p. 192.

9 174, p. 310. These are reminiscent of the *kośas*, the coverings or sheaths fitting one inside the other in the Indian texts; see Part II, p. 177-178.

in the body. I shall return later to this image of the garment for the subtle body.

Closely related to the hermetic writings are the so-called Chaldaean oracles which, it is generally assumed, originated in the second century A.D. In¹ these writings too, there is reference to a descent and an ascent of the soul and to a pneumatic garment.² The neo-Platonist Proclus regarded these writings, together with those of Plato, as the greatest authority.³ Here too, we have a "Chinese box" situation.⁴ Kissling also maintained that the doctrine of the *ochêma* and the *pneuma* is also met with here.⁵

Also related to the three literary expressions that I have so far discussed are the so-called *magic papyri*. One scholar in particular, T. Hopfner, has made a very profound study of these writings.⁶ Here too, forms of *pneuma* are discussed frequently.⁷ I shall have to return to the magic papyri when I am dealing with belief in daemons in connection with hylic pluralism.⁸

The last group of texts that I mentioned was that including the ancient *alchemistic writings*.⁹ A very remarkable characteristic of the alchemists, both those who practised in later centuries and those of this period, is that they were concerned, on the one hand, with chemical substances and with doctrines about ordinary nature and, on the other, with mysticism.¹⁰ Viewed in the perspective of hylic pluralism, however, this becomes more or less intelligible. They were not simply concerned with changing ordinary substances,—other metals, for example, into gold—they were also and indeed above all concerned with the need to change, in an inward and esoteric manner, man's lower bodies into higher and subtler bodies and with man's quest to obtain or to build up an indestructible and perfect body, which of course, comes within what I have called the "sublime *pneuma*". C. G. Jung has summarised it thus—the alchemist is concerned with an "incorruptible substance", known in Chinese Buddhist alchemy as the "diamond body".¹¹ Similar themes also occurred in the alchemy of later antiquity.¹² The

1 See B 170, p. 523.

2 B 70, I, p. 48; see also B 33, p. 318 note 6.

3 B 33, p. XII.

4 See B 174, p. 315.

5 B 85, p. 325.

6 B 70.

7 See B 174, p. 321 ff.

8 See below, Section 34.

9 See B 174, p. 328 ff.

10 See F. Sherwood Taylor, *The Alchemists, Founder of Modern Chemistry*, 1951 (B 161), p. 227; B 99, p. 17 ff.

11 C. G. Jung, *Psychologie und Alchemie* (B 78), pp. 573; see also Part II, p. 247.

12 B 174, p. 343 ff.

important figures here is Zosimos. According to the later alchemists, the *pneuma* or spirit was active as a factor both in metals and in man in different degrees of subtlety.¹

In discussing this alchemistic literature, however, we have moved on a long way in classical antiquity. The other writings that I have discussed briefly in this section originated before neo-Platonism, but this literature was continued beyond it. It would be impossible to deal here with all kinds of other writings and figures, although many of these ought to be mentioned in a detailed account of hylic pluralism at this period, because, like the writings and figures already discussed in this section, there was a lively interchange between them and neo-Platonism. We must, however, now turn to consider this philosophical movement in connection with hylic pluralism.

60. NEO-PLATONISM

This brings us to a very interesting part of our account of hylic pluralism in the ancient world. Yet there is no more reason to discuss in great detail the possible occurrence of hylic pluralism in neo-Platonism in a historical survey of this kind than there was in the case of Stoicism. To wish to prove that hylic pluralism does occur in neo-Platonism would be as foolish as wanting to break down an open door. All those who have studied this philosophical movement fully agree that it is quite clearly present, just as it was, for example, in Indian thought. It would require an extensive treatment of the subject, a more detailed study than the rather short monographs by Kissling and Dodds, to reveal this presence really clearly. It would, in any case, be quite superfluous to try to demonstrate indirectly that it might have been in the background of neo-Platonic thought as it was, for example, in the case of Plato.² It is not without good reason that I chose the title of this work from the terminology of neo-Platonism.

The theme of hylic pluralism does not, however, occur in exactly the same way and to exactly the same degree in the works of the leading neo-Platonists, who lived, moreover, at different times,³ and I shall have something to say about this.

The founder of the school, Ammonias Saccas (ca. 175-242) wrote or at least published, as far as we know, as little as Socrates. His disciple, Plotinus, on the other hand, is one of the most important neo-Plato-

1 See Sherwood Taylor, *op. cit.* p. 11.

2 See above, p. 48.

3 Plotinus lived ca. 204-270 and Proclus 410-485 A.D.

nists and at the same time one of the most interesting because, although inner experience occurred in the case of all the neo-Platonists, he revealed the most genuine philosophical interest, which is why he has always been greatly esteemed as a philosopher and is still read even nowadays.¹ Dodds has observed that Plotinus was not very interested in our theme and this is probably something that has to be admitted both quantitatively and qualitatively—as I shall emphasize later and as I have already suggested previously, the question of finer bodies is a fruitful theme, but it is also more or less external.² At the same time, however, Dodds has also said that “Plotinus accepted the hypothesis of the *leptoteron sōma*”, that is, the finer body.³ Another point is that the term *ochēma* in this sense is not found in his writings—it only became current among later authors. This is not, however, very important—Plotinus used the word *pneuma* in this context and thus expressed himself clearly enough. In the case of man, he said, *par'hēmīn to pneuma to peri tēn psuchēn*, the *pneuma* is something around the soul.⁴ This is clearly, Dodds maintains, what thinkers defined more precisely at a later stage as the astral body.⁵ Rüschke's interpretation of this text is that, according to Plotinus, the soul was surrounded by an “ethereal and heavenly light-body”.⁶

Many other doctrines of a hylic pluralistic nature can also be found in Plotinus. For example, he referred explicitly to a *kosmos noētos*, an intelligible world,⁷ in which much of what he mentioned took place. This other world consisted of *noētē hulē*, intelligible matter,⁸ in which the daemons, for example, participated.⁹ This *mundus intelligibilis* and this *materia spiritualis* were to enjoy a long life in philosophy.

Plotinus' disciple Porphyry (232-314) was above all the one who published the *Enneads* of his master. With him, however, a second period of neo-Platonism began, marked by a shift of emphasis, in which the dominant factor in the ascent of the soul was no longer wisdom, but “theurgy”, a bringing about of the deity or a kind of magic. Even though Porphyry himself warned against the misuse of this method, the subjects dealt with changed, even in the case of his thought. As

1 See B 170, p. 600.

2 See Part I, pp. 8-9 and below, Section 134.

3 B 33, p. 318.

4 *Enn.* II, 2, 2. see B 85, p. 322; B 174, p. 359; B 137, p. 51; B 33, p. 318, note 4. In using for the meta-organism the strange term “perispit”, the nineteenth century spiritists, it would seem, had learnt from Plotinus.

5 B 33, p. 318.

6 B 137, p. 53.

7 See B 177, p. 328; B 139, p. 185.

8 See B 170, p. 605.

9 See B 8, p. 410.

Dodds has observed, Porphyry dealt in far greater detail with the doctrine of the astral body than his master had done.¹ He went fully into the question of the daemons and their coverings of fine matter.² In Porphyry's teaching about these daemons, the *phantasia*, which may be translated as formative capacity, played an important part.³

The theurgic and magical phase of neo-Platonism reached a peak with *Jamblichus* (ca. 330), who followed Porphyry in Rome and founded a school in Syria, his native country.⁴ In a treatise on the soul, a fragment of which has been preserved in Stobaeus,⁵ and a text published and translated by Hopfner and usually known as *De Mysteriis Aegyptiorum*,⁶ Jamblichus discussed in detail the various finer bodies of the soul, once again in connection with the soul's descent and ascent through the spheres. The term *ochêma* is used frequently in these writings and what is particularly interesting is that he distinguished different *ochêma* by using different names. He also wrote explicitly about the radiant vehicle, the *augoeides ochêma*.⁷ According to Jamblichus, the gods radiated such a fine light that man was not capable of comprehending it with his corporeal eyes. When he had visions of this kind, he felt impotent, like a fish in the air.⁸

Proclus (410-485), who flourished more than a hundred years later and who once again taught in Athens, was far more of a pure and, what is more, systematic philosopher. Because of this and of his great influence on medieval thought,⁹ he has been called the great scholastic thinker of the ancient world and the forerunner of medieval scholasticism.¹⁰ Proclus' inclination to systematic thought is, moreover, expressed in his treatment of our special subject. On the one hand, he distinguished quite emphatically a series of *ochêmata* of the soul consisting of fine matter, which he also called *chitônes* or garments of the soul.¹¹ There is, therefore, every reason for us to speak, not of a hylic dualism, but of a hylic pluralism.¹² On the other hand, he tried to synthesise various doctrines of his predecessors—something to which both Kissling and Dodds have drawn attention.¹³ The terms *ochêma*

1 B 33, p. 318.

2 See B 174, p. 366 ff.; J. Bidez, *La vie de Porphyre*, p. 89; B 70, p. 236, note 93.

3 B 85, p. 321.

4 See B 170, p. 612 ff.

5 See Festugière, Appendix to B 44.

6 T. Hopfner, *Über die Geheimlehren des Jamblichus*, Leipzig, 1921; see also B 137, p. 54; B 174, p. 376.

7 *De Mysteriis*, III, 14; see B 33, p. 319; B 70, p. 17.

8 *De Mysteriis*, II, 8.

9 See B 212, p. 516 ff.

10 B 170, p. 626.

11 See, for example, B 33, p. 320; B 170, p. 629.

12 See Part I, pp. 7-8.

13 B 85, p. 319; B 33, p. 320.

and *pneuma* were united at this time in the phrase *pneumatikōn ochēma*. There is also another question of fundamental importance. A degree of uncertainty is discernible in the case of Porphyry and Jamblichus with regard to the question as to how long the *ochēma* survived after death. They did not give the same answer to this question. Proclus, on the other hand, solved all the difficulties at one stroke. *Ochēmata* of the ordinary series could be cast off by the soul in its ascent. In addition to these ordinary *ochēmata*, however, the soul also possessed, Proclus taught, an innate *ochēma*, *ochēma sumphues augoeides*, which never left it and was therefore intransient. I should like to remind the reader here of my formulation of what I called "psychohylicism"—after the death of the ordinary body, the human soul is said to have another body of fine matter. Here, however, two views are possible—(a) either the soul *always* possesses some body, as long as it exists in plurality or (b) it may exist immaterially and entirely in itself, in which case it only has an *ochēma* or *ochēmata* from a certain level downwards.¹ Because of his doctrine of the innate *ochēma*, Proclus clearly opts for the first alternative—the absolute interpretation of psychohylicism.

Proclus also called the innate *ochēma ahulon*, immaterial.² I am pretty sure that this word should be understood in a relative sense, in other words, as immaterial compared with ordinary matter,³ because a vehicle or *ochēma* and complete immateriality are a contradiction in terms. It has not always been thought of in this way, however, and immateriality was stressed at the expense of the aspect of being a vehicle in the Middle Ages especially, when the doctrine of hylic pluralism tended to be pushed into the background. It is also probable that some part was played here by the "mistake" made by Plato to which I have already referred, according to which an insufficiently clear distinction was made between existence in time and pure immateriality or ideality.⁴

I cannot discuss here everything that Proclus taught in connection with hylic pluralism. Again and again in his *Institutio theologica*, which was translated and edited by E. R. Dodds,⁵ there is evidence of his teaching about the very subject which prompted Dodds to add, as an appendix to this edition of Proclus' work, an essay on the astral body. The theme of hylic pluralism, however, occurs not only here, but also

¹ See B 33, p. 304; Part I, 4 and p. 41, 147; Part II, pp. 193-196; Various shades of meaning are also to be found here in Indian thought.

² See, for example, *The Elements of Theology* (ed. Dodds, 1933), Prop. 208, see also p. 183.

³ See above, pp. 8-9 see also Part I, p. 17.

⁴ See above, p. 36.

⁵ *The Elements of Theology*, 1933, 2nd edn., 1963.

in Proclus' other writings, such as his commentaries on the dialogues of Plato.

I will confine myself here to repeating Dodds' observation in his commentary on Proclus' expression *en to psuchikō platel*, namely that Proclus' favourite term *to platos*, "breadth", was, in his case, "the literal equivalent of the 'planes' of modern theosophy".¹ These "higher planes" in theosophical teaching, which can, of course, be compared with the *sūkṣma-bhūtas* in Indian thought,² are without any doubt intended to be understood on a cosmological scale and in a hylic pluralistic sense. There is clearly a great deal to be found in Proclus, the full extent of which has not yet been understood.

Hylic pluralism also occurs quite clearly in the personal convictions and in the commentaries on other authors recorded both by later neo-Platonists who are less well-known than the four I have dealt with in this section, some of whom, especially those who lived in Alexandria, were also Christians,³ and by other thinkers in the later ancient world who were more loosely associated with neo-Platonism. Among these may be mentioned, for example, the somewhat older Themistius (ca. 320-390), whose thought was close to that of the Peripatetic School,⁴ Hierocles (fifth century A.D.), the author of the "Commentaries on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras",⁵ the Christian Olympiodorus, according to whom the subtle organism had the form of an egg,⁶ the Christian bishop Synesius (ca. 370-415),⁷ Syrianus (450)⁸ and Damascius,⁹ who was the head of the Academy when the Emperor Justinian closed it in 529.

The *duplex corporalitas* can also be found in the writings of Boethius (ca. 480-524)—in his well-known *De consolations philosophiae*, he mentioned the *leves currus*, the light chariots of the soul.¹⁰

Verbeke was right when he concluded: "This idea of the pneumatic body, which formed the link between the soul and the body, was very widespread during the first centuries of the Christian era".¹¹

If we look at the history of ideas in the Graeco-Roman world as a whole, the same impression of hylic pluralism in general emerges. In

1 B 33, p. 303. See also A. Bielmeier, *Die Neuplatonische Phaedros-Interpretation*. Paderborn, 1930, p. 19 ff.

2 See above, p. 13.

3 See B 170, p. 639.

4 See B 33, p. 315; B 85, p. 319; B 170, p. 656.

5 B 33, p. 319; B 85, p. 322; B 170, p. 641; B 174, p. 368.

6 B 33, p. 308, note 3; B 70, p. 90.

7 B 33, p. 316, note 1 and 3; B 85, p. 321.

8 B 33, p. 320; B 85, p. 321.

9 See Part I, p. 16, note 4; B 170, p. 633.

10 III, 9; see B 170, p. 654; Part II, p. 139.

11 B 174, p. 368.

neo-Platonism, a form of hylic pluralism is revealed, in which the soul, which is in itself immaterial, makes use of *ochēmata* of fine matter. This is what I have called the delta standpoint. Plato and Aristotle can also probably be regarded as adherents of this standpoint. In addition to this, there is also the other form of hylic pluralism—the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism, according to which the soul itself consists of fine matter. This standpoint occurred very frequently in classical antiquity—the pre-Socratic philosophers and the Stoics, who were very influential for many centuries, were dualistic materialists. Since anthropological dualism hardly occurred at all in the ancient world,¹ it is possible to say that hylic pluralism flourished during this period.

61. ISRAEL, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM

We have come quite a long way from the beginnings of Western civilisation in our discussion of neo-Platonism in the preceding section. Only one of the origins of Western civilisation, however, is to be found in ancient Greece—the other is expressed in the Old Testament and was continued in Christianity and Islam. The occurrence of hylic pluralism in these spheres forms the subject-matter of the originally planned but as yet unwritten Dutch Volume IV of *Ochēma*. Even though I have not yet completed the preliminary studies for this Dutch volume, it is, of course, not possible to omit entirely some reference to Israel, Christianity and Islam from the historical summaries, indicating the presence of hylic pluralistic themes in the whole history of thought, which precede my discussion of the sense, the truth of hylic pluralism.

The originally planned Dutch Volume IV could be called the *theological* part of the series. This is, of course, too one-sided a characterisation, because philosophical doctrines have also to be given prominence in any consideration, for example, of the Middle Ages. All the same, the theological flavour is very pronounced here, because theological and philosophical thought were so closely interwoven in the Christian Middle Ages and purely philosophical thought has never occupied such a prominent place in Christianity as it has elsewhere, for example, in Indian thought.² My aim, then, in the following sections

¹ According to Simplicius, the Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (200 A.D.) was an opponent of the doctrine of *ochēma*; see Dodds (B 33), p. 317.

² There is, for example, no counterpart in the Old and New Testaments to the subdivision of the Mahābhārata known as the Bhagavad Gītā.

of this book, is to deal with hylic pluralism in Christianity and to continue this up to the modern age.

It is hardly possible to keep to a strictly chronological order.¹ Going back to the Old Testament after having dealt with neo-Platonism is already a "flash-back" and, in discussing certain Lutheran thinkers up to the nineteenth century in a later section, I shall have to consider thinkers who flourished during the Renaissance. This cannot be avoided, since various genealogies have developed and continued alongside each other. It is only in this way that related thought which is often separated by time can conveniently be discussed. Christian gnosticism was, for example, connected with non-Christian gnosis, about which I have already had something to say in a previous section.² The Lutheran theologians whose ideas I shall discuss in a later section were closely in touch with the romantic movement which in itself forms part of the modern age. The threads of thought are thus very closely interwoven.

If, then, so much theology is discussed in this part of my summarised account of the history of the occurrence of hylic pluralism, I am bound to say something in advance about my attitude towards theological and religious questions and towards the relationship between theology and philosophy. In thinking, I give priority to philosophy and, in the last resort, I do not let theological considerations prevail above philosophical considerations.³ I do not need to go further into this question here. Insofar as religious themes are discussed, this forms a part of the study of comparative religion or of the phenomenology of religion. In any case, the only question that is asked in this part of my book is: to what extent did faith in fine materiality in religious experience and to what extent did hylic pluralistic views occur? It is, however, worth while pointing out here that there is, in my opinion, a continuous line running from the phenomenology of religion to a centralisation of the importance of religious experience, in contrast to the tendency to regard theological dogmas as centrally important. This has obvious consequences for the treatment of our subject. If, for example, Christian visionaries or mystics talk of visions of figures surrounded by light or emanating light, this will clearly have a bearing on our theme. On the other hand, so do similar appearances in non-Christian environments—although dogmatic theologians would probably be inclined to deny these, we are bound to take them seriously, both in general and in our particular context. This also has an even

1 See Part II, p. 68-69.

2 See, for example, my "De twee Sôphia's of de verhouding van theosofie en wijsbegeerte" (B 242), 1962, p. 8.

wider significance. In my opinion, there is probably nothing which has devalued religious experience in the minds of the majority of people so much as the orthodox claim to the exclusive importance of one special interpretation of a given religious event, which took place long ago and is, according to this view, no longer or hardly capable of continuing.

What I have said above also has consequences as far as our attitude towards the sacred scripture of Christianity—The Bible—is concerned. I regard the various sacred writings of a series of religions as very venerable, not all to the same degree, but certainly as very often filled with spirituality and inspiration. This spirituality and this inspiration can in my opinion, never be absolute. The Bible is not, I am convinced, "God's word" from a to z. Taking this point of view, then, I do not have to make enormous efforts to make untenable or even distasteful statements in the Bible tenable or meaningful. I can simply leave them as they are. On the other hand, I am extremely interested in passages which reflect authentic inner experiences. Such passages may, if need be, be called "revelations", but, if they are, certainly not in an absolute or completely binding sense.

Various interpretations are possible of the Bible and other "sacred" writings. The three principal kinds of interpretation are, broadly speaking, literal interpretation, allegorical interpretation and inwardly realistic interpretation. I do not need to discuss all these in detail here.¹ As far as "biblical realism" is concerned, the following is relevant to our special study. It is partly a question here of the *miracles*—did they really take place or not? It seems to me that investigations in which parallels between biblical accounts and reports of so-called occult or parapsychological phenomena at different times and in different contexts are examined merit very close attention. Studies by theologians who have concerned themselves with such similarities² have often, quite wrongly, been neglected by their fellow theologians either because the latter have been influenced by doctrinal considerations or because they have not been conscious of the importance of parapsychology. Several theologians, on the other hand, take up a position in the middle. On the one hand, they acknowledge the affinity between certain themes and phenomena, both in the Bible and later, for example, in the lives of certain "saints", and various parapsychological phenomena, but, on the other hand, they reserve one section or category of so-called

¹ See, for example, "Over enige min of meer occulte motieven in de wereldliteratuur", Assen, 1937 and in B 237, p. 274 ff.

² See, for example, M.C. van Mourik Broekman, *Parapsychologie en Godsdienstig Leven*, 1938 (B 228); B 220, Spring 1966.

miracles for direct intervention on the part of God. Those who take this point of view are clearly more favourably disposed to my standpoint but I would prefer not to make any such distinctions between profane phenomena, even in a religious context, and absolute divine intervention. In my view, even the "higher" element, everything that comes from "above", however, exalted this may be, is an expression in this world of infrasubjects and is therefore subject to relativity.¹

With this in mind, then, I propose now to ask to what extent hylic pluralism occurs in the Bible, basing my answer to this question on the result of a provisional investigation. In this, my criterion will, at least in this part of my examination of the question (I do not propose to go here and now into the possible truth of hylic pluralism in the Bible), be the intention of the author of the biblical account. Let me give one example. In John 20.22, we read "And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and said to them, 'Receive the Holy Spirit'". This amounts to, or, to put it simply, this is phenomenologically a very concrete, individual and private view of the Holy Spirit and it has an obvious explanation, namely that the author intended to denote the transference of something consisting of fine matter. But, because we are so influenced by the epsilon standpoint, anthropological and cosmological dualism, according to which the Holy Spirit is regarded as purely spiritual, we are now inclined to overlook this obvious explanation.

My interpretation is clearly a form or an expression of biblical realism. This does not mean, however, that we should therefore be in favour of a very realistic explanation of all kinds of other themes in the Bible.

62. ISRAEL: THE OLD TESTAMENT

As Onians said in an appendix on "ancient Jewish conceptions" to his great book *The Origins of European Thought*, "we must beware of preconceptions created by translation".² If, then, *nephesh* and *ruah* are usually translated by "spirit" and "soul" in the Old Testament, we should not take as our point of departure the modern concepts called to mind by the words spirit and soul, but rather seriously ask ourselves what must have been in the minds of the authors in the original context. I have already mentioned³ that, whereas *ruah* was rendered by *pneuma* in the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Old Testament made round about the year 270 B.C., nothing purely immaterial was meant

1 I do not mean by this that the absolute in itself has no sense or meaning.

2 B 233, p. 481.

3 See above, p. 23.

by these terms, but rather a "subtle essence". I also alluded to the transference of Moses' spirit to the seventy elders (Num. 11. 17, 25) and said that the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics called this "materially regarded".¹ So much, however, has already been written about this *rûah* or "spirit" in the Old Testament that I do not feel that it is necessary to speak any more about it here.

In this case, however, it is not simply a question of man's "spirit", but also of Yahweh's *rûah*. The same, however, applies to the latter as well—in the same place in the above-mentioned encyclopedia, we read that "the earliest documents of the Pentateuch present the spirit of Jahweh (or Elohim) in materialistic fashion". In place of "materialistic" here, it might be better to read "consisting of fine matter, just as, according to the Stoics, who were, after all, so very close to "primitive" thought,³ the deity consisted of a fine *pneuma*.³

There is a passage in Genesis in which God's spirit is referred to as moving over the waters in the beginning of creation (and at the beginning of the Old Testament): "And the Spirit of God was moving over the face of the waters".⁴ A great deal of thought has been given to this text and much has been written about it. A fairly obvious comment is that God's spirit and the waters or the ocean are fairly heterogeneous factors, but this only remains convincing so long as one continues to think in terms of cosmological dualism. There is, however, every reason to think, in this case, of the doctrine of the ancient *elements* that is to be found in so many divergent ancient civilisations. This passage at the beginning of Genesis refers to four of the four or five elements usually listed—in Gen. 1.1, we read of the "heavens" (cf. "ether") and the "earth", whereas in this second verse, Gen. 1.2, *rûah* or *pneuma* or air⁵ and water(s) are mentioned. Viewed in this way, then, we do not have a heterogeneity, but rather a homogeneous or continuous cosmogony which may, among other things, be seen in a hylic pluralistic light—as preliminary stages, partly consisting of fine matter, of further, coarser stages of creation. This was, in any case, the view of certain later thinkers. One of these, for example, was Phoib Judaeus (ca. 25 B.C.—50 A.D.), who maintained that the expression "invisible earth" (*gē aorartos*, according to the Septuagint) in Gen.

¹ B 40, XI, p. 786.

² See above, p. 44.

³ See above, p. 43.

⁴ Gen. 1. 2.

⁵ See H. Leisegang, *Der Heilige Geist* (B 92), p. 24. In many other places in the Old Testament too, Yahweh's spirit is very closely connected with the winds or the storm which he causes. See, for example, J. H. Schoepers, *Die Gees van God en die Gees van die mens in die Ou T.* (1960), p. 11: *rûah* as wind.

1. 2 referred to a creation in two phases: "For Philo, the invisible earth was the suprasensible Idea of the Terrestrial element".¹ However this may be, whether the analogy that Philo draws here with the *Timaeus* of Plato is regarded as too far-fetched or not, there is certainly no question, in this text, of God being regarded as a purely immaterial spirit.

There is also an obvious connection between this passage and Gen. 2. 7, in which God is said to have breathed into man's nostrils the breath (*rūah* or *pneuma*) of life. This connection, which is made between God's spirit or *pneuma* and man (so that man "became a living being") is also a theme which occurs elsewhere and in which there is no question of an immaterial spirit, but above all a *pneuma* of fine matter.²

Something can, no doubt, be said here about the biblical concept of God in the context of hylic pluralism. It cannot, of course, be denied that Jewish Christian ideas resulted in a transcendent and highly immaterial concept of God. Tertullian and, at a much later date, Thomas Hobbes, both maintained that "spirit" or *spiritus* in the Bible, even when it referred to the deity, was always intended and had always to be thought of in a (dualistic) materialistic sense,³ but they are quite alone in this view. In the case of Augustine, there is a clear breakthrough in the direction of a transcendental and immaterial conception of God (even though there are many examples in what he has to say about the creation of hylic pluralistic elements).⁴ In this connection however, it is not entirely certain whether he was, as far as the immaterial, is concerned, influenced principally by the neo-Platonists or by the Bible.⁵ Nonetheless, I believe that it cannot be denied that there is, with regard to God, a great deal in the Bible which points in the direction of transcendence and immateriality. The development of the idea of Yahweh, the God of Israel, into an abstract and monotheistic conception is characteristic of the Jewish Christian civilisation. It is going too far to claim that "God as spirit" is wrongly projected everywhere in the Bible on the basis of a later cosmological dualism as interpreted immaterially. It is true to say that the Bible provides a very different picture from that presented by Graeco-Roman thought in general. Apart from a number of more or less hesitant approaches in the case of Plato and Aristotle and certain doctrines in this sense in the case of the neo-Platonists, transcendence fares rather badly in our classical

1 B 174, p. 239.

2 Porphyry, who was a typical hylic pluralist, commented on this text of Gen. 2. 7 and the *pneuma* mentioned in it in his "To Gaurus"; see Festugière, B 44, p. 283.

3 See above, pp. 6-7.

4 See B 174, p. 492-494.

5 G. Verbeke, B 174, p. 507, believes that he was influenced mainly by the Bible, but I do not find this entirely convincing.

antiquity. What is very prominent in classical thought, both in the case of many of the pre-Socratic thinkers and in that of the Stoics later, is the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism, in which everything is regarded as material or as consisting of fine matter. It can be defended that Genesis also contains evidence of this standpoint¹ and that, if it is seen in a different light, a later view is being read into the text. Gradually, however, a change has come about in this, probably parallel with the transition to a pure and more abstract monotheism. I cannot go into the question as to where and how this took place here. If the beta standpoint cannot be applied here, however, there is, in connection with hylic pluralism especially, still the choice between the gamma and the delta standpoints. In what I have called the gamma standpoint, immateriality only extends as far as the deity. In the case of the delta standpoint, on the other hand, it goes even farther and includes the soul as well.² The extent to which these shades of meaning are revealed in the Old and New Testaments and precisely those places in which they are revealed cannot be investigated in this summary, but I am bound to point out that all kinds of passages occur, especially in the Old Testament, in which the breakthrough in the direction of immateriality is not fully completed, in particular those passages in which God is presented anthropomorphically. I am indeed inclined to say this. In contrast to a view which does accept a supreme, completely immaterial principle or factor at the summit (or in the depths), but rejects all gods existing more in plurality (like Plato's or the neo-Platonists' demiurge or *Íšvara* in Indian thought) in *between* this one God and man and therefore above man, a strictly monotheistic view has this disadvantage. This is that everything which refers to a direct intervention on the part of God himself becomes inconsistent and doubtful. This difficulty is expressed even in later Jewish theology—for example, in the Cabbala. Man must not make any image of God (Exod. 20.4), yet, again and again—even in connection with the creation of man in God's likeness (Gen. 1. 26, 27)—blood is thicker than water and God nonetheless expresses himself.³ This is again and again the case in the Old Testament, whether this is called "primitive" or "naive" or not. I am moreover inclined to say that this is indicative of hylic pluralism with regard to God. If one is averse to seeing a *shape* or form of God, God's *voice* is heard again and again

1 See also B 174, pp. 495-496.

2 See above, p. 6.

3 See G. Scholem, *Von der mystischen Gestalt der Gottheit. Studien zu Grundbegriffen der Kabbala*, 1962, p. 7 ff.

in the Old Testament and in the New. Whoever believes in this is in fact subscribing to hylic pluralism—a voice or sounds undoubtedly form a sensory datum, even though they affect senses which are different from the ordinary ones. It is precisely here that hylic *pluralism* is to be found. What is more, there is also reference in the Old Testament to *light* in connection with God—the *kābhodh*¹ is, among other things, the gleam of light which surrounds God or which betrays his presence and when, for example, Moses came down from Mount Sinai, his face was shining from the reflection of this splendour (Exod. 34. 29 ff). Elsewhere in the Old Testament there are other places in which God is regarded in a far less abstract and monotheistic way and more hylic pluralistically in the sense of what I have called the “sublime *pneuma*”. An example of this is Ezek. 1. 15 ff, in which the *merkābhāh*, Yahweh’s chariot or throne figures and to which a whole mysticism has been attached.² The chariot, however, is a typically hylic pluralistic theme³ and, taken as a whole, there is clearly an analogy here between these ideas and similar ideas in Indian thought concerning the world or, very strikingly, part of the world as God’s (Īśvara’s) body.⁴

As I have said before, I cannot discuss all these and similar points in a satisfactory manner here. I shall therefore limit myself to a few observations. An expression which frequently occurs in the Old Testament is “to bless” and in many cases this amounts to—in asking a blessing or in blessing—“be gracious to me” or respectively “I am gracious to thee”. In certain Old Testament accounts, however, the blessing is conceived in very concrete terms. An example of this is the story of Jacob’s or respectively Esau’s birthright (Gen. 27. 36; 33. 11). Aram there fore said: “What theology has completely spiritualised into a ‘blessing’ is in reality (Gen. 27) a force (*mana*) transmitted by a definite formula”.⁵ As I have explained earlier in this work, there is in *mana*, at least partly, a factor consisting of fine matter.⁶

I must also point out that a great deal has been written about Psalm 104. 4 (cf. Heb. 1. 7) in connection with the question as to whether the *angels* are of fine matter or not. This text has been variously translated, but it always amounts to equating God’s messengers or angels with winds, spirits or *pneumata* and his servants with flames of fire. A

1 This is translated by *doxa* in Greek and by *gloria* in Latin. These words do not mean “light”. These translations were favoured by a later and non-realistic interpretation.

2 See Part II, p. 133; see also Scholem, *op. cit.*, p. 12 ff.

3 See Part II, 133.

4 See Part II, p. 224.

5 B 4, p. 142.

6 See Part II, pp. 93-94.

whole series of Christian authors, especially Greek apologists during the first few centuries after Christ, appealed to this text as an indication that the angels could be said to possess bodies of fine matter—this is a theme to which I shall return later. Grotius, for example, expressed his agreement with this conviction¹ in connection with the idea that everything created is of (fine) matter² and this appeal to the Greek apologists and indirectly to Psalm 104. 4 is also found in the writings of a number of eighteenth century theologians about the *corpora angelorum*.

Another Old Testament text that has attracted a good deal of attention is Gen. 3. 21. This runs: "And the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins and clothed them". A considerable amount has been written about these "coats of skins" (Authorised Version) or "garments of skins" (Revised Standard Version).³ The obvious and literal explanation is that Adam and Eve needed clothing after the fall in order to cover their nakedness and no textiles were available. There is also a symbolic meaning—as a sign of their fall they were clothed with *animal* skins. This line of argument can be followed through. We know that Porphyry was of the opinion that, as it descended, the soul assumed a series of increasingly coarse bodies and that he was acquainted with the Old Testament. He called these coats or garments of skins man's "last garment" and used, for the body of flesh and blood, the expression *dermatikos*, of skin of leather—according to Dodds, an epithet which was not the most obvious one to use.⁴ Dodds believed that Porphyry was influenced here by the *gnosis* of Valentine and his exegesis of the text of Gen. 3. 21, in which the prominent thought was that what was intended here was Adam's last body, the coarse body, Adam having possessed a different, finer and spiritual body before the fall. This is, of course, a hylic pluralistic, idea. Origen also word about Gen. 3. 21, but the commentators are not agreed about whether he himself accepted this idea of Adam's second, coarser body after possessing a first, more spiritual body or whether he was simply reflecting it.⁵ The use of the word *chiton* tunic or garment, for the carnal body would seem to be very ancient⁶ and Valentine and those like him probably arrived at their exegesis of the *chiton dermatikos* in Gen. 3. 21 in this way.⁷ Finally, the same

1 *Opera theologica omnia*, IV, p. 676 (edn. 1732).

2 See above, p. 6; see also Part I, p. 40.

3 See, for example, B 190, p. 301 ff; G.R.S. Mead, *Vestures of the Soul*, p. 99.

4 B 33, p. 308.

5 See Pepin, B 190, p. 302.

6 See Dodds, B 33, p. 307.

7 *ibid.*

idea also occurs again in the Cabbala—before the fall, Adam possessed what Saurat has called a “glorious garment” and Mead a “celestial garment”, whereas, after the fall, he possessed, in Saurat’s words, “a coarse skin”.¹ In any case, this is certainly envisaged hylic pluralistically.

In Part II, p. 224 ff. (see also the illustration 4 which goes together with this section), I questioned whether the chariot of fire mentioned in connection with Elijah’s ascension (2 Kings 2. 11–12) ought not to be regarded as the prophet’s own vehicle or *ochēma* of fine matter, in connection with the frequent use of the chariot or vehicle as an image for the higher aspect of the soul consisting of fine matter.² It can therefore be said that there is undoubtedly more evidence of possible hylic pluralism in the Old Testament and that it would be very difficult to maintain that there are no hylic pluralistic ideas contained in it.

63 ISRAEL: MISCELLANEA

The book known as the Wisdom of Solomon is one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament and was probably written during the first century before the beginning of our own era. It was, however, included in the Vulgate, the Latin translation of the Bible made round about 400 A. D. It was clearly written by a Jewish author from Alexandria and it defends Jewish teachings against Stoic doctrines and other Græco-Roman ideas, although quite a number of both Stoic and Platonic ideas have been taken over by the author of Wisdom. As Verbeke has shown in some detail, there is a good deal of reference in this writing to *pneuma*—the psyche, the principle of life is, for example, called *pneuma zotikon* which is reminiscent of Gen. 2. 7, in which God is said to have breathed into man’s nostrils the breath (*rûah* or *pneuma*) of life.³ Quite apart from hylic pluralism, of course, a great deal could also be said about the concept of *sophia* or wisdom, but what concerns us above all here is that it was itself regarded as an all-pervading *pneuma*, as *pneuma hagion* a holy *pneuma* of “extraordinary subtlety” (*lepton*: VII, 22).⁴ This is yet another example of hylic pluralism.

At a rather later period, but also living in the same sphere of Alexandria, we find the figure of Philo Jadaeus (ca. 25 B.C.—50 A.D.), the most important Jewish Hellenistic thinker, who attempted, on the one hand, to defend Jewish ideas by an allegorical exegesis of the Old Testament and, on the other, took part in Hellenistic mysticism. There

1 See D. Saurat, B 145, p. 106; Mead, *Vestures of the Soul*, p. 99.

2 See also the Indian theme of the *vimanas*, in Part II, pp. 205.

3 See B 174, p. 225.

4 See B 174, pp. 227–228.

is abundant reference to a *pneuma* of fine matter in his writings, on the one hand in connection with Gen. 1. 2 — God's *pneuma* moving over the waters—as I have already indicated in the previous section, and in connection with Gen. 2. 7—the *pneuma* of life (just as the book of Wisdom does) and also as the prophetic *pneuma*, in which man is open to divine inspiration.¹ Verbeke has pointed out that Philo's *pneuma* strikes a distinctly different note from the *pneuma* of the Stoics—the tendency towards “spiritualisation” is more clearly felt in Philo's *pneuma* than in that of the Stoics, in Verbeke's opinion, under the influence of the Old Testament. This does not mean that his colleague, F. Rüsche, who discussed Philo in detail in his *Blut, Leben und Seele*² and also spoke about Philo in the sequel to this work, *Das Seelenpneuma*,³ did not have to admit that the *pneuma* fluid was thought by Philo to be “concrete and substantial” and “of the finest materiality”.⁴ This also applies to the light *pneuma*. Philo made use of this concept as well, speaking, like Heraclitus, of *augē* here,⁵ in order to emphasise the difference between this and the ordinary *pneuma*.⁶ H. Leisegang also renders Philo's opinion, saying that “the spirit must have a body—it must even be a body”, even though it is a light, fine and unterrestrial.⁷ It is moreover also clear that there was an attempt, in Philo's case, to depict God as immaterial, in that case in the manner of the gamma standpoint perhaps.

Hylic pluralistic ideas are also encountered in the writings of the Jewish thinker Saadia ben Joseph (892–942), according to whom the soul was uncorporeal, but not immaterial.⁸ “Uncorporeal” is clearly meant in a relative sense here,⁹ Saadia ben Joseph accepting more than one species of matter.

The Jewish philosopher from Spain, Solomon ben Gebirol, formed part of the medieval Arab philosophical movement and is, as such, known by the name of Avicbron (1020–1070). According to him, intelligible forms could not be without matter.¹⁰ He was therefore the advocate of the doctrine of a *materia spiritualis*, which was a well-known point of controversy in medieval thought and something to which I shall return later.

1 See B 174, p. 236 ff; p. 237; 242; 252.

2 Paderborn, 1930 (B 136), p. 364 ff.

3 Paderborn, 1933 (B 137).

4 B 137, p. 26.

5 See above, p. 64–65; B 137, p. 24.

6 See also F. N. Klein, *Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und in den Hermetschen Schriften*, 1962; see also below, Section 104.

7 B 92, p. 30.

8 B 140, p. 172.

9 See above, p. 8.

10 See B 171, p. 337; B 140, p. 173.

The Cabbala was a remarkable movement in Jewish mysticism, flourishing in the thirteenth century especially, when the main work of this movement, the *Sohar* (gleam of light) appeared. One of the teachings of the Cabbala is the doctrine of three souls or trichotomy. The three souls are *nepheš*, or the vital or animal soul, *rûah* or the intellectual soul, and the deepest soul, *nesamah*, to which a world always corresponds. The form assumed by the *nepheš* here has been described simply as "spiritual body" or "astral body".¹ G. Scholem has, however, been more precise. In his collection, to which I have already referred, *Von der mystischen Gestalt der Gottheit*, he has devoted a chapter to "Zelem, the Idea of the Astral Body" as one of the basic concepts of the Cabbala. Man was created, according to God's image, "in the *zelem* of God" (Gen. 1. 26). This is also the form of man, but his pure shape or form.² This *zelem* recurs, in a somewhat varied form, in the three souls accepted by the Cabbala.³

As far as this pure shape or form is concerned, even the learned Cabbalistic mystics have given their consideration to Gen. 3. 21 and were of the opinion that the animal skins were the consequence of the banishment from paradise and that, before this banishment, Adam possessed a glorified, celestial garment (or body).^{4, 5}

It was my aim in his section to confine my remarks to the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Jewish thought exclusively insofar as the Old Testament is concerned and this has led me rather far on into history. Now, however, we must return to an earlier period.

64. THE NEW TESTAMENT

The word *pneuma*, usually translated as "spirit" occurs again and again in the New Testament and the question that we are bound to ask in this context is the extent to which this word *pneuma* may be intended in a hylic pluralistic sense. As I have previously indicated, I do not in any way dispute that an immaterial concept of God developed in Jewish Christian religious thought,⁶ although I would not like to

1 I. H. Fichte, B 45, p. 274; E. Mattiesen, B 97, p. 570; B 39, under the headings referred to.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 250.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 270.

4 See Mead, *Vestures of the Soul*, p. 99; Saurat, B 14, p. 106.

5 According to E. Benz, *Die Christliche Kabbala, ein Stiefkind der Theologie*, 1958, the Cabbala formed a point of contact for the dialogue between Christianity and Judaism and was, among other things, influential in the thinking of J. Boehme and F. C. Oetinger.

6 See above, p. 60.

exclude the influence of Platonism in this on the later Christian authors.¹ This therefore amounts to our gamma standpoint, in contrast to the beta standpoint of many of the Graeco-Roman thinkers.² It may however be that, in the New Testament, not only God—whom no one has ever seen (John 1. 18) and who is a spirit who must be inwardly worshipped “in spirit (pneuma) and truth” (John 4. 24)—but also man’s soul and all that is spiritual in man is regarded as immaterial (and that this interpretation has not simply been read into the New Testament by Christians in recent centuries under the influence of anthropological dualism). In this case, we should find the delta standpoint in the New Testament—in addition to hylic pluralism (about which I shall have more to say presently), the opinion that *both* God *and* the soul are to be regarded as immaterial.³

Opinions differ, however, *both* about the extent to which this is so and where the dividing line has to be drawn between regarding as hylic pluralistic and regarding as immaterial *and* about the *origin* of immaterial conceptions in the New Testament. Siebeck, for example, was of the opinion (and many scholars would be inclined to agree with him) that the process of “spiritualisation” was already quite far advanced in the Old and New Testaments.⁴ Verbeke, who has gone, into the question of spiritualisation in much greater detail than Siebeck has come to this general conclusion in his book, *L’Evolution de la doctrine du Pneuma du Stoicisme a S. Augustin*, that, if Augustine reached, as it were, a decisive point of development in this question, he did so under the influence of the Bible rather than under the influence of the neo-Platonic authors with whose writings he was acquainted. It is clear, then, that Verbeke was not in agreement⁵ with H. Leisegang, who, in his two books on the Holy Spirit,⁶ tried to demonstrate that the concept of the spirit in the synoptic gospels was indirectly derived from Greek mysticism. Obviously there is no unanimity here. It would, of course, take me too far out of my way to go too deeply into this question and to take up a position in this controversy. I shall confine myself here simply to drawing attention to places in the New Testament which are *manifestly* hylic pluralistic. I shall not, therefore, consider questions concerned with how *pneuma* ought *in general* to be seen in the New Testament (with, as a result, the question as to whether

1 See above, p. 60.

2 See above, p. 54-55.

3 See above, p. 5.

4 B 155, p. 155 ff; see also B 174, p. 3 ff.

5 B 174, p. 4.

6 B 92; see also B 93.

the standpoint adopted in the New Testament should be the delta standpoint, the gamma standpoint or even the beta standpoint—a standpoint which I personally regard as improbable, even though Tertullian and Hobbes¹ were of this opinion).

I should only like to make the following observation. Verbeke is a person who weighs all the data very carefully and he says that this "worship in spirit and truth" of John 4. 24 (one can add to this—this worship which seems so purely spiritual and immaterial) should also occur as such in the doctrines of Cleanthes, Chrysippus Posidonius, in other words, in the teachings of prominent Stoics, because, according to them, the subtle *pneuma* or spirit permeates the whole of reality.² The step from the immaterial view of the Holy Spirit (*to pneuma hagion*—a very common expression for some time even before the New Testament) to a material view (of fine matter³) is therefore not so very great. And anyone who might perhaps have wanted to defend the view that *pneuma* in the New Testament was very frequently intended in the sense of fine matter must have been influenced by the Stoa, a philosophy and system of teaching which was extremely widespread at the beginning of the Christian era. It is certainly true to say that Stoic ideas about the soul and so on had a considerable influence on the content of the New Testament and, in accordance with this, the earliest Christian authors—the so-called apologists—show evidence of having been very close to the gamma and even to the beta standpoint and of being subject to the influence of the Stoa.⁴

As I have already said, however, I have decided not to discuss this question as to the extent of the spiritualisation of concepts in the New Testament and should prefer to consider here a number of texts which *in themselves* point strongly in the direction of hylic pluralism.

G. A. van den Bergh van Eysinga (1874-1957) has pointed to John 20.22: "And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and said to them, 'Receive the Holy Spirit' and has had this to say about it: 'Despite his ideal view of the Spirit. (see, for example, 4. 24; 14 17; 26; 15. 26; 16. 13), the evangelist nonetheless thought of the Spirit as a fluid, a more or less etheric and material element, which could bring about, in a tense state, the great miracle of the resurrection of the dead, that prototype of Jesus' resurrection of himself. Spirit seems to be a superhuman divine power which is transferred to the disciples by blowing".⁴ I am bound to add to this that it should not be forgotten

1 See above, p. 6.

2 B 174, p. 390.

3 See above, p. 6; see also below, p. 77-78.

4 *Godsdienstwetenschappelijke Studien*, XIII, p. 56.

that the stem *pne* means "blow" and that *rûah* in the old Testament means "wind" and that this is all thought of hylic pluralistically.

There are many different places in the New Testament in which there is reference to a *personal* and *concrete* *pneuma*. Verbeke has also pointed to these.¹ John the Baptist was "filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb" (Luke 1. 15). The Holy Spirit, who overshadows Mary, has a concrete effect (Luke 1. 35).² Quite often, someone is instigated by the Holy Spirit to do something definite. There is a whole series of texts referring to the imposition of hands, either in order to bless (Mark 10. 16)³ or in order to cure (Mark 6. 5; Luke 4. 40; 13. 13; Acts 9. 17)—in which there is a remarkable similarity with the "animal magnetism" practised by A. Mesmer in the eighteenth century⁴—or finally simply in order to receive the Holy Spirit (Acts 8. 17). The pouring out of the Holy Spirit is particularly concrete and strong at the feast of Pentecost (Acts 2. 2)—being accompanied by a sound "like the rush of a mighty wind" (*pnoës biatas*) in which "there appeared tongues as of fire, distributed and resting on each one of them" (the apostles) who "began to speak in other tongues". Further on in the Acts of the Apostles too, the Holy Spirit is represented again and again as a concrete force which was poured out in certain special cases and which Simon Magus tried to purchase (Acts 8. 18). It is not, of course, everywhere stated that this *pneuma* is of fine matter, but in view of the very widespread idea of a *pneuma* of fine matter—for example, the prophetic *pneuma*⁵ of Philo and the mantic *pneuma* of Plutarch, in other words, the general view at the period—it is obvious that the *pneuma* in those texts in the New Testament in which concrete situations are referred to must be regarded as being in keeping with this general view and as analogous with it.

It cannot, however, be denied that there are certain religious elements in the New Testament which cannot be discerned elsewhere, for example, in the Stoic philosophy, even though this movement was also inclined towards religion.⁶ This does not mean, however, that various aspects of hylic pluralism do not occur in the New Testament and, what is more

1 B 174, p. 393.

2 See below, Section 97.

3 See above, p. 62.

4 See below, Section 96.

5 See, for example, Luke 1. 67: "And... Zechariah was filled with the Holy Spirit, and prophesied, saying..." Leisegang has said that this *pneuma* must be seen as "supraterrestrial power from God suddenly flowing into the soul" (see B 92, p. 113), which inevitably makes one think of the Stoic saying that everything that is active is of (fine) matter.

6 See above, p. 44.

aspects of a special character or quality which—even though similar aspects may be reported elsewhere as well—appear very characteristically here in the New Testament. Above all, I am thinking in this case of the transfiguration of Jesus on Mount Tabor and his resurrection.

The account of the transfiguration appears in all three synoptic gospels, in which we read that Jesus took three of his disciples up to a high mountain where they saw not only Jesus, but also Moses and Elijah and Jesus “was transfigured before them, and his face shone like the sun, and his garments became white as light”.¹ This is a very remarkable passage. I shall deal in a separate chapter with the image of garments used for the body of fine matter and with the theme of a supraterrrestrial light, about which a great deal has already been written.² The Hesychasts of Mount Athos were later to attach a whole mysticism of light to the apparitions on Mount Tabor—they claimed that they had themselves occasionally perceived this special light. What, however, is most important for us is that, according to the gospel story Jesus was *metemorphothē*—transfigured or changed in shape or form. It has been suggested that the disciples saw, through this transfiguration, instead of or through the ordinary body a different, radiant body, emanating an unusual or “intelligible” light. This is also a hylic pluralistic idea, in which it is not the ordinary *pneuma* which is involved, but a *pneuma* at a different, higher level—the *pneuma* that I have called the “sublime *pneuma*”.³ I am not alone in this position—this is clear from what R. Eisler has said about Jesus’ transfiguration on the mountain: “The meaning of this account is evident—the garment of light and the illumination of his features, which the first Adam had lost because of the fall, are given back to the Son of Man “the *eschatos Adam*, during his lifetime on earth”.⁴ What is more, the mystic P. Poiret (1646-1719), the disciple of Boehme, was of the opinion that not only Jesus, but also Moses and Elijah appeared on this occasion “with their true bodies”, the “subtle”, “of subtle matter”.⁵

Whatever the case may be, all these questions arise even more insistently in the account of Jesus’ resurrection. In this, we read of a “glorified body”, a *corpus gloriosum* or a “glorious”, in contrast

1 Matt. 17.2; see also Mark 9.4; Luke 9.29.

2 As far as the New Testament is concerned, see, for example, H. H. Malmede, *Die Lichtsymbolik im Neuen Testament*, 1960.

3 See above, p. 11; see also Part I, Section 9.

4 *Orphisch-dionysische Mysteriengedanken in der christlichen Antike*, 1925, p. 31

5 See P. Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, III, p. 2479, note. This may be compared with the shining of Moses’ face when he came down from Sinai (see above, p. 62) and Malmede’s analysis.

with the ordinary body that has been cast off. Roman Catholic theology contains detailed doctrines about this body, according to which the resurrected body of Christ is distinguished from an ordinary body by the *dotes* or bridal gifts discussed by the Church Fathers and later by, among others, Thomas Aquinas. A description of these bridal gifts can be found, for example, in M. J. Scheeben's *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik*, revised by L. Atzberger.¹ These gifts are 1. *incorruptibilitas* or intransience; 2. *claritas* or clarity, gleam of light, a more or less great halo; 3. *agilitas* or dynamism—free of weight, it follows the spirit everywhere; 4. *subtilitas* or fineness or penetrability.² It cannot be denied that this gives a strongly hylic pluralistic impression—a different and finer materiality is postulated in the case of a special quality. This doctrine of the glorified body of Jesus is a typical example of faith in the existence of a *pneuma* at a high level—that of the sublime *pneuma*.

It is, however, important to distinguish first of all between Jesus' resurrection on the third day and the general resurrection of all men in the fullness of time, which is also mentioned in the New Testament.³ Secondly, it is necessary to consider which texts form the basis of this doctrine of the four *dotes*. What is striking is that there is not very much in the gospels themselves which can give us a clear indication of these special qualities of Jesus' resurrected body. It is true that, according to John 20. 19, he entered the room where the disciples were "the doors being shut" (*januis clausis*)—this may point to the gift of *subtilitas* or penetrability.⁴ It is for this reason too that the spiritistic or parapsychological question has been raised as to whether what we have here are not reports of *appearances* of Jesus in analogy with others.⁵ One is also reminded of the event on the road to Emmaus, which is generally interpreted as Jesus being there suddenly and unnoticed and then suddenly disappearing again, becoming invisible.⁶ Other factors however, argue against this explanation of the event as a spiritual appearance. Jesus himself denied that he was a spirit and to prove this he told them to touch him and ate fish and honey.⁷ No, if we disregard the transfiguration on the mountain, we are bound to affirm

¹ B 147.

² *op. cit.*, p. 923; see also B 29, III, col. 1887.

³ See, for example, Matt. 23. 28 ff; John 11. 24.

⁴ See B 29, III, col. 1887.

⁵ See, for example, G. Zorab, *Het Opstandingsverhaal in het licht der parapsychologie*, 1949.

⁶ Luke 24. 15 ff.

⁷ Luke 24. 39, 42.

that very little can be found in the four gospels: which points to the *corpus gloriosum* as such.

This doctrine of the glorified body, which was condensed in, for example, the teaching of the four bridal gifts, is based less on the gospels than on the letters of Paul. I shall discuss the doctrines concerning the resurrection of *men* in connection with hylic pluralism later in a separate chapter.¹ Now, however, I should like to consider the opinions of the apostle Paul.

65. PAUL

These views are all the more interesting in connection with our investigation, because Paul does explicitly discuss various bodies with different qualities. A great deal is involved in this and a great deal has also been written about it, with the result that I must limit myself. Paul wrote, in his first letter to the Corinthians, in some detail about the resurrection body and made a connection between the body of the resurrected Christ who is the first-born (1 Cor. 15. 20) and the body of the mass of humanity at the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15. 22 ff.). This resurrection body is, among other things incorruptible or imperishable according to Paul (see 1 Cor. 15. 42) and incorruptibility is one of the "bridal gifts". It is therefore indisputable that the theologians who have written about these dotes have based their teachings more on Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians than on the gospels (see the manual of Scheeben and Atzberger, B 147, IV, p. 923).

The term that Paul uses for the "spiritual body" that is resurrected is *sōma pneumatikon*, the pneumatic body. We must, however, be careful in our interpretation of "pneumatic" in this context. *Pneuma* was used in antiquity in many different senses and at various levels. One level was, for example, the medical and physiological level, which had been current for a long time at the period when Paul was living² and had indeed for centuries been at a premium as *spiritus animales et vitales*. Paul certainly did not intend his teaching to be understood at this level. He had a very special *pneuma* and body in mind at the level which I have called that of the sublime *pneuma*. I shall be returning briefly in a later chapter to the various ideas of the resurrection body of men generally, but what I can in any case say here is that this form of hylic pluralism, the acceptance of an elevated body of fine

¹ See below, Section 107.

² B 174, p. 175 ff.

matter, certainly occurs in Paul's teachings and that this is at the beginning of a whole development of ideas.

This, however, is not the only form of hylic pluralism in Paul's writings. As far as his ideas in general are concerned, I should like to point to the following observation (in a different context) in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*¹: "(not) as a quasiphysical radiance of the suprasensible world, closely associated with the *pneuma* as a light-substance,² as in Pauline teaching. . ." This is, of course, completely in accordance with our hylic pluralism. But where, then, can evidence of another kind of hylic pluralism be found in Paul's writings apart from that concerning the pneumatic or resurrection body? In the first place, there is the well-known series of texts in 2 Cor. 5. 1 ff, which tell us that man will have a "house from God" when his earthly tent" is destroyed and that he will be "clothed"—*ependusasthai*—with a "heavenly dwelling". It should not be forgotten, in connection with this image of the dwelling, that it was probably derived from Paul's own experience as an erstwhile tent-maker. The image of the garment, however, of clothing for the body—not only for the ordinary body, but also for higher bodies³—was a very common one, as we shall see later.⁴ What did Paul have in mind here? It is to some extent obvious that what we have here is once again the resurrection body and this is indeed the way in which it is often regarded. There may, however, be a different intention. One is reminded here of the question which has frequently confronted theologians as to what happens to man's soul during the time between death and the ultimate resurrection at Christ's second coming, when the resurrection body becomes effective. There is no general agreement among theologians about this. Some have expressed the view that there is in fact nothing during this intervening period, at the most a kind of sleep. (This view has been rather prominent among Calvinist theologians in the last thirty or forty years.⁵) Roman Catholic theologians, on the other hand, believe that this period is spent in purgatory and heaven.⁶ It is possible to see, at the beginning of 2 Cor. 5, an allusion to just such an intervening state in heaven, in which there is also reference to a certain corporeality with which man is "clothed" but which at the most anticipates the resurrec-

1 B 40, XI, p. 795.

2 See also E. Benz, *Paulus als Visionär*, 1952 (B 192), p. 85 ff.

3 See above, p. 63 with reference to Gen. 3. 21.

4 See below, Section 93.

5 See, for example, G. van der Leeuw, *Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding?* 1936; see also Part I, p. 177.

6 See, for example, I. Klug, *Het katholieke geloof*, 1939, p. 608.

tion body without in fact being that resurrection body itself. This is indeed the view of a number of Lutheran theologians—to whom I shall return briefly later—who have spoken of an “intermediate corporeality”, that is, a corporeality between death and the resurrection. We can name one of these theologians here—H. W. Rinck, a “pastor at Elberfeld”, who appealed to 2 Cor. 5 in this sense in a book which he wrote in 1861.¹ If this really was Paul’s intention, then there is clearly another form of hylic pluralism in his teachings, other than that concerning the pneumatic or resurrection body.

We cannot, however, come to this conclusion yet. There is another and still more important problem concerning the interpretation of a text in Paul’s letters, even more difficult than the problem that I have just discussed. It is the well-known passage in 1 Cor. 15. 44, which has been translated as “If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body” in the Revised Standard Version, but which was rendered in the earlier Authorised Version as “There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body”. I do not propose to discuss this “spiritual body” here—the *sōma pneumatikon*, but rather the “natural body”, which presents us with a very strange problem. The Greek text has *esth sōma psuchikon*. How did this “psychical body” come to be translated in the first place as “natural body”? It is well worth while consulting a number of Dutch translations of the Bible (in some of which the word “natural” is also used) in order to ascertain the way in which *sōma psuchikon* has been rendered. A considerable divergence is to be found, here. A very useful book here is F. W. Grosheide’s New Testament which provides six translations into Dutch in six parallel columns.² Three of these, including the State Translation, render this text as “natural body” and three, including the Leiden translation and Dr. A. M. Brouwer’s version, as “soul body”. There is, as I have said, great divergence here, but what cannot be denied is that “soul body” or “psychical body” is the most literal translation. The argument in favour of the other translation (“natural”) is that it is quite clear that the ordinary body is meant here, in contrast to the elevated, pneumatic body. But the word that appears in the Greek is *psuchikon* and it is only by a certain amount of contortion that this word can be translated in such a way that it reminds us of the ordinary, physical body. All kinds of arguments have been put forward to justify this choice—including the one that the psychical aspect was, for Paul, what Bolland would call “pertaining to the soul”³ an argument which has a great

1 *Vom Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode*, Basle, 1861, 3rd edn. 1878, p. 166.

2 *Het Nieuwe Testament in zes Nederlandse vertalingen*, 1950.

3 See, for example, *Spreuken*, 2nd edn., 1919, nos. 427, 480, 481.

deal in its favour—but why, I am bound to ask, a psychical *body*? The strongest argument in favour of equating it with the physical or natural body seems to me to be the biological argument. There is, in 1 Cor. 15. 42-44, frequent reference to the *sowing* of the body which is late called the psychical body. In this case, what is clearly meant is the ordinary physical body. This was the opinion of, for example, both Calvin and Erasmus, but I am afraid that I do not regard this explanation as very convincing. Something that is connected with this question, is, in this argument, completely ignored—the theme of hylic pluralism, which is, in general seriously neglected. In my opinion, a point must be taken into account in connection with these passages in Paul which is in itself sufficiently firmly established and sufficiently well-known.

Three views are, generally speaking, distinguished in connection with the origin of the human soul. The first is creationism, which teaches that God creates directly a soul for every individual embryo. The second is the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul and the third is *traducianism*, according to which a part of the parents' soul is transferred to the child at fertilisation.¹ Tertullian was in support of this third doctrine, but it would be wrong to claim that he was the first to proclaim it. Verbeke, for example, has written explicitly about the traducianism of the Stoics, both of the Stoa in general (B. 174, p. 30) and of Zeno (p. 47), of Panaetius and Posidonius (p. 96) and of Seneca (p. 145). Traducianism also occurs in the teachings of Aristotle (*De anim. gen.*, II, 3, 736 b 33) and it is especially the *pneuma* of the father which is transmitted to the child via the sperm. In other words, there was, in the production of the embryo with a soul, a factor of fine matter—the *pneuma* (here in a much lower, "physiological" sense, not in the sense of the sublime *pneuma*) which was active in this process. This was, without any doubt, a very widespread view.² Whatever path that were peculiar to himself Paul may have followed,³ he was in very many ways a child of his time and dependent on the Stoic ideas of that period.⁴ It is therefore obvious, I feel, to accept that traducianistic views, postulating the transference of a *pneuma* of fine matter on birth, played a part in the conception of 1 Cor. 15. 42. This means that the biological argument in favour of equating the psychical body with

¹ See, for example, B 179, XVII, p. 571.

² See Onians (B 233), pp. 119-120. I shall be returning to these problems of birth in connection with hylic pluralism; see below, Section 97.

³ See, for example, Acts 17. 18 ff.

⁴ See, for example, J. de Zwaan, *Mnemosyne N. S.*, Vol. 48, pp. 321-323, on 1 Cor. 11.24; see also K.H.E. de Jong, B 77, pp. 144-147.

the ordinary physical body no longer holds good and that some light is also thrown on the use of the term "psychical body" (and superfluous to a forced style)—apart from the ordinary body and the pneumatic and spiritual body, there is also a factor of fine matter which is here condensed into a "psychical body".

I do not know whether others have also pointed to this possible explanation for 1 Cor. 15. 44 with the help of the theme of a *pneuma* of fine matter transmitted at birth which gives rise to a body of fine matter which is transcendent and "belongs to the soul". What I do know is that the question has often been raised as to whether there are not three factors in Paul's teaching here, a *trichotomy*, although this conclusion has only been drawn with considerable hesitation. In this case, then, *in addition* to the psychical body and the pneumatic body of 1 Cor. 15. 44, we may accept the ordinary body as a third factor, which Paul usually calls *sōma*, but also flesh, *sarx*. In support of this, 1 Thess. 5. 23, in which an explicit list is given—spirit or *pneuma*, soul or *psuche*, body or *sōma*,—of these three factors, has often been quoted. In his well-known manual, H. Lietzmann has therefore asked whether a trichotomous anthropology ought not to be attributed to Paul.¹ Verbeke has pointed out the text² in question as well, but he is reluctant to conclude from it that Paul teaches a trichotomy even though others have come to this conclusion. It is a fact that, in the later gnosis, the triad hylic, psychical and pneumatic types of men—was customary.³ Some scholars too do not hesitate to call Paul a gnostic—F. Heiler, for example, said that Paul was "a Christian gnostic"⁴ and H. Leisegang said that "the apostle Paul's view of the world was that of the gnostics".⁵ Even F. Gogarten has said of Paul: "This distinction between the psychical and pneumatic belongs to the gnostic terminology".⁶ It can, in my opinion, be safely assumed that Paul inclined towards a trichotomy, although we should not let ourselves be put off here by later condemnations of the idea of trichotomy in this sense. The central factor of the three was called explicitly a *soma psuchikon*, a psychical body, by Paul. In view of the general tendency in antiquity to regard the soul as consisting of (fine) matter, we may, I believe, safely assume that Paul had a body of fine matter in mind when he spoke of this psychical body, a material body which was different both from the

1 III, p. 38.

2 B 174, p. 407.

3 See B 226, p. 28; B 174, p. 298.

4 *Der Unsterblichkeitsglaube*, 1950, p. 19.

5 *Die Gnosis* (B 226), p. 3.

6 *Die Verkündigung Jesu Christi*, 1948, II, p. 254.

ordinary body (*sarx*) and from the pneumatic or resurrection body. This psychical body is thus connected with the *pneuma* of the child's father (according to Tertullian, it is, in this way, even indirectly connected with Adam's soul¹) and it is the characteristic principle of life. Hence the biological themes which Paul introduces in 1 Cor. 15, those of sowing and of perishing. He also quotes Gen. 2. 7 in 1 Cor. 15. 45: "The first man Adam became a living being", that is, by having life blown into him by God. The result of that blowing in of life was the *nepheš* or soul and this *nepheš* was regarded, as we have seen, as consisting of fine matter in the Old Testament² and was equated by later thinkers with the astral body.³ It therefore seems to me that it is plausible to assume that Paul understood the psychical body of 1 Cor. 15. 44 to consist of fine matter.

Hylic pluralism is therefore present in many different forms in the writings of Paul. To conclude this section, I should like to refer briefly to 2 Cor. 12. 2, in which the apostle says that he was, on one occasion, "caught up to the third heaven". This, of course, is a text that many readers prefer to pass over, but what it says comes within the category of what is known as "excursions". I shall have more to say about these in a later section.⁴ All that I shall say here is that several spheres, stages or "planes" are accepted in the New Testament so that it is possible to speak here of a cosmological hylic pluralism.⁵

66. EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Early Christianity was faced with a twofold task—the defence (or apology) of its message against the criticism and the attacks of contemporary non-believers and, closely connected with this, the construction of a specifically Christian theoretical standpoint or theology. Rather a varied picture is provided by the writings of the early Christian authors—in addition to the specifically Christian teachings which are variously explained, we find in these writings the existing philosophical or religious views of the period, one group of Christian authors following one set of philosophical or religious views, another following another set more closely. The well-known medieval scholar, E. Gilson, has distinguished two main periods of early Christian theology. The first is the *patristic* period, during which Christian theologians were, as far

1 See B 179, XVII, p. 571.

2 See above, pp. 23, 58-59.

3 See above, p. 66.

4 See below, Section 100.

5 See below, Section 111.

as philosophical and other doctrines are concerned, principally under the influence of Plato and the neo-Platonists. The second period is that of *scholasticism* and this was orientated mainly towards Aristotle and Aristotelianism.¹ The name of Augustine is linked above all to the first period, that of patristicism and the name of Thomas Aquinas is associated with the second or scholastic period. Both of these periods, however, occur somewhat later than the beginning or the very first centuries of Christianity. I have already pointed out that, as far as the very first period is concerned, there is the problem of the "materialistic psychology" of the early Christian authors.² It is difficult to dispute that this very first period was very much dominated by a philosophy which was different from that of either Plato or Aristotle—in other words, by the Stoic philosophy which was so influential at that time. It is moreover generally agreed that a form of materialism was very characteristic of the Stoic philosophy.

The problems confronting this very early period of Christian thought have been investigated by M. Spanneut and the results of his study have been published in a very detailed work entitled *Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'Eglise*³ de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie.⁴ Spanneut suggests that Gilson's two main periods, patristicism and scholasticism, should be preceded by an earlier period, which he calls "a Stoic phase" (p. 434). With regard to the anthropology of these very first authors in the Church, he says that "the influence of the Stoa is undeniable" (p. 149) and that "the Stoic elements in the psychology of the Fathers are altogether very numerous" (p. 176). With regard to the question of the relationship between God and the world, there was Spanneut claims, "a real influence of Stoicism" (p. 344). This is certainly true, even though much more has been written about the influence of Platonism (p. 33) in this later period.

These affirmations are, of course, important for us because this "materialism" raises problems connected with hylic pluralism. As I have already pointed out, despite this "materialism", the Stoics were

1 "Le christianisme et la tradition philosophique", *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, II, p. 249 ff.

2 See above, p. 6-7.

3 In this dissertation which he defended at the Sorbonne, Spanneut took a rather broad view of the concept "father of the Church", treating the fathers as Christian authors in general of the first Christian centuries—as a rule, Tertullian, for example, is not called a father of the Church (see B 179, XII, p. 41). What is more, Spanneut limited himself to the period of ca. 230, going therefore as far as the emergence of neo-Platonism on the one hand and of figures such as Origen, Augustine and others on the other hand.

4 1957; B 251.

genuinely religious, or at least inclined towards religion¹ and this was something which makes it possible to understand more easily the relationships between early Christianity and Stoicism. We have also ascertained, however, that the materialism of the Stoics was a *dualistic materialism*—the beta form of hylic pluralism²—which means that there were considerable differences between their materialism and ordinary or monistic materialism. Similarly, there is consequently less reason to treat the materialistic psychology of the Church Fathers of the first Christian centuries as a kind of “skeleton in the cupboard”—or not to deal with it at all. There is also another factor. As well as dualistic materialism or the beta standpoint, there are also the gamma and the delta standpoints, both of which postulate that God is purely immaterial, but at the same time that the soul is either of fine matter or possesses a vehicle of fine matter.³ The first is certainly a typically Christian doctrine⁴ and, as far as fine materiality in connection with the soul is concerned, the problem of a “materialistic psychology” can certainly be raised with regard to those who adhere to the gamma and delta standpoints. Here, however, there is no real materialism, because it is not matter, but God that is regarded as the highest reality. Insufficient distinction has, in my opinion, been made here. As far as the authors who were above all influenced by Stoicism are concerned, however, the question of a genuine materialism is certainly raised.

It would take me too far out of my way to discuss in detail the nuances that occur in connection with these problems in a long series of theologians.⁵ I can do no more than limit myself to a discussion of a few characteristic examples of the standpoints that occur.

One of the most important figures here is Tertullian (160-222), a man who wrote a great deal and exercised a great influence. He is still the object of serious attention, but he is not usually accorded the honorary title of “father of the Church” because he departed from the Christian teaching of the Church which eventually came to be generally accepted and, among other things, joined the Montanists. He is, however, very important for us in our special study because he adhered very closely to Stoicism and the dualistic materialism which it taught. Spanneut has, for example, referred to Tertullian’s “universal materialism” (p. 390). This is in the first place related to the human soul, which is “corporeal” (p. 161; *De anima* IX, 1) and possesses a form

1 See above, pp. 7-8, 43.

2 See above, p. 44.

3 See above, p. 6.

4 See above, p. 61.

5 See above, p. 6.

with the three deminisions, length, breadth and depth (*ibid.*). In the second place, it is also related to God—the answer to the question, is God in principle “material or spiritual”, is he is a body (pp. 289-290; *De carne* XI).¹ In the third place, the angels are, according to Tertullian, also material. In this context, Tertullian also quotes Psalm 104. 4 (p. 392).² We may also say that, in writing about the sojourn of souls in heaven after death and before the resurrection (and, what is more, in some detail),³ and in describing their state there as material, Tertullian was the forerunner of the doctrine of “intermediate corporeality” as propounded by the school of Lutheran theologians.⁴

It is, however, necessary to make a few observations here. Tertullian was not concerned with *one* kind of matter, ordinary matter as we know it. On the contrary, he believed that the soul possessed “its own kind of body” (Spanneut, p. 161; *De anima* IX, 1). This also applies to the angels—they too possess a “corporeality of its own special kind” (p. 392). In other words, what we have here is a case of dualistic materialism, as with the Stoics. As far as the concept of God is concerned, we are here too reminded of a *pneuma* of fine matter which penetrates everything, once again as in the case of the Stoics. All the same, this beta standpoint makes a rather strange impression in the case of a Christian author and Tertullian and, much later, Hobbes are more or less alone in this. We should, however, realise that the Stoic conviction, that everything that is—everything that *really* is—is material,⁵ was continuing to make itself felt in the writings of Tertullian (Spanneut, p. 391; *De anima* VII, 3). Augustine was to write, at a later stage, that Tertullian believed that God was a body because he was afraid in case God was otherwise nothing (*De Gen. at Litt.* X, 25, 41; see Spanneut, p. 391, note 6). This is taking the principle that everything that acts must consist of mater or of fine matter a long way, but it cannot be denied that it is consistent.

Similar views are to be found in other Christian authors of the same period. Spanneut has said that Tertullian’s contemporary Irenaeus of Lyons (ca. 140-202) was “quite extraordinarily materialistic” (p. 143) and that, as far as the form of the soul was concerned, he was “as radically materialistic” as Tertullian himself (p. 166).⁶ It would therefore

1 See above, pp. 6-7.

2 See above, p. 63.

3 See H. Finé, S. J., *Die Terminologie der Jenseitsvorstellungen bei Tertullian, Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des Zwischenzustandes*, 1958. See also Festugière, (B 44), p. 20.

4 See above, p. 74 and below, Section 72.

5 See above, pp. 7, 44.

6 B 140, p. 19.

seem to be certain that Spanneut was right to define an early period in Christian theology, preceding the patristic and the scholastic periods and to characterise it as dependent on the philosophy of the Stoics, with all the advantages and disadvantages of this dependence. It is, in my opinion, obvious that this should be kept in mind in any judgement that might be made of the background to the New Testament.

There are, however, also different tendencies that are present in the Old and New Testaments and these have been considered more by the Greek authors than by the Latin writers. Spanneut concludes his study with a discussion of Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-211) and shows in this that quite a different view is encountered in the writings of this author from the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, a view which at the same time anticipates the period which followed (p. 166 ff). According to Clement, the lower part of the soul and the angels were certainly also of (fine) matter, but God¹ was not a 'body' (p. 289). In our terminology, then, Clement's standpoint was not the beta, but the gamma standpoint.

This standpoint or climate of opinion emerges even more clearly in the Greek writings of another very well-known and highly esteemed author, Origen (185-254) than in the case of Clement. Spanneut does not discuss Origen in his book, because his writings mark the beginning of the period which was predominantly influenced by Platonism or neo-Platonism. Like Plotinus, Origen followed the lectures given by Ammonias Saccas, who is regarded as the founder of the neo-Platonic movement. Whereas Tertullian had disputed the teachings of the gnostics, Origen—whose writings were to be condemned later in 399—tried to be as philosophical as the gnostics themselves and to achieve a synthesis between revelation and philosophy, between Christianity and the wisdom of the ancient world. He has always had a great influence on the Eastern, Greek Orthodox branch of Christianity.

As far as our special subject is concerned—Origen rejected the materialism of the Stoics and preferred to follow the teaching of Philo Judaeus,² who was inclined either to postulate an immaterial being or to accept great qualitative differences between various species of *pneuma*.³ In the thought of Philo and Origen, this clearly points in the direction of the delta standpoint—the soul using a *pneuma-ochēma* of fine matter, but being itself immaterial. This was also the opinion of Plotinus and the other neo-Platonists, who also rejected Stoic materialism. Origen,

1 It is moreover worth while considering the fact that, for many of the authors in question, the "World", the Logos or the Son was also material, even though there are mutual differences between them (see p. 299).

2 See B 136, pp. 421-422.

3 See above, p. 64-65.

however, was explicitly of the opinion that soul was *always* bound to possess some *ochēma*—Dodds has drawn attention to this,¹ referring to Origen's *De principiis* II, II. Rüsche too has referred to this passage and concludes that it is, according to Origen, impossible for purely spiritual beings (*noes*) "to live and exist without some corporeality".² It is precisely to this that I have given the name "psychohylism". Origen also used the term *augooides sōma*, radiant body, in connection with the soul in *Contra Celsum*, II, 60³. These doctrines are also typical of neo-Platonism and of hylic pluralism. Origen also distinguished various *pneumata*, accepting a trichotomy of the soul. Rüsche has analysed this.⁴ The life-*pneuma*, *pneuma zotikon*, also plays a part in this, but I cannot go into all the details here. It is almost unnecessary to say that the angels too has subtle bodies at thier disposal according to Origen.⁵ Finally, I am bound to mention that Origen also declared that resurrection bodies naturally assume the shape of a sphere.⁶ (This was one of the points in his teaching which was quoted against him later as heretical). This doctrine also occurs in non-Christian authors with regard to the subtle body. Clearly the spherical shape was regarded as more perfect than the human shape.⁷

On the whole, it is not wrong to regard Origen as marking the beginning of the period in Christian theology which was influenced principally by Plato and the neo-Platonists, even though Clement of Alexandria preceded him in certain ways in this. This tendency was to be continued by Augustine and was to set the tone in Christian theology for many centuries after Augustine. Before we examine the theology of Augustine and Augustinianism, however, we must once again go back into the past as it were and give our attention to a side-shoot of official Christianity which was at the time of considerable importance—the movement known as gnosticism.

67. Gnostic Trends

In my opinion at least, gnosticism was a very interesting phenomenon. But how very differently it has been assessed and how difficult it is to

1 B 33, pp. 319-320.

2 B 137, p. 43.

3 See Rüsche, *ibid.*; Dodds, p. 317.

4 See B 136, p. 412 ff; see also B 174, p. 451 ff.

5 G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, 1961 ff, gives places under the heading of *angelos*; see also H. Cornélis, *Les fondements cosmologiques de l'eschatologie d'Origène*, 1959, p. 27; see also, in general, M. Lang, *Die Leiblichkeit der Ver-nunftwesen bei Origenes*, 1892.

6 *De oratione*, 31, 29; see also Dodds, B 33, p. 308.

7 See K. H. E. de Jong, *Die Kugelgestalt der Seele*, B 65, p. 20 ff; see also below, Section 102.

define its limits!¹ G. Quispel, for example, is convinced that it forms a single whole, claiming that this is evident now that a series of manuscripts, those of Nag Hammadi, for example, have been brought to light. What is more, in the form of Manicheanism, gnosticism almost succeeded in supplanting Christianity. This is why Quispel called one of his books *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (1951). On the other hand, how many different forms were not assumed by this gnosis! I briefly described, on pp. 581-585, the hermetic literature, the so-called Chaldaean oracles and the Mithras liturgy. These are usually included within the gnostic movement and, although they are called non-Christian or pagan gnosis, this does not mean that the boundary between this and the Christian gnosis, which existed at more or less the same time and in which Jesus played a part (in, for example, the *Pistis Sophia*), were not very fluid. As far as this Christian gnosis is concerned, it was and still is regarded by historically developed orthodox Christianity as a regrettable deviation and was, for example, ardently opposed by Irenaeus. Even Plotinus, for example, opposed the gnostics! But these Christian gnostics in no sense formed a unity among themselves—Leisegang has described the various sects among the gnostics in his *Die Gnosis* (B 226; 1924; 4th edn., 1955). It is also important to distinguish between gnostics so called in the narrower sense and gnostics in the broader sense. In this broader sense, even the apostle Paul has sometimes been called a gnostic² and typically gnostic elements occur in the thought of Clement of Alexandria and of Origen. There is also a Jewish gnosticism, embodied in Philo Judaeus³ and later in the Cabbala.⁴ It is generally accepted that there was a clear link between gnosticism and Iranian thought and, in the form of the religion founded by Mani (215-276), which is connected with Mazdeism, the whole complex enjoyed considerable success for some time. Later, there were various offshoots of Manicheanism in the history of religion—the medieval Cathari or Albigenians, for example.

What have all these various phenomena or trends in common, then? It has been suggested that it might have been an esoteric doctrine which had followers not only in Persia, but also in Egypt and ancient Greece and which formed an unbroken line from the Greek mysteries the gnostic aspect of Christianity. All these religious phenomena, which flourished in later antiquity and which were in any case certainly

1 E. M. J. M. Cornélls, *Mogelijkheden en moeilijkheden bij het definiëren van de Gnosis*, 1959.

2 See above, p. 76.

3 See above, pp. 64-65.

4 See above, p. 66.

connected with the religious life of the Middle East, have been grouped together under the title of the "mystery religions".

In answer to the question, what was common to all these teachings, we are bound to say this—whereas traditional and orthodox Christianity, generally, speaking, has always given prominence to *pistis*, faith, in these teachings, the emphasis was placed on *gnosis*, knowledge¹ and especially knowledge of the suprasensible. Another very frequently occurring theme is a metaphysical and ethical dualism—a violent rejection of this world as something which prevents man from truly perceiving knowledge. Sexual relationships are consequently valued very little, even within marriage, even though there are exceptions to this, sometimes grave exceptions.²

Everything considered, gnosticism presents us with a fascinating spectacle. What we have to ask here, however, is simply the extent to which hyllic pluralism occurs in it. In connection with this, we have a general statement by H. Leisegang: "In speaking of the spirit, the gnostic did not mean our modern, quite abstract and non-sensory concept of the spirit. For him, spirit was always matter, although a very fine and very light matter, a breath, a fluid, an aroma or a gleam of light. The gnostic speculated within this sphere of ideas, of which I have outlined only the principal characteristics here. In the working out of details and the making of connections, of course, gnostic speculative ideas can often show important mutual differences".³ It seems hardly necessary to comment on this. Before making this statement, Leisegang says that, according to the gnostics, the soul casts off one terrestrial covering after another as it ascends through the seven spheres of the planets. We have, of course, encountered this view several times already.⁴ In this context, what Leisegang says may be quoted: "The body becomes an aerial body, which in turn becomes an etheric body in the astral region and again a purely spiritual or light-body, since spirit and light are identical and essentially one in the world of gnostic ideas. God too is a spirit and is therefore light—"a light which no one can approach". It is possible therefore to conclude from this that gnosticism did not recognise a really transcendent concept of God and that the standpoint of the gnostics was, unlike that of, for example, Clement of Alexandria,⁵ not the delta, but the beta standpoint, even

1 This is very reminiscent of the distinction made in Indian philosophy between *jñāna-yoga* and *bhakti-yoga*, the striving towards redemption either by knowledge or by dedication.

2 See, for example, B 226, p. 186 ff.

3 B 226, p. 28; this passage is also quoted in B 137, p. 38 and in B 174, p. 306

4 See above, pp. 48-49, 63-64.

5 See above, p. 81.

though we have here to do with a particularly fine *pneuma*. Probably, however, Leisegang is generalising too much here.

This dualism in gnostic teaching is also expressed in what they have to say about the *pneuma*. A typical doctrine here is concerned with *to antimimon pneuma*, which is frequently referred to in the *Pistis Sophia*, for example. This *pneuma* is undoubtedly *pneuma*, but it is—if, by analogy with “unspiritual”, the word may be coined—the “unspirit”,¹ the enemy which pulls down and leads astray and which was clearly called *antimimon* or “imitative” because it puts itself in the place of the real, pure soul, surrounding it with the encumbrance of a garment (*enduma*).² On the other hand, however, there are also the higher, bodies of the soul, which are described, according to the translation,³ as a “robe of glory”, a “garment of light” and so on, and which are clearly to be included within the category of what I have called the “sublime *pneuma*”. In this connection, light—supraterrrestrial light—is very often referred to. Rüsche has said of this⁴ that this “light is to some extent the materialisation of reason, *nous*” and has, for example, made a connection between this and Heraclitus’ *augē xērē*,⁵ the finest fire which I have already mentioned. On the other hand, however,—in Thomas’ apocryphal Acts, for example, this light-garment is also especially attributed to Jesus⁶ and more recent discoveries have confirmed that these hylic pluralistic ideas certainly occurred in the writings of the gnostics. (I am referring in particular here to the content of the Codex Jung.⁷)

Although I cannot go into any more detailed discussion about hylic pluralism in the writings of, for example, Marcio, Basilides and Valentinus, I should like to mention the following. The disciples of Mani taught that man had two souls, one of which was the light-soul.⁸ The Cathari, who flourished between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries and whose teaching has been described as “medieval Manicheism”,⁹ also taught the existence of a light-body. Augustine, who was a Manichean for a number of years as a young man, later rejected this theory of the two souls and, according to Verbeke, went over “from Manichean materialism to Christian spiritualism” (B 174, p. 507). The word

1 See Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (B 246), p. 4.

2 See B 174, p. 304; see also Dodds (B 33), pp. 314, 320, note 4.

3 See B 100, XI; B 99, p. 48; see also Part I, p. 52.

4 See B 137, p. 37.

5 See above, p. 30-31.

6 See B 226, p. 365.

7 See, for example, H. C. Puech and G. Quispel, *Les écrits gnostiques du Codex Jung*, 1954 (B 245); see also Part II, p. 241.

8 See, for example, B 155, p. 362; B 128, p. 95.

9 S. Runciman, B 138; see also Part I, p. 30, note 8.

"materialism" here should be understood in the sense of dualistic materialism. I shall be dealing with Augustine in the following section, but am bound to observe here that it is in no sense out of the question that these gnostic trends did in fact go no further than a dualistic materialism and did not reach the gamma standpoint, including the real transcendence and immateriality of God. This may, of course, be connected with the fact that the gnostics were partly, perhaps directly and perhaps not directly derived from Mazdeism, with its doctrine of two gods (the light-god Ahuramazda, contrasted with Ahriman). This probably accounts for the sharp dualism of many of the gnostic sects. Furthermore, this also amounts to what may be regarded as the "wrong dividing line". If the dividing line is *not* drawn between the immaterial deity on the one hand and the *whole* of creation on the other (as is done in the case of the gamma standpoint), but rather somewhere *within* plurality, then the lower element (such as the imitative *pneuma*, sexual relationships, the demiurge as the god of this world) comes to be sharply contrasted with the higher, radiant aspect. At the same time, however, it is obvious that no explicit distinction will, in this case, be made between the deity on the one hand and any light that is connected with this deity. In this case, then, we are left with the beta standpoint.

68. AUGUSTINE

Aurelius Augustine (354-430) was the bishop of Hippo in North Africa, indisputably a Father of the Church and an extremely important figure in Christianity. He exerted a great influence in the centuries after his death and is, for example, also highly regarded by Protestants as well. It is scarcely possible to summarise his ideas and at the same time render them faithfully because he was a very many-sided man and wrote a great deal. What is more, he was not always consistent and clear in his theories—Sassen has called his doctrine of knowledge, for example, "not entirely free from vagueness and ambiguity".¹ In addition, much of his writing was about points about which opinions were, even much later, very divided, with the result that the modern reader must always be on his guard against tendentious or simply fragmentary presentations of his views. The great number of books and articles that have been written about him can be to some extent seen in the book published to mark his jubilee, *Augustinus Magister* (Paris, 1954—B 190—three volumes), with its many contributions about him.

¹ B 140, p. 41.

A really sound investigation of hylic pluralism in the works of this Church Father would require a great deal of study (including study of the original sources). All that I can do here is to confine myself to a number of observations.

It is indisputable that Augustine was familiar with a number of neo-Platonic works¹ and it is, in this context, remarkable that Gilson has distinguished a patristic period in medieval thought and characterised this period as dominated by the ideas of Plato and the neo-Platonists.² This Platonism—which was, in fact, far more in accordance with neo-Platonism than with the teachings of Plato himself—played a predominant part in medieval thought for centuries and is usually referred to in the theological manuals as Augustinianism. It reached a climax in thirteenth century.

A very important doctrine, both in Augustinianism as a whole and in our investigation into the occurrence of hylic pluralism in that teaching, is the doctrine of the *materia spiritualis*. According to this doctrine, the spiritual substances—human souls, not only after death, but also before it, and the angels—consist both of form and of matter and this matter, in contrast to the matter of the ordinary body (which also has its own matter—both form and matter therefore occur twice), is called spiritual matter or *materia spiritualis*.³ This doctrine of twofold form (pluriformity) and of twofold matter was to become a typical teaching of countless thinkers in the centuries during which Augustinianism flourished. Although Augustine himself was to some extent hesitant in his expression (H. Robbers has stressed his uncertainties in an article on Augustine's authority in the doctrine of the *materia spiritualis*⁴), this teaching undoubtedly goes back to Augustine himself, who seems to have followed the neo-Platonists and especially Plotinus' *Enneads* (where there is reference to two kinds of matter) in this question.⁵

This doctrine concerning the *materia spiritualis* therefore relates on the one hand to the human soul and on the other to the angels. In both cases, hesitations are expressed here, either by Augustine himself or by his interpreters. B. Jansen simply assumed, in an article on Peter Olivi: "Above all, Saint Augustine accepts matter in the angels; see Confessions XII, XIII; *De genesi ad lit.* V, 5; VII, 6; *De vera reli-*

1 See, for example, B 140, p. 35.

2 See above, p. 77-78.

3 See Part I, p. 12.

4 "Sint Augustinus als autoriteit voor de *materia spiritualis*", *Studia Catholica*, VI, p. 31 ff (B 131).

5 See Robbers, B 131, p. 47; *Enneads* II, 4 and elsewhere.

glione c. 18".¹ Gilson is rather more cautious, saying that Augustine and Bonaventure appear to doubt whether the angles are not "naturally united to a body".² In this, it is important to remember that a *materia spiritualis* in the form of a kind of germ is something other than a complete body. (This should also be borne in mind in the case of later Augustinianism.) In any case, C. Couturier has written in the symposium mentioned above that, according to Augustine, the angels consist, like every other creature, of matter and form³ and that Augustine "as a good follower of Plotinus, attributed 'etheric' bodies, simple and luminous bodies, to the angels".⁴ As far as man is concerned, Sassen expressed himself very carefully: "Augustine did not exclude the possibility that an (immaterial⁵) matter, a *quasi-matter* has to be accepted in the soul".⁶ If every creature consists of form and matter, this must also apply to human souls after death.

The distinction that I have made between different standpoints in connection with hylic pluralism should not be forgotten here. I do not dispute that Augustine claimed that the soul itself possessed all kinds of immaterial qualities⁷—as did the neo-Platonists. On the other hand, however—and this is something that is of special interest to us—he undoubtedly accepted the existence of factors consisting of fine matter in connection with the soul—just as Plotinus did.⁸ Verbeke and others have, for example, pointed to the fact that Augustine accepted a link between the soul and the body, consisting of *pneuma*.⁹ More evidence pointing in this direction can also be found. Other contributors to *Augustinus Magister* have, for example, called Augustine's intuitive method a "spiritual realism" (see F. J. Thonnard, I, p. 319). In the same work, V. Warnach said that, in his use of the concept of *illuminatio*, Augustine literally had a *lux incorporea* in mind, a spiritual light which was supra-empirical and non-metaphorical (see p. 436). R. Allers was convinced that Augustine thought of the memory and the imagination as "material" (p. 479; this is bound to be regarded more as hylic pluralistically conceived than as conceived in the manner of

1 "Die Lehre Olivis über das Verhältnis von Leib und Seele", *Franz. Studien* 1918, p. 162.

2 *La philosophie de S. Bonaventure*, 1927, p. 193.

3 B 190, I, p. 545.

4 *ibid.*, p. 548.

5 my note—I mean here relatively (see above, p. 513-514) immaterial.

6 B 140, p. 41.

7 See, for example, Verbeke, B 174, p. 501.

8 See above, p. 51.

9 B 174, pp. 215, 505; B 155, p. 386; B 137, p. 72. In this context, Augustine referred to this "pneumatic covering", however, as *lux et aer* rather than as *spiritus* (see B 174, p. 505).

nineteenth century physiological psychology). R. Allers also said: "The so-called spiritual view needs (in the case of Augustine) a spiritual light which must be of the same subtle materiality" (as the memory; *ibid*). Finally, P. Blanchard has written about the "interior space in Augustine—symbol or reality?" (p. 535 ff.)

All with all, I am therefore very much inclined to conclude that a great deal of hylic pluralism occurs in the teachings of Augustine. This has so far passed to a great extent unnoticed and all that has been done is to establish a partial link between Augustine and hylic pluralistic themes occurring elsewhere. This cannot, however, be said—or can at least only partly be said—of another and, from our point of view, very interesting contribution to *Augustinus Magister* by J. Pēpin on the subject of Augustine and the symbolic use of the garment in neo-Platonism.¹ I shall be returning later in this image of the garment for the body, consisting of fine matter, of the soul. Unfortunately, it is not possible for me to discuss here the many analogies which Pēpin draws—in two parallel columns—between passages in Augustine's writings and corresponding passages in the writings of the neo-Platonists. In my opinion, too, although this author is not bold enough in concluding that Augustine thought hylic pluralistically, he is very close to this conclusion, for example, in distinguishing between an "external" and an "internal" garment of the soul (p. 295). Another example of Pēpin's approaching a hylic pluralistic conclusion with regard to Augustine is his pointing to a similarity between Augustine's "garments of the angles" and Proclus' teaching about the descent of the soul through the elements and its assumption of increasingly coarse garments (p. 297). He also draws attention to the analogy between Augustine's doctrine that the angels make themselves known to humans in dreams² and Porphyry's teaching that the daemons intervene in a similar way (p. 298). According to Porphyry, they do this by means of a *pneuma*, which, Pēpin writes "has nothing of a pure spirit—it is rather a vehicle, an *ochēma*" (*ibid*). This, the author goes on, is connected with the imagination,³ about which both Porphyry and Augustine (p. 298). Finally, he mentions that Augustine also discussed the "coats of skins" as man's "last garment" (p. 301 ff).⁴

Apart from what is said in this particular book, we should not forget that Augustine also wrote in his Enarr. in Ps. 85, n. 17 that the bodies

1 "Saint Augustin et le symbolisme néoplatonicien de la vesture", B 190, I, p. 293 ff

2 Democritus also taught that fine *eidōla* coming from outside sometimes made themselves known in dreams; see 177, p. 131.

3 See below, Section 99.

4 Pēpin, p. 301; see also above, p. 63.

of men after the resurrection would be *qualia sunt angelorum corpora*, "as are the bodies of the angels", in which the possession of bodies by the angels is accepted as certain and the resurrection bodies of men are regarded as consisting of fine matter.

In conclusion, I would like to make two comments. Verbeke entitled his learned study *L'évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicisme à S. Augustin* (1945, 572 pp; B 174). In it, he regarded this development of the concept of pneuma as a progressive "spiritualisation" in the modern sense. I pointed out, at the end of Part I of this work, how useful his study has been to me in my researches, but the problems confronting Verbeke and myself are different—Verbeke was looking for signs of *already* occurring spiritualisation, whereas my task in this work has been to ascertain where hylic pluralism *still* appears or *re-appears*. Our two tasks have thus supplemented each other.¹ It is, of course, impossible to deny that there was a movement towards spiritualisation. The pure beta standpoint, for example, tended to be abandoned more and more in the development of thought. Verbeke regarded Augustine as a milestone on this road towards spiritualisation. To what extent is he right in this? There is indisputably a great deal of hylic pluralism in Augustine's teaching. If really spectacular advances are to be made in the direction of spiritualisation, then we must, together with Thomas Aquinas, say that the souls of men and angels are purely spiritual substances, without any material aspect at all in the form of a *materia spiritualis*, although whether this would be a fortunate choice or not to take spiritualisation so far is another question. In any case, even though it might be suitable to conclude a vast investigation like Verbeke's with Augustine, this process of spiritualisation did not go so terribly far with this author. It is true that Augustine accepted the immateriality of God and of aspects of the soul and he can therefore not be situated at what I have called the beta standpoint, like Tertullian, nor can we place him, like so many of his contemporaries, at the gamma standpoint, which teaches that only God is immaterial. His standpoint is, I believe, the delta standpoint. This is, however, not synonymous with the epsilon standpoint or anthropological dualism—in Augustine's teaching, there is sufficient emphasis on fine materiality in connection with the soul to make the epsilon standpoint impossible in his case.

My second comment on Verbeke's work is this. He concludes that, despite the fact that neo-Platonic ideas were of considerable importance

¹ See Part I, p. 66.

in Augustine's thought on Verbeke's own admission,¹ Augustine's spiritualisation was not primarily due to the influence of these ideas, but to that of the content of the Bible. I am not at all convinced that Verbeke is right here. Why, in that case, did the Bible not exert more influence in this sense on the Christian authors of the earliest centuries of Christianity? It would seem as though this is because they were in living contact with Stoicism and this was the most important philosophy in the world around them—hence this "Stoic stage" in Christian thinking. At the time of Augustine, however, a new phenomenon was emerging in ancient thought—a revival of Platonic philosophy in the form of neo-Platonism. It is quite certain that Augustine was associated with this movement. Would neo-Platonism, then, not have been decisively influential in the extent to which the Bishop of Hippo professed spiritualisation? We may say with certainty that both neo-Platonism and Augustine belonged without doubt to what I have called the delta standpoint.

69. CHRISTIANITY OF THE MIDDLE AGES

Medieval Christian theologians practised philosophy a great deal. Although many of their works have already been known for a long time, numbers of their writings are only emerging for the first time from archives and libraries and are gradually being re-edited and re-published. Medieval thought is because of this one of the few departments of the history of philosophy which is at present moving. There is no need for me to discuss all these thinkers and tendencies in detail here, but, because it is possible that various aspects of hylic pluralism may appear in this period,² there is one circumstance that is favourable to us, namely that a subject that is without doubt connected with hylic pluralism was a very well-known point of controversy in the thirteenth century. Even though it is desirable that more monographs should be written about this subject, there is nonetheless already sufficient material available for us to deal with it here. The subject that I have in mind is that of the *materia spiritualis*, which I mentioned in the pre-

¹ B 174, pp. 495, 507.

² At the end of his review of the occurrence of the idea of the astral body, Dodds wrote: "It remains a familiar idea throughout the Middle Ages" (B 33, p. 321). I should like to see this supported with further proofs. On the other hand, Verbeke quotes a question asked by Thomas Aquinas—"Utrum substantia spiritualis corpore aereo uniatur?" (*De spir. creaturis*, VII), "Is the spiritual substance united with the aerial body?"—and answered negatively by him and remarks with surprise that this question should be discussed at the time of Thomas Aquinas (see B 174, p. 37 note 49). The truth is clearly to be found somewhere in between.

vious section. In other words, it is the question of uniformity or plurality with relation to the soul—is there a form of the body (*forma corporeitatis*) as well as a form of the soul with a corresponding spiritual matter or does a simpler relationship in fact exist. In other words, is the soul simply the form of the body, without any separate matter of a second species being present?

As we have seen, Augustine held the first opinion¹ and this doctrine is one of those which was very typical for many centuries before Augustine and before the "Augustinian tradition". Several variations are possible here. One of these is whether this *materia spiritualis* amounts to no more than a *foundation*, a possibility of matter at a spiritual level or whether it was, as was the case in the example of the neo-Platonists, extended to the idea of a clearly etheric or light-giving *body* or at least a body consisting of fine matter. In any case, this doctrine of the *materia spiritualis* can be found in this whole tradition of thought, whether in earlier or in later Augustinianism, until the end of the heyday of this school at the beginning of the fourteenth century. A special characteristic of this teaching is that there was a tendency to attribute this spiritual matter more to the angels, who apparently formed a good example of the doctrine, than to human souls. Gilson, writing about the doctrines concerning the angles in medieval thought, asked whether they were regarded as completely immaterial and his answer was that this was not so—"there are numerous philosophers who deny this".²

It is worth while summarising the views of some of the thinkers who taught this doctrine of the *materia spiritualis* in a more or less elaborate form, following the Augustinian tradition. John Scottus Eriugena (ca. 810-870) was strongly orientated towards neo-Platonism—he was very much influenced by the Greek Fathers of the Church—and taught that both the angels and men possessed spiritual bodies.³ Peter Lombard (ca. 1100-1160) also believed that the angels, both the good and the bad angels, had an "aerial body".⁴ In this, he was faithful to the neo-Platonic Augustinian tradition.⁵ The same can also be said of the psychology of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109).⁶ The well-known teacher, Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153) also accepted that the angels possessed an aerial body.⁷ The doctrine that spiritual sub-

1 See above, p. 87-88.

2 *Le Thomisme*, 1922, p. 127.

3 See Gilson, B 212, p. 215; B 131, p. 33, note 10; B 39 under "Leib".

4 B 29, I, col. 1225.

5 B 140, p. 123.

6 B 140, p. 104.

7 B 29, I, col. 1225.

stances, both in the form of angels and of human souls, consist of matter plus form can further be found in a whole series of thinkers—Alexander of Hales¹ (ca. 1170-1245), Bonaventure's teacher, Dominic Gundissalinus² (middle of the twelfth century), Roger Bacon³ (ca. 1210-1292) and to some extent Albert the Great⁴ (1206-1280). Finally, this doctrine also occurred in the writings of convinced Augustinians when the heyday of the school was beginning to come to an end—Giovanni Fidanza, usually known as Bonaventure⁵ (1221-1274), according to whom the soul was constituted of form plus a "second matter" even before it was united with the ordinary body,⁶ his disciple John Peckham⁷ (ca. 1215-1292), Peter Olivi⁸ (1248-1298) and John Duns Scotus⁹ (1266-1308).

Of all these thinkers, the two most important in connection with our special study are Bonaventure and Peter Olivi. Above all, the great controversy which occurred towards the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries¹⁰ is linked with their names—with that of Bonaventure because he was such a typical and important representative of the Augustinian standpoint¹¹ and with that of Olivi because the controversy was brought to an end with the condemnation of his ideas at the Council of Vienne in 1311. In this conflict of ideas, the "conservative theologians", as Knowles has called them, were opposed by the exponents of emergent Aristotelianism, with Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1224-1274) as the most important figure in this movement. It did not, apparently, come to a personal struggle between Bonaventure and Thomas—in fact, it has even been claimed that they were friendly with each other. Yet the opposition was all the more fundamental because of this. It was also not simply a question of Thomas' coming, seeing and conquering. On the contrary, Thomas' ideas were violently disputed and even condemned. In England, for example, they were opposed by John Peckham and Robert Kilwardby, despite the fact that the latter was himself a Dominican.¹² (The two

1 See B 171, p. 389.

2 See B 171, pp. 359, 389.

3 See B 140, p. 262.

4 See B 140, p. 423 219; B 212, p. 513.

5 See, for example, B 155, II, p. B 171, p. 389; B 133.

6 E. Gilson, *La philosophie de S. Bonaventure* (1927, 2 1943), pp. 258, 262.

7 H. Spettmann, *Die Psychologie des Joh. Peckham* (1919), p. 10 ff; other advocates of this view are mentioned by Spettmann.

8 See B. Jansen, for example, "Die Lehre Olivis über das Verhältnis von Leib und Seele", *Franz. Studien V*.

9 See B 171, p. 505.

10 See, for example, D. Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (1962), p. 291 ff; B 133, p. 108; B 171, p. 974.

11 See B 171, p. 389; Knowles, *op. cit.*, p. 236 ff.

12 See, for example, B 140, p. 222; 234; B 171, p. 494.

opposing sides were to a very great extent against each other in the orders, either that of the Franciscans or that of the Dominicans). Thomas' victory after this conflict was all the greater.

Thomas Aquinas was a very important thinker who wrote a great deal about a series of subjects. He is very highly regarded in the Roman Catholic Church. Here we are concerned with a particular doctrine of his in which he was diametrically opposed to the Augustinian tradition and which played a very important part in the thinking of the centuries that followed. With regard to the question of the relationship between the soul and the body, Thomas rejected the neo-Platonic Augustinian view concerning the presence of two forms and two matters. According to Thomas, the soul was simply the form—Aristotle called it the *entelechy*¹—of the body. Spiritual substances—the angels and human souls—did not, according to Thomas, possess, in addition and in themselves, another matter, a second matter or *materia spiritualis*. On the contrary, he did not accept, in addition to the fact that the soul was the form of the body, another form of the body or *forma corporeitatis*.²

This doctrine of the *forma corporeitatis*, inherited from Augustine, was condemned in 1311 at the Council of Vienne by means of a rejection of the views of Peter Olivi (1248-1298), who had accepted the existence of a spiritual matter and even of several forms of the soul in addition to that of the ordinary body.³ The Council of Vienne rejected these doctrines and declared that the human soul was the form of the body,⁴ with the result that man was to be regarded as a strictly "unified" being.⁵ This established for the rest of the Middle Ages that there was no apart *forma corporeitatis*, no pluriformity or plurality of forms and no "second matter" or *materia spiritualis*, either as a germ or as a foundation or as a body consisting of fine matter. We may safely say that this was a condemnation of hylic pluralism in one of its most important aspects.

All this was perfectly in accordance with the standpoint of Thomas Aquinas in this respect. I shall be coming back later to the consequences of this decision. Now, however, I should like to draw attention to the remarkable and complicated situation revealed by this controversy at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries. The Augustinian tradition, which was defeated

1 See above, p. 38 ff.

2 See, for example, B 140, p. 229; B 171, p. 435.

3 See B 140, p. 248.

4 See B 140, p. 285; B 212, p. 453.

5 See B. Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Denzinger, § 409.

in this conflict, is often called Platonic, whereas it is beyond dispute that the victorious Thomas propagated the teaching of Aristotle and helped to make him the philosopher of the medieval Church, a position which he continued to hold in scholastic thought.

With regard to our particular subject, however, the matter is not, quite so simple. It is, of course, true that Thomas took over the Aristotelian doctrine that the soul is simply the form—or, in Aristotle's terminology, the entelechy—of the body. In itself, however, this is something which is also reminiscent of Plato. Thomas' acceptance of *purely* spiritual substances—the angels and human souls—without any corresponding *materia spiritualis* is very reminiscent of the Platonic dualism between ideas and ordinary reality. Similarly, Thomas regarded the angels, at least the higher angels, not as individuals, but rather as *species*.¹ This very closely approaches the Platonic ideas ("horse-ness" and so on) and the point of coincidence is that both were regarded as eternal and unchanging—always praising the angels through the Lord. But Aristotle toned down Plato's dualism (which he had himself supported at first) by his doctrine of form plus matter or hylemorphism, which is why Aristotle's teaching is known as immanentism as opposed to Plato's transcendentalism.² As I have already observed,³ everything fits in so beautifully in Aristotle's teaching—only God is form without matter, whereas all the things of the world are composed of form plus matter.⁴ Thomas, however, encroached on Aristotle's hylemorphism⁵ by affirming that not only God was pure form, but that there were also purely immaterial beings within the world—angels and human souls consisted of spiritual substances without any matter, even *materia spiritualis*. In this, I am convinced that Thomas was more Platonic than Aristotelian and that he at the same time committed what I have called Plato's "mistake", by identifying the eidetic or immaterial content of ideas with being in plurality.⁶

The reverse is true, however, of the Augustinian tradition! This is called Platonic, but, as I have already observed, it is much closer to the neo-Platonists than to Plato, who was hardly known at all to those who followed Augustine—their doctrine of the *materia spiritualis* went back in the first place to Augustine himself, but his teaching went back

1 See, for example, B 1 33, p. 116.

2 This is the reason given for Raphael's painting—in his "School of Athens" at the Vatican—Plato with his hand held up vertically and Aristotle with his hand held horizontally.

3 See above, p. 38.

4 See, for example, B 177, p. 227 ff.

5 See B 140, p. 229; B 171, p. 435.

6 See above, p. 36.

especially to Plotinus.¹ In the chapter of the *Enneads* with which we are concerned here, Plotinus is more Aristotelian than Platonic—the neo-Platonists believed in the immateriality of the soul, but at the same time emphasised the correlativism of the soul with the *noētē hulē*, *materia spiritualis*, hence all their doctrines about a *pneuma* around the soul,² about *ochēmata* of the soul³ and so on. This is far more in the tradition of Aristotelian hylemorphism than in that of Platonic dualism. Thomas was certainly able to appeal to Aristotle in his doctrine that the soul was simply the form of the body, but it cannot be denied that both Aristotle and Thomas were tending towards Platonism here. On the other hand, Plotinus, Augustine and the thinkers in the Augustinian tradition kept closer to the spirit of the correlativism contained in the Aristotelian hylemorphism by accepting that this correlativism was maintained in all cases, including that of spiritual substances—which all concerned regarded as existing—and that a second matter, the *materia spiritualis*, was contrasted with their form. In the case of man, this results in two kinds of form, a pluriformity—during his life, the form plus matter of his soul work in some way or another together with the matter of his body and its form (the *forma corporeitatis*). According to this view, then, man is a composite being.

The irony of the situation is that this doctrine of the *materia spiritualis* as taught by the Augustinians is in another way in accordance with Aristotle's teaching. On the one hand, Aristotle certainly regarded the soul as the entelechy of the body, but, on the other, he again and again accepted a *pneuma* in connection with the soul.⁴ This is why Siebeck and others called Aristotle's psychology "wavering".⁵ It would be going too far to say that, despite their appeal to Plato—and here we should, of course, read neo-Platonism—the Augustinians were, with regard to Aristotle, "more Roman than the Romans". After all, Thomas was certainly able to appeal to Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is the entelechy of the body. But it is true that, as far as those who regard hylemorphism as very important and who recognise that it has a many-sided application are concerned. Thomas taught an inadequate doctrine when, following Aristotle, he affirmed that the spiritual substances were forms without matter. What it in fact amounts to is that the doctrine that the soul is the form or entelechy

1 See above, p. 87. D. Knowles says: "There is a practical rule which rarely fails the commentator on Augustine's philosophy; it is that when a source is wanting the *Enneads* of Plotinus should be searched". In this case, the reference is *Enn.* II, 4.

2 See above, p. 51.

3 See above, p. 52 ff.

4 See above, p. 40.

5 See above, p. 41.

of the body is one-sided and oversimplified. Aristotle himself corrected this inadequacy by accepting a *pneuma* of fine matter and the Augustinians elaborated this further by making this *pneuma* in the form of the *materia spiritualis* correlative with a second form, thus showing themselves to be more consistent hylemorphists than Aristotle or Thomas.

What is more, the teaching of many of the Christian authors of the earliest centuries that only God was truly immaterial¹ becomes more intelligible when one thinks of Aristotle's doctrine that only God is form without matter, whereas the world has to be regarded as consisting of form plus matter.

70. THOMAS AQUINAS

Again and again I have referred in the preceding section to Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1224-1274), who played an important, in fact decisive part in the conflict of ideas which took place towards the end of the thirteenth century. We must now consider him separately and begin by dealing with the consequences of the negative decision with regard to the *materia spiritualis*. These were certainly not negligible. Aristotle himself had shown little interest in the question of man's continued existence after death and, according to his doctrine that the soul was the entelechy of the body, this special correlativism, this whole composition, ceased to exist at death.² In addition to this, Aristotle also taught that the spirit or *nous*—unlike the soul—comes from outside the individual—the position of the *nous* is not too clear in Aristotle's teaching³ and it is quite possible that it is of a very universal nature. This is was the conclusion drawn by various Arab philosophers, namely that the *intellectus agens* was really universally human. This doctrine was exhaustively discussed in the Middle Ages under the title of monopsychism. Arab thinkers such as Averroes⁴ concluded from this that man was not individually immortal. Thomas' attitude was not so far removed from that of Aristotle here. As far as the camp is concerned, the doctrine of pluriformity, that of the *materia spiritualis* of the soul, makes it possible to understand continued existence after death—a complex disintegrates and the two components continue to exist, at least for the time being, each with its form plus

1 See Part I, p. 39; this therefore amounts to the gamma standpoint.

2 See B 139, p. 95.

3 See B 139, p. 97; see also above, p. 567.

4 See B 16, p. 206; B 140, p. 169.

matter. This is a point in favour of the Augustinian tradition and those who followed it were closer to the neo-Platonists with their detailed doctrines about the descent and the ascent of the soul through the spheres—in other words, a theory about the hereafter—and about the activity of the angels¹ than to Aristotle with his agnosticism—in general concerning these questions.

I am not alone in this view. Even in the Middle Ages, the Franciscan Peter Aureoli († 1322) observed that, if the human soul had to be regarded as the form of the body, as defined by the Council of Vienne, the existence of the soul after death became incomprehensible to human reason.² On the subject of Thomas' doctrine of the spiritual substances, a contemporary author, D. Knowles O.S.B. of Cambridge University has said: "To many, those answers have appeared as the weakest elements in Thomist psychology, and it is unquestionable that the Neoplatonic-Augustinian doctrine on the soul and its powers is more easily compatible with Christian teaching and practice than is the Aristotelian".³ Even Etienne Gilson's view tends in this direction. He says that the immortality of the soul could no longer be demonstrated after the Council of Vienne—"if the soul is the form of the body, it is born and dies with the body". This so in accordance with human reason. Yet "God can preserve the soul without the body, but this is a miracle".⁴ The pronouncement made at the Council of Vienne was so important that "from that date onward, it was impossible for a Christian to maintain that the intellectual or rational soul was not in itself and essentially the form of the human body". This was "a conciliar decision with far-reaching re-percussions".⁵

I do not wish in any way to detract from the great significance of Thomas Aquinas, a man who concerned himself with so many subjects and whose influence was and still is, even now, enormous, partly because of the fact that the study of his theology was recommended in 1879 by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris*.⁶ Several things must, however, be mentioned in connection with the repercussions of his doctrine that the soul is a purely spiritual substance. It is a fact that, when something is declared to be a miracle, a great number of believers will accept this, but many others will, as time goes on, no

1 See above, p. 51 and below, Section 94.

2 See B 140, p. 28.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 242.

4 B 212, p. 628.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 453.

6 It may also be pointed out, however, that his philosophy is in no sense an article of faith for Roman Catholics, with the result that the Roman Catholic Church can, in theory, show a preference for another philosophy.

longer believe in the doctrine relating to the miracle. The rejection of the doctrine of the *materia spiritualis*, then, meant the removal of a support for the idea of the continued existence of the soul. The Augustinian tradition, which was so close in many respects to neo-Platonism and which kept alive faith in "another world", was replaced in medieval thought by a different movement, scholastic in a rather narrower sense, which thrust this other world generally speaking into the background, except as a pure article of faith. This was of very great importance in the centuries that followed and what is remarkable is that this development was really very much in accordance with the times. I have called Thomas' standpoint dualistic (a Platonic rather than an Aristotelian dualism). In his view, the purely spiritual soul is contrasted with the substance of the body and forms a unity with it, although the way in which it does this is not entirely intelligible. This could be called anthropological dualism. As I have already explained in Part I of this work, Thomas anticipated the anthropological dualism (the epsilon standpoint of hylic pluralism, in other words, not hylic pluralism at all) of René Descartes,¹ who, for his part, must have been inspired by Thomist thought. Descartes made a sharp contrast between thought, consciousness, and the body, extensiveness, and accepted an interaction between them, although their pronounced heterogeneity makes it difficult to understand this. It was therefore quite in accordance with his thinking to call animals machines.² This improbable interaction was corrected by Spinoza's parallelism, according to which the two series of thought and of extensiveness continue to run parallel to each other and never have any effect on each other. This too amounts to an anthropological dualism, dividing man into two. The farther the two substances are separated from each other, the easier it becomes to deny the reality of both of them. This was done in the eighteenth century—a notable example being Lamettrie, in his *L'homme machine* of 1748—and in the nineteenth century by the materialists, for whom the only reality was ordinary matter. The philosophers of the Enlightenment and especially, at his own special level, Immanuel Kant, emphasised dualism in another way. Following Descartes—Balthasar Bekker taught that the devil and spirits existed, but were not able to have any effect on us—the thinkers of the Enlightenment accepted the non-efficaciousness of this other world. Kant also accepted the existence of the other world, the *mundus intelligibilis*, following a circuitous

1 Part I, pp. 47-48.

2 See *ibid.*, p. 67.

route via practical reason, but believed that contact with that world was not possible—this was something that Swedenborg also affirmed—so that it had to be classified under the heading of unknowable things in themselves.¹ It was only very gradually that a reaction against these consequences of anthropological dualism set in—it came about eventually, among other things, via the romantic movement, the affirmations of members of the occult movements and the findings of parapsychology.

This anthropological dualism has, however, had repercussions in the developing field of human thought. The spirit of the age was clearly in favour of this concentration on one pole of the antithesis and this has borne rich fruit in the form of marked progress in modern science. The opposite pole has, however, been far too much neglected.

In my opinion, this whole development began with medieval Aristotelianism—Thomas Aquinas' doctrine concerning the soul as the form of the body and the decision of the Council of Vienne which which restricted Augustinianism in this important respect.

After this long digression, we must now return to Thomas, attitude towards hylic pluralism. Although it is clear that he was very much opposed to the characteristic pluralism of the *materia spiritualis*, in certain other respects there is nonetheless evidence of some hylic pluralism in his writings. Like Albert the Great, he also accepted the doctrine of the *spiritus animales et vitales*.² This is not in itself very important, since it was a universally accepted medical and physiological theory. On the other hand, however, it was probably connected with Aristotle's doctrine of the *pneuma*, which was subsequently worked out in greater detail by Galen.³ I shall be returning to these *spiritus animales* later.⁴ In addition to this, Thomas also taught the doctrine of the *dotes*, the bridal gifts of the glorified body.⁵ I shall be dealing with the various views of the resurrection later,⁶ but it is possible to say now that wherever this teaching of the *dotes* of *claritas*, *subtilitas* and so on as applied to the resurrection body is found, we have something pointing in the direction of hylic pluralism and especially in the direction of the sublime *pneuma*.

As far as the psychological *pneuma*, the body of the soul consisting of fine matter, is concerned, Thomas was completely against this and

1 For more details, see *Immanuel Kant en de Parapsychologie*, Amsterdam, 1963 (B 238) and below, Section 80.

2 B 166, I, 76, 7 ob. 2; see also B 39 under "Lebensgeister".

3 See above, p. 9; see also Part I, p. 52.

4 See below, Section 78.

5 See B 166, suppl. III, q. LXXXIV.

6 See below, Section 107.

as I have pointed out, his opposing doctrine had very important consequences. Extremely little has been heard in Roman Catholic Christianity since that time of bodies of fine matter either of the souls of men or of the angels. (I shall, however, be dealing briefly with the mystics later.¹) The few exceptions are therefore all the more striking. It is, for example, not entirely clear to me how the well-known leader in the Counter-Reformation, Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534), who was himself a prominent Thomist,² came to teach the doctrine of the "corporeality of the demons", who, he believed, possessed "etheric bodies".³ But his view of immortality was also different⁴ and the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* has called the first view a "strange opinion" and referred to his "boldness" (*ibid.*)

The Jesuit Caspar Schott (1608-1666) is said to have taught the doctrine of man's subtle body⁵ and the same applies also to the Benedictine Dom Calmet (1672-1757).⁶ The Dominican pulpit orator, J. B. H. Lacordaire (1802-1861) had his own views about the resurrection body—in the intermediary state, man makes use of an "interim" body.⁷

The doctrine of a *link* between the spirit and the body consisting of fine matter became almost impossible because of the declaration of the Council of Vienne and, together with this doctrine, another which contained a trichotomy. Despite this, A. Günther (1783-1863) believed that he had to advocate a trichotomy, although he withdrew this doctrine later.⁸

In our own times, the Roman Catholic author Alfons Rosenberg (b. 1902) wrote about the "psychical body" used by man in the intermediary state in his book *Die Seelenreise* (1952) and was clearly very much in agreement with this idea.⁹ Some of Rosenberg's books were later placed on the Index.

As a whole, hylic pluralism has not been well received in Roman Catholic circles for several centuries, but it will be interesting to see whether the "new theology" will be more sympathetic towards strict Thomism, in connection with our subject as well, or towards the Augustinian view.

1 See below, Section 77.

2 See B 141, p. 89.

3 See B 29, IV, under "démon"; see also B 76, p. 33.

4 See B 141, p. 90.

5 See B 42, II, p. 337.

6 See B 96, p. 66.

7 See B 147, IV, p. 918.

8 See for example, B 128, p. 290.

9 *op. cit.*, p. 116 ff, 138.

71. EASTERN CHRISTIANITY

Probably under the influence of the Roman emphasis on juridical formulations, Christianity in the West took on an increasingly clear outline under the guidance of successive popes in Rome. The most important centre of Eastern Christianity, on the other hand, was Byzantium, the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, and perhaps for this reason alone Christianity in the East remained more or less untouched by this development. Gnostic characteristics in the broader sense as well as mystical and (neo-) Platonic features, insofar as they were present in the earliest period of Christianity, in the teaching of, for example, Clement of Alexandria¹ (ca. 150-211) and Origen² (185-254) have been more preserved in the East. Furthermore, in the Greek Orthodox Church at least—I cannot go into any of the other branches of Eastern Christianity here—the emphasis has always been placed, not on the suffering Christ, but on the risen Christ,³ that is, on the resurrection of Jesus. I shall be discussing briefly various doctrines concerning the resurrection of men later,⁴ but one thing has to be said here and now in connection with Eastern Christianity. It is that free, not rigidly corporeal and hylic pluralistic views about these doctrines occurred frequently in the East, because a favourite theme there has always been the expectation of a redemption not only of individual man, but also of the whole of fallen creation, a restoration of everything (*apokatastasis panton*: Acts 3. 21). Origen taught the latter, just as he also taught the resurrection of man not with an ordinary body, but with an etheric body.⁵ This has always been the case in the East. J. C. A. Fetter (1885-1959), in his book on the Russians and the Church (*De Russen en hun Kerk*, 1947), called the Greek Orthodox Church again and again a "pneumatic Church" (pp. 135, 226, 260). This branch of Christianity has always been aware of the inner world. The author writes that the prayers in Orthodox monasteries perform a holy task for Russia and the rest of the world by causing waves and vibrations which are felt at the farthest ends of the universe (p. 33). The radiation from this other world is also perceptible in their ikons (p. 99 ff). E. Benz has said that the ikons are intended to throw light on the aura of the heavenly world and to reflect, according to set rules, the prototypes of figures from that world. The saints as it were enter

1 See above, p. 81.

2 See above, pp. 81-82.

3 See B 179, VI, p. 38.

4 See below, Section 107.

5 See above, p. 82; see also B 39, under the heading "Ätherleib".

the ikon, which is at first empty, and their presence is confirmed by a "supraterrestrial radiance shining for a long time from the ikon".¹ The ikons are therefore parallel to the sacraments, which are known as mysteries in the Eastern Church. The aim of both is to enable the believer to participate in the higher, more real life which is in the background of ordinary life and permeates everything.

Let us now briefly examine the teaching of several figures in Eastern Christianity. One of them, John Philoponus (sixth century), denied that the body which was eventually to rise again was identical with the ordinary body² and taught that man had a pneumatic body in which penance was done in the intervening period before receiving the light-body.³ He was clearly teaching unadulterated neo-Platonism and both Dodds and Kissling have called him an author who, with Proclus, distinguished the radiant body (*augoeides*) from the astral or pneumatic body or *ochēma*.⁴

It will cause the reader no surprise to learn that finer bodies are generally attributed to the angels in the Eastern Church. One author who was especially concerned with this subject was Michael Psellus (1018-1096), whose teaching has been extensively discussed by K. Svoboda in his *La démonologie de Michel Psellos* (Brno, 1927; B 159). Svoboda said: "Psellos explicitly attributed a body to the demons and to the angels" (p. 17). Psellus also wrote that it was the practice to call the denser bodies "corporeal" and the finer, which "could neither be seen nor touched" "incorporeal" (*ibid.*), but "incorporeal" is here used in a purely relative sense.⁵ Psellus also reviewed the doctrines concerning the demons as expounded by various authors before him, including Plato and the neo-Platonists (when the term was still neutral in tone). He himself also made an explicit distinction between the radiant angels and the dark demons.

The Hesychasts, who, for example, on Mount Athos sought *hēsuchia*, inner rest, were especially interested in the "uncreated light", which was the light of Mount Tabor⁶ which they were able, they believed, to perceive in their hearts: "The most important mystical experience of the hesychastic monks was the vision of the divine light which shone in the beholder as the conclusion of methodically practised

1 *Geist und Leben der Ostkirche*, 1957, pp. 11-12.

2 B 160, p. 47.

3 See, for example, B 155, p. 354.

4 B 33, p. 321; B 85, p. 322.

5 See above, pp. 8-9; see also Part I, pp. 17-18.

6 See B 160, p. 274; see also above, p. 70.

contemplation".¹ This movement was not without antagonists; its chief protagonist was Palamas († 1360).

Although Eastern Christian teachers have always been very much concerned with the inner life and have always been reluctant to make clear formulations in the scholastic sense, everything is closely interconnected in their theology. E. Hammerschmidt² has written about the light that Eastern Christians believed was present in their ikons and has observed that the words "I am the light of the world" (John 8. 12) that often appears on them do not simply have a symbolic significance, meaning the light of Christian teaching and of the new life, but "they mean, in the direct and literal sense, the appearance of the divine light in the world". As for the angels, the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* comments, under the heading of "Angélogologie dans les Eglises Orthodoxes", that, even in the nineteenth century, Eastern Christian authors were saying that only God was without a body—see our gamma standpoint—whereas the angels possessed a subtle body—*leptosōmatous*.³

A remarkable and little known sect which flourished in the Eastern Roman Empire during the eleventh century and which differed from the Greek Orthodox Church in many of its doctrines, the Bogomiles, taught that there was no resurrection of the body, but rather an ascent into heaven in the form of a spiritual body.⁴

What is remarkable is that these ideas, all more or less hylic pluralistic in nature, have also had an influence on the thought of a number of prominent Slav and especially Russian philosophers. In connection with what I have said above, I should like now briefly to consider this influence on these later writers. The idea of a corporeality which is different from the ordinary body and through which man is transfigured and the view that there is a universal restoration of all things occur again and again, with individual differences, in the thought of all these authors. The first of these writers, A. N. Radishchev (1749-1802) was of the opinion that man would, after his present body had perished, possess another body in accordance with the development that he had reached.⁵ V. S. Soloviev (1853-1900) taught, at least in his early period, a doctrine of the "transfiguration of the body; of a holy corporeality" which had to be nourished by communion.⁶ The well-known writer

1 E. Benz, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

2 and others, *Symbolik des Orthodoxen und Orientalischen Christentums*, 1962, p. 74.

3 B 29, I, col. 1249.

4 See D. Obolensky, *The Bogomils*, 1948.

5 See B 95, p. 12.

6 See B 95, p. 126.

S. N. Bulgakov (1871-1944), who was more of a theologian, although not entirely orthodox, than a philosopher, made a distinction between "materiality and corporeality". In his view, there were all kinds of corporeality, in other words, a pluralism—"bodies of different degrees of refinement". It had to become a "holy corporeality".¹ N. A. Berdyayev also looked forward to "a new clothing in bodily form".² and said "It is a mistake to separate this world and the other altogether".³ There are undoubtedly also all kinds of other themes in his writings of a similar nature, but it is not possible for me to go into them here. The same applies to the work of the nestor of Russian Philosophy, N. O. Lossky (1870-1965), who emigrated to the United States and wrote the history of Russian thought (B 95) on which I have depended to a great extent here. He suggested a "pansomatism", which was not, however, a materialism. According to him, the "members of the Kingdom of God", the "dwellers in heaven", possess "transfigured spatial bodies", which are not separated from each other, but which penetrate each other.⁴

This group of Russian thinkers, none of whom are in any way unknown in Western Europe, clearly remained very faithful to the older themes of Eastern Christianity.

72. A TREND WITHIN PROTESTANTISM

Although, as we shall see, hylic pluralism has not, generally speaking, been very favourably regarded in the modern age, a remarkable trend did nonetheless emerge in the theology of this period which was very open to hylic pluralistic ideas. This trend was particularly noticeable in the Protestant and especially the Lutheran main current of Christianity and, in accordance with what I have just said about the general attitude of the modern age, it was characteristically an *undercurrent*. Despite this, however, its extent, influence and obstinacy should not be underestimated. The eighteenth century, for example, has been called the age of Enlightenment, but, if we go no further than this characterisation of the century, we are bound to overlook the importance and the youthful impetus of some of its most typical tendencies, which later came to a climax in, for example, romanticism. This is

1 See B 95, p. 210.

2 See B 95, p. 241.

3 See *The Beginning and the End*, 1952, p. 234.

4 See B 95, p. 259.

why Alfons Rosenberg called the eighteenth century the "charismatic century".¹

This undercurrent within Protestantism was also closely associated with pietism, the movement founded by the Alsatian P. J. Spener (1635-1705) as a reaction against the doctrinal orthodoxy of the Lutheran Church. The pietists, who dedicated themselves to the movement in so-called conventicles, stressed above all the importance of the inner life and the name "pietist" was later applied to rather diverse Christian figures, even as late as the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the movement, with a considerably changed character, became known as the *Réveil*, the *Erweckungsbewegung* or Revivalism.

Even at the beginning, this movement had many branches and very fluid borders, overflowing frequently into different groups and sub-movements, but, viewed as a whole, the occurrence of hylic pluralistic ideas within pietism was very high indeed. At the very centre was the concept of "spiritual corporeality" which was, according to A. Ritschl, first formulated by the pietist J. C. Dippel (1673-1734).² As far as its content is concerned, this concept is, of course, much older than pietism. The idea that predominates here is that Jesus Christ rose again with a glorified body and that a similar prospect is, according to Paul (1 Cor. 15. 22), also in store for man. In pietism, this teaching is somewhat changed, so that this glorified body is not something that will only be received by man at the end of time—it is also something that he can anticipate. This can be seen in two ways. In the first place, it can be regarded as a coming into contact here and now, in this life and at this time, with this "heavenly corporeality" (becoming one with Christ in the sacrament also plays a part in this) and as a building up of something of this nature within himself by man living now. In the second place, it can be viewed as the possession after death not of a spiritual body at the highest level, but, in anticipation of this, of some "intermediate body". The pietists, then, were not favourably disposed towards the view which occurs quite frequently in Protestant theology, namely that the soul is overcome by a kind of sleep between death and resurrection. They were more inclined to accept a view parallel to the Roman Catholic doctrines of purgatory and heaven. In addition, the idea that it is natural for all existence to express itself materially, in other words, that man should have a body of fine matter after death plays a conspicuous part in pietistic teaching. Using a

¹ *Der Christ und die Erde*, 1953 (B 134), p. 13 ff.

² *See Geschichte des Pietismus* (B 129), II, p. 335.

German idiom containing two words which have a similar sound and were originally related etymologically, Baader expressed this as "Alles Leben ist Leiben", "all life is body", in other words, the principle which I have called "psychohylism" was accepted by the pietists.¹

I should like now to discuss very briefly various thinkers in whose work such hylic pluralistic themes occurred and at the same time indicate some of the threads leading in different directions.

Jakob Boehme (1575-1624), the shoemaker from Görlitz, had a very great influence on the whole pietistic movement and I shall have more to say about him in connection with the mystics. He himself was influenced by cabbalistic, alchemistic and neo-Platonic ideas and those who belonged to the trend we are considering appealed again and again to him and to his quality as a visionary. He taught, for example, that man possessed a spiritual "tincture-body"² in the biblical sense.

I shall not discuss his followers now, but turn at once to an important figure, F.C. Oetinger (1702-1782), the Lutheran pastor who later became a prelate at Wurtemberg and who was known as the "magus of the south", whereas J. G. Hamann (1730-1788) was called the "magus of the north". Oetinger was reputed to have been a visionary himself. He had a very high opinion of Boehme and corresponded with Swedenborg, although he did not always agree with him about everything.³ According to Oetinger, "a hidden, sidereal or etheric body, a special incorruptible body" comes about in believing, praying man's "natural body".⁴ Oetinger also discussed the "interim state",⁵ but man's transition to resurrection was, according to him, fluid: "Every believer rises again as soon as his spiritual natural organism is completed".⁶ He also believed in a "restoration of all things"⁷ and that the punishments of hell could not be everlasting.⁸ His ideas were therefore closely related to those of Origen. A saying of his that is often quoted is "the end of God's way is corporeality", which is usually interpreted in the sense of what I have called psychohylism. Although it is not in fact stated, this was clearly the author's intention.⁹

1 See above, pp. 11-12.

2 See B 154, p. 76 etc.; see also B 172, p. 149; B 78, p. 573.

3 See E. Benz, *Swedenborg in Deutschland* (B 194), p. 3 ff.

4 See B 7, p. 446.

5 See B 7, p. 568.

6 See B 7, p. 390.

7 See B 7, p. 650.

8 See B 7, p. 492.

9 See also B 154, p. 38 and the author's Murrhardt Sermons, p. 27.

The concept of "spiritual corporeality" is also to be found in the teachings of Oetinger's counterpart, J. G. Hamann,¹ who was also a friend of Kant, Herder and Jacobi.²

P. M. Hahn and J. M. Hahn, who also proposed a doctrine of the "soul-body", were closely related to Oetinger. Here we find ourselves in the environment of Wurtemberg and Swabia which also exerted a powerful influence, via the Stift or theological college of Tübingen, on the romantic movement and on the philosophers of the school of German idealism. In his book on the spiritual ancestors of this idealism, *Schellings und Hegels Schwäbische Geistesahnen* (1938), R. Schneider claimed that Schelling's and Hegel's ideas went back, in certain respects, to Oetinger and the two Hanns.

J. C. Lavater (1741-1801), J. H. Jung-Stilling (1740-1817) and J. F. Oberlin (1740-1826) also held views which were clearly similar. They are also generally included under the heading of pietism in the broader sense and had an influence on the revivalist movement. Lavater dealt again and again, in his "Views into Eternity" (*Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*, 1768, a book which was also translated into Dutch and published in Amsterdam in 1779), with the finer body which lies ahead of man and which made the author express himself lyrically:

I would cover a million miles

In less than a moment's time

If I were made of light.³

Lavater was moreover very close to C. Bonnet,⁴ whose works he translated into German. Jung-Stilling, on the other hand, tended to follow Swedenborg and taught the existence of an "etheric or nerve-spirit".⁵ Rosenberg has dealt in some detail with Oberlin, the hard-working preacher serving a poor parish in Alsace, in his book *Der Christ und die Erde* (B 134). It would appear that Oberlin was convinced of the reality of the spiritual body⁶ and, according to his diary, that he experienced the "intermediate state", since he was in spiritual contact with his wife for nine years after her death.⁷

Generally speaking, however, it is not easy to discover which Lutheran and other theologians were associated with this current within Protestantism and taught, for example, the doctrine of intermediate corporeality". Scheeben and Atzberger's Roman Catholic handbook does,

¹ See E. Jansen Schoonhoven, *Natuur en genade bij J. G. Hamann*, 1945, p. 326.

² See B 171, I, p. 439.

³ IV, p. 6.

⁴ See below, Section 78.

⁵ B 83, p. 332, 336.

⁶ See B 134, p. 258.

⁷ See B 134, p. 254; see also my "J. F. Oberlin, een 'heilige van het Protestantisme'", B 239, p. 117 ff.

however, provide a number of names, including some from other spheres,¹ and a summary will also be found in T. Kliefoth's *Christliche Eschatologie*.² There were clearly quite a few of them.

In this context, too, attention must be drawn to the Catholic philosopher, F. von Baader (1765-1841), who brought the works of Boehme to Schelling's notice³ and was undoubtedly responsible for influencing later Lutheran theologians and various Russian authors.⁴ According to Baader, "purely material corporeality" was "a degeneration of true corporeality"⁵ which man eventually receives back again. He also said that all "eternal life" was "eternal body".⁶ He therefore taught an "astral spirit" or "etheric body"⁷ and that, in the process of building up the higher body, the sacraments played a part.⁸

One of Baader's followers was J. Hamberger (1801-1885) who, after having studied the works of Boehme and Oetinger, published in 1869 his *Physica sacra oder der Begriff der himmlischen Leiblichkeit*. *Physica sacra—nomen est omen*. Hamberger's physics had as its object "a nature or corporeality which was sacred in itself" (B 62, p. 4) and in his book he provided an outline of the history of the concept of "heavenly corporeality". Hamberger was, however, not a theologian and, in my opinion, he included too many figures within this theme and often failed to make sharp distinctions. He regarded the angels not as substances consisting of fine matter, but as purely spiritual substances (p. 209).

As far as Lutheran theology is concerned, it is also possible to point to a number of thinkers who were in favour of the ideas discussed in this chapter in the nineteenth century. Kliefoth listed a whole series of names, but I will confine myself to mentioning only a few. R. Rothe (1799-1867) wanted to "bring about a gradual evocation of the light-body".⁹ F. Schleiermacher's (1768-1834) ideas also tended in the same direction.¹⁰ H. W. Rinck's book on the state of the soul after death, *Vom Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode*,¹¹ was especially concerned with the intermediate state, in connection with which the author appealed

1 B 147, p. 918.

2 B 86 (1886), p. 57 ff; see also K. Dijk (B 35) p. 43 ff.

3 See D. Baumgardt, *Fr. von Baader und die philosophische Romantik*, 1927 (B 10), p. 230; B 173, p. 65.

4 See above, p. 104-105.

5 See B 62, p. 25.

6 See B 10, p. 279.

7 See B 10, p. 109.

8 See B 10, p. 326.

9 See B 7, p. 589 note; Rothe also wrote the preface to B 7.

10 *Der christliche Glaube*, 3 II, p. 531; see also B 45, p. 331.

11 1861, 3rd edn., 1878.

to 2 Cor. 5. 1.¹ Especially important in this context is J. T. Beck (1804-1878), who was a professor first at Basle and then at Tübingen University. Following Oetinger, he also taught the doctrine of "spiritual corporeality",² the building up in those who were reborn of a new organ consisting of a supraterrrestrial substance.

It is furthermore clear that this trend has not yet died out in Lutheran theology from the fairly recently published *Festschrift für Adolf Koberle*, entitled *Die Leibhaftigkeit des Wortes* (1958), in other words, the "corporeality of the Word". It is true that P. Althaus, who has contributed an essay to the collection with the same title as that of the whole book, does not support a too explicit hylic pluralism,³ but other contributions do deal with it—for example, the article by Otto Betz, "Geistige Schönheit von Qumran zu Michael Hahn", in which the author discusses the part played by light and other essays by L. Präger on Oetinger, E. Bayreuther on biblical realism and K. Kindt on the figure of Rocholl.

These ideas on man's state after death have also met with some response in the Netherlands, especially in the case of Willem Bilderdijk⁴ and the ethical theologian and professor at Leiden University, J. H. Gunning jnr. (1829-1905), who attended lectures by Beck at Tübingen. According to Gunning, a germ of a higher corporeality is to be found in every Christian and this has to grow towards glorification.⁵ Gunning was also very much concerned with the works of Boehme, Oetinger, Baader and Rothe, but, whether for this reason or for others, he remained a very lonely figure.⁶

What, then, are we to term the theology that we have been discussing here? In various respects, it goes much farther than pietism, which, of course, began in opposition to traditional Lutheranism, but later showed a tendency to go over to doctrinal orthodoxy. Kiesewetter called these theologians "the German pneumatologists,"⁷ but also included under this heading a number of figures who were far less disposed towards theology.⁸ Another name that has been given to the members of this undercurrent in Lutheran theology is that of the "Christian theosophists".⁹ Gunning's ideas have also been called theosophical.

1 See above, p. 73.

2 See, for example, G. J. Lindijer, *J. T. Beck*, 1951, p. 245.

3 See Part I, p. 32.

4 See Part II, pp. 143-144; see also below, Section 87.

5 See Lindijer, *op. cit.*, p. 224; J. H. Semmelink, *Prof. Dr. J. H. Gunning*, 1926, p. 154 and Gunning's own *Blikken in de Openbaring*, II, p. 165.

6 M. J. A. de Vrijer, *Gunning tragicus*, 1946, p. 10 ff.

7 See B 83, p. 326 ff.

8 See below, Section 81.

9 See B 7, B 154. The title of a Dutch translation of a work by Boeme, published in Amsterdam in 1686, is *Alle de theosoophische of godwijze werken*, "All the theosophical or religious works".

The use of the word "theosophy" here clearly relates to another form of theosophy, theosophy in a broader sense than that of the Theosophical Society founded in 1875. There is clearly a tendency to call everything which provides reasoned religious doctrines (cf. "gnosis") on the basis of inner experience and visions, either at first or at second hand, simply "theosophy". In this sense, the teaching of such a figure as Philo Judaeus¹ has been called "theosophy", as has, in a rather broader sense, that of Clement of Alexandria and Origen on the one hand and of the neo-Platonists on the other.

In all these cases, the various systems contain certain doctrines concerned with hylic pluralism and this also applies to the various figures discussed in this section.

This brings us to the end of the historical outline of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in Christianity. I shall return to some of the themes in Christianity when I come to the sections providing "cross-sections", namely the doctrines concerning the angels,² the resurrection³ and the sacraments.⁴

73. ISLAM

So far, I have not devoted any attention at all, in my survey of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in the history of thought, to the third so-called "prophetic" religion, that is, Islam. I shall have to make up for this neglect now, although it will not be possible to do full justice to this very different and quite independent sphere of thought in the space of a few pages. Yet, on closer inspection, Islam is not so very different nor so entirely independent as it first appears to be. Both Moses and other Old Testament figures are recognised in this religion, as well as Jesus, and all are thought of as prophets. Even the story of the annunciation made to Mary is told in the Koran (Surah III, 42 ff; XIX, 16 ff). Many verses in the Koran follow certain verses in the Old Testament—for example, God's blowing life into man (Gen. 2. 7) is also reported in the Koran (Surah XV, 29). Arabic also has a direct equivalent both for *rūah* and for *nepheš* and it is obvious that these concepts were not thought of as immaterial in the Koran any more than they were in the Old Testament. This becomes clear if we approach the question by way of a long détour. As Hidding has observed, the originally Arabic word *roh* was used by the Soendanese both for *njawa*

1 See B 184, II, p. 272.

2 See below, Section 94.

3 See below, Section 107.

4 See below, Section 108.

and for *lelemboetan*¹ and, as we have seen in Volume I in the section on hylc pluralism among primitive peoples, something consisting of fine matter was certainly meant by this concept.² In support of this, we may also quote Gonda, who said, on p. 158 of his *Sanskrit in Indonesia* (1952), that both *suksma*, which signifies, among other things, "subtle spirit",³ and the word *roh*, which is derived from the Arabic, are sometimes used interchangeably.

There are also references to the angels, *malā'ikah*, for example, in Surah XXXV of the Koran. Allah, God, appointed his angels to be his winged messengers (Surah XXXV: 1)—he sends out his winds and these fluttering winds (Surah LI) are, according to the commentary,⁴ none other than his angels. This is, of course, very reminiscent of Psalm 104. 4, according to which God "makes the winds his messengers, fire and flame his ministers". The Christian theologians who attributed bodies of fine matter to the angels were in the habit of supporting their argument with this text.⁵ The angels are also described as a "blazing fire" in Surah XXXV: 6 of the Koran.

Another species of non-human spirit also occurs in the Koran. These spirits are called the *jinn* (or *djinn*) and there is still widespread belief in them in the Mohammedan world.⁶ They are, so to speak, a kind of middle group between the angels and the devils. They sometimes listen to readings of the Koran and are open to conversion. A rather amusing aspect of Mohammedan belief in these *jinn* is that Mohammedan jurists have been known to worry in case the presence of a number of *jinn*—who are, of course, not visible to everyone—might make a difference at a meeting requiring a quorum. *Jinn* are mentioned in about a dozen places in the Koran, where they are said to be created from a substance of fire (LV: 15; XV: 27), from a fire without smoke. It was for this reason that Zbinden insisted—although he did not have hylc pluralism especially in mind—that they were "created from fire" and were "therefore of fine matter" (p. 86) and that they were regarded in all kinds of stories as "without exception material" (p. 62). Al-Ghazali († 1111) defined the *jinn*, Zbinden says, as "aerial beings with invisible bodies" (p. 152). The same author also mentions an interesting dispute among Arab theologians of different opi-

1 *Gebruiken en Godsdienst der Soendanezen*, 1935, p. 51.

2 See above, Part II, pp. 105-106.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 155; see also Volume I, p. 328.

4 B 222, p. 540.

5 See above, pp. 62-63, 79-80.

6 See E. Zbinden, *Die Djinn des Islams und der altorientalische Geisterglaube*, 1953.

nions about the extent to which the *jinn* could be seen and to which they could influence men. The well-known teacher Shāfi'i did not in any sense deny the existence of the *jinn*, but he did explicitly deny that they could influence men (p. 144). This is, incidentally, very reminiscent of Balthasar Bekker's attitude.¹ Avicenna thought of the *jinn* as "aerial bodies" (p. 147).

According to the introduction in the English edition of the Koran, Surah XVII, an especially detailed chapter, "relates to the Prophet's vision, in which he was carried by night upon a heavenly steed to the Temple at Jerusalem, whence he was caught up through the seven heavens to the very presence of God".² This is therefore clearly one of Mohammed's famous ecstasies³—whenever he felt one of these ecstasies coming on, he wrapped himself in a garment⁴—and it is also reminiscent of Paul's having been caught up to the third heaven.⁵ What strikes me particularly is the expression "upon a heavenly steed"—this is not, it is true, mentioned explicitly in the Koran itself, but it clearly forms a part of the tradition. We are inevitably bound to be reminded here of the horses which play a part in Elijah's ascension into heaven in 2 Kings 2. 11-12⁶ and of the horses found in the higher regions both in Plato's *Phaedrus* and in the *Mahābhārata*.⁷ There is certainly reference in these texts to horses drawing a vehicle or chariot, but *vimāna*, the word for chariot of the gods, can also be simply a horse⁸ and, in his *Lux Perpetua*, F. Cumont mentions, among the themes that are discussed in the "journey to the beyond", both "chariot" and "horse".⁹ Since "vehicle" or *ochēma* was used in certain spheres, such as, for example, neo-Platonism, explicitly as a term for the body of the soul consisting of fine matter, it cannot be entirely ruled out that Mohammed's "heavenly steed" was also regarded basically as something similar, for example, as a private meta-organism.¹⁰ In the same context, Cumont also speaks of the "ladder" and, in Surah LXX, 3, Allah is called "Lord of the Ascending Stairways" and the whole Surah is in fact named after this verse. As a result of Gen. 28. 12, in which we read of a ladder between heaven and earth with the angels ascending and descending on it, the ladder has regularly been used as

1 See above, p. 99.

2 B 222, p. 282.

3 See B 179, XIII, p. 776.

4 See Surah LXXIV; see also B 222, p. 618.

5 2 Cor. 12. 2; see also above, p. 77.

6 See above, Part II, p. 140.

7 See above, Part II, pp. 139-140, 203-205.

8 See above, Part II, pp. 204-205.

9 B 23, p. 275 ff; see also above, Part II, pp. 144-145, note 4.

10 See above, Part II, p. 205, for Arjuna's chariot and Part II, p. 140, for Elijah.

a symbol of the link between ordinary and higher worlds. This is a hylic pluralistic theme.

As far as human beings are concerned, another edition of the Koran tells us, in the commentary, that "the Koran teaches that, when a person dies, his soul enters a new life and assumes a new body".¹ There would, however, appear to be no one specific text referring to this, but it is clear that Islam does teach a resurrection of the dead.

After Mohammed's death, Islam spread very quickly and great Islamic empires were founded. In conjunction with the learning of classical antiquity, the study of science flourished in Bagdad as the centre of learning in Asia and in Spain. There were many prominent physicians and philosophers in the Arab world at this period, the physicians generally speaking following the teaching of Galen about the "vital spirits".² As far as the philosophers are concerned, Nazzam of Basra († 845) accepted not only the animal spirits, but also that the soul consisted of fine matter.³ Alfarabi († 950), like the neo-Platonists whom he followed, must have taught the existence of an etheric body in man.⁴ The philosopher and mystic Al-Ghazālī (1059-1111) regarded it as possible to achieve ecstasy by means of natural power.⁵ I have already referred to his definition of the *jinn* above. Avicenna (980-1037) held the same opinion. The important philosopher Averroes (1126-1198) believed that all creatures consisted both of form and of matter. One aspect of the human intellect, the *intellectus passivus*, was, in his opinion, purely material,⁶ so that it could be regarded as consisting of fine matter. (The other aspect, the *intellectus agens*, was according to Averroes, very general, in fact, universally human.) Avicbron, a Jewish philosopher living in the Moorish environment in Spain (1020-1070), taught, like so many thinkers of this period, that a special matter belonged to forms which were in themselves immaterial.⁷

It is also not possible for me to discuss in detail here the mutual differences between the doctrines of the various philosophers or their great influence on Christian thought in the Middle Ages—it was through the Arabs that many of the works written by classical authors became known for the first time in the West. It is, however, by no means impossible that a more profound study of their writings made with

1 *De hellig Quo'raan* edited by M. B. Mahmud Ahmad, 1953, p. 150.

2 See B 123, I, p. 589.

3 See B 15, p. 52.

4 See B 96, p. 28.

5 See B 140, p. 164.

6 See B 140, pp. 168-169.

7 See above, p. 65.

hylic pluralism in mind might reveal a number of remarkable factors. This is probable because Arab thought was so deeply influenced not only by Aristotelianism, but also by neo-Platonism. In this case, the teaching of the Sufis, the mystics of Islam, would also have to be studied more carefully.

Although Islam has certainly produced a large number of movements and sects,¹ it has nonetheless remained fairly conservative. This tendency on the part of Muslims to preserve their ancient doctrines intact is illustrated by the following example. Henri Corbin, professor at Teheran and at the Sorbonne, has made a special study of the ideas which have prevailed or which still prevail in Persia. In one of his publications, *Terre céleste et corps de résurrection de l'Iran Mazdéen à l'Iran Sh'ite*, 1960, he draws attention to, among other things, the constant influence in Persia of doctrines related to neo-Platonic teachings. For example, Sheikhism—so called after Sheikh Ahmad Ahsá'i († 1826)—taught that man possessed several subtle bodies, thus following the teaching of Proclus (p. 150), but at the same time making use of a very complicated process in order not to depart from the teaching of the Koran. According to Sheikhism, then, there were two *jasads* and two *jisims*, the *jasad* B being the *caro spiritualis* composed of elements of the spiritual world (p. 285). Corbin explicitly connects this teaching with the *ochēma* doctrine of the neo-Platonists (p. 170), which prevailed not only in the thought of Psellos and others in Byzantium, but also continued to prevail in Persia.²

One of the occult movements of modern times, contemporary Sufism, which has become quite widespread even in the Netherlands as a result of the work of Inayat Khan³ and his followers, also contains the doctrine that man possesses several bodies of fine matter—see, for example his *The Soul, Whence and Whither*, 1927, or L. Hoyack's⁴ *De grote ontdekkingen*, 1939.

At least it is not possible to say, therefore, that no hylic pluralistic themes occur in Islam and its ramifications.

74. HYLIC PLURALISM IN THE MODERN AGE

In reviewing the occurrence of hylic pluralism in the history of human thought, we have now come to an end of the summaries of the "theo-

1 For the hylic pluralistic use of the term *ḥulul* by various sects, see the *Enzyklopädie des Islam*, 1927, II, p. 354.

2 See also, for example, the same author's *Physiologie de l'homme de lumière dans le soufisme iranien*, 1960, and the *Eranos Jahrbuch* of 1953.

3 See B 113, p. 274, suppl. 118.

4 See B 113, p. 271, suppl. p. 116.

logical" part of this work, the material originally intended for Volume IV of the Dutch edition. We are therefore now ready to approach the summaries of the history of hylic pluralism in the modern age (the material to be published in full in Volume V of the Dutch edition). In this, the emphasis is bound to be on the occurrence of hylic pluralistic ideas in modern *philosophy* and, to discuss this, I shall go briefly into the views of a number of modern thinkers with regard to this. I shall not, however, be dealing exclusively with philosophers and philosophical movements as such, because the theme also occurs in the writings, for example, of physicians and biologists, physicists and psychologists, occultists and parapsychologists and mystics and artists, and I shall have to say something, however briefly, about these. A difficulty presents itself at once here—in an age which was far less specialised than the twentieth century, many philosophers were also psychologists, many physicians were also philosophers and many scientists were also occultists. It would therefore be possible to classify many figures under several different headings and a choice would consequently have to be made. What is more, there are also certain points where the figures dealt with in the "theological" sections on the Old and New Testaments, Christianity and Islam and those to be dealt with in the sections that follow on the "modern age" also overlap. Clearly, a number of theologians or religious thinkers, whom I have already mentioned, have chronologically to be included in the modern period and, on the other hand, the physicians and mystics at least to be discussed in the sections that follow do not all belong, strictly speaking, to the modern world.

As far as hylic pluralism in general in the modern age is concerned, what emerges clearly and at once is that it has been very much less in vogue in recent centuries than in the past. In India, it forms an important part of almost all the systems of thought, including the important ones like the Vedānta and the Sāṅkhya. In classical antiquity, even though there was a widespread scepticism, it is quite definitely encountered—among the pre-Socratics, in the background in the case of Plato and Aristotle and in a very special way in the Stoa and in neo-Platonism. It is also present in the Bible and even more so in Christianity during the early centuries of our era, but also in the centuries of Augustinianism and for a very long time in Eastern Christianity. In the modern age, however, there is a marked change of emphasis. Powerful opponents appear on the scene—both individuals and whole movements—and their arguments will have to be considered separately. Hylic pluralism is now regarded more or less as a relic from the past.

an obstinately persistent superstition in the opinion of many, a repeated emergence of the same ideas, all of which go against the grain in the modern world, on the basis of consistent inner experiences in the opinion of others. However this may be, the theme of hylic pluralism does form a part of certain tendencies which are either not officially recognised or else are not supported by leading thinkers. There have, however, been exceptions to this—during the romantic period, for example, the climate was favourable to hylic pluralism and at a certain time quite well-known and prominent thinkers have been concerned with these ideas. Even though this was followed by a sharp reaction against hylic pluralism, the tide more or less turned again afterwards. It is possible to say that blood is and has always been thicker than water—this is borne out by the great interest shown in recent movements, such as spiritualism, modern theosophy and anthroposophy, all of which teach, among other things, hylic pluralism. It is therefore clear that hylic pluralism has experienced a number of ups and downs in the modern age and has not, in general, played a very important part in modern thought, but rather a subordinate and almost disregarded part. This is why it has been so often ignored and why it occurs so irregularly in reviews, manuals and dictionaries.¹ Yet it is surprising how frequently it does occur—the problem has always been under what heading to classify it, since the phenomenon has so often been encountered in the case of individuals or as a part of the doctrines of very disparate figures.

75. PHILOSOPHERS OF THE RENAISSANCE

As a general rule, the modern age is usually regarded as beginning with the Renaissance. The concept "Renaissance" is not, however, completely unequivocal. No one would deny that the great revival of art in fifteenth and sixteenth century Italy has to be included under the Renaissance, but it is less easy to establish what is meant by Renaissance thinkers and philosophy. What is more, the Renaissance came to Western Europe later than it did to Southern Europe. I shall, in any case, use the concept of Renaissance in the broad sense. The content of Renaissance thought is, for example, easier to define than its extent. What in fact emerged at a certain point in time was an independent way of thinking which refused to be forced into the strict pattern of scholasticism, was, among other things, stimulated by the study of classical authors on a greater scale and with much deeper interest than

¹ See Part I, p. 1-3.

medieval thought and was also inspired by humanism. The Reformation can be regarded as a secondary phenomenon which accompanied this whole development, while on the other hand the reaction to the Reformation in the form of the Counter-Reformation determined to a very great extent the character of Roman Catholicism in the centuries that followed. Medieval thought, with Aristotle as its authority, nonetheless continued to be influential for a very long time, in, for example, "Protestant scholasticism"¹

A typical phenomenon of the Renaissance was so-called Italian natural philosophy.² As I am bound to limit myself here as much as possible to the subject of hylic pluralism, I will say no more than this about this philosophy. Italian natural philosophers such as H. Cardanus (1501-1576), B. Telesius (1508-1588) and T. Campanella (1568-1639) were not troubled about a pronouncement of the kind made by the Council of Vienne³ and later confirmed by the Fifth Lateran Council⁴ that the soul was single and uniform. They taught that a third factor existed, a lower soul consisting of (fine) matter and forming a bond or link, the *vinculum*, between the higher soul or spirit and the body. According to Cardanus, this lower soul was, because of its materiality, mortal, but the spirit was not.⁵ Campanella's concept of the soul was also "materialistic".⁶ Like the Stoics, Telesius taught that the soul consisted of an extremely fine and dynamic matter.⁷ Generally speaking, these Italian natural philosophers assumed, however, that the higher soul or spirit was immaterial, just as God was immaterial. This means that their view has to be classified under the delta standpoint and not the beta standpoint.

What is interesting is that the well-known thinker Francis Bacon (1561-1626), one of the first really important philosophers of the modern age, was, in certain respects and especially with regard to anthropological questions, very close to the Italian natural philosophers, for example, Telesius. He too distinguished two souls—the lower soul which was not rational and the spiritual and rational soul.⁸ The first—the *anima sensitiva*—consisted, in Bacon's view, of fine matter and man had this lower soul in common with the animals.⁹ Bacon compiled a scale of increasingly rarefied matter, beginning with air and breath and conti-

1 See, for example, B 141, p. 109 ff.

2 See, for example B 41, p. 33 ff.

3 See above, p. 94.

5 See B 184, I, p. 97.

6 See B 141, p. 57.

7 See B 128, p. 144; B 172, p. 43.

8 See B 184, I, p. 38.

9 See B 89, I, p. 116; Works (1901), IV, Chapter III.

4 See Denzinger, § 621

nuing through the *spiritus vitales*—which were accepted throughout almost the whole of this period—on to the sensitive soul.¹ This is obviously hylic pluralism, even though these ideas can hardly be called new, unlike Bacon's formulation of principles of empirical knowledge, which was indeed new. In his *De anima brutorum*, T. Willis (1622-1675) closely followed Bacon's doctrine of the sensitive soul.

Another very well-known English philosopher of this period, a man who often caused considerable scandal, was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). I can, however, only deal with a few aspects of his thought here. He was clearly a materialist—in his opinion, even God was a *corpus* or body²—and for this reason and for others, he was an *enfant terrible*. It would, however, be quite wrong to regard Hobbes simply and solely as a materialist in the sense that the later monistic materialists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were materialists. His works include, for example, a treatise *De regno tenebrarum*,³ in which he discusses, among other things, demonology. According to Hobbes, the daemons were made of air—*facta ex aere*—or of another subtle matter—*allave subtiliore materia*.⁴ He certainly called himself a Christian and supported his argument with reference to 1 Cor. 15. 44, stressing that Paul speaks there of *corpora spiritualia*,⁵ spiritual bodies. The angels were, in Hobbes' view, *spiritus, sed non incorporeos*. Every reference in the Old and New Testaments to *spiritus, pneuma* or spirit was, in Hobbes' opinion, intended in the material sense—the words *incorporea vel immaterial* were not to be found in the Bible. *Spiritus* in any case meant a *corpus subtile*, a fluid.⁶ *Inspiratio* also had to be taken in the literal sense of the word, in other words, as a “breathing in” (cf. *spirare*) *corporis alicuius subtilis*, of some subtle body.⁷

This is quite clearly hylic pluralism and, what is more, a much more extensive manifestation of hylic pluralism than in the case of Bacon. Whereas the other Renaissance philosophers accepted the existence of something that transcended matter, Hobbes regarded everything, including God, as material. He did, however, accept matter that was finer than ordinary matter and, in this, his standpoint was, like the Stoics' and Tertullian's, that of dualistic materialism.

Another Renaissance philosopher was Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), one of the most important members of the so-called “Cambridge

1 *Works* V, p. 350.

2 *Opera* (1658), VIII, p. 344; see also Part I, p. 39.

3 VIII, p. 289 ff.

4 *ibid.*

5 *ibid.*

6 VIII, p. 183.

7 *ibid.*, p. 189.

Platonists". In his *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678),¹ he engaged in polemics with Hobbes, whose materialism and mechanism went, in his opinion, too far. He was himself also a hylic pluralist, however, and indeed it is almost possible to say that he was a kind of philosophical last of the Mohicans in the modern age.² I say this because he was one of the few modern thinkers who was directly influenced by the neo-Platonists and explicitly defended fine materiality in connection with the soul—he did not, it should be noted, teach the fine materiality of the soul itself (his point of view was the delta stand-point rather than the beta or gamma standpoint) — and saw the problems connected with this as a whole, discussing them, in successive chapters, both systematically and historically. Every or certainly almost every theme contained in hylic pluralism can be found in Cudworth's *Intellectual System*—the *ochēmata* of the neo-Platonists, Paul's pneumatic body, the views of the Church Fathers concerning the angels and so on. What is more, none of these themes are discussed vaguely, Everything is subjected to careful reasoning and the relevant places are cited. A rapid glance at von Mosheim's page headings to his translation of Cudworth³ should be enough more or less to convince the reader of the validity of this claim. In addition to this, von Mosheim's very long notes on the one hand supplement Cudworth's material considerably and, on the other, make it clear that von Mosheim was not able to agree with the author of the book that he was translating. It is, of course, undeniably true, as G.R.S. Mead (1863-1933), the author of *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body* in the Western Tradition (1919, B 99), a book which amounts to far less than Cudworth's, observed, that posterity has agreed more with von Mosheim than with Cudworth himself.⁴ There is, unfortunately, insufficient space available here for me to discuss in detail Cudworth's doctrine that all beings have a "plastic nature".⁵

The Irish bishop and philosopher, G. Berkeley (1685-1753) was, in his maturer years, the author of a work, *Siris* (1744), in which he defended his own point of view, namely that matter was not real, but nonetheless approached neo-Platonism and discussed, for example,

1 I quote from B 22, The Latin translation of Cudworth's work made by the German theologian, J. L. von Mosheim.

2 One can also say before the submergence of hylic pluralism, which reduced it to the status of an undercurrent.

3 See Part I, p. 62.

4 B 99, p. 58, note 1. A comparison could be made here with the contrast between Kant and Swedenborg (see B 238, p. 8). In this Kant was victorious, at least provisionally (see below, Section 80).

5 See B 141, p. 236.

the *augoelides ochēma* of the soul. He therefore accepted that there were differences, that there was, in other words, a pluralism in matter, even though he was convinced that matter was only appearance, and, to this extent, his point of view was the zeta standpoint.¹ It is quite likely that the influence of Cudworth led Berkeley to accept this view and to approach neo-Platonism in this way.²

Berkeley, of course, brings us into the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the Renaissance, there were a few other figures who are important in connection with our subject and among these we must include Paracelsus (1493-1541) and Jakob Boehme (1575-1624). I shall have something to say about these thinkers in a different context. Here, however, I should like simply to say this. The well-known natural philosopher, P. Gassendi (1592-1655), despite his polemics with the followers of Aristotle and with Descartes, wanted to renew the atomism of classical antiquity and, in this, followed Epicurus and Lucretius. Like them,³ he regarded the soul as material, as consisting of fine matter, of atoms, of rarefied matter—*substantia quaedam tenuissima ac veluti flos materiae*.⁴ This "flower of matter" was, however, not enough for Gassendi—he regarded the rational soul as *incorporea* or immaterial,⁵ with the result that he cannot be classified under the beta standpoint. In this, he was certainly in the tradition of the other Italian natural philosophers who were somewhat older than he was.

76 DESCARTES

As I have already observed, hylic pluralism has not been favourably considered in the modern age as a whole or by thinkers in circles that have tended to set the tone. This has, moreover, undoubtedly persisted up to the present time. Generally speaking, this is probably because modern thinkers are inclined to be very "matter of fact" and not to be interested in such uncertain data as bodies of fine matter and other worlds. This no doubt also played a part in the thought of Aristotle, who also had very little interest in the question of continued existence after death. It was similar in the case of the Arabic philosophers, who to a great extent shared Aristotle's positive interest in science. Thomas Aquinas, the systematic theologian, was open to the suggestion that the soul might simply be the form of the body, by which

¹ See Part I, pp. 56-57.

² See B 22, II, note K.

³ See above, pp. 42-43.

⁴ See B 172, p. 178.

⁵ See B 38, p. 197; B 89, I, p. 135.

a rational treatment of the problem of man's continued existence after death and of the existence of the angels was rendered impossible.¹ Apart from various details, which I shall not discuss here, this was very much in the tradition of many of the Arabic philosophers. This tendency, which may safely be called *positivism* because it is concerned almost exclusively with what is obvious, tangible, positive and not uncertain, has always been and is still characteristic of thinking in the modern age. It has had far-reaching and very fruitful results in the great interest taken in science during the whole of this period and, as a consequence of this, in the achievements of modern technology. On the other hand, however this generally positivistic attitude has undoubtedly been one of the major causes for the decline in interest in hylic pluralism, although this does not, in my opinion, mean that hylic pluralism is incorrect.

In addition to this general attitude, which is always present in the modern age, sometimes tacitly and at others, especially during the Enlightenment, explicitly, there have also been other ideas, introduced by certain thinkers, which have had a considerable influence on the ultimate rejection of hylic pluralism because they were, as far as their content was concerned, undoubtedly in conflict with it. I shall deal in some detail with these ideas in the last part of this work, the part that is especially devoted to the sense and meaning, the truth of hylic pluralism in a section on the obstacles against acceptance of hylic pluralism.² But even here, in this historical survey, it is necessary to give some attention to figures who have worked against hylic pluralism because of certain views that were opposed to our theme. I have already mentioned Thomas Aquinas, some of whose teachings have to be included within this category,³ and I shall have also to consider Immanuel Kant. One thinker, however, who was undoubtedly a leading opponent of hylic pluralism, was Ren  Descartes (1596-1650).

One Cartesian doctrine in particular has had a very deep influence on the rejection of hylic pluralism. This is Descartes' teaching concerning the contrast between the thinking substance and the extensive substance, between the immaterial soul with its spiritual effectiveness and the material body, which exists in space as a complicated machinery that is divisible into component parts. This is the doctrine that has quite correctly been called *anthropological dualism*, a doctrine containing the view that there is a *division which cuts right across man*. I have

1 See above, p. 98-99.

2 See below, Volume IV, Section 120.

3 See above, Section 70.

defined hylic pluralism as "psychohylism", that is, the doctrine that the inner, psychical aspect is *always* accompanied by a material aspect and that, if this material aspect is not ordinary matter, then it is fine matter.¹ There can be no question of psychohylism in Descartes' teaching. If the two substances are in fact so heterogeneous, so separate from each other, then each can easily enough go its own way, especially, for example, on death. Several thinkers accepted a *vinculum* or link of fine matter between the spirit and matter²—here too, Descartes' teaching rules this out, because a trichotomy is not possible.³ Leaving aside the question of the precise way in which the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Descartes was connected⁴—an important part was obviously played in this by later scholasticism, according to which the form of the soul and the matter of the body were relatively independent factors—there can be no doubt that this Cartesian placing of the soul, the thinking substance, on its own is very similar to the Thomistic doctrine of the existence of angels as purely spiritual substances without a body, without a *materia spiritualis*. The following characteristic of Descartes' dualistic standpoint is also connected with this. The psychical and physical aspects, soul and body, are, according to Descartes quite heterogeneous. It is clear, then, that the more heterogeneous they are, the more difficult it becomes to explain the interaction between them, an interconnection which is, however it may be interpreted, a datum of man's experience. Thomas believed that the human soul, like the angels, was a purely spiritual substance and he consequently also had difficulties with this point⁵—it more or less amounted to the fact that this connection was a miracle, a unity which had to be accepted, but could not easily be understood. Descartes, on the other hand, tried to limit this interaction between the body and the soul to a definite point, the pineal gland,⁶ but even then, this interaction as such is an infringement of the dualism taught by Descartes himself, as soon as this is taken seriously. Other thinkers, especially the so-called parallelists, came to the conclusion that there was no interaction at all, but rather that the two—the psychical aspect and the physical aspect—constantly ran parallel to each other. As far as Descartes is concerned, his attitude with regard to the relationship between the soul and the body has been characterised as "an angel driving a

1 See above, pp. 11-12.

2 See, for example, above, pp. 88, 118.

3 See B 89, I, p. 116.

4 See E. Gilson, *Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans le système cartésien* (1930).

5 See B 184, II, p. 117; B 171, p. 420; B 212, p. 629.

6 See, for example, B 141, p. 160.

machine".¹ In fact, Descartes did regard animals as automatic or as machines² and, insofar as the human body is placed on its own in space as a purely material factor, it is clear that this mechanical element is also present in it. But what about the angel driving this machine? by means of a single point of contact? Surely this is precisely Thomas' angel as a spiritual substance without a *materia spiritualis*, which by way of transition, makes the effect on ordinary matter to some extent intelligible. It is, of course, true that not everyone can agree with Maritain's view concerning Descartes here, and Descartes himself seems to have aimed at preventing a comparison of this kind,³ but, considered as a whole, this image does appear to provide a striking and essentially correct illustration of Descartes' doctrine in this respect.

In my opinion, therefore, it is beyond doubt that, as such, as pure dualism, according to which the soul and the body were essentially heterogeneous and interaction between them was very dubious, Descartes' conception has certainly become an almost unquestioned value in the history of thought. This heterogeneity of soul and body has become one of our accepted convictions in the modern age and has led, for example, to the detailed discussions which took place round about the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between a number of philosophers who were at the same time also psychologists about the real nature of the relationship between the soul and the body—whether it was a parallelism or an interaction.⁴ On the other hand, this anthropological dualism, as well as the positivistic tendency to which I referred above, were basically responsible for the virtual disappearance of the themes of an aspect of the soul consisting of fine matter, of spiritual corporeality, of an etheric body after death and so on in the modern age. The epsilon standpoint, which is, because of dualism—the dichotomy between the soul and the body—completely negative with regard to hylic pluralism,⁵ has therefore been very prominent in the modern age.

Quite apart from hylic pluralism, however, we are now witnessing a strong reaction against this anthropological dualism of Descartes. As one example of this, let me quote J. J. Louet Feisser: "The difference—one might even say the division—between the body and the soul, which has for a long time dominated the anthropological sciences under the influence of so-called Cartesian dualism, has now, under

1 J. Maritain, *Religion et culture* (1930), p. 70; see also Part I, p. 53, note 1.

2 See, for example, B 141, p. 159.

3 In a letter to Regius; see *Oeuvres*, III, p. 492; B 235, p. 33.

4 See below, Sections 86 and 130; B 68; B 114, Section 37 etc.

5 See above, pp. 5, 10.

the influence of phenomenological psychology and psychosomatic therapy, had to make way for a view of corporeality in which the phenomenon of the consciousness is inherent".¹ Many other authors could also be quoted, supporting this statement.² One could almost say that Cartesian dualism has become a kind of "try your strength" machine. This new attitude can only mean that there should be more openness towards our special theme, hylic pluralism, and towards the need to reconsider the close interlocking of the psychical and the physical elements much more fully. In my opinion, it is simply not sufficient to say "there is therefore no anthropological dualism".³

There is, however, one remarkable circumstance. We cannot, I believe, deny that Cartesianism has, as a form of anthropological dualism, had a very great influence on thought in the modern age and that this has been fatal, among other things, as far as hylic pluralism is concerned. If we look at the question a little more closely, however, we find that it is not quite as bad as that in the case of Descartes himself. This would appear, in any case, to be a rather general phenomenon. A certain -ism comes in the first place from a certain figure, but as a slogan it goes far beyond the original figure and lives a life of its own. It is therefore only fair to point out any discrepancies between the origin and the slogan. As far as our special subject, hylic pluralism, is concerned, Thomas' doctrine about the existence of purely spiritual substances had important consequences for hylic pluralism, but his opposition was tempered by the fact that he accepted the *denes* or "bridal gifts" of the glorified body⁴ and also by another fact to which I shall return later.⁵ As far as Kant, another opponent of hylic pluralism is concerned, we shall, in the second instance, have to take account of other considerations.⁶ Finally, Aristotle also accepted a *pneuma* of fine matter, despite his hylemorphism.

What, then, is the situation in connection with Descartes, which makes us say that the food is not eaten as hot as it is served? Even apart from hylic pluralism, something of this kind is certainly observable in his idea that animals are purely automatic or machines. He seems to have reconsidered this idea to some extent in later life.⁷ All the same, his attitude towards this question had its effect and it seems undoubtedly to have played a part in Lamettrie's extension of the machine-like

¹ B 160, March 1962, p. 134.

² See, for example, *Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, 1958, II, p. 93.

³ See below, Section 130.

⁴ See above, p. 100; see also Part I, p. 52.

⁵ See below, p. 126 f.

⁶ See below, Section 80.

⁷ See W.A.J. Meyer, *Descartes' Entwicklung*, p. 20; see Part I, p. 50.

characteristic to man in the eighteenth century (*L'homme machine*, 1748). Man expresses things which are "not said to deaf ears". As far as hylic pluralism is concerned, we are bound to say that something of this kind certainly occurs in Descartes' case. For example, although he quite explicitly supported the doctrine of the *spiritus animales*.¹ I should prefer not to accept this. In the first place, this teaching about volatile matters distilled from the blood was for many centuries and even at the time of Descartes himself a universal doctrine concerning the nervous system. In the second place, however, these "animal spirits" were included by Descartes exclusively within the physical aspect of his dualism, that is, even before any contact was made between the mind and the body in the pineal gland. This is why Lange said that the animal spirits were, in Descartes' case, free "of that mystical dualism between matter and spirit"² that is met with elsewhere in his thought. Even more evidence of hylic pluralism, however, in Descartes' philosophy is provided in the following. Van Peursen has drawn attention to the fact that Descartes said in a letter that the soul could, in a certain sense even be called *corporeus* or corporeal, that is to say, insofar as it had an effect on the body, so long as this did not mean that it could itself be called corporeal. Even materiality and spatiality could safely be ascribed to the soul, so long as it was borne in mind that this matter and extensiveness of thought was of a species which was different from that of ordinary matter.³ This is, of course, precisely the difficulty of the effect of the soul on the body, about which Descartes said that it was an everyday experience⁴ for which a place had to be made, but which could not be reconciled with a consistent dualism. To avoid this difficulty, it is necessary to follow another course, in other words, to say that the "I" which was, according to Descartes, an "immaterial substance",⁵ is neither yours nor mine, but the one pure "I", the suprasubject. Descartes did not, however, go as far as this. The dilemma remained unresolved, a contradiction—the "I" was, on the one hand, immaterial and, on the other, the soul was in certain respects "corporeal.. In his eagerness to bring the soul and the body closer together, van Peursen tried to show that Descartes tended to follow this course as well. But all that can be said is that Descartes' fundamental heterogeneity results in any interaction between the soul and the body causing an infringement of the system

1 See B 128, p. 158; E. Gilson, *Index Scolastico-Cartésien*, 1912, under the heading "esprits animaux".

2. B 89, I, p. 116.

3 See *Oeuvres* (ed. Adam and Tannery), III, p. 423 ff; see also B 235, p. 23, 33.

4 *Oeuvres* V, p. 222; see also B 235, pp. 25 33.

5 See Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

and that his clearly formulated anthropological dualism had an enormous influence on the subsequent history of thought. To this extent, Descartes has to be regarded as one of the main opponents of hylic pluralism.

The doctrine of psychophysical parallelism, as taught, for example, by Spinoza (1632-1677), avoids the contradiction of the interaction between two completely heterogeneous substances by maintaining that the two series run parallel to each other. This theory has, however, other objections.¹ As far as hylic pluralism is concerned, the contrast between these two series, the psychical and the physical aspects contains a certain dualism (one which is, moreover, even more consistent than Descartes' dualism) and, even though it might be possible to find elements in the teaching of Spinoza² and Heymans³ which could be extended to include hylic pluralism, it would nonetheless be forcing the issue to do so, because the dichotomies, generally speaking, lead to a rejection of any third factor of fine matter.

77 MYSTICS; OCCULTISTS I

We have now reached the point where we can investigate the occurrence of hylic pluralism in certain groups of persons and the first of these groups that I should like to consider is that formed by the Christian mystics and, in connection with this group, certain occultists. It is probably useful to make a distinction between mysticism and occultism and perhaps the best distinction is this. The mystic above all concentrates inwardly on trying to obtain contact within himself with God and on becoming one with God or the divine element. The occultist, on the other hand, follows this inner experience, but then goes on to turn outwards and either objectivises what he has experienced subjectively, formulates and elaborates a doctrine or theory or else changes this experience into action. It is possible for the mystic to be completely without occultism and to remain predominantly orientated inwardly.⁴ On the other hand, there is also a form of occultism in which the religious aspect which is so characteristic of mysticism is completely lacking. In this context of mysticism and occultism, we can also say something about the term theosophy. This term, the basic meaning of which is, of course, "divine wisdom", is usually applied to the attempt to

1 See B 114, Section 37 ff.

2 See L. Hoyack, *Spinoza als ultgangspunt*, 1965, passim, and my "Spinoza, Louis Hoyack en het hylic pluralisme", B 261 and Amsterdam, 1967.

3 See Part I, p. 57 ff.

4 One is reminded here of Plotinus' "flight from the one to the One" (*Enn.* VI, 9, 11).

know a reality that is different from ordinary reality and to do this by means of direct contemplation and with the help of unusual faculties and secondly to the doctrines and theories formulated and elaborated as a result of these experiences. The latter are usually, of course, mystical experiences which in any case contain more than a purely a-religious occultism. What theosophists have, generally speaking, in common with occultists is that they tend to objectivise their inner experience and to theories about it by formulating anthropological and sometimes even cosmological doctrines. They usually go further, then, than the mystics, who tend to remain turned inwards. Both mystics and theosophists, however, emphasise inner experience and thus often come, quite involuntarily, into conflict with the traditional teachings of a theology that is based on dogmatic considerations or on a religious experience that took place in the distant past (as distinct from "continued revelation").

This digression was more or less necessary before turning to consider the extent to which hylic pluralism may be present in the teachings of well known mystics. Insofar as hylic pluralistic themes contain a measure of objectivisation, it is possible to say that the mystics were not, according to my definition, exclusively concerned with mysticism. On the other hand, however, it is equally possible to say that not too much hylic pluralism should be expected in the most characteristic mystics.

So far, I have said very little about mysticism.¹ We have therefore to begin by going back to the time before the modern age. In this quest, we shall confine our attentions to Christianity, since something has already been said in a different context about such mystics as Sankara and Plotinus. Christian mysticism is often regarded as beginning² with Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153). As I have already said,³ Bernard accepted an "etheric body" in the case of the angels.⁴

Several ideas of a hylic pluralistic nature certainly occur in the mystical writings of Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179), in which she describes her visions, although her commentator was obviously not interested in them. She says, for example, that the soul takes possession of the body of the child "like a fiery globe" during the mother's pregnancy.⁵ She also calls the soul the "animating fire of the body"⁶ and says that "as a fiery globe, it does not have the outline of the human

1 See above, pp. 49, 56, 62, 100.

2 B 171, p. 253; E. Gilson, *La théologie mystique de St. Bernard*, 1934.

3 See above, pp. 7, 92.

4 B 29, I, col. 1225.

5 In *Selvas Lib. I, Visio IV*; see *Magna Ungrund. Die metaphysische Anthropologie der heiligen Hildegard von Bingen*, 1938, p. 37.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

body."¹ Once again, then, we meet with the theme of the soul in the shape of a globe or sphere.² "Almost everywhere", Hildegard's commentator tells us, the mystic calls the soul a "breath" or "aerial".³ In connection with her visions, the phrase "in the shadow of the living light"⁴ occurs again and again. Elsewhere, Hildegard is said to have recognised "seven levels which were at the same time both spiritual and physical"⁵ and for this we can safely read "of fine matter".

Another prominent mystic during the Middle Ages was Master Eckehart (1260-1327). Does hylic pluralism occur anywhere in his works? The real difficulty here is that his writings are so controversial. Shortly after the Council of Vienne, in 1329, some of his teachings were condemned by the Church. It has been claimed that the content of his writings in German is not entirely in accordance with that of the Latin texts. Überweg and Geyer are cautious here: "Eckehart's psychology is first of all in accordance with that of Thomas. The soul is immaterial, the simple form of the body".⁶ Was Eckehart therefore not a supporter of Augustinianism, despite the fact that he was living and working so soon after its heyday? On the other hand, however, attention has also been drawn to the presence of neo-Platonic influences in his works.⁷ I am of the opinion that we shall have to wait until a more complete edition of his writings, including those in German, has been published before we can come to a definitive conclusion about this. In the meantime, however, we can quote M. d'Asbeck: "Eckehart speaks of corporeal heavens: *die liplichen himel*"⁸ and this undoubtedly seems like hylic pluralism in the cosmological sense.

Another well-known mystic of approximately the same period, John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) also spoke explicitly of a corporeal heaven, *lijflieke hemele*,⁹ and of four species of fire, including that of purgatory, of a making "subtle" of the elements¹⁰ and of the "so subtle body".¹¹ Ruysbroeck was, moreover, not a Thomist and, in accordance with the Augustinian tradition, he thought of the union of the soul and the body as dualistic.¹²

1 *ibid.*, p. 43.

2 See above, p. 82.

3 *ibid.*, p. 44.

4 *ibid.*, p. 9, 53.

5 See B 134, p. 241.

6 B 171, p. 563.

7 See, for example, B 212, pp. 694, 699.

8 *La mystique de Ruysbroeck, l'admirable*, 1930, p. 213, note 6.

9 *Werken*, ed. Ponkens and Reypens, I, p. 12; for "corporeal", we can safely read "of fine matter".

10 *ibid.*, p. 91.

11 *ibid.*, p. 94.

12 See B 140, pp. 322, 324.

Edith Stein refers on p. 129 of her book *Kreuzeswissenschaft* (1950) to the "garment of the soul in three colours" which occurs in the writings of John of the Cross (1542-1591), but this was, of course, a well-known theme¹ and the three colours serve to emphasise its hylic pluralistic meaning.

After this brief discussion of the Roman Catholic mystics, let us now consider some protestant mystics. The most famous and most influential of these is, of course, Jakob Boehme (1575-1624). He was, however, preceded in history by, among others, Valentin Weigel (1533-1588). Boehme, a well-read man despite his humble position in society, was certainly acquainted with Weigel's works. These two men were the first of a series of mainly German "Christian theosophists."² Weigel taught, for example, that man consisted of an animal body, an astral spirit and an immortal soul,³ in other words, of a trichotomy.

It is not possible for me to go into Boehme's many doctrines in detail here, but it is safe to say that hylic pluralism clearly occurs in his works. He wrote explicitly, for example, about "subtle flesh", about a "force-body" which was so subtle that it could pass through stones and also about an "inner, holy body."⁴ The latter he also called a "spiritual tincture-body". This is very clearly Christian thinking and the ideas expressed are obviously within the context of the resurrection—so much so that Boehme undoubtedly belonged to that trend in Protestantism that I discussed in Section 72. He was indeed one of the leading spirits in this movement, to whose writings constant reference was made, but he was at the same time also a mystic of quite an independent kind a Protestant who went his own way. His spiritual body clearly anticipated the resurrection, whereas later theologians distinguished between an "intermediate body" and an ultimate "resurrection body".

In his book, *Der Jenseitige Mensch*, E. Mattiesen raised the problem as to whether the whole mystical way should be regarded as a "metaphysiological process of growth", in which a "superbody" could be made known by a "flowing breath", in other words, a mystical breath.⁵ An idea of this kind is also encountered in Boehme, in Swedenborg at a much later date and in pietism. In this context, it would be necessary to investigate, for example, the works of G. Tersteegen (1697-1769). So long as it is not simply a question of doctrinal pronouncements, but of "experience", it is possible to find numerous figures

1 See below, Section 93.

2 See, for example, B 154.

3 See B 141, p. 113.

4 B 154, p. 77.

5 B 97, p. 796.

who bear witness to an inner fullness, an inner growth which they often attribute to the action of the Holy Spirit.

Boehme exerted a great influence, although the number of those who followed him was not very great. Hyllic pluralistic ideas can be found in the works of his followers P. Poirer (1646-1719)¹ and G. Gichtel (1638-1710). What is particularly interesting in this context is an illustration from a book by Gichtel which shows a similarity with the Indian doctrine of the *chakras*.² Antoinette de Bourignon (1616-1680) must also be mentioned in connection with all these mystics. She was of the opinion that the body which was created for man by God and was eternal lived concealed inside him even during his present life and after the fall.³

In addition to all these mystics, there are several figures who can more appropriately be called occultists. I should like to discuss one or two matters in connection with one group of these occultists here.

In the first place, however, it is important to point out that alchemy was actively practised at the end of the Middle Ages and during the first few centuries of the modern era, just as it had been at the end of the ancient world. I have already drawn attention to the fact that the alchemists were not only concerned with the attempt to make gold, in other words, with the beginnings of modern chemistry, but also strove to transform man's lower body into a higher, more subtle vehicle or, as C.G. Jung expressed it, their ultimate aim was to find an "incorruptible substance."⁴ For the Christian, this assumes the form of "transfigured resurrection body."⁵ What is interesting, however, is Boehme was also acquainted with these ideas—Jung has written that the "parallels between the philosopher's stone and Christ" also played an important part for Boehme.⁶ In connection with Jung's book on *Psychologie und Alchemie* (1944, B 78), Sherwood Taylor also commented: "To treat alchemy as no more than plain material chemistry is undoubtedly an error; to treat it as no more than an interior mental process is no less."⁷ The point where the two views coincide is obviously the body of fine matter and this is, of course, of importance in connection with our subject. Unfortunately, however, I cannot go into this interesting and very extensive question of alchemy in greater detail here.

1 See above, p. 70.

2 See below, Section 96 and Plate 7.

3 See B 97, p. 795. This idea is clearly related to that of the innate *ochêma* taught by Proclus; see above, p. 52.

4 See above, p. 49; see also Vol. I, p. 247.

5 See B 78, p. 573.

6 *ibid.*

7 B 161, p. 229.

As far as those in the modern age who were more occultists than mystics, one figure who must be mentioned is C. Agrippa of Nettesheim (1486-1535), about whom and similar figures C. Kiesewetter (B 83) and A. F. Ludwig (B 96) have written. Agrippa was, like the Italian thinkers whom I have already mentioned,¹ a Renaissance natural philosopher. In his *De occulta philosophia* of 1510, for example, he taught the existence of an astral or etheric body, which he remarkably enough called a vehicle or chariot of the soul, *vehiculum animae*, something which played a part in man's birth and death.² In another of Agrippa's books, translated by the poet J. Oudaan (1628-1692), we read: "But those who have professed the soul usually believed that it was the finest of all bodies, infused throughout the coarse body".³

A contemporary of Agrippa and a man who was very similar to him, but much more important, was the physician T. B. von Hohenheim who was born in Einsiedeln in Switzerland, usually known as Paracelsus (1493-1541). Even now, in the twentieth century, interest has been taken in his medical principles. B. Aschner, for example, has written about him and C. G. Jung has called him a pioneer in the field of medicine.⁴ Paracelsus also taught the doctrine of an invisible body, *corpus spirituale*, which he called man's "sidereal" body.⁵ He also accepted a *spiritus vitae* which he called man's *archeus*.⁶ This is clearly connected with the level that I called the level of the physiological *pneuma*. The physicians of the romantic period were, moreover, in agreement in several respects with paracelsus' views.⁷

Both the van Helmonts, who were distinguished physicians and natural philosophers practising in the southern Netherlands, J. B. van Helmont (1577-1644) and his son, F. M. van Helmont (1618-1699), who was greatly appreciated by Leibniz, were followers of Paracelsus, even in the doctrine of the *archeus*.⁸

Mentioning these figures has, however, brought us to the point where we are already considering the views of physicians and others, to which we must give special attention in the section that follows. It is important to say once again here that the various groups that I have distinguished merge into one another again and again in the modern era.

1 See above, p. 118.

2 III, 36; see B 141, p. 51; B 39, under *Ätherleib*; B 83, p. 16; B 96, p. 47.

3 *Van de Onzeekerheijdt ende Ijdelheijdt der Wetenschappen en Konsten*, 1650 p. 212.

4 *Die Wirklichkeit der Seele*, 1939, p. 118.

5 B 39; B 172, p. 122.

6 See, for example, B 32, p. 20.

7 See B 215, II, p. 287.

8 See B 45, p. 286.

Several other occultists who were living at the beginning of the modern age must also be mentioned—R. Fludd (1574-1637), his disciple W. Maxwell († 1670) and the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614-1687).¹ Fludd taught that angels and daemons possessed an aerial body and that the human soul was radiant.² Maxwell, who was in a sense a precursor of A. Mesmer, had a theory about radiations emanating from the ordinary body³ and Fludd was also influenced by Paracelsus.⁴ There was also some connection between Fludd and the poet John Milton (1608-1674),⁵ to whom I shall return later.

The occultists discussed in this section as "Occultists I" were influenced not only by alchemistic ideas, but also by the Cabbala⁶ and neo-Platonism.

78. PHYSICIANS, BIOLOGISTS AND PHYSICISTS

We now come to a group of men, biologists, physicists, but especially physicians, who were particularly concerned with the natural sciences. If we examine the part played by hylic pluralism in their ideas, we are bound to conclude that it is a decreasing part throughout the centuries. I shall return later to a discussion of the various counter-offensives launched in this field, but it cannot be denied that the hylic pluralism, which is encountered in this group of thinkers especially, gives the impression of fighting an increasingly losing battle, not so much in the face of attacks from metaphysical dualism of the Cartesian kind as in confrontation with the general growth and predominance of the positive sciences, which were tending to make hylic pluralism look very much out of date. We have already seen that F. Bacon's lasting services to the history of thought were certainly not in the first place his doctrine concerning the animal soul of fine matter.⁷ This example is repeated again and again in the modern age. Seen from the point of view of the history of ideas, however, it is interesting to note how many figures who have in other respects achieved a very great deal in many different ways have in addition also all but held hylic pluralistic views. Yet, even though hylic pluralism has emerged again and again with new arguments—and especially in the group of thinkers that is now under discussion—it has certainly been fighting a rearguard action.

Despite the fact that we are now dealing with the modern age, we had to go back into the Middle Ages when we were discussing the mystics.

1 See B 172, p. 260.

2 See B 83, pp. 235, 245.

3 See B 96, p. 52.

4 See B 172, p. 191.

5 See B 146, p. 68.

6 See above, p. 66, note 5.

7 See above, pp. 118-119.

The same applies to the physicians dealt with in this section—in their case, we shall have to go even further back in history. Viewed in another way, of course, it is possible to say that I have postponed my investigation into medicine in classical antiquity until this section.

Strictly speaking, therefore, I ought to include Indian medicine in this short survey. I shall, however, have to be content to observe that the physician Caraka (ca. 100 A.D.), for example, used the ancient elements, the fine character of which emerges very clearly in Indian philosophy,¹ as a basis for his medicine. In addition, it should also be noted that one meaning of the Indian term *prāna*, which is in this case usually translated as “vital airs”, “life-breaths” etc., is very similar indeed² to the *spiritus animales et vitales* in the West. (I shall be discussing these presently).

What is more, certain questions concerned with birth are also closely connected with medicine. I shall discuss the hylic pluralistic points of view which occur both in ancient India and in Western antiquity in a separate section.³

Quite a considerable amount is known and has been written about medicine in classical antiquity in the West.⁴ The concept of *pneuma* was widely used in Greek medical circles. Hippocrates of Cos lived from about 460 until 377 B.C. and, in the so-called *Corpus Hippocraticum*, we find reference to *to pneuma* which nourishes *to thermon*.⁵ In the first place, however, this *pneuma* is not, or is at least not only the ordinary outside air, even though it reminds one in its effects of oxygen. It is rather “matter moving like air in the veins.”⁶ In the second place this warmth is much more than ordinary warmth—it is innate and immortal, it sees and understands everything and it is, in a word, the principle of life.⁷ This is, at it were, the first introduction to a remarkable theme which was to be discussed for a long time afterwards. following the *Corpus Hippocraticum*, Galen of Pergamus (ca. 129-199 A.D.) systematised this principle. In this context, it should not be forgotten that the ancients were ignorant of the circulation of the blood and inclined to think of the veins as hollow and empty and to regard the nerves similarly. Galen distinguished three species of “animal” or “life” spirits, all of them fluids consisting of fine matter. The first were the *spiritus naturales* (*to pneuma phusikon*), originating in the liver

1 See above, pp. 227-228.

2 See above, p. 162.

3 See below, Section 97 and above, pp. 73-74.

4 See, for example, B 32; B 123; B 174; p. 175 ff: “Les écoles médicales”

5 See B 123, pp. 237.

6 B 177, p. 85.

7 See B 149, p. 43.

and playing a part in the digestion and metabolism. These "natural spirits" were peculiar to the venous blood. The second were the *spiritus vitales* (to *pneuma zotikon*), the principle of life which moved through the arteries. The third were the *spiritus animales* (to *pneuma psuchikon*), the finest of the three, distilled in the brains from the second, functioning as an organ of the soul and setting the body in motion via the nerves.¹ Although the assumptions upon which this doctrine is based were, of course, incorrect, Galen's teaching nonetheless dominated medical thinking for many centuries. The discovery of the circulation of the blood by W. Harvey (1578-1658) put an end to belief in the *spiritus vitales*, but the *spiritus animales*, the life-spirits in the narrower sense, survived. Descartes² believed in them, but even in the eighteenth century, H. Boerhaave³ (1668-1738), Lamettrie⁴ (1709-1751) and many others regarded them as real. Even in our own times, we still occasionally read in the miscellaneous columns in our newspapers, at least in the Netherlands, "the life-spirits had already departed". This persistent survival is probably to do with the fact that the *spiritus animales* formed the transition, in the ideas of this period, from what I have called the "physiological *pneuma*"—the level of fine materiality which is very closely connected with the level of the ordinary body—to a different level, that of the soul, existing on its own, independent of the ordinary body, as fine matter, for which I have used the term "psychological *pneuma*."⁵ The "life-spirit" which featured in eighteenth and even nineteenth century treatises was the embodiment of this transition. On the one hand, it was the *pneuma* which, according to these theories, made use of the nerves (hence the German name *Nervengeist*) and, on the other hand, it was the independent meta-organism. However strange an impression these three species of spirit may make on scholars of our own times, they were certainly thought of as consisting of fine matter and therefore deserve to be mentioned here.

There were also certain variations in the teachings of the ancient physicians concerning the *pneuma* and these have been discussed in some detail by Verbeke, who has dealt in turn with Erasistratus⁶ (third century before Christ), the school of pneumatic physicians (thus called in the rather narrower sense)⁷ and Galen,⁸ all in the context of the prevalent

1 See B 149, p. 42; B 128, p. 59 ff; B 136, p. 285 ff; B 174, p. 207; see also Part I, pp. 23-24.

2 *Passion. anim.*, I, 7, 10 ff.

3 B 128, p. 186.

4 See Part I, pp. 23-24.

5 See above, pp. 9-10; see also Part I, Sections 7 and 8.

6 B 174, p. 177 ff; see also B 123, I, p. 295.

7 B 174, p. 191 ff; see also B 123, I, p. 358.

8 B 174, p. 406 ff; see also B 123, I, p. 126; B 136, p. 285 ff.

ideas concerning the *pneuma*, among others, of the Stoics. There is no real need for me to go into all these subtle distinctions here. What certainly deserves to be mentioned, however, is, as Dodds has observed, that Galen referred not only to the three pneumata already discussed in this section, but also to an *augoeides kai altherodes soma* or *ochēma*. This is remarkable, in the first place because it is such an early reference—before the neo-Platonists—to an *ochēma* of the soul and, in the second place, because Galen's view, as Dodds points out, is a compromise between the ideas of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics a concerning the theories of the *ochēma* and the *pneuma*.¹ This has more to do, however, with Galen as a philosopher than with Galen as a physician.

The Arabic physicians also adhered, generally speaking to this doctrine of the three species of spirit.² Paracelsus was not entirely in agreement with it.³ However much this may seem to be a good example of hylic pluralism, it is important not to overestimate it. Unless the *spiritus animales* really form a transition towards an independent meta-organism, they remain very close to the ordinary body. As I have already said, Descartes apparently classified them under the category of the ordinary material body existing in extensiveness, that is, he placed them at one pole of his dualism, even before the body and the soul had reached the point where they came into contact with each other in the pineal gland.⁴ Even a typical monistic materialist like Lamettrie (*L'homme machine*, 1748) accepted the existence of these spirits.

It is, in my opinion, better to deal with the figures discussed in the section more or less in chronological order rather than first to consider all the physicians and then to review the biologists and physicists. I have already said something about physicists—who would be more appropriately called natural philosophers—such as the Italians Cardanus, Telesius and Campanella, the Englishman Bacon and the Frenchman Gassendi in Section 75 and about physicians such as Agrippa of Nettesheim, Paracelsus, the two van Helmonts and Fludd in Section 77. The well-known physician G. E. Stahl (1660-1734), who was a professor at Halle and the founder of the "animistic" school, distinguished between an immortal psyche and an *anima inscia*, which was extensive and material.⁵ According to Stahl, this *anima* constructed the body for itself.⁶ It would be also interesting to know the extent to which

1 See B 33, pp. 316-317.

2 See B 128, p. 295; B 149, p. 43.

3 See B 32, III, p. 29.

4 B 41, p. 96; B 128, p. 158; see also above, pp. 125-126.

5 See B 184, II, p. 617; B 45, p. 276.

6 See B 38, p. 707.

the famous I. Newton (1643-1727) concerned himself with the theories of J. Boehme and H. More.¹

We now have to consider the Swiss biologist, Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), whose works were famous enough and sufficiently read to have been translated, for example, into Dutch.² I have already had occasion to refer to Bonnet's works elsewhere.³ In connection with his doctrine of a palingenesis, he accepted the existence of a body of finer matter, "an etheric body, the true seat of the soul, inhabiting the coarse, destructible body".⁴ What is interesting in this context is that Lavater has written about "impressions made by the animal and life spirits on the etheric machine of Bonnet"⁵—in other words, the level of the spirit (the physiological pneuma) is distinguished by him from the body of the soul (the psychological pneuma, the *ochēma* of the soul). Lavater also translated Bonnet into German. Bonnet exerted a remarkable influence, for example, on E. Platner⁶ (1744-1818), a professor in philosophy and medicine at Leipzig, who taught that "the soul is always connected to a fine organism (an etheric body) which survives death"⁷ and on J. C. Lossius⁸ (1743-1813), a professor at Erfurt.

The discoverer of oxygen, J. Priestley (1733-1804) lived at about the same time as Bonnet, Platner and Lossius and he too believed in the existence of an etheric body.⁹ Somewhat later, we meet the psychotherapist F. Groos (1768-1852) and the Swiss physician and professor of philosophy I.P.V. Troxler (1780-1860). Groos ascribed spatiality¹⁰ and an "incorruptible body, probably of light matter"¹¹ to the soul. According to Troxler, philosophy ought to be "anthroposophy", a "chemistry or a physics of the spirit."¹² It is possible that Rudolf Steiner took the term "anthroposophy" from Troxler.¹³ Troxler also taught the doctrine of an "inner or soul body" and of "spiritual corporeality" in general.¹⁴

Also living and practising round about the turn of the eighteenth

1 See B 184, II, p. 199.

2 See B 113, Suppl. 1958, p. 92.

3 "Over sommige denkbeelden van Charles Bonnet", B 261, 1952.

4 *La Palingénésie*, I, p. 185, 171.

5 *Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*, 2 1773, I, p. 83; see also Part I, p. 45.

6 See B 172, p. 432.

7 See B 38, p. 548.

8 See B 184, II, p. 73.

9 See B 34, p. 67.

10 See B 109, p. 718.

11 See B 45, p. 282; B 97, p. 570, note 5; B 34, p. 4.

12 B 38, p. 768.

13 See R. Steiner, *Die Rätsel der Philosophie*, 2 1918, II, pp. 15-16.

14 B 54, p. 135.

and nineteenth centuries was the physician J. H. Jung-Stilling¹ (1740-1817), who was related to the pietistic preacher Lavater and who shared the latter's views about the fine materiality of the soul.² We must also mention here another figure living at about the same time as Jung-Stilling—F.A. Mesmer (1733-1815). Mesmer's work gave rise to Mesmerism and "animal magnetism"—something that is still practised even nowadays. He became a physician in 1765 in Vienna, but, in my opinion, this chapter is not really the proper place to discuss him. (In this section, we should really confine our attention above all to scholars who were concerned with the natural sciences.) The pietist Jung-Stilling is also outside the sphere of this chapter. There was, in fact, a reaction in the second half of the eighteenth century against rationalism that had been carried too far. This reaction reached a climax in the romantic movement and a number of romantic and "pneumatological" physicians and psychologists have to be included under this heading. These figures can better be discussed in another section, that devoted to the "pneumatologists" (Section 81). Mesmerism also played a part in their thought. Important figures such as C. G. Carus (1789-1869) and J. Kerner (1786-1862), both physicians, can also be discussed more appropriately in this later section.

Various histories of philosophy mention the "controversy about materialism" which took place round about the year 1854.³ This controversy was sparked off by a lecture given in 1854 by the professor of physiology at Göttingen, Rudolf Wagner (1805-1864), entitled "On the Creation of Man and the Substance of the Soul". As a result of this lecture, there was a heated debate, in which the later professor in zoology at Geneva, C. Vogt (1817-1895) took part. The well-known chemist, J. Liebig (1803-1873) sided with Wagner in this debate and it is only necessary to associate Vogt with Büchner and Moleschott to realise that the point of view taken by the opposing party was that of monistic materialism, which was so typical of the nineteenth century and was, in the years that followed, almost taken for granted in scientific circles especially. What is, however, often overlooked, but is in fact very interesting is that this "soul substance" discussed by Wagner was a "fluid closely resembling ether",⁴ in other words, the two sides in this controversy were monistic and dualistic materialists (or those occupying the delta standpoint in hylic pluralism, as Wagner regarded the soul itself sometimes as immaterial). It is not absolutely certain

1 See above, p. 108.

2 See B 82, p. 336; B 96, p. 85.

3 See B 151, p. 267; B 173, pp. 287-288.

4 See B 109, p. 718.

what Liebig's precise point of view was, but R. Virchow (1821-1902) who is known for his discoveries in the field of cell pathology and was one of the most important medical scholars of the nineteenth century,¹ certainly agreed with Wagner—he regarded the soul as a fluid, related to ether.²

Later in the nineteenth century, we encounter the private scholar and doctor, Gustav Jäger (1832-1916), the man who incidentally gave his name to a special kind of wollen fabric used especially in underclothes—"jaeger" wear. The same man was also a convinced hylic pluralist and had a theory about the "aromatic matters of the soul,"³ namely that the soul was a chemical constituent, an aroma of the body.⁴ In 1936, his grandson, W. Kröner, wrote about this theory in *Gustav Jägers Sendung*.

It would be possible to deal with the psychiatrists C. G. Jung and G. R. Heyer in this context, while we are discussing doctors and physicians, but I should prefer to postpone a consideration of these men until we come to the section entitled "Psychologists".

As far as the physicists are concerned, P. Spiller (1800-1879), a professor of physics at Berlin, taught, more in the capacity of a philosopher, a universal etherism which is reminiscent of the Stoic theory and according to which an "etheric body" falls away before the soul.⁵ The well-known English chemist and Nobel prize winner, William Crookes⁶ (1832-1919) gave a presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1898, in which he discussed man's "spirit-body", claiming that it was continuous with the ordinary body, but "raised to an indescribable number of vibrations."⁷ I suspect that very few of those present at the meeting agreed with him. Another English scholar of approximately the same period, Sir Oliver Lodge (1851-1940), who was well-known for his work in the field of electricity and was a friend of the Frenchman Charles Richet,⁸ was inclined to attribute a wider function to the ether of the physicians, even in connection with the manifestation of spirits—see, for example, his *Ether and Reality* of 1925. In the case of these two scholars, Crookes and Lodge, interest in hylic pluralistic themes was closely connected with interest in what used to be called psychic research and what is now

1 See B 179, XVIII, p. 148.

2 See B 109, p. 718; B 32, III, p. 95; B 165, p. 197.

3 See B 128, p. 249; B 38, p. 290.

4 See below, Section 103.

5 See B 184, II, p. 587; B 36, p. 68.

6 See B 179, VI, p. 523; B 214, p. 11.

7 See B 97, p. 573; B 98, III, p. 192.

8 See below, Section 85, Parapsychologists.

known as parapsychology. I shall be returning to discuss parapsychology in greater detail later, both as a phenomenon on its own and in connection with hylic pluralism.

We may conclude this chapter by saying that there have been figures throughout history who have gained their spurs in the field of the natural sciences, but who have at the same time not lost sight of hylic pluralistic ideas, even though this interest has given rise, either at the time or else later, to scornful smiles.

79. PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century has been called the climax in man's growth to maturity. The seeds of this maturity, planted in the Renaissance, certainly grew and flourished during the Enlightenment—man wanted to think and decide for himself. He trusted his intellect and preferred not to place his faith in all kinds of religious and superstitious traditions. He preferred to live, not in the past, but in the present, his thinking was above all optimistic and, using his intellect and will to the furthest extent, he believed that he could very quickly bring about all kinds of changes and achieve real progress. This attitude certainly led to widespread reforms and advances, although the results, for example, in the field of educational reform and expansion and in the sphere of democratic government, to name only two, were not fully visible until the nineteenth century and even later. Alongside this optimistic, progressive attitude, however, there was another tendency in the Enlightenment. This manifested itself in a concern with the positive, obvious and empirically verifiable realities¹ and in a determination to get rid of all kinds of chimera and superstitions. The positivism of the Enlightenment did not, however, stop there—it was also directed against religion itself and dealt with it in ways which differed from country to country. In England, for example, there was an earnest attempt to find a rational religion on the basis of the new principles—"deism" was one of the results of this quest. In France, on the other hand, there was a radical anti-religious movement during the Enlightenment—this is borne out by Voltaire and the encyclopaedists. Finally, in Germany, everything possible was done to reconcile the new ideas with Christian thought.²

It is obvious that the positivistic aspect of the Enlightenment would not be encouraging to hylic pluralistic themes and this is indeed so—thinkers of this period regarded hylic pluralism as a form of superstition

¹ See above, pp. 121-122.

² See B 179, XVIII, p. 63.

and attacked it along with other "superstitious" ideas. Nonetheless, these hylic pluralistic ideas continued for a long time during and after, the Enlightenment and were held by many people. It is, of course possible to classify them simply under the heading of superstition, as was done in the enlightenment, but it is also possible that, in many respects, as, for example, the radical rejection of the authenticity of all kinds of unusual phenomena, so-called occult phenomena, the Enlightenment went much too far, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Thinkers of the romantic period were of a different opinion here and, on the basis of parapsychological research, many people today are beginning seriously to wonder whether it is not necessary to reconsider the Enlightenment completely in this and similar respects.¹

I shall have to return to this question,² but in the meantime I should like to discuss here the attitude taken by several well known thinkers living and writing during this period of the Enlightenment towards hylic pluralism, in which I propose to view the period of the Enlightenment in a rather broad sense. John Locke (1632-1704) is generally regarded as one of the pioneers of the Enlightenment, but he was in fact a seventeenth century figure. The radical thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who was somewhat older than Locke, was also a precursor of the Enlightenment. On the other hand, it is customary to contrast English empiricism with the radicalism of the continent. This rationalism—of, for example, Descartes, with his methodical doubt—was a preparation for the Enlightenment as a universal movement towards independent research. The rationalist G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), for example, had a very great influence on the German Enlightenment. All this only goes to show how fluid the boundaries are and what I should therefore like to do is to consider a number of *thinkers* of this period—that is to say, men who were predominantly philosophers rather than religious figures, physicians and so on—insofar as I have not spoken about them already. (I have, for example, already discussed Hobbes, Descartes and Berkeley.)

The first of these thinkers whom we must consider is John Locke. Locke was a typical figure of the Enlightenment in the narrower sense, mainly because of his investigations in the field of human knowledge and because of the tendency towards empirical thinking, which is characteristic both of English philosophy in general and of the whole of the modern age in particular, so clearly expressed in his writings. He wrote polemically not only against Descartes' doctrine of innate concepts,

¹ See G. F. Hartlaub, "Parapsychologie als Revision der Aufklärung", B 270 IV, 2, p. 81 ff.

² See below, Section 120.

but also against Cudworth's similar theory.¹ According to Locke, the soul was empty before it received knowledge from outside. It was simply a *tabula rasa*. This idea has also been expressed in the formula, *nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*—"there is nothing in the intellect that did not previously exist in the senses". This attitude, namely that all knowledge comes to us via the senses, has been given the name of "sensualism". All this is very similar to the view that is typical of positivism and it results in the elimination of a great deal of inflated "nonsense", probably including hylic pluralism as well.

But what is in fact the case? Überweg has remarked that it is not correct to say that Locke was the father of consistent sensualism, because he taught that there were two kinds of perception—the ordinary kind, outward perception, and inner perception, which was, for example, concerned with states of mind, doubt, the will and so on.² It rather looks as though what we have here is another case of the representative of a movement being in fact more moderate than the movement itself with its slogans.³ If, however, we accept inner perception and its impulses, where do we end? We shall come up against this point of view quite frequently. If it is to be fully positivistic, the affirmation *nihil est in intellectu*... must be supplemented to read "what has reached us via our ordinary senses is all that is present".

It is true to say that Locke was not in favour of all kinds of unusual impressions, but he did accept a number of possibilities. He was certainly very well acquainted with the idea of hylic pluralism.⁴ There is, for example, a chapter in his most important work, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1680-1690), entitled "Of the Complex Nature of Substances" (II, 23), and this contains a section (13) on "Conjecture about Spirits". In this section, Locke writes about "an extravagant conjecture of mine: imagine that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure and conformation of parts". If this were so, then their knowledge might possibly exceed ours, Locke thought.⁵ He apologised for such a "way out" supposition, but went on to say, "the supposition at least that angels do sometimes assume bodies, need not startle us, since some of the most ancient, and most

1 See B 141, p. 194.

2 See B 172, pp. 359-360.

3 See above, p. 125.

4 This is, of course, in no way unexpected, since Cudworth (see above, p. 118) was Locke's older contemporary. What is more, Locke also lived for a time at the house of Cudworth's daughter, Lady Masham, and in fact died at Lord Masham's house; see B 172, p. 357.

5 Swedenborg referred occasionally to this passage; see E. Benz, B 193, p. 171.

learned Fathers of the Church seemed to believe, that they had¹ bodies: and this is certain, that their state and way of existence is unknown to us". Clearly, he took refuge in agnosticism, but he certainly left the possibility open. Further on, he says: "spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate, but where they are" and, unlike God, "all finite spirits change of place" whenever they move and this sometimes happens through "subtler matter than the air" (II, 23, sections 19, 21). Finally, it is as impossible to know what the "substance of spirit" is as it is to know what the "substance of body" is (section 30). Thus, although Locke did not recognise hylic pluralism, he certainly toyed with the idea of it.

What is remarkable is that the German diplomat and philosopher, G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716), who wrote almost exclusively in French, composed his *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement* section by section to correspond with Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*² and engaged in polemics with him on all kinds of questions. (Leibniz wrote this treatise in 1704, but, because of Locke's death that year, it was not published then. Publication did not in fact take place until 1765.³) In this treatise, Leibniz discussed the points that I have just mentioned in connection with Locke. He made a general observation about the "ease with which it is possible to give up the earlier doctrine of the subtle bodies of the angels (which is often confused with the corporeality of the angels themselves) and to accept the idea of intelligence in creatures".⁴ The Thomists might clearly be concerned with this. Leibniz' opinion that "the great aims of religion and ethics are assured by the immortality of the soul, without there being any need to suppose that it is immaterial" also points in very much the same direction.⁵ His commentary on Chapter 23 of Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* bears the very similar title "Of Our Complex Ideas of Substances" (V, p. 201 ff). In Section 13, both make observations about microscopes, which were a new invention at the time, and Leibniz' comment was: "For the rest, I believe that the *gentes* perceive things in a way that is similar to our own", but he went on to add that, in his opinion, they had a number of advantages over human beings. Clearly, then, Leibniz was a good deal more positive with regard to the capacities

1 Locke did not make a clear distinction here between the assumption and the (permanent) possession of bodies by the angels. Thomas Aquinas denied that they possessed bodies, but accepted the possibility of their assuming them (see B 29, I, col. 1231) when they appeared to men as messengers.

2 See *Schriften* ed. C. J. Gerhardt; B 91, V, p. 39 ff.

3 See B 172, pp. 329-330.

4 B 91, V, p. 51.

5 B 91, V, p. 55.

of the spirits than Locke. He concluded by saying: "There is nothing so wonderful that the mechanism of nature is not capable of producing it and I think that the learned Fathers of the Church were right to attribute bodies to the angels" (p. 204). Both philosophers, then, pay tribute to the Church Fathers, but Leibniz declares himself to be in favour of hylic pluralism and does not play with the idea of it.

Hylic pluralism is also to be found elsewhere in the writings of Leibniz, but it is not easy to provide a survey of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in his works, mainly because, as far as I can tell, there are still no adequate indices to these. What is more, statements made in the spirit of our special subject are scattered throughout his works, but his intention is not always completely clear. As in the case of Plato,¹ a special thesis or monograph on hylic pluralism in Leibniz' thought would be most desirable. Here, however, I shall have to be content with a few observations.

In other places in his works, Leibniz spoke about angels in a very similar way to the way in which he discussed them in the quotation above. Writing in Latin in a letter to des Bosses, he said, for example, "The angels . . . have, in my opinion, both entelechies, certainly minds, and bodies", although "those who assert that all the angels are creatures possessing bodies are legitimately to be considered as wrong".² According to Leibniz, the angels' "minds" were "incorporeal". In his polemics with the Jesuit des Bosses, he later on expressed the view that the question as to whether the angels had bodies had not been settled definitively by the Fifth Lateran Council.³

In his "philosophical dissertations" in Part VI of his works (*Philosophische Abhandlungen*), he says, in a similar vein: "I am inclined to think that all finite immaterial substances (even the genies or angels in the opinion of the Fathers of the Church) are united to organs and accompanied by matter" (p. 507). Leibniz thus rejected the beta standpoint and occupied the delta standpoint, regarding the spirit as immaterial, but always accompanied by a material element. On the other hand, he was convinced that "Only God is above matter because he is the author of it" (p. 546). This is, of course, an idea that we have encountered again and again.

Closely connected with this is the question to which I have given the name of psychohylism—even where it is not expected, the soul, which is in itself immaterial, is always accompanied by something

1 See above, p. 32.

2 B 91, II, pp. 32.

3 See above, p. 118.

consisting of (fine) matter. Leibniz accepted this in the strict sense,¹ believing that this was the case not simply from a certain level downwards, but everywhere within the whole of creation. This conviction is expressed quite unambiguously in Volume VI of his works: "Every soul or monad is always accompanied by an organic body" or, in different words, "Souls never leave their bodies entirely" (VI, p. 601)²

Leibniz' further elaboration of this idea follows a very complicated course. On the one hand, he considered whether, even though the body to a very great extent perished at death, a small nucleus of that ordinary body did not survive afterwards,³ clinging in some way to the embryo present in pregnant women. In this, he was clearly influenced by the discoveries made by A. van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) of very small animals under the microscope.⁴ Certain authors writing at this time even went so far as to assume that the whole of later mankind was contained in the sperm of Adam.⁵ In any case, this idea was more or less confined to the ordinary material level. On the other hand, however, Leibniz also came very close to an idea such as that of metempsychosis or reincarnation. He was certainly familiar with this idea and quoted, among others, "Van Helmont fils",⁶ who believed not only in a pre-existence, but also in the transmigration of souls (V, p. 222). In that case, Leibniz concluded, what would happen is that "souls possessing subtle bodies would pass at once into other coarse bodies" (*ibid.*), as is accepted in Indian thought.⁷ Leibniz, however, rejected this idea (p. 223). If, then, he did not accept a metempsychosis or transference from one body to another, he did accept a metamorphosis, in which a great deal was lost, for example, at death, but in which a nucleus was preserved and a new body was built up around this (VI, pp. 601-602).

Quite a number of articles have been written about this question as to whether reincarnation occurs in Leibniz' thought or not and, if it does, what form it takes.⁸ Some authors have been inclined to think that Leibniz' conviction went beyond what he believed, in deference

1 See above, p. 11.

2 See Part I, p. 14.

3 See B 91, I, pp. 30-31. For similar ideas in India philosophy, see B 21, I, 3, p. 399 and Vol. I, p. 186-187.

4 See B 91, VI, p. 601.

5 The so-called theory of pre-formation. See my article "Over sommige denkbeelden van Ch. Bonnet" in B 261, 1952, p. 10. Bonnet was very close to Leibniz in this.

6 See above, p. 132.

7 See Vol. I, pp. 186-187.

8 See N. Lossky, "Leibniz' Lehre von der Reinkarnation", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XL, 1931, p. 214 ff; A. J. Hamerster, "Leibniz' Theory of Reincarnation Compared with Theosophical Teachings", B 262, VI, March 1933, p. 555 ff.

to the theology of his period, he should say explicitly.¹ We can, however, safely overlook this question here and conclude that Leibniz was in any case a thinker in whose teaching hylic pluralistic ideas, such as psychohylicism and the idea of bodies in the case of the angels, undoubtedly occurred.

A word or two must be said in this section about two figures who were very typical of the Enlightenment, even though they were not primarily philosophers. The first of these is G. E. Lessing (1729-1781), the great advocate of tolerance and the author of the play *Nathan der Weise* (1779). He also wrote a treatise on the possible existence of more than five human senses ("Dass mehr als fünf Sinne für den Menschen sein können"²), in which his ideas were very similar to those of Bonnet.³ In this, his thought constitutes a break-through of sensualism in the narrow sense.⁴ In his theory of education (*Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes*, 1780), he showed that he supported the doctrine of metempsychosis.⁵ He may or may not have been following Leibniz here.

The second of these figures is J. G. Herder (1744-1803), a preacher at the court of Weimar and a well-known figure in the German literary world at the time, one of the heralds of the movement known as *Sturm und Drang* and a friend of Goethe. He was not a supporter of the doctrine of metempsychosis, but he could "not conceive of a soul without a body" and believed that there was always left "a fine, sensual vehicle".⁶ In other words, he was a psychohylist.

Finally, it is important to mention three more thinkers living at this period. The professor in Philosophy A. Rüdiger (1673-1731) attributed extensiveness to the soul,⁷ and is pupil C. A. Crusius (1715-1775) agreed with him in this.⁸ The educationist J. B. Basedow (1723-1790) was convinced of the existence of a "dynamic substance of the soul which is different from the coarse body"—of a "fine covering of the soul".⁹

1 See K. H. E. de Jong, "Leibniz over de reincarnatie", *De Nieuwe Gids*, 1921, p. 7.

2 *Schriften* (ed. Lachmann), XI, p. 458 ff.

3 See B 109, p. 719.

4 See above, p. 141-142 and below, Section 98.

5 This doctrine and hylic pluralism or the doctrine of the fine materiality of the soul do not by any means always accompany each other. The first seldom occurs without the second, but the second frequently occurs without the first, especially in Western thought. I do not propose to go into this point in detail here. The interested reader should consult the special number on reincarnation of the *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* (B 271), IX, 2 (1957). E. Benz' article, "Die Reinkarnationslehre in Dichtung und Philosophie der deutschen Klassik und Romantik" (p. 150 ff), is especially interesting in this particular context.

6 See E. Koch, *Goethes Stellung zu Tod und Unsterblichkeit*, 1932, p. 20.

7 See B 184, II, p. 389; B 141, p. 292; K. H. E. de Jong, *Rüdiger und ein Anfang! Kant und ein Ende!*, 1931, p. 46.

8 See B 62, p. 76.

9 See B 27, p. 275.

This does not, however, bring us to the end of our survey of the thinkers of the Enlightenment. One of the greatest philosophers of this period, who probably had a great deal in common with the Enlightenment, but who certainly stood far above the other thinkers of this movement, still remains to be discussed. This is Immanuel Kant and I shall devote the next section to him and to the contrast between him and the mystic Swedenborg.

80. KANT VERSUS SWEDENBORG

Before going on to discuss the remarkable contrast between Kant and Swedenborg, it is preferable to say something about each of these men separately in connection with hylic pluralism.

Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) can be regarded as a mystic, an occultist or a theosophist in the broader sense. On the other hand, it is also possible to place the main emphasis on his connection with the trend within Protestantism that I discussed above in Section 72. His attitude towards that movement was rather independent and, although he certainly regarded himself as a Protestant, he occasionally preached decidedly unorthodox views. In whatever category we place, him, however, one thing is quite certain—he claimed to be a visionary. He was the son of a bishop in the state Church of Sweden and his early career was in the field of practical science as a mining engineer. During this period, he published scientific articles and books and was made a member of the Swedish Academy of Sciences. He was also raised to the nobility. Round about 1743 or 1744, however, he experienced a religious crisis, in which he had a vision of Christ and received a call. This vision was followed, throughout the course of his life, by a series of other visions which were related to life after death, to intercourse with the dead and with angels and to the other world (or worlds) in which this took place. Swedenborg recorded these experiences in a series of writings based mainly on his diaries and so on. He incorporated them into a theology and later a church community was founded by his supporters. Nonetheless, his teaching had one great weakness. The spirits, with whom he claimed to have been in contact, accorded rather too readily with his own views, even though their point of view was quite different while they had been on earth. In other, words if it is at all possible to make a clear distinction between the subjective and the objective in visions, this was certainly not Swedenborg's strong point. I am therefore completely in agreement with Ernst Benz' twofold characterisation of Swedenborg. On the one hand, Benz claimed, rightly I think, that the relationship between the chaff and the wheat was

rather unfavourable in Swedenborg's case¹ and, on the other, he was cautious and reserved in what he said about his visions. Generally speaking, it is possible to say that he had "an authentic experience of the numinous".² Benz' book on Swedenborg is penetrating and thorough and the reader is advised to study it for further details.

The question that must be asked here, however, is this—to what extent does hylic pluralism occur in Swedenborg's teachings? Generally, of course, hylic pluralism occurs in the thought of all visionaries and occultists, with the result that to mention its occurrence in such cases is really breaking open an already open door. It is, in fact, much more interesting to discover that figures who are active in a completely different sphere also give a positive place to hylic pluralistic ideas in their thinking.

In the first place, the *spiritus animales* are again met with in Swedenborg.³ He extended this theme, however, and, following the doctrine of the *archeus* found in Paracelsus and van Helmont,⁴ he talked about a "life-fluid" (*fluidum spiritoasum*) which formed a kind of organ for the soul to be used when the soul withdrew from the body after death.⁵ This idea occurred with increasing frequency in the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, that is, that the "animal spirit" was closely connected with the nervous system—the nervous system had been linked with the *spiritus animales* for several centuries, since the time of Galen—but at the same time it also indicated an independent organ of the soul which functioned after death. In the terminology used in this work, this is a contamination of the "physiological" and the "psychological" *pneuma*.⁶ It is, however, a fact that, whether Swedenborg was in any sense a leader here or not, this idea occurred regularly at this time. As far as the higher aspect of this life-spirit or animal spirit is concerned, we may safely say that Swedenborg's doctrine included a "spiritual body".⁷ The affinity that German theologians such as Oetinger, the Hahns and others, with their doctrines of "spiritual corporeality", felt with Swedenborg is abundantly clear from this teaching.⁸ Quite early in his career, Swedenborg attributed spatiality to the soul⁹ and this is all part of the same tendency. There was, moreover,

1 See B 193, pp. 573-574.

2 See B 193, p. 292.

3 See B 193, p. 145; see also S. Toksvig *Emanuel Swedenborg*, London, 1948, p. 104.

4 See above, p. 132-133.

5 See B 193, p. 145; see also S. Toksvig, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

6 See Part I, p. 38, Sections 7 and 8; see also above, p. 9-10.

7 See B 184, II, p. 97.

8 See E. Benz, *Swedenborg in Deutschland*, 1947 (B 194), p. IX.

9 See B 193, p. 134.

also a probable link in this instance with A. Rüdiger,¹ whom Swedenborg, who travelled a great deal, visited in Halle.²

In the case of Swedenborg—whose reports about the other world were extremely concrete and sometimes almost scandalously physical—then, there is no doubt of the occurrence of hylic pluralism. What is, however, very remarkable is that a man who is well acquainted with Swedenborg's writings and is, one might go so far as to say, a firm adherent of his teaching—C. H. van Os (born 1891; professor at Delft 1919-1961)—expressed the opinion that Swedenborg's teaching was that the spiritual world was not spatial.³ Nonetheless, van Os admits that what Swedenborg called the *limbus* (the hem or aura) was regarded by him as spatial. This was the covering of the spirit".⁴ My interpretation of this, then, is that Swedenborg's point of view was not the beta standpoint, but the delta standpoint because he regarded the spirit itself as immaterial. This is in accordance with what S. Toksvig has written: "The soul clothes itself with an organic body as with a garment" (p. 344). All the same, some part is played by the fact that no clear distinction is made between the relative and absolute use of terminology. For example, S. Toksvig has said that Swedenborg "did not say or believe that the organised substance was material in any sense" and "it had extension, not materiality" (p. 223). Material" here must clearly be regarded as consisting of *coarse* matter, which does not exclude fine materiality within a rather divergent sphere.

What was Immanuel Kant's position with regard to hylic pluralism? It is obvious that someone as learned as the philosopher from Königsberg (1724-1804) was acquainted with the basic idea of hylic pluralism, of which a good deal was heard in the eighteenth century. He seems even to have been in support of this idea in one of his early writings. In his *Kant-Lexikon*, Eisler renders Kant's view as follows: "It is to be assumed that all finite spirits are provided with bodies that are in some way organic".⁵ This, of course, amounts to psychohylism. Later on, he at least mentioned the idea. In his lectures on psychology (*Vorlesungen über Psychologie*), which were first published by Pöhlitz in 1821 as a part of the *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik* and reprinted much later, in 1889, by du Prel separately from the other lectures on different subjects, he asked whether the human being was conscious of himself as a pure spirit after death or whether he was "united with

1 See above, p. 146.

2 See B 193, p. 138.

3 *Het wereldbeeld van E. Swedenborg* (B 227, 1938, p. 131).

4 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

5 B 37, under "Leib". The writing in question is the *Principiorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidation* of 1755.

an organic body".¹ What is more, he also distinguished between the assumption of another body in general and the assumption of a glorified or transfigured body in the Pauline sense. It is, moreover, not entirely certain when it was that Kant gave these lectures or whether the published text is entirely correct.²

Hylic pluralistic ideas are also to be found elsewhere in Kant. In another fairly early work of 1755, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*, he considered whether man's soul did not "migrate" and become "embodied" elsewhere, not on this earth, but on more perfect planets, where man would share in a different vision.³ Benz has pointed out the connection between this and other theories of transmigration in the eighteenth century.⁴ Probably what is involved with these other modes of existence is a lighter and finer materiality—Kant was discussing in this context the stars as the "seat of transfigured spirits".⁵

Kant had no objection to the *spiritus animales* or animal spirits and referred to Descartes here. He believed that the ideas of the "imagination" were deposited in these animal spirits and were consequently called *ideae materiales* or "material ideas"—just as all kinds of ideas were regarded in the nineteenth century as being localised in the brains. Kant, however, regarded all this as a "quaking or vibration of the fine element, which is separated from them (the movements of the animal spirit or the texture of the nerves)".⁶ In other words, he regarded it in the same way as other thinkers of his period—he saw it at the level of the physiological *pneuma*.

Taking everything into consideration, the results of an investigation into the occurrence of hylic pluralistic ideas in the writings of Kant are rather meagre. This impression is reinforced and indeed takes a definitely negative turn as soon as we consider the nature of the contact that Kant had, in two writings, with the visionary Swedenborg. I have discussed this in detail elsewhere and would refer the reader to this publication,⁷ but a summary of the most important elements would not be out of place here. In a letter to Charlotte von Knobloch,⁸ which Benz has established was written before 1763,⁹ Kant

1 p. 253 and p. 91.

2 See B 238, p. 45.

3 See B 81, I, p. 353 ff.

4 B 271, IX, p. 157.

5 B 81, I, p. 367; see also B 193, p. 467 ff.

6 B 81, II, p. 361.

7 B 238 *Immanuel Kant en de Parapsychologie*.

8 See B 81, IX, p. 34 ff.

9 B 194, p. 261; see also B 238, p. 4.

shows evidence of a real interest in Swedenborg and in his parapsychological ideas. In his book *Träume eines Geistersehers* of 1766,¹ however, it is clear that his attitude had changed completely. Without examining the facts at all closely, he called Swedenborg an "arch-fantast". What is more, this book contains a theoretical speculation which anticipates the point of view taken by Kant in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in 1781. According to Kant, all that we are permitted to know are phenomena. We cannot think about the principle of life, "spiritual nature", at all, because no data are to be found concerning it in the whole of our perceptions.² In other words, Kant denied that it was possible to come into contact with that other world which he equated with the *noumena*, things in themselves which cannot be known.

There is every reason for us to call this chapter "Kant versus Swedenborg", because Swedenborg claimed to have reached in his capacity as a visionary precisely what Kant maintained on theoretical grounds could not be experienced—easy contact with the other world. Swedenborg was above all not one of those visionaries who fall into a deep trance and give an account of all kinds of experiences when they regain full consciousness. On the contrary, according to this personal testimony, the transition was rapid and easy.³ There was, then, a great contrast between Kant and Swedenborg and, as Benz has pointed out, Kant has undoubtedly carried the day as far as posterity is concerned. Apart from influencing a relatively small number of followers, the members of the Romantic movement and the Protestant thinkers belonging to the undercurrent that I discussed in Section 72, Swedenborg has definitely come off worse. This is, of course, because Kant's opinion of his views were decisive⁴ and also, to some extent, because of the strongly subjective tone of so many of Swedenborg's affirmations.⁵

What is important, however, in connection with our special subject is that Kant acted here as the spokesman of the Enlightenment in the radical sense. Although he was clearly head and shoulders above most of the other philosophers of the Enlightenment, with their perfunctory rejection of everything which they could not define as immediately useful, because of the profuncy of his philosophy in general,⁶ his thinking was nonetheless completely in accordance in this respect with the radical tendencies of the period in which he was living. He could not fail to be influenced by contemporary thought. For this

1 B 81, II, p. 331 ff.

2 See B 238, p. 5; B 81, II, pp. 367-368.

3 See B 193, p. 308.

4 See B 193, p. 234.

5 See above, pp. 147-148.

6 See, for example, B 237, p. 79 ff.

reason he could not be really open to the claims made by Swedenborg and could only regard contact with another world as impossible. His opinion was readily accepted in the nineteenth century, especially after about 1840.

I am inclined to see two main factors in Kant's view. The first is that it contains evidence of the continued influence of the positivistic thinking of the modern age, according to which what cannot be seen by everyone simply does not exist and has to be swept aside. Because of his outstanding claim to preeminence as a thinker, Kant has often been quoted as a authority in support of this attitude. The second factor is that Kant's attitude is a clear expression of the tendency in the modern age towards anthropological dualism. This can be put in the following way. There has been, in the modern age, a general tendency towards a pregnant dualism,¹ towards emphasising firstly each of the two poles in itself at the expense of the whole and secondly one pole, the most obvious one, at the expense of the other. This tendency is most noticeable in many different spheres.² It was in this way that (monistic) materialism was able to emerge from Cartesian dualism and this monistic materialism later became "man as a machine" (Lametttrie's concept). The situation is analogous in the case of Kant. During the first phase of the modern age, philosophers in particular and men in general were full of a sense of the whole—the whole of this world *and* the next. (It is not without significance in this context that William the Silent is reputed to have said on his death bed: "My God, My god have mercy on *my soul* and on this poor nation".) This is why hylic pluralistic ideas concerning an aspect of the soul consisting of fine matter had a very good reception during this period. What Kant did, however, was to widen the gap which relatively speaking exists in every case so much that he claimed that the soul itself,³ the other world, continued existence after death, could not *in principle* be known. He accepted all these factors to some extent, that is, via the circuitous route of the postulates of "practical" reason.⁴ Posterity, however, has generally speaking tended to reject practical reason in the Kantian sense, just as little notice has been taken of the Cartesian concept of the isolated soul. Insofar as this first, radical aspect of Kant's philosophy has been triumphant, he has, together with Thomas Aquinas and Descartes, clearly been one of the leading opponents of hylic pluralism as a view

1 See B 114, p. 442.

2 See B 238, p. 11.

3 See, for example, B 37 under the heading "Seele"; "Immaterial spirits are not the object of knowledge".

4 See B 238, p. 6.

of a body consisting of fine matter in a radically different space, sphere or world. After having made a fleeting re-appearance during the romantic period, this hylic pluralism was therefore obliged to go underground again.

Is it really true to say that Kant and the radical thinkers of the Enlightenment had such a strong case here? After all, Democritus¹ believed that there were other senses latent in man and this was also asserted in Kant's own time by Lessing² and more recently by certain parapsychologists.³ What is more, Kant himself was clearly inconsistent or at least ambivalent. Although other thinkers, such as Leo Polak, have contrasted the bathos in the positive sense of depth of Kant's "pure" reason with the pathos—and, in their opinion, false pathos—of his "practical" reason,⁴ Kant himself certainly believed in the postulates of practical reason and regarded them as fully tenable. He even went so far as to say that, simply as persons in our ordinary everyday consciousness and with our normal mode of knowing, which is the only admissible mode from the scientific point of view, we cannot know anything of the other world. He insisted that it was "simply a subject, belonging to the visible and the invisible world at the same time as a member."⁵ In this connection, he even arrived at the idea of the *corpus mysticum* of "rational beings", the idea of a "spiritual republic", in other words, of the mutual relationship that was bound to exist between subjects in themselves as citizens of that other world.⁶ But this is precisely what Swedenborg maintained—that there was a community of spirits. Kant even used the same terms for that community as Swedenborg, contrasting the *mundus intelligibilis* with the *mundus sensibilis*.⁷ This, of course, explains why Kant's commentator, H. Vathinger, insisted that there were without any doubt points of contact between Kant and Swedenborg and that Swedenborg had some influence on the philosopher from Königsberg.⁸

All this, however, points, in my opinion, clearly in the direction of a most regrettable rupture in our knowledge and shows that a fundamental dividing line has been drawn where there should be none at all.⁹ Insofar as it is concerned with the unknowability in principle of the

1 See above, p. 31.

2 See above, p. 146.

3 See below, Section 85.

4 See B 238, p. 6.

5 *Traume* (B 81, II), pp. 352-353.

6 See *Werke*, III, p. 543.

7 To this extent, it is possible to speak of Kant's tendency to follow Plato.

8 *Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, II, f pp. 431, note 1; p. 512; see also B 238, p. 7.

9 See Index under "Dividing line"; see also below, Section 136.

soul as a thing in itself, Kantianism has undoubtedly become an obstacle to the acceptance of hylic pluralistic ideas. It was necessary to point this out in this discussion of Kant's attitude towards hylic pluralism and this opposition on Kant's part is most characteristically revealed in the contrast between his view and Swedenborg's.

This is obviously the point at which a number of Kantian philosophers can reasonably be discussed. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) showed a remarkable interest in what would nowadays be called parapsychological phenomena. In Volume V of his works, for example, we read the heading "Essay on Visions and Related Subjects".¹ In many other cases, on the other hand, apart from those modern parapsychologists who rejected the theory of "radiation",² an interest in so-called occult phenomena led also to an acceptance of hylic pluralism. This was not so in the case of Schopenhauer. His contacts with Indian philosophy did not lead him to take a positive view of hylic pluralism either. Schopenhauer agreed with Kant's criticism of Swedenborg in the *Träume eines Geistessehers*.³ As far as such appearances of spirits were concerned, he believed that it was in accordance with the "concept of a spirit that its presence is made known to us in quite a different way from that of a body" (p. 241). He was also of the opinion that the spirit "presents itself completely as a corporeal appearance, but it is not an appearance of the body, nor should it be". He also thought that "the material reality, the body which influences our senses from without, belongs as little to the appearance of spirits as it does to dreams" (p. 318). Why did Schopenhauer, then, insist on this to such an extent? I think that he took this attitude because, like Kant, he was basically a subjective idealist, for whom time, space and the various categories all had a purely subjective character⁴ and for whom the *noumena* could therefore not be known, but could only be indirectly assessed at the level of the will. This meant that a fine materiality which has an effect on us and which can be known to us as such could not, in Schopenhauer's opinion, exist.⁵ This attitude of subjective idealism had the result of making Schopenhauer, as it did Kant, reluctant to accept hylic pluralism.

1 *Werke*, ed. by Frauenstädt, V, p. 241 ff; published in *Schopenhauer, Parapsychologische Schriften*, Basle, 1960.

2 See below, Section 85.

3 *op. cit.*, p. 242.

4 See B 173, p. 133.

5 In B 45, p. 346, note. I. H. Fichte referred appreciatively to Schopenhauer's essay from which I have quoted here, but called his explanation "unsatisfactory" because it was subjectively idealistic.

This was also the case with other thinkers. I have already spoken about F. A. Lange (1828-1875) at the very beginning of this work, where I said that his well-known history of materialism (*Geschichte des Materialismus*, B 89, first published in 1866) might better have been entitled a "history of monistic materialism", because he shamefully neglected dualistic materialism (or hylic pluralism) in it.¹ Lange was himself not a materialist, of course, but quite explicitly a Kantian.

The Dutch professor in philosophy, Leo Polak (1880-1941), denied, because of his Kantian convictions, the possibility of telepathy or clairvoyance and of any continued existence after death. Polak believed, for example, that it could be established *a priori* that a spirit could never be in this room, but only matter and space.²

One remarkable case is C. Renouvier (1815-1903), who was both instrumental in introducing Kantian thought into France³ and at the same time a hylic pluralist. He believed in a "community of superior spirits living in subtle and obedient matter"⁴ and wrote, among other things, about the "composition of the immortal body", the "indestructible germ" as a part of a "new monodology", in which the "monad is never incorporeal" (p. 119). Überweg has pointed out that Renouvier was a Kantian, but was of the opinion that "only the Kantian view of the immortality of the transcendental self can be rejected".⁵ There was more to be known about this than Kant assumed.

Another Kantian, whose ideas were very divergent from those of Kant with regard to hylic pluralism was Carl du Prel (1839-1899). This remarkable private scholar from Germany can be looked at from various points of view—as a learned spiritist, as a very early parapsychologist and as a philosopher and a Kantian. He responded energetically to the call of "back to Kant" that was heard in Germany round about the year 1870. As a convinced Kantian, he re-edited Kant's lectures,⁶ *Vorlesungen über Psychologie*, in 1889. In certain respects, however du Prel had his own distinctive opinions. He believed in the existence of the astral bodys,⁷ was a convinced hylic pluralist and attempted to achieve a unity between Kantian thought and hylic pluralism. He did this by assuming that what he—in a rather strange way, but his

1 See Part I, p. 1-2.

2 See his *Kennisleer contra Materie-Realisme*, 1912, pp. 79-80; see also B 115, pp. 51, 57.

3 See B 184, II, p. 337.

4 See D. Saurat., *Perspectives*, p. 84.

5 Überweg and Oesterreich, *Die Philosophie des Auslandes*, 1928, p. 49.

6 See above, p. 149.

7 See, for example, his treatise on this subject, "Der Astralleib", which is included, in his *Die monistische Seelenlehre* of 1888 and was also published previously in the journal *Sphinx*.

terminology was often confusing—called the “transcendental subject” and what amounts to that individual subject in a higher context, which was, according, to Kant, a function of man and a member of the *corpus mysticum*,¹ could make itself known, either after death or by means of telepathic and other contact even now.² The fundamental character of the gulf that Kant saw between ordinary experience and the mode of being of that other subject and which Kant used in his condemnation of Swedenborg was therefore denied both by du Prel and by Renouvier. This meant that contact between the ordinary world and the other world was once again made possible in principle and consequently hylic pluralism was also possible again. At the same time, this did not close the door on an appreciation of Kant’s philosophy in other respects.

81. OCCULTISTS II: PNEUMATOLOGISTS

The Enlightenment was, of course, above all characterised by a complete confidence in the power of the human intellect and by a positive emphasis on progress. There was at the same time, however, a decidedly negative aspect to the Enlightenment in its rejection of everything that could not be seen and belonged to the opposite pole as purely chimerical.³ This aspect is clearly revealed in the ideas of various individual thinkers and groups active during the eighteenth century. The mood or attitude of mind engendered by this did not, however, become really effective until the second half of the nineteenth century—in this respect, it was similar to the demand for government by the people. Because of this delay, the inclination to believe in the invisible world and not to throw overboard all the traditional values persisted for a very long time. As I have already observed, it was especially in Germany that an attempt was made to unify the new ideas with those of the past. It was in England and France that the Enlightenment followed a more radical course.⁴ This divergent inclination was, however, not confined to a simple conservatism and a reluctance to accept the new ideas—on the contrary, it led to a direct counter-movement. It is possible to say, in this case, that the new spirit of autonomy which had seized hold of men also took the form of a desire to experience inner and religious values personally. This tendency had already been expressed in pietism and in Protestant mysticism.⁵ It gathered impetus in the eighteenth century and was expressed in many different

1 See above, p. 153.

2 See B 184, II, p. 308; B 173, p. 620

3 See above, p. 151-152.

4 See above, p. 140.

5 See above, Section 72.

ways. It is important to stress this, because this aspect of the eighteenth century has often been misunderstood. The whole century has frequently been seen as a period exclusively stamped by the radical Enlightenment with its tendency to crush all opposition.

This other aspect of the eighteenth century has been discussed at depth and in considerable detail by Alfons Rosenberg (born 1902), in his book *Der Christ und die Erde* (1953, B 134), as an introduction to his comprehensive outline of the figure of J. F. Oberlin.¹ In this book, he even went so far as to call the eighteenth century the "charismatic century", a period in which God's gifts were experienced in many different ways and gave rise to varied spiritual phenomena.² I do not necessarily agree with everything that Rosenberg says, however, in my opinion, for example, he does not do sufficient justice to the positive aspect of the Enlightenment, such as its liberating effect on independent thought. He also overlooks, in his discussion of these phenomena, the rise of freemasonry which occurred at precisely this time. In many respects, however, he is undeniably right—there was serious intent and deep life in many of the religious phenomena of the period. What is more, there was, in this religious life, a conscious resistance to the negative, exclusively rationalistic aspect of the Enlightenment, a convinced counter-offensive.

This is probably not usually seen sufficiently as a whole, but the different sectors of this counter-offensive are very well known. The whole counter-offensive has been called the romantic movement and many of the aspects of this movement have been well described by Ricarda Huch in her well-known work *Die Romantik* (B 215). The term is, however, not particularly fortunate, because it is usually associated with a primarily literary movement. In fact, the romantic movement was far more than this. If, for example, the meaning of the romantic movement for history is stressed, then the movement certainly seems to be simply conservative and too little justice is done to the religious experience of romanticism and the ethical idealism which was associated with it and which aimed to convert that religious experience into action.³ We have, however, very little alternative but to use the word "romanticism", with the rider that it is employed here in the wider sense.

Our task is to investigate to what extent hylc pluralism occurs in the romantic movement in the broad sense of the word. The trend

1 See my summary in B 239; see also above, p. 108.

2 B 134, p. 13; see above, p. 105-106.

3 See B 134, p. 111 ff.

within Protestantism (see Section 72) and the romantic movement in this extended sense are, of course, closely related—pietism formed a kind of pre-romantic movement. I have therefore already said a few things about hylic pluralism as it occurred in the religious views of the romantics. I shall later be dealing briefly with hylic pluralism in the ideas of the literary figures in the romantic movement in Section 88, which is devoted to hylic pluralism in literature. Although only very few philosophers are customarily termed romantics (one who comes to mind at once is Schelling), several of them were influenced by romanticism in the broader sense. For these thinkers, the reader should turn to Section 82, "Philosophers of Romanticism".

In this section, we shall be concerned with another group of figures active during this period. These are not too easy to summarise, but they all have several characteristics in common. In the first place, we must consider a second class of occultists or mystics, among whom Swedenborg must also be included, although I have dealt with him in some detail in the previous section. Secondly, we have to look at a number of physicians whom I did not discuss in the previous section (78)¹ Finally, the greater group also includes another group of figures who were partly physicians and partly psychologists, but who had one important element in common. They were all open to belief in another world and in unseen forces—often in connection with Mesmer's "animal magnetism" and Schelling's natural philosophy—and were in contact both with the theologians discussed in Section 72 and with the literary figures of the romantic movement. In accordance with Kiesewetter² and others³ it is probably advisable to call these men *pneumatologists*—those who believe that they have knowledge of spirits. They do not count for very much nowadays, but they are occasionally rediscovered and their importance is then re-emphasised. (Examples of this are C. G. Carus and G. H. von Schubert.) What is more, these pneumatologists are significant in another way—they were the precursors of parapsychology. Once again, what is apparent here as elsewhere is the extent to which the threads linking these figures together—most of them are German, which is further evidence for regarding Germany as the land of poets and philosophers—are connected with other individual figures and groups. I shall now, however, mention a number of these figures and very briefly outline some of their leading characteristics.

¹ See above, p. 137-138.

² B 83, p. 326 ff.

³ See B 36, p. 499; Larousse, under the heading "pneumatologue".

Among the occultists or mystics who constitute the first group to be discussed briefly in this section, the first to be mentioned must undoubtedly be E. Swedenborg (1688-1772). I shall, however, say no more about him here as he and his views concerning hylic pluralism have been discussed in some detail in the previous section. Although his claims were taken less and less seriously, he had perhaps via Oetinger and perhaps without him, an important influence on the romantics.¹

A comparable figure was Louis Claude de Saint-Martin (1743-1803), who has been called the Jakob Boehme of France. He was personally acquainted with the works of Boehme and Swedenborg and, on the other hand, Goethe and Baader knew his writings.² As far as hylic pluralism is concerned, the idea of heavenly corporeality can also be found in his works.³ In the case of Saint-Martin and similar figures, it should not be forgotten that work was carried on in small, closed and rather "esoteric" groups. The writings of the members of such groups are often difficult to obtain and were possibly distributed only among small circles of people. There was also some emphasis on purely oral doctrines. Nonetheless, the influence of groups such as the *Illumines* and others, who were clearly orientated towards occultism, must have been considerable, at least behind the scenes. Among others, Auguste Viatte has written about this subject in his *Les sources occultes du romantisme* (1928, B 175).

In this context, we must also mention the remarkable English mystic, poet and artist, William Blake (1757-1827). For a long time, his work was misunderstood, but now he is regarded as one of the "greatest figures in English poetry and art".⁴ Denis Saurat has written about him in various contexts.⁵ Blake was extremely well read and his religious attitude was based on deep conviction and feeling, but was very broad. According to him, "the natural body" was "an obstruction to the soul or spiritual body".⁶ Clearly, what we have here is hylic pluralism.

Another author to whom reference can be made in this context is J. C. Hennings (1731-1815), a professor at Jena, in whose works—some of which have been translated into Dutch⁷—not only clairvoyance but also hylic pluralism can be found. It should be noted, however,

1 See above, p. 107.

2 See B 10, p. 110; B 184, II, p. 400.

3 See B 62, p. 188.

4 B 179, IV, p. 277.

5 *Blake and Modern Thought*, 1929; *William Blake*, 1934.

6 Saurat, 1929, p. 126.

7 B 66; B 113 Suppl., p. 114; B 96, p. 71.

that Hennings referred quite frequently to hylic pluralism, but did not believe very much in it himself. At least, he was a member of the Enlightenment, and as such remained at a distance from it—rather like the author of a detective story who takes an indignant attitude towards the murders that he describes.

Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1811), whom I mentioned briefly in Section 78,¹ has to be discussed here rather than in that previous section on physicians, biologists and others. He was a physician by profession, but the direction which he followed was one which deviated considerably from normal medicine. He assumed, on the basis of ordinary magnetism, which had at that time not been known for very long and was still not fully understood, that a kind of radiation emanated from man which could be used by people who were suitably gifted to cure others of illness or to influence their health. Diepgen has said of him that he “believed in a magnetic fluid (which was analogous to the *pneuma* of the ancient world). This fluid is infinitely fine and it penetrates the whole of the cosmos and, in man, the nervous system”.² Ricarda Huch has said: “Mesmer explained the power of the magnetiser as a reception of a very fine ether which flowed into the magnetiser from the universe and which he was able to radiate again”.³ This is not definitely natural science, but “mesmerism” or “animal magnetism” is still commonly practised nowadays, although its tenability or explanation is very much disputed.⁴ Mesmer encountered a great deal of opposition to begin with, but towards the end of his life, during the heyday of the romantic period, his ideas came to be accepted more readily.

The magnetisers treated their “patients” by means of movements of the hands. Very similar to this was “somnambulism”, in which the person treated fell into a kind of trance—it was thus an anticipation both of later spiritualism and of the application of hypnosis—and, in this state, made communications about the supposed world of the spirits or else about events that were taking place a great way away. The physician Justinus Kerner (1786-1862) must be mentioned in this context. He had a very suitable “guinea pig” in Friederike Hauffe, the “visionary of Prevorst”, whom he observed for years on end and about whom he made detailed reports.⁵ According to her communications, it was the “animal spirit” which connected the soul to the body.

¹ See above, p. 138.

² B 32, II, 1, 1959, p. 30.

³ B 215, II, p. 11.

⁴ See below, Section 96; see also B 152.

⁵ *Die Seherin von Prevorst*, 1829, 5th edn., 1877; *Blätter aus Prevorst*, 1831-1839.

After death, the soul entered a "middle realm".¹ H. Straumann wrote an informative book about Kerner and occultism: *J. Kerner und der Okkultismus in der deutschen Romantik* (1928, B 157), in which he claimed that the romantics were as a whole inclined towards an occult psychology or pneumatology, in which animal magnetism was frequently pursued (p. 119). According to this pneumatology, man possesses fine senses and a fine organised body (p. 21). Ricarda Huch has also pointed out this aspect of romanticism and this has been called her interest in the "nocturnal aspect" of life—in death and in life after death, which also implies that death is regarded as a liberation of the soul, like the flight of a bird to higher regions,² in which the ancient image of the heavenly moth is also used.³ She has also pointed out that the concept of a sidereal body (as, for example, in Paracelsus), of an etheric body, also recurs in romanticism.⁴

These ideas are not only to be found in the literary figures of the romantic movement (see below, Section 88), but also and above all in the writings of the group of authors mentioned above, and in those of many physicians (the "physicians of the romantic movement"⁵) who were interested in mesmerism and somnambulism and who practised psychology with an occult and theological flavour who speculated about life after death. They wrote a great deal, but their work is to a great extent forgotten nowadays. A doctrine which occurred in almost all of their writings was that of a body of fine matter and the term that they used for this was usually "animal spirit". It is not possible for me to deal separately with all of these figures—both Straumann (B 157) and Kiesewetter (B 83) and Ludwig (B 96, p. 88 ff) have done this in some detail—so I shall content myself with listing the most important in chronological order: Mesmer's follower de Puységur (1736-1825); J. H. Jung-Stilling (1740-1817), whom I have already mentioned several times before in this work; K. von Eckartshausen (1752-1803: an etheric body is the link between the soul and the ordinary body⁶); K. A. Eschenmayer (1768-1852: f the doctrine of an ethereal body⁷); H. Zschokke (1771-1848: an "invisible covering of the soul"⁸); J. F. von Meyer (1772-1849: *Hades*, 1810⁹); J. J. von Görres (1776-1848: *Christliche Mystik*,

1 B 96, p. 105, p. 374; B 157, p. 83, 120.

2 See G. van der Leeuw, B 90, p. 283.

3 See, for example, C. G. Carus, *System der Psychologie*, I, p. 372.

4 B 215, II, pp. 95, 116.

5 See Diepgen, B 32, II, p. 95 ff; R. Huch, II, p. 264 ff: "Romantische Ärzte".

6 See B 83, p. 349.

7 See B 39; B 96, p. 93.

8 See B 54, p. 133.

9 See B 83, p. 358 ff.

1836-1842¹); C. G. Nees von Esenbeck (1776-1858²); G. H. von Schubert (1780-1860: *Die Geschichte der Seele*, 1830³); J. Kerner (1786-1862), whom I have already mentioned; J. Ennemoser (1787-1854⁴); C. von Reichenbach (1788-1869: *Odisch-magnetische Briefe*, 1856⁵); C. G. Carus (1789-1869: *Psyche*, 1846⁶) and finally J. K. Passavant (1790-1859⁷).

I cannot go into all the shades of meaning contained in the teachings of these closely related authors here, but I would like to make the following observations. Reichenbach's doctrine of the "Od" as an explanation of animal magnetism was not taken seriously even by his contemporaries. J. J. von Görres, like many others in this group of writers, was first influenced by Schelling's philosophy, but later became more and more of a good Roman Catholic. This also happened in the case of many other romantics. Von Görres, like du Prel later, had a very broad view of mysticism which included many occult elements. He wrote, among other things, about a kind of corporeality which made itself known at death and sometimes also independently of death.⁸ G. H. von Schubert has even recently been the object of attention—A. L. Janse de Jonge has, for example, written about him.⁹ According to von Schubert, the imagination was the "first or the more subtle body of the soul" and "an invisible body" was "retained" from the visible body after death.¹⁰ Probably the most important figure in this series of authors is Carl Gustav Carus. His work was valued by Goethe and rediscovered by L. Klages.¹¹ R. Bakker wrote a dissertation about him some years ago.¹² He was the first to formulate clearly the concept of the unconscious mind¹³ which formed the basis for the later development of depth psychology.¹⁴ Hylic pluralism is encountered in Carus' writings: "A new etheric body must have commenced and must already have developed to a certain degree when the coporeal appearance

1 See B 83, p. 30.

2 See B 184, II, p. 193; B 83, p. 369.

3 See B 184, II, p. 490.

4 See B 83, p. 392.

5 See B 96, p. 137.

6 See B 184, I, p. 171; B 173, p. 57.

7 See B 134, p. 330.

8 B 56, III, pp. 303-308.

9 Included in *Verkenningen in de psychopathologie*, 1962.

10 *Geschichte der Seele*, 5th edn. 1877, p. 205, 299; 6th edn. 1961.

11 See B 184, I, pp. 172, 174.

12 *Het wijsgerig en psychologisch denken van C. G. Carus in het licht van zijn Godsbeschuwing*, 1954.

13 See, for example, B 184, I, p. 173.

14 B 179, V, p. 550.

disappears".¹ Carus also wrote in the same work about the "spiritual organism" which had to be distinguished from the ordinary organism (p. 29), that is "some etheric body" (p. 354). There is also clear evidence in his *Psyche* that he was acquainted with other doctrines about bodies of fine matter, such as the *śarīras* of the Hindus (p. 538).

These pneumatologists were influenced, on the one hand, by mesmerism and, on the other, by Schelling's natural philosophy. Mainly physicians and psychologists, they were in many ways in agreement with the theologians whose ideas I discussed in Section 72. This movement flourished especially at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth century, until approximately 1840, when it was brought to an end with the rise of modern medicine and natural science and all the discoveries that accompanied it. Although the pneumatological movement was then thrust into the background, it still continued to exist—human life, even the life of a pneumatologist, is relatively long in relation to the changes that take place in the spirit of the age. The simple fact that the works of these men have been reprinted proves that a certain amount of interest has always been taken in pneumatology as an undercurrent, even up to the present. It is therefore possible to speak, in some ways, of a post-romantic movement in the broad sense of the word.

So far however, we have not yet considered the thinkers or philosophers of the romantic period. This has to be done in the following section.

82. PHILOSOPHERS OF ROMANTICISM

The radical aspect of extreme rationalism which characterised the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century was quickly followed by a reaction. It was, of course, not until the middle and latter half of the nineteenth century that most of the ideas and slogans of the Enlightenment reached a wider circle of people and were heard on a greater scale. A reaction against the one sided emphasis placed by the Enlightenment on the intellect and pure reason had already set in before the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This reaction, which stressed the lasting value of feeling, history, religion and deep speculation, tended to dominate the spiritual and intellectual life of the early part of the nineteenth century. This changed climate of thought is, of course, usually known as romanticism, but it is very important to think of this term in the broader sense and not simply as a literary

¹ *System der Physiologie*, 1838, I, p. 357; see B 7, p. 452, note.

movement.¹ It is customary to speak of the romantic philosophers in this broader sense of the word. These philosophers of the romantic movement more or less include the pneumatologists discussed in the preceding section (81), but they also go much further than them.

The German idealists *par excellence* are, of course, J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), F. W. J. Schelling (1775-1854) and G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). It is also possible to call Kant an idealist (strictly speaking a "subjective" idealist), but for Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the idea was entirely central and the point of departure for great speculative systems of thought. In this, they took very little notice of Kant's warning that philosophy should confine itself to the limits of ordinary experience. It would appear that this warning was completely overlooked. There is no doubt that a good deal was due to an attitude on their part of opposition to Kant's rejection, in common with most of the radical thinkers of the Enlightenment, of everything that could not be perceived directly by the ordinary senses, in which he showed himself to be a forerunner of the positivism of the later nineteenth century. In ignoring Kant's advice, these German idealists were simply following a general tendency to react against the Enlightenment. They can therefore reasonably be called romantic philosophers or members of the romantic movement in the wider sense. We shall have to ask in this section to what extent hylic pluralistic ideas occurred in the works of these philosophers.

I have not been able to establish any evidence of hylic pluralism in the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, although it is possible that a more thorough search might reveal something.

Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling has been called the "classical philosopher of romanticism".² He passed through several phases in his development as a thinker, in each of which different themes and ideas were prominent. The natural philosophy of his second period³ certainly had a great influence on the physicians of the time—the men whom Ricarda Huch has called the "romantic physicians".⁴ What one would naturally expect is that hylic pluralism would play a fairly important part in his thought and would be as clearly revealed here as it is in the work of the pneumatologists discussed in Section 81. This expectation is, however, not fulfilled. It is true that Schelling, like so many of the romantics, was interested in so-called occult phenomena and in Mesmer's

1 See above, p. 157-158.

2 See B 151, under the heading "Schelling".

3 See B 184, II, p. 428.

4 For these figures, see above, p. 161-162.

animal magnetism (which also played a large part in the thought of the "romantic physicians"), but there is only one of Schelling's texts in which he showed himself explicitly to be in favour of hylic pluralism in the special sense of the theory of man's possession of a body of fine matter. This is remarkably enough a treatise, probably written between 1816 and 1817, which was published posthumously in 1861 and which does not appear in all the editions of his works. It deals with the relationship between the natural world and the world of spirits (*Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt*) and is usually known simply as the *Clara* dialogue.¹ In it, Schelling asks whether man's state after death is simply and solely a "life of the spirit" (p. 50; cf. "psychohylism"). It is probable, we read, that man has two shapes and that "when the shape of the body in which the interior is bound by the exterior decays, the other shape is liberated" (p. 54). Clara then says that she "has often heard of a finer body which is contained in the coarser body and which separates itself from the latter at death" (*ibid.*). There is also something dark that is "changeable" but not "destructible" in the consciousness. This has "something physical", so that "something physical must follow us at death" (p. 69).² Schelling doubted whether the "natural world and the world of spirits" were so opposed to each other as one might be inclined to say according to the concepts (p. 93). The other world, that of spirits, must "be in its own way as physical as this present physical world is spiritual" (p. 94). There is, however, always one serious disadvantage in the dialogue form of writing—one can never be completely sure which of the characters in the dialogue is representing the author's own views. Certain scholars have nonetheless concluded from the passages that I have quoted that Schelling was here declaring his faith in the existence of a subtle body, an etheric body which survived death and "then emerged properly in its special character for the first time".³ This is certainly an explicit reference to hylic pluralism on the part of Schelling.

What is the situation with regard the greatest and most gifted of all the German idealists, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel? What was Hegel's attitude towards hylic pluralism? K. H. E. de Jong has drawn attention to a passage at the end of his lectures on the history of philosophy ("Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie", *Werke* XV) in which he developed the "spiritual forms of philosophy in their

1 It is printed in *Werke*, Stuttgart, 1861, IX, pp. 1-110 and separately in 1862 2nd edn. 1865.

2 A rather similar reasoning will be found also in Plato's *Phaedo*; see above, p. 32.

3 A. F. Ludwig, B 96, p. 141; see also B 180, p. 175; B 157, p. 52.

departure" and wrote that "this series is the true *spiritual realm*, the only spiritual realm that there is".¹ This seems to me to be an idea that is highly characteristic of Hegel. It is possible to think of many philosophers, like Aristotle,² who were simply not interested in the problem of man's continued existence after death. On the other hand, there have also been thinkers, like Averroes,³ who were preoccupied with other points of view and, because they regarded the universal *nous* as more important, tended to deny the possibility of a continued existence after death. In his book on immortality as a philosophical problem (*Onsterfelijkheid als wijsgerig probleem*, 1933, B 180), Herman Wolf regarded this as a choice between immortality as perpetuation or *aeternitas* and immortality as continued existence or *sempiternitas*.⁴ For Wolf—and in my opinion as well—recognition of the first point of view as the most profound and the most true does not exclude recognition of the second standpoint as a relative importance.⁵ Hegel, on the other hand, appears to have regarded the one as so important that the other had to be rejected—he was concerned not with "spirits" but with the one, subjective, objective and absolute "spirit". For this reason, there is practically nothing to be found in his works about hylic pluralism or about man's bodies of fine matter especially active after death. In fact, I may go so far as to say that, as far as I can see, there is nothing at all.⁶ Hegel is therefore not a philosopher of the romantic movement in the narrower sense—he transcended this movement as much as Kant transcended the Enlightenment.

One probable consequence of this rather one-sided attitude on Hegel's part is the almost total rejection of everything that smacks at all of parapsychology or the occult by the Dutch Hegelians.⁷ Nonetheless, it is possible to ask whether Hegel was really so indifferent to this "nocturnal aspect" of man which aroused so much interest among the romantics. One very good reason for asking this question is that both Schelling and Hegel were, at the same time as Hölderlin, students at the *Stift* of the Protestant theological faculty of Tübingen University, a strict and spiritually orientated institution, strongly influenced at that time by the "Swabian mysticism" of Oetinger and the two Hahns.

1 See B 76, p. 12, note 1.

2 See above, p. 38-39.

3 See above, p. 97.

4 B 180, p. 248 ff.

5 See B 237, p. 245 ff, 260.

6 See B 55.

7 See, for example, B Wigersma in *De Idee*, VII, p. 24 ff and P.A. Dietz in B 265, VI, p. 267 ff; see also J.V. Meininger in *De Idee*, XXXIII, p. 64; see also B 265, XXV, p. 33.

What is more, Hegel and Schelling even shared a room in the *Stift* and certainly studied together a great deal. R. Schneider published the results of his researches into the "Swabian spiritual ancestors" in a rather one-sided book, *Schellings und Hegels schwäbische Geistesahnen* (B 153), but his arguments cannot simply be dismissed entirely. Whereas Kant was not *persona grata* at the *Stift* at Tübingen, some of Oetinger's ideas and those of his fellows certainly recur later in Hegel and Schelling.¹ Schneider is probably right in this and also in saying that this relationship has been frequently overlooked by Hegelian scholars. Certainly this influence seems to have been expressed in Hegel's youthful works. If even the main ideas contained in Hegel's later works can be compared with the pre-romantic ideas of the Swabian mystics,² then there must be very good reason to ask whether Hegel really remained completely indifferent to the theme of the "nocturnal aspect" and to occult phenomena. But a little research shows that this was not in fact the case—we find in Glockner's *Hegel-Lexikon* (B 55), under the key-word "Somnambulismus, animalischer Magnetismus (Hellschen)", a whole list of places in Hegel's works dealing with these themes.³ Surely, it can hardly be expected that he would have given no attention at all to such a question as "animal magnetism" which was arousing so much interest in his own days? We find too that his attitude towards this theme was not entirely negative. In this context too, it is significant that P. G. van Ghert (1782-1852), who was responsible for introducing Hegel into the Netherlands, also published several texts on animal magnetism.⁴ Van Ghert was therefore also a romantic insofar as he was a pneumatologist (see Section 81).

As one might expect, however, Hegel expressed his conviction in the abovementioned quotations that these phenomena were of little importance—"Philosophy is not somnambulism. It is rather the most lively consciousness".⁵ As in the case of J. G. Fichte, there is no sign of any openness to hylic pluralism in the form of the existence of a subtle body in the writings of Hegel.

The same cannot be said of all his disciples. The jurist K. F. Göschel (1781-1861) belonged to the right wing of the Hegelian school, inclining towards theism, Christian orthodoxy and the quest for proofs of human

1 B 153, p. 51.

2 See B 153, p. 5.

3 B 55, XXVI, p. 2296 ff.

4 See B 113, p. 241.

5 B 55, XXVI, p. 2299 (— *Werke*, XVII, p. 68).

mmortality.¹ This latter formed the theme of his book, *Von den Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit*, 1835, in which he accepted the existence of an etheric body (p. 163 ff). In another book, *Der Mensch nach Leib, Seele und Geist, diesselts und jenseits*, 1856, he called the soul the "middle member", was very much in favour of a trichotomy (p. 6) and interpreted the *soma psuchikon* of 1 Cor. 15. 44 as a "soul body" (p. 53). I shall return later to the "semi-Hegelian" C. H. Weisse.

Having discussed the great thinkers, J. G. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel does not mean that we have come to the end of the romantic philosophers. Philosophy was pursued with great intensity in nineteenth century Germany both in the universities and outside them—many different points of view were defended and new systems of thought were constantly being worked out, taught and published. Interest in hylic pluralistic ideas can be encountered in a number of these philosophers and in their case the interest is usually more central and explicit than it is in the case of Schelling, under whose influence most of them were.

I should like now to consider two of these philosophers, of whom a detailed comparative study, rather on the lines of Plutarch's *Vitae parallelae*, could very profitably be made. The first of these figures is Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796-1879), the son of Johann Gottlieb and a man to whom less attention is given than he deserves. The second is Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887), who is well known mainly because of his work in the field of psychology. Both of them began to publish books while romanticism was still in its heyday and they continued to write and to publish until they reached a ripe old age. They were clearly typical representatives of the post-romantic period. They were also conscious of the mutual affinity between their ideas—Fechner frequently quoted Fichte² and Fichte alluded with satisfaction to the similarity between his methods and results and those of Fechner.³

What is very important for our special subject, however, is that both of these authors were explicitly in favour of hylic pluralism,⁴ although both of them had an aversion to the word "etheric body"⁵ which was very popular in certain circles at the time when they were

1 See B 173, p. 200; B 184, II, p. 344; B 67, under "Göschel".

2 B 42, II, p. 401.

3 B 45, p. 349.

4 For I. H. Fichte in this connection, see B 173, p. 239; B 184, I, p. 328; B 39, I, p. 20; for Fechner, see B 173, p. 619; B 36 under the heading "Tatenleib"; B 180 Ip. 202.

5 I. H. Fichte, *Die Idee der Personlichkeit und die individuelle Fortdauer*, 1834, 2nd edn. 1855, p. 162; Fechner, B 42, II, p. 394.

writing. In his *Zend-Avesta*,¹ Fechner provided a short survey of what is known in this work as hylic pluralism and Fichte did the same in his *Anthropologie*.² One relevant comment that Fichte makes in this book is: "...this doctrine of the 'inner body' is extremely old and has been taught in very many different forms at all times".

The emphasis, however, is different in the case of each author. I. H. Fichte, who lectured in philosophy from 1836 to 1863, the longest period being spent at Tübingen, was closer than Fechner to romanticism proper. He had friendly relationships with C. G. Carus,³ C. H. Weisse,⁴ A. Günther⁵ and J. Kerner⁶ and also with other members of the romantic movement in the broad sense.⁷ He was also clearly influenced not only by his father's *Anweisung zum seligen Leben* of 1806⁸ and by the thought of Schelling and Baader. In her thesis on him, *I. H. Fichtes Seelenlehre*, Zurich, 1935, Rose Mehlich spoke about his "romantic psychology" and maintained that he was a precursor of C. H. Jung (p. 23).

Fechner, on the other hand, studied the natural sciences and was, to begin with, a professor in physics. It was only later that he changed to philosophy. He was friendly with Lotze, who was far less of a romantic psychologist or philosopher. Fechner was principally concerned with experimental psychology—there is the well-known Weber-Fechner law—and was one of the founders of psychophysics. It is in this capacity that he is best known, but he was at the same time also a philosopher and, what is more, a speculative thinker. This aspect of his personality was already expressed when he was quite a young man—he wrote about life after death under the pseudonym of Dr. Mises in 1836 (*Das Büchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode*) and continued throughout his life—at a very advanced age, he published a work contrasting the "diurnal" with the "nocturnal" aspect of life (*Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht*, 1879). There were therefore two sides to Fechner—this is, of course, something that can be observed in the case of several figures in the eighteenth century.⁹ But we must now consider what these two thinkers have said about hylic pluralism and in particular about a possible subtle body possessed by man after death.

1 B 42, II, p. 161 ff.

2 B 45, p. 285 ff.

3 See above, p. 162.

4 See below, p. 173.

5 See above, p. 101.

6 See above, p. 160-161.

7 See B 184, I, p. 323.

8 See his *Zur Seelenfrage*, 1859, p. 186.

9 See above, p. 140-141.

I. H. Fichte thought that "every soul forms a 'soul-body' or inner body, which has to be distinguished from the outer body".¹ This was the "true and inner body which is invisible, but which is present in all visible materiality"² and was the factor which kept the ordinary, visible body together despite all change of matter. This idea, Fichte claimed had been for a very long time a stimulus to thought in the form of the "pneumatic body".³ In his opinion, then, the soul was an organism and Fichte consequently called one chapter in his *Anthropologie* "Von der Seele und ihrer Verleiblichung"—"the soul and its embodiment".⁴ According to Fichte, this pneumatic organism was, on the one hand active during life and, on the other, not impaired by death, but rather liberated by it. Throughout life, the "inner body" acted as an "inner creative power of the soul", an objective "imagination fashioning the body".

In this, Fichte placed special emphasis on *spatiality* with regard to the soul: "The spiritualistic idea that the soul (is) not spatial must be abandoned".⁵ The "embodiment of the soul" to which I have referred above is also related to this (which is why the soul and the body interact so well). In this context, Fichte has said, for example, that "everything that is real has its spatiality (embodiment)" "all that is real is temporal and spatial"⁶ and "to attribute real effects to the soul is to equip it with a spatial existence".⁷ This is certainly very akin to what I have called psychohyлизм and the gamma standpoint.

Very similar ideas are expressed in a different way by Fechner. In *Überweg und Österreich*, his doctrine has been summarised as follows: "Fechner's view of the beyond and the continued existence of the soul, which is not without a body even in the hereafter, is very strange. In many respects, it is related to Swedenborg's teachings, to which Fechner himself frequently refers".⁸ One of the chapters in Fechner's book, *Zend-Avesta*, is entitled "The Corporeal Basis of the Future Life".⁹ What I have called psychohyлизм has been explicitly formulated by Fechner: "Can the soul ever completely do without a corporeal bearer?"¹⁰ and his answer to this question is that it cannot. He makes a

1 B 184, I, p. 328.

2 B 545, p. 284.

3 B 45, p. 286.

4 B 45, p. 272 ff.

5 B 45, p. 34.

6 *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer* (1834), 2nd edn., 1855, p. 111; see also p. 92.

7 B 45, p. 292.

8 B 173, p. 296.

9 B 42, II, p. 253.

10 B 42, II, p. 201; see also Part Section 4.

much stronger connection here than Fichte with "the spiritual body to which Paul refers".¹ This is a "fine light-body or transfigured body".² He also taught that the heavenly bodies were beings animated by souls, of which only the outer body was visible. In this doctrine too—which I cannot discuss further here—Fechner quoted St. Paul.³

The idea of a "spiritual body" is also encountered in Fechner's early *Büchlein* of 1836.⁴ He elaborated it more fully in his *Zend-Avesta* and continued to maintain its validity in his *Tagesansicht* of 1879 (p. 41 ff). It is very characteristic of Fechner's thought that what he has in mind in this "diurnal aspect" is the future life, in contrast with which life here on earth is seen as a "nocturnal aspect". Other, earlier members of the romantic movement who were more inclined to pessimism also referred, in connection with death, to the "nocturnal aspect of life".

What is interesting is that Fechner avoided the term "etheric body", apparently for himself, and called this concept the "further body". At the same time, apart from this term "further body", he also used the term "body of actions" or "action-body" for what is otherwise known as the "etheric body".⁵ The subtle body is therefore, according to Fechner, characterised by *activity*, which is very close to the idea that matter and reality or everything that acts or works are identical.⁶ Unlike Fichte, Fechner was philosophically concerned not only with the nature of the existence of the human soul after death, but also with the form in which the angels existed—a chapter of his *Zend-Avesta* is, for example, entitled "On the Angels and Higher Creatures Generally".⁷ He believed that the angels lived in the most fine element, what he called the "etheric sea of heaven" (p. 143). His view, however, was different from that of many theologians in that he was of the opinion that they were not perfect beings and that they were still seeking and striving (p. 148). Their bodies tended to be spherical in shape, they possess senses which were, however, much finer than those of men and their bodies consisted of a kind of vapour.⁸

1 B 42, II, p. 405, 202.

2 B 42, II, p. 338.

3 1 Cor. 15. 40 in *Über die Seelenfrage* (1861, 2nd edn. 1907), p. 148.

4 2nd edn., 1911, p. p. 72 ff.

5 See, for example, B 36, p. 668.

6 See above, for example, pp. 7-8.

7 B 42, I, p. 143.

8 See his "Vergleichende Anatomie der Engel", first published in 1825, under the pseudonym of Dr. Mises, in *Kleine Schriften*, 2nd, edn., 1913, p. 143-144, 157 ff, 160-161.

It is obvious, then, that both the younger Fichte and Fechner were explicitly in favour of the (fine) materiality and the spatiality of the soul. As long as no clear distinction is made between the different metaphysical standpoints within hylic pluralism—such as the beta standpoint or dualistic materialism and the gamma and delta standpoints¹—their views are bound to make a very materialistic impression. What I said at the very beginning of this work about F. A. Lange,² namely that he ought to have given a little attention to these views held by some of his contemporaries, is clearly not so very wide of the mark. Lange's work was above all a history of monistic materialism and Kantianism, to which he adhered, seemed to him to have no place for hylic pluralism.

In the case of a number of thinkers of the romantic and the post-romantic periods, hylic pluralism was even more developed than in the case of the thinkers dealt with so far. I should like now to discuss briefly some of these thinkers, many of them in no way prominent in their own time and now more or less forgotten. In this connection, I hardly need to stress that they frequently exchanged views with the pneumatologists or romantic psychologists whom I discussed in the preceding chapter (81).

The first of these figures is the Bohemian thinker B. Bolzano (1781-1848), who was older than the younger Fichte and Fechner and who believed that the soul was situated in space and at death took a finer body with it.³

Although he was an "ideological socialist", F. M. C. Fourier (1772-1835)⁴ taught a temporal continued existence after death, when man transferred to an 'aromatic etheric body'.⁵ His follower Hippolyte Renaud also wrote about an "aromatic body" in his *Solidarité* of 1845. It is obvious that both of these thinkers were under the influence of L. C. de Saint Martin.⁶ As one would expect, H. P. G. Quack did not say anything about these or similar doctrines.

The younger Fichte was friendly with a number of thinkers and, apart from his disciples, there were others with whom he was in close touch. One of these was E. Reinhold (1793-1855, professor at Jena and the son of the better known K.L. Reinhold), who was rather older than he was.

1 It is not at all easy to classify I.H. Fichte and Fechner under one of these headings, especially because neither of them expresses very clearly either the immaterial element or the transcendental—Fechner's "pantheism" is well known. Their standpoint was, however, certainly not purely materialistic. See Part I, pp. 79-80.

2 See Part I, p. 1-2.

3 B 173, p. 10, 179; see also B 184, I, p. 132.

4 B 38; B 184, under "Fourier".

5 See A. Viatte, *Victor Hugo et les Illuminés de son temps*, p. 70.

6 See above, pp. 159.

According to E. Reinhold, man possessed a finer organism which was liberated on death.¹

Another friend of Fichte's was the "semi-Hegelian" whom I have already mentioned, C. H. Weisse (1801-1866). Weisse, who belonged to the school of theists on the Hegelian right wing whose position was halfway between philosophy and theology,² saw for man the "creation of an immortal corporeality"³ (which can be compared with the trend within Protestantism which I discussed in Section 72) and, before this happened, the possession of an etheric body, since there was no soul without a body.⁴

A younger and fairly well-known author was the Hungarian magnate and philosopher Lazarus von Hellenbach (1827-1887), whose doctrine that an invisible body, a meta-organism, was present behind the visible body⁵ was probably derived from the younger Fichte.⁶ On the other hand, however, he was a member of occult circles and probably had recourse to clairvoyance.⁷ Hellenbach was active at a fairly late stage—he was, for example, friendly with du Prel⁸ and contributed to the journal *Sphinx* (1886 ff.). The title of one of his writings, which translated is "Birth and Death as a Change of Form and Appearance" (1885), points clearly to a Kantian tendency in his thought. In this respect, he was similar to du Prel.⁹

C. Fortlage (1806-1881), who was a professor at Jena, partly followed "Fichte"—probably the older Fichte¹⁰—and partly followed F. E. Beneke. He accepted, for example, the existence of a "sensation or soul-body"¹¹ and the younger Fichte fully approved of his point of view.¹²

Another of Beneke's disciples was the well-known author F. Uberweg (1826-1871), whose name is inseparably linked with one of the most thorough and reliable histories of philosophy, a work which, despite its lack of balance towards the end, in dealing predominantly with German philosophers, has been re-edited and reprinted many times since its

1 See B 38, p. 588.

2 See B 184, II, under "Weisse"; B 41, p. 606.

3 See B 173, p. 249.

4 See Weisse's polemics with David Friedrich Strauss in *Der christliche Glaube* II, p. 659.

5 See B 184, I, p. 497.

6 See B 165, p. 142.

7 See B 184, I, p. 497.

8 See B 83, p. 702 ff.

9 See above, p. 155-156.

10 See B 184, I, p. 351; B 173, p. 281.

11 See B 39, under "Leib"; B 109, p. 718.

12 B 45, p. 285.

first appearance. As F. A. Lange has pointed out,¹ Überweg regarded the soul as extended and material. Can Überweg's point of view simply be classified under the heading of monistic materialism, however? He himself defined it in a letter as "on the one hand, extremely materialistic and, on the other, exclusively spiritualistic".² He believed that matter consisted "of contents of sensation which exist in themselves and are extended".³ I should like to return later to this remarkable idea, which apparently betrays a transition to ordinary (monistic) nineteenth century materialism, but which does not entirely coincide with that materialism.

Clearly related to Überweg's views were those of H. Czolbe (1819-1873), whom Lange also liked to quote, although it is rather doubtful whether he was right in doing so. Czolbe accepted, for example, the existence of a world-soul which permeated the "corporeal world".⁴ The psychical aspect consisted, he taught, of movements—"sensations and feelings exist objectively in space in the world" (*ibid.*). This certainly gives rather a strong impression of hylic pluralism and of anticipating the teachings of W. Haas.⁵ The title of one of Czolbe's writings, "Characteristics of an Extensional Theory of Knowledge", which was published after his death in 1875, shows that his ideas went in this direction. Both Überweg and Czolbe could equally well have been included under the nineteenth century psychologists discussed in Section 84, but it is possible to see in their thought the direction in which the romantic psychology and philosophy was also able to develop.

In passing, the little known author Max Drossbach (1810-1884) should be mentioned. He believed that the soul was matter and that matter was also soul, was an atomist and taught metempsychosis.

I should like to conclude this chapter with a discussion of two closely related figures, Max Perty (1804-1884) and H. Ulrici (1806-1884). The first of these men was a professor of zoology and allied subjects at Berne, the second held the chair of philosophy at Halle. Ulrici edited, from 1847 onwards, the philosophical journal that had been founded by the younger Fichte, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*—a journal containing contributions which were frequently criticised in many respects by Hegel and his followers. Like the younger Fichte, Perty and Ulrici both belonged to the group of speculative theists⁷

1 B 89, II, p. 490.

2 *ibid.*, p. 495.

3 B 38, p. 773.

4 B 81, II, p. 102 ff.

5 See B 38, p. 113.

6 See below, Section 86.

7 See B 173, p. 231 ff, 242 ff.

and also shared a lively interest for "mystical" phenomena—phenomena which we should nowadays call "occult". Like so many authors of the post-romantic period, they attempted to demonstrate the immortality of the human soul. Both were convinced that a "fluid" was involved in this and Perty especially believed that this fluid assumed the form of an etheric body.¹ Some people were capable of observing unusual phenomena because they possessed a finer perceptive capacity.²

Perty and Ulrici, then, belonged to a group of authors, to which the younger Fichte and later C. du Prel and L. von Hellenbach also belonged—authors who can, because of their interest in what we would now call occult phenomena, be regarded as precursors of parapsychology.³ At the time when they were living and working, they were generally known as "spiritualists".⁴ The English S. P. R. had at this time hardly begun to exist, but, from about 1848 onwards, a wave of spiritualism had swept over the United States and Europe. I shall be returning to this in the next chapter. It is, however, important to point out that there was a great difference in quality between this popular interest in spiritualism and the studies conducted by the abovementioned authors, who either taught at universities or elsewhere private scholars of considerable learning. This is reflected in the attitude taken by these German scholars, especially the professional scholars among them—including, for example, Fechner and his colleague at Leipzig, the astronomer J. C. F. Zollner (1834-1882)⁵ towards these popular spiritualists. They were distinctly uneasy about the similarities that existed between their views and those of the popular spiritualists. They were in fact criticised for their "spiritualism". An example of this is Wilhelm Wundt's book, written as an open letter to Ulrici questioning the scientific character of spiritualism—*Der Spiritismus, eine sogenannte wissenschaftliche Frage, Offener Brief an H. Prof. H. Ulrici* (1885)—and the same author's reference to the same question in his address commemorating Fechner delivered on 11 May 1901.⁶

It is important, however, to distinguish the great tendencies of philosophy at this period in this attitude towards "spiritualism". In his commemorative address, Wundt also called Fechner the thinker who "renewed and completed the romantic philosophy of nature in the

1 *Über die Seele* (1856), p. 9; see also B 98, III, p. 190.

2 See B 83, p. 638.

3 See B 173, p. 238.

4 The words "spiritist" and "spiritualist" seem to be interchangeable in this context in English. I have chosen the more common. Transl.

5 See B 173, p. 618.

6 See his *Reden und Aufsätze* (1913), p. 338.

nineteenth century" (p. 312). This post-romantic movement which I have discussed in the present chapter paled into insignificance when confronted with the materialistic, positivistic and critical tendencies which predominated in the nineteenth century and were reflected in the views of university specialists in the field of the natural sciences, of professional philosophers, of members of various intellectual circles¹ or of the increasing numbers of Marxist thinkers. I have already stressed that the movement which had its heyday during the romantic period and which therefore included a revival of interest in hylic pluralistic ideas was forced to go underground again round about the year 1840² and I certainly do not think that I have overstressed this fact. On the other hand, however, these post-romantic thinkers undoubtedly helped to further the reaction against the materialistic and positivistic thought that prevailed during the second half of the nineteenth century. I shall consider this reaction more fully in the following chapter, but, in the meantime, it should be noted that the Dutch philosopher and psychologist, G. Heymans (1857-1930), who explicitly called himself a disciple of Fechner,³ became in 1920⁴—although he was hardly or not at all open to hylic pluralism⁵—the founder of the Dutch S. P. R. The interest which the romantics took in so-called occult phenomena was thus placed on a more scientific basis by this and other S. P. Rs and this is indisputably one of the ways in which romanticism and post-romanticism persisted.

83 OCCULTISTS III

The thinkers of the eighteenth century Enlightenment disagreed with a great deal and, in many cases, correctly. Among the many things that they rejected were belief in the possibility that man can be influenced by the devil and by spirits and also quite frequently, though not always,⁶ belief in the existence of the devil and of spirits and in the reality of unusual phenomena of the kind that later came to be called occult. The rejection of man's body of fine matter before and

1 Most of these men did not at this time take religion or anything that resembled it at all seriously.

2 See above, p. 153.

3 See B 69, I, p. 54. Fechner and Heymans were also in correspondence with each other.

4 Heymans' lectures at Groningen University were much better attended round about 1900 than in 1920 or thereabouts. I have been told by those who attended at the turn of the century that the great interest then was due to a reaction against nineteenth century materialism.

5 See below, p. 187-188; see also Part I, p. 57-59.

6 See above p. 99.

after death and of all more subtle worlds, in other words, the rejection of hylic pluralism was undoubtedly due to this attitude. This rejection, however, was not taken really seriously until the nineteenth century and especially after roundabout 1840. It became a very widespread and general attitude in the second half of the last century especially among intellectuals.¹

Its progress was far less rapid in the eighteenth century and, what is more, it was quickly followed at the end of that century by a very widespread reaction in the form of the romantic movement. Roundabout 1840, the pendulum swung back again—the discoveries of the natural scientists at about this time led to a gradual abandonment of the medical teachings of romanticism and to an aversion to the thought of the German idealists as “pure invention of concepts”. Immanuel Kant had, of course, played an important part in convincing philosophers that they should not leave the sphere of ordinary experience.² We have seen, however, that a post-romantic undercurrent persisted for quite a long time among German thinkers, for example, but that this took place very much in the background. It can safely be assumed, in other words, that the representatives of this underground movement were often not taken at all seriously in scientific circles. The general pattern of nineteenth century thought, at least during the second half of the century, then, is quite clear—all such fantasies were firmly rejected in a climate of thought which was, not only in scientific circles but in intellectual circles generally, very different and often explicitly materialistic and in which man’s consciousness was regarded as fundamentally dependent on cerebral processes.

There were many reactions to this basic attitude. Neo-Kantianism—that of F. A. Lange, for example—was not in itself materialistic. We cannot, however, go any further into the philosophical reactions here, nor can we discuss all the religious reactions, many of which took the form of a neo-orthodox response. It is, however, important in the context of our particular subject to indicate briefly one aspect of this offensive conducted against the prevailing spirit of nineteenth century thought. This is the emergence in the nineteenth century of a number of movements to which I have already referred in the preceding section under the name of *occultism*. These occult movements all have a religious attitude of a special kind in common. In addition, (monistic) materialism and a limitation of man to matter and especially of man’s

1 See above, Section 80.

2 See above, Section 82, especially pp. 168, 172.

consciousness to his brains are radically rejected. In connection with this, a conviction prevails in occultism that it is possible to come into contact with "spirits" in the beyond. Occultists also still regard the so-called "occult" phenomena which have been discussed at very many different times throughout history, which interested the romantics, for example, and which were rejected by the radical thinkers of the Enlightenment as significantly important.

What I have particularly in mind here is the emergence of *spiritualism* and *modern*, as distinct from the earlier *theosophy*. What is especially striking is that both these occult movements are non-scientific in character. By this I mean that, apart from a number of important exceptions, their members have been found above all in non-scientific, non-university circles. They are, one might say, movements involving the people and supported in the main by often quite large groups of adherents who, in the manner of members of a religious sect, are very little or not at all concerned with public opinion or with academic opinion. In this way, spiritualists and modern theosophists can be seen to be in sharp contrast to scientists and scholars. On the other hand, they have always possessed an inner strength and deep conviction, so that their counter-offensive against materialism and positivism cannot be under-estimated.

The counter-movement represented by these two tendencies continued to increase and reached a peak in the first ten or so years of the present century, when various splinter-movements such as anthroposophy and the Rosicrucians appeared. Although it is no longer quite so flourishing, it has certainly continued to exist. Running parallel to this counter-movement, there are, on the one hand, the scientific investigation of so-called occult phenomena in the form of "psychical research" or parapsychology—I shall be returning to this later—and, on the other, many different reactions to the spirit of nineteenth century thought. These reactions include, for example, a less materialistic attitude in science, despite a certain tendency towards behaviourism and physicalism, new philosophical movements such as phenomenology and the philosophy of life and finally new religious attitudes, such as the dialectical theology and the ecumenical movement. It would be interesting to investigate, in a special study, the extent to which themes which were explicit in the romantic period have returned in a broader form in these reactions against the nineteenth century,¹ just as many of the radical ideas of the Enlightenment returned in the materialism of the nineteenth century.

¹ See B 239, conclusion.

This occultism which arose during the second half of the nineteenth century and to which I have given the title of "Occultism III" is provided with a very comprehensive bibliography which is unfortunately not well known among those who do not specialise in this subject. It is, in fact, so great that I cannot begin to discuss in detail all the figures and all the phenomena and data involved in it. My concern is above all philosophical¹ and in the second place with hylic pluralism. In the case of the latter, this whole occult movement of the second half of the previous century has certainly to be mentioned, but as far as fine materiality is concerned it is rather like breaking down an already open door. The occultists who come within this third group generally speaking accept—with a few notable exceptions—the existence of a subtle body in the case of man and of worlds of more rarefied materiality. we are, of course, bound to ask to what extent this is connected with popular character of this occultism, with its practical nature or with the fact that it is largely based on experience. Again and again, figures—sometimes the leading figures, but quite often others—emerge who claim to have had *experience* of the phenomena in question. In this respect, of course, there is a close resemblance to Swedenborg and his teaching, based on the claim that he spoke from experience. Certainly, when we are investigating the question of the truth of hylic pluralism, we shall have to come back to this.² Here, however, in this section, we must content ourselves with a very brief discussion of a number of figures and phenomena drawn from very many and of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in these ideas.

In *spiritualism*—the name originated with one of the leaders of the movement, Allan Kardec (1804-1869)³—the most important idea is that the human personality continues to exist after death as a spirit and that it is possible to get into touch with this spirit, especially through "séances", in which a "medium" falls into a trance and also through "automatic writing", "ouija boards" and so on.

This movement began round about 1850 in the United States and very quickly swept through Europe, where it soon found connections with mesmerism. Spiritualism was practised in many different and even the highest circles and even by prominent figures, such as the romantic author Victor Hugo and Queen Sophie of the Netherlands. The emphasis, of course, was on the practice of spiritualism and this caused a good deal of scorn in intellectual circles. Allan Kardec's

1 See above, p. 115-116; see also Part I, Section 1.

2 See below, Sections 117 and 119; see also the index to this work, under "witnesses".

3 See B 163, p. 18.

movement proved remarkably popular in France¹ and it has an enormous number of followers today, for example, in Brazil. Various societies and associations were founded and journals appeared in which non-dogmatic and rather vague Christian convictions were expressed.

What strikes us today most of all is the great divergency of views and tendencies within this movement as a whole. On the one hand, for example, there is what Tenhaeff has called the "spiritualism of revelation". This is a very large group of people who believe quite deeply in the possibility of communication via mediums and other means with the deceased. Their séances, however, are not well controlled from the scientific and parapsychological point of view and are therefore not valuable. From the religious point of view, however, their activities command a certain respect, because it would be presumptuous to judge what exalted contacts may possibly be established in such small, closed circles of believers.

On the other hand, there have also been very many more scientific figures who have been prepared to consider the content of spiritualism seriously as a hypothesis and who have, moreover, gone to great lengths to verify this hypothesis by means of carefully controlled séances. What used to be known as "psychical research" and the English Society for Psychical Research (S. P. R., founded in 1882) grew out of this more scientific interest in "spiritualism". As I have already observed there was also a group of scholars in Germany—some of them university teachers (the younger Fichte, Fechner, Perty, Ulrici, Zöllner) and others private scholars (von Hellenbach, du Prel)—who were theoretically not so very far removed from spiritualism and who have therefore often been called "spiritualists", although they were not always entirely happy about the similarity between their teachings and those of popular spiritualism.²

Hylic pluralistic ideas occurred frequently in the teachings of the spiritualists. A. Jackson Davis (1826-1910), who was in a sense a precursor of the movement and who has been called the Swedenborg of the New World,³ expressed the opinion that "a spirit (is) no immaterial substance".⁴ Allan Kardec—whose real name was H.L.D. Revail—devised the remarkable term *perisprit* for the semi-material covering or sheath which remains behind when the coarser covering of the ordinary body is destroyed. This concept therefore is the same

1 See B 163, p. 16 ff.

2 See above, p. 175.

3 See B 83, p. 415.

4 See B 168a, I, p. 456.

as what Kardec's predecessors had called the "animal spirit".¹ The existence of this "perispit" was—and still is—very widely accepted by spiritualists. I shall be returning later to consider the teachings contained in *The Supreme Adventure* (1961, B 201), a book by a contemporary author, R. Crookall, who has made a special study of the themes and concepts which have occurred very frequently in different accounts of spiritualism. It is, however, relevant to say this now about Crookall—one concept which, Crookall has shown, recurs again and again is that of the subtle body of man. Crookall here makes a distinction between various levels as these have occurred in the various accounts—"vital body; soul body; celestial body". We may therefore conclude that hylic pluralism is a very common theme in spiritualism.

It is also important in this context to discuss an author who can be called the theoretician of spiritualism of the present century, as du Prel was of his own period—Emil Mattiesen (1875-1939), who was, by profession, professor of the history of music at Rostock. He can hardly be called a parapsychologist, since he was rather too convinced of the continued existence of the soul. On the other hand, however, he studied the material that was available at the time when he was living with such characteristic German thoroughness that even those who are more sceptical respect his work.² In his first book, on "man in the beyond" and "mystical experience", *Der Jenseitige Mensch. Eine Einführung in die Metapsychologie der mystischen Erfahrung* (1925, B 97), he discussed, among other things, "problems of the astral body" (p. 568 ff). His attitude was rather hesitant, especially with regard to the possibility of explaining materialisation of "previously formed" astral bodies in séances (in which he was particularly interested). In his other great work, also on personal survival after death, *Das persönliche Überleben des Todes. Eine Darstellung der Erfahrungsbeweise* (1936-1939, B 98), he returned to the theory of the subtle body and regarded it this time with more favour,³ although he was still conscious of various difficulties in connection with the concept (p. 155, 189).

Another movement, which formed a part of modern occultism, came into being in 1875 when the Theosophical Society was founded by a group of people gathered around H. P. Blavatsky (1831-1891). This movement can be called "modern theosophy" in contrast to the theosophy of Philo Jadaeus and of Origen or the neo-Platonists on the one hand and the so-called "Christian theosophy" outlined in Section 72

1 See B 83, p. 483.

2 See H. Driesch, B 209, p. 131.

3 See P. Ringger, B 249, p. 26.

on the other.¹ It originated among men who were interested in spiritualism, but soon moved away from this. Members of the movement were not encouraged to take part in sêances, but were actively encouraged to concern themselves with the ethical teachings of modern theosophy—the idea of “brotherhood” played an important part here—and to study and read. Modern theosophists certainly taught that it was possible to acquire knowledge in an unusual way, but they did not value especially the acquisition of such knowledge except perhaps as an indirect result of “spirituality” rather than of “psychism”. As a consequence, only a small group of specially “initiated” theosophists and members who were far advanced in occultism claimed to possess this knowledge and some of these made communications on the basis of detailed and trained visionary experiences.

Hylic pluralism occurs frequently in modern theosophy, although, of course, the extent to which it occurs differs from author to author. The Theosophical Society and its various offshoots have never in fact had a particularly large membership. There have always been, for example, far fewer theosophists proper than members of the spiritualist movement, with its lower demands of understanding, sympathy and participation. Nonetheless, theosophical ideas have become very widespread in the West. They have acted as a kind of leaven permeating Western thought to the extent that many people have at least heard of karma and reincarnation, of an intermediate sojourn in other worlds and—quite apart from the constant insistence, long before the idea was fully accepted, on ecumenism of a kind that embraced all the great religions—of the astral body and possibly even several higher bodies in the case of man.

Let us briefly consider some of the leading authors in the field of theosophy, particularly with regard to what they can tell us about hylic pluralism. H. P. Blavatsky mentioned in her *The Secret Doctrine* (1888 ff; B 14) various “bodies”, *Kośas*² or *upādhis*³ of man as well as different “planes” of existence. (These can all be found in the index of *The Secret Doctrine*.) H. P. Blavatsky’s followers, Annie Besant (1847-1933) and C. W. Leadbeater (1847-1934), systematised her work and expressed it in a more popular form in, for example, a series of manuals entitled *The Astral Plane* and so on. They also expressed her ideas in many other publications and extended and amplified her thought on the basis, so they claimed, of independent research into clairvoyance.

¹ See above, p. 110.

² See above, Vol. I, p. 179-180.

³ See above, Vol. I, p. 192, 227.

Two typical examples of such books, containing illustrations, are C. W. Leadbeater's *Man, Visible and Invisible* (1902) and *Thought Forms* (1905), which was the work of both C. W. Leadbeater and Annie Besant. What is more, A. E. Powell made a compilation of everything that these two authors published about hylic pluralism and these four books (B 116, B 117, B 118 and B 119, 1925-1930) from the most exhaustive treatise on fine materiality that has until now appeared. It should, however, be borne in mind that these four books were not the result of clairvoyant investigations by A. E. Powell himself.

Hylic pluralism in the field of modern theosophy gives rise to two important comments. In the first place, it explicitly takes the form—as it did in the case of Proclus¹ and in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad²—of a hylic pluralism, in other words, according to theosophical views, man possesses a whole series of bodies (an etheric body, an astral body, a mental body and so on) and there is also a series of subtle “planes”³ which penetrate each other and are at the same time composed of increasingly fine matter.

The second comment is this. Although modern theosophists as a whole have been very much opposed to nineteenth century materialism,⁴ the theosophical movement has again and again been accused of materialism. In this, it is clear that insufficient distinction has been made between monistic materialism and dualistic materialism in the first place and, in the second, insufficient attention has been given to whether it really was the opinion of the theosophists that this finer materiality represented the *highest* reality. Quite apart from dualistic materialism or the beta standpoint, it is quite possible for hylic pluralism to embrace, for example, either the gamma or the delta standpoint, in which case it is *not* assumed that fine materiality is the highest reality.⁵

Another publication about hylic pluralism by a member of this circle is G. R. S. Mead's *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition* (1919, B 99). As we have already seen in Part I of this work,⁶ the title of this book does not entirely reflect its contents, because the author only deals with part of the subject, namely the doctrine of the subtle body in neo-Platonism and a few other ancient authors.

Generally speaking, however, it would be correct to say that hylic pluralism occurs in all the branches of modern theosophy, irrespective

1 See above, p. 52-53.

2 See above, Vol. I, p. 176-177.

3 See above, pp. 13, 53-54.

4 See above, p. 177.

5 See above, p. 5-6.

6 See above, Part I, p. 63.

of the size and influence of the branch. The leaders of the second biggest Theosophical Society, the headquarters of which has for a long time been at Point Loma in California (unlike the other Society, established at Adyar near Madras) have not occupied themselves so exhaustively and in such detail with the phenomenon of fine materiality as C. W. Leadbeater and Annie Besant, for example, did. Nonetheless, even in the *Occult Glossary* (1933, 2nd edn. 1933) compiled by G. de Purucker (1874-1942), the "astral body, popular term for the 'model-body', the *linga śaritra*" is mentioned, (p. 8).

A very important offshoot of the Theosophical Society is *anthroposophy*. The founder of the anthroposophical movement was Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), who was head of the German Theosophical Society from 1902 until 1912, after which he went his own way. He was immensely active and creative and, what is more, claimed to be a visionary. One of the consequences of this was a long series of publications and the formation, especially in Germany, of a solid group of convinced and well trained collaborators. These anthroposophists too have always accepted hylic pluralism as a reality which can be verified by anyone possessing certain well developed capacities. It would be a worthwhile task to examine the anthroposophical attitude towards hylic pluralism in detail and to investigate in what respects the teachings of the anthroposophists about hylic pluralism differ from or are similar to those of the theosophists. For reasons of space, however, we must confine ourselves here to naming a few of Steiner's published lectures. These often speak for themselves—"Welche Bedeutung hat die okkulte Entwicklung des Menschen für seine Hüllen—physischen Leib, Ätherleib, Astralleib?"¹ ("What is the significance of man's occult development for his 'coverings'—physical body, etheric body or astral body?") and "Die Wirklichkeit der höheren Welten"² ("The reality of the higher worlds"). G. Wachsmuth's *Die ätherische Bildekkräfte* (1924) ("The Etheric Formative Powers") can also be mentioned in this context, as can O. J. Hartmann's *Anthroposophie* (1950), which contains a great deal about "etheric bodies" and the "polarity of the physical and the etheric" (p. 28 ff). As far as Rudolf Steiner himself is concerned, a valuable book which provides useful information is A. Arenson's "guide" to Steiner's courses of lectures, *Ein Führer durch die Vortragszyklen R. Steiners* (1930), especially under the words "Ätherleib", "Astralleib" and so on.

1 *Vorträge*, 1913; 3rd edn. 1957.

2 *Vorträge*, 1921; 1962.

We may therefore conclude that there is a deep conviction of the reality of fine materiality in the whole of this modern occult movement, which includes not only the bigger groups, but also, for example, the modern Rosicrucians, the modern Sufi movement and a large number of smaller movements such as that led by A. A. Bailey as well as independent figures like K. von Dürckheim (born 1896: the "being body") and representatives of purely popular occultism.

84. PSYCHOLOGISTS

We now have to return to the nineteenth century to begin our investigation into the part played by psychologists in the sphere of hylic pluralism, although the work of the psychologists tends to overlap into the twentieth century. First of all, however, something has to be said about various psychologists. Practised as an independent discipline, psychology is relatively recent, a twentieth century phenomenon, although Fechner¹ was a precursor of the study and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) opened the first institution for experimental psychology as early as 1879. Round about the turn of the century and later, a whole series of well-known figures appeared on the scene who were both philosophers and psychologists at the same time. Among these, and very typical of them, was the Dutchman G. Heymans (1857-1930), with his psychological laboratory, the first in the Netherlands.

In what follows, I propose to make a selection which will have a direct bearing on our special subject. I have furthermore already said something about the pneumatologists or romantic psychologists.² Figures such as C. Bonnet (1720-1793) and J. C. Lossius (1743-1813)³ preceded these figures and their work, like that of so many others, also had a psychological aspect.

Among the nineteenth century psychologists, the shortlived W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) is particularly striking because of his theory of the "mind-stuff", which was criticised by William James. According to Clifford, awareness consisted of this "mind-stuff" or atoms of the soul⁴ It would be interesting to investigate whether what he was aiming at would not have gained in clarity by a distinction being made between ordinary matter and a finer matter.

Clifford's views were similar to those of the two "philosophers of romanticism", F. Überweg and H. Czolbe, whom I discussed in Section

1 See above, p. 169.

2 See above, Section 81.

3 See above, p. 137.

4 See B 41, p. 561; B 128, p. 245; B 184, I, p. 193.

82, but whom we might equally well have been included here. Überweg believed that matter consisted of independently existing contents of the consciousness possessing extensiveness, whereas, in Czolbe's view, the psychical aspect consisted of movements which existed objectively in space in the world.¹ This also strikes one as rather vaguely formulated hylic pluralism.

Round about the turn of the century a controversy raged among those psychologists who were at the same time philosophers about the correct standpoint with regard to the relationship between the psychical and the physical aspects. In this controversy, there were two conflicting theories—some scholars insisted that there was an *interaction* between the two aspects, whereas others maintained a theory of psychophysical *parallelism*. Heymans' *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (B 68) and L. Busse's *Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib* (B 17) provide a useful survey of this debate. In connection with our special subject, the point of view taken by the Russian scholar N. J. von Grot (1852-1899)² is particularly interesting and one of his articles on psychological concepts of the soul and psychical energy ("Die Begriffe der Seele und der psychischen Energie in der Psychologie")³ is frequently quoted. Von Grot supported the theory of psychophysical interaction and was much more strongly in favour of psychical energy than certain other German scholars of the period.⁴ In his opinion, it was possible for a transference between psychical and physical energy to take place. This idea was, of course, violently opposed by those who supported the theory of parallelism.⁵ Von Grot also insisted that the sum total of energy was retained in this process,⁶ a point to which I shall be returning later in this book, in the systematic part.⁷ What is, however, remarkable is that von Grot believed that "an etheric substance"⁸ was the bearer of psychical energy and, although he was rather cautious and hesitant, he also made a connection, in his article quoted above, between this psychical energy and a possible continued existence after death, asking why the psychical current should not be transferred then to other bodies or spaces (p.333). It is fairly obvious, in view of this, that von Grot was in the tradition of those Russian philosophers who have been open

1 See above, p. 174.

2 See B 38, B 184, both under "Grot"; B 128, p. 255; B 38, p. 215; B 184, I, p. 421

3 *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, IV, 1898. pp. 257-335.

4 See B 17, p. 418.

5 See B 68, p. 70; B 17, p. 424; see also B 114, p. 339.

6 See B 17, p. 426.

7 See below, Section 130.

8 See B 17, p. 419.

hylic pluralism—whether they have been within the tradition of Eastern Christianity,¹ whether they were under the influence of the romantic movement² or whether they were fairly recent figures.³ Von Grot, then, was clearly interested in the connection with the psychophysical problem.

It is possible to claim that to place the emphasis on *psychical* energy is to tend towards hylic pluralism. C. G. Jung certainly seems to have been conscious, in his *Über die Energetik der Seele* (1928), of the dynamic and even of the quantitative aspect⁴ of psychical energy and of the connection between this and the concept of movement. Although he quotes von Grot in this book, he did not draw any consequences as far as hylic pluralism is concerned. The extent to which he approached hylic pluralism in other works will be discussed later.

We must turn now, however, to consider some extremely remarkable ideas about related questions put forward by Heymans in his publication on the application of the psychological concept of energy (*“Über die Anwendbarkeit des Energie-begriffes in der Psychologie”*⁵). Heymans here asked whether it was possible to demonstrate, in the field of psychology, relationships which were analogous to the laws of energy in physics and came to the conclusion that this was quite possible. What is more, in connection with the question of the narrowness of the consciousness, that is, the fact that the contents of the consciousness as it were displace each other in an attempt to escape from the periphery of the central consciousness and to occupy the central position of the mind, Heymans also formulated a number of laws and definitions. Every content of the consciousness, Heymans argued, had a greater or lesser power enabling it to move towards the centre of the mind and thus to increase its degree of consciousness. The product of this power and the distance that had to be covered was called by Heymans its “distance energy”.⁶ In approaching the centre of the consciousness in this way, the content of the consciousness gained what Heymans called “level energy” and this “released” the various energies that were already present in the “level energy”—the potential energies of association, thought, feeling and will. In this transference from distance energy to level energy, a part is perhaps played by a third, psychical form of energy, what Heymans called “movement energy”. Subject

1 See Section 71.

2 See above, p. 108-109.

3 See above, pp. 104-105.

4 See *op. cit.*, p. 17.

5 Leipzig, 1921; included in B 69, II, p. 319 ff; see also B 114, p. 301 ff; P. A. Dietz, B 263, XII, p. 19.

6 See B 69, II, p. 358-359.

to quantitative control, Heymans affirmed, it was possible to maintain in this context the hypothesis that psychical energy was conserved.¹

These are audacious ideas. One thing, however, is quite certain—from the philosophical point of view, Heymans is a psychical monist, in other words, he believed that only the psychical aspect was real, the physical aspect, including, for example, movement, being simply a “different appearance” of something that was in reality psychical. This has to be borne in mind by anyone who may be inclined to take too literal a view of Heymans’ analogy with the physical laws of energy. Heymans himself has warned us of this danger: “It should be obvious that all my terms should be regarded as figurative; there is, for example, no question of any spatial movement of thoughts or ideas” (p. 325). In the context of hylic pluralism, however, I am not so inclined to agree with Heymans. He himself has said that “the analogy with spatial movements suggests itself again and again” (*ibid.*). If it were simply the case that the contents of the human consciousness could be seen to be taking part, for example, in a race to cover a certain distance from the periphery to the centre of the consciousness, would this not be an accurate description of a factual situation? In the preface to his treatise, Heymans said that he was anxious “to say emphatically that these results (that is, those outlined in the book) certainly bear out psychical monism, but do not presuppose it” (p. 319). As far as Heymans himself is concerned, then, there is certainly latitude for our interpretation. This implies that, quite apart from his metaphysical standpoint, Heymans here expressed very fruitful ideas which become much more intelligible if they are seen in the context of hylic pluralism. Distance and the movement of thoughts or contents of the consciousness are undoubtedly views which come within the sphere of hylic pluralism.²

To what extent, we may ask, are similar themes to be found in the writings of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961)? The great range of his work, the wealth and variety of his views and the personal influence which he exerted have made this Swiss psychologist and psychiatrist a man of tremendous importance, much more sympathetic to many people, for example, than his older colleague Freud. He has, however, been criticised for frequent vagueness and for failing to elaborate fully the views that he expressed and to synthesise them satisfactorily. He has always had an extremely stimulating effect, but I would agree with the criticism of Jung insofar as his attitude towards hylic pluralism is concerned. Let us look briefly at this aspect of Jung’s psychology.

¹ *ibid.*

² See B 114, pp. 301-303.

In a psychological commentary on the German edition of the *Tibetan Book of the Dead* (the English version is by W. J. Evans-Wentz), Jung had this to say about one passage in the text: "It is a question of a disintegration of the totality of the Bardo-body which, as the so-called subtle body, forms the visible reality of the soul in the deceased state".¹ It is clear, then, that Jung was quite familiar with the idea. To what extent did he regard this, however, as being concerned with reality?

Jung's friend R. Wilhelm published a translation of a Chinese text entitled *Das Geheimnis der goldenen Blüte* (the "Mystery of the Golden Flower"),² with a foreword by Jung in which he referred to the "idea of the diamond body, the incorruptible breath-body, which originates ... in the golden flower".³ I have used an illustration from this publication by Jung and Wilhelm in volume I of this work, with the caption: "The third stage of meditation: Separation of the spirit-body to an independent existence". In this illustration, it is easy to see that a little doll, a *homunculus* or *cidolon*, was believed to leave the body of a person in meditation and to float above the body—this can be compared with an "excursion".

Jung returned to this idea of the "diamond body" in his *Psychologie und Alchemie* (1944; B 78), in which he pointed to a connection between Chinese and Western alchemy. The Western alchemists aimed to "establish a *corpus subtile*, the transfigured body resurrection body—that is, a body which is at the same time spirit".⁴ There can be no doubt that this was one of the aims of the alchemists—they wanted not only to transform ordinary metals into gold, but also to achieve an inner transformation of man, in other words, a metamorphosis.⁵

To what extent, however, was a "diamond body" (or *corpus subtile* according to the alchemists) a real concept for Jung? In *Ein moderner Mythos* (1958), in which he dealt with the supposed observation of "flying saucers" from the psychological point of view, Jung mentioned the statement made by Hildegard of Bingen which I have already quoted: "The spirit-souls of men are 'fiery globes'" (p. 67).⁶

The question which inevitably arises here is whether Jung wanted to explain—or explain away—in terms of psychology everything that seemed to be hylic pluralism. His attitude towards occult or parapsychological phenomena undoubtedly betrays his tendency to do this

1 p. 29; see also above, Vol. I, p. 266-267.

2 2nd edn. 1929.

3 p. 5; see also Part I, Section 9; see also above Vol. I, p. 280-281.

4 B 78, pp. 573-574; see also above, Vol. I, p. 246-248.

5 See B 161, p. 229; see also above, p. 49-50, 131.

6 See above, p. 128-129.

and in this respect he was more inclined to psychological explanations than, for example, the biologist H. Driesch. His theory of synchronicity is really (perhaps among other things) an attempt to refute prophecy. His disciple Aniela Jaffé, what is more, gave her book on spiritual omens and appearances, *Geistererscheinungen und Vorzeichen* (1958; B 217) the sub-title of "a psychological interpretation" (*Eine psychologische Deutung*). It is, moreover, not really possible to make much headway by interpreting so much, as Jung seemed to do, in the light of psychology and explaining it all away in this way. But this was not in fact what Jung himself did. In his foreward to F. Moser's book on "ghosts", *Spuk* (1950), he spoke "unambiguously" about case of haunting in which he was personally involved when he was in England. In her article on "C. G. Jung und die Parapsychologie",¹ Aniela Jaffé wrote also that Jung regularly had occult experiences.

Are we therefore bound to conclude that, here as elsewhere, Jung was vague and ambiguous with regard to this question of hylic pluralism was a real one or not? Although it certainly looks as though this is the case,² there is another possibility. This is that Jung did not wish to express his real opinion and consequently decided simply to give hints. This hypothesis is borne out by a number of indications in his last work, published posthumously by Aniela Jaffé, *Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken* (1962). In the first place, this contains a hitherto unpublished treatise entitled "Septem sermones ad mortuos" (p. 388 ff), which was originally written in 1916 and intended to be read within a fairly small circle. G. Quispel has called this a gnostic writing and was convinced that, by virtue of this short treatise, Jung was a genuine modern gnostic himself.³ Jung may therefore have remained silent about this and many other matters. In this second place, in this last, posthumously published book in which he no longer had or wanted to consider anyone, he wrote much more openly than he had ever done before and reported that he had, at the end of a period of crisis in his life experienced a series of visionary states which were typically hylic pluralistic in character. "It is impossible", he wrote, "to have any idea of the beauty and intensity of the feelings that I experienced during the visions. They were the most tremendous experience that I have ever had". In these visions, apparently, "there was a great holiness in the room . . . The presence of the Holy One was, for me, a magical atmosphere . . . I understood at last why it was that people spoke of the

1 B 270, IV, p. 8 ff; B 265, 1963, p. 15 ff.

2 It may, on the other hand, also be that Jung was in fact convinced of the authenticity of certain occult phenomena, but not of the reality of the subtle body.

3 See, among other places, *Elsevier's Weekblad*, 1, XII, 1962.

"odour" of the Holy Spirit filling the room. It was so. There was in the room a *pneuma* of unutterable holiness. . . ." (pp. 298-299).

We must therefore conclude that it is almost impossible to establish to what extent Jung was in general convinced, as a theory, of hylic pluralism. All that we can say with certainty is that he did not develop any such theory.

G. R. Heyer (born 1890), the well-known Bavarian psychiatrist and author who was a follower of Jung, went, in my opinion, a good deal, further than Jung himself. In his *Organismus der Seele* (2nd edn. 1937), he wrote: "Speaking in the figurative sense, it is possible to say that there is . . . a collective soul-body which contains old and young, just as the physical body contains its own organs"—a kind of "family soul-body" (p. 87). This is completely in accordance with what he said in his earlier book on "psychical spaces", *Seelenräume* (1931), in a chapter on "telepathic dreams": "Does it not seem as though there is a 'we', that is, a psychical body, a psychical *homo major*, the individual expression, individual cells and organs of which we "egos" are?" (p. 16). It seems to me that the proviso in the first quotation, "speaking in the figurative sense" should not be taken too literally. In the first mentioned book too, Heyer said that "the individual has only in the sense of coarse matter to be regarded as an isolated existence" (p. 135). But what about in the sense of *fine* matter? Heyer thought that a "breath from cosmic spaces" was also possible (*Seelenräume*, p. 79) and wrote: "the one space, the interior space of the world, extends through all beings" (p. 37). It would therefore seem as though Heyer distinguished a spatial and material aspect (of fine matter) in the collective conscious of Jung. He also spoke elsewhere of "accepting a corporeality animated by a soul" and wrote "that there is a kind, a sphere or a level of human life which cannot be sufficiently differentiated from ordinary life by the means that we have at our disposal now. We cannot see this other life in anatomical examination (of a corpse) or in a test tube, because the parts and organs of this body are not accessible to the *coarse* senses" (Heyer's italics).¹ Does this mean that they are perceptible by finer senses? This is strikingly hylic pluralistic in tone, but the author's conviction, if in fact he was convinced of hylic pluralism, does not emerge sufficiently clearly.

Gerda Walther (born 1897),² who was a pupil of Husserl and Pfänder, discussed, in an article entitled "Seelenorgane und Seelenbezirke

¹ In *Reich der Seele*, II, 1937, p. 50.

² See B 184, II, p. 828.

grundlegend für den Astralleib"¹ (thus on the astral body and its fundamental psychic organs and regions), the teachings of A. Pfänder (1870-1941), but I do not have the impression that Pfänder himself approached hylic pluralism very closely. Gerda Walther herself went much further in this direction in her *Phänomenologie der Mystik*,² introducing a number of fine distinctions. She believed moreover that it was possible to see the human "aura" at a certain level, having had personal experience of this since her youth, and maintained that there was a great difference between "aural and physical life".³

Finally, one further figure must be mentioned in this context—the psychologist Fritz Giese (1890-1935),⁴ a professor at the Technical University of Stuttgart, who published a book entitled *Die Lehre von Gedankenwellen* ("thought waves"; 1910, 2nd edn., 1924).

The conclusion that may be drawn from our brief examination of these psychologists is that they made various approaches in the direction of hylic pluralism.

85. PARAPSYCHOLOGISTS

In Section 83 ("Occultists III"), I drew attention to the fact that various reactions were evoked in the first half of the nineteenth century when the ideas of the radical Enlightenment became more widespread. One of these reactions against the Enlightenment was, in my opinion, expressed by the movements which I discussed briefly under the heading of "Occultists III". Another can undoubtedly be found in the rise of parapsychology, which was for a long time known as "psychical research" and indeed still is often called by this name. It is easy enough to give an exact date to the beginning of this movement, despite the fact that there were precursors—this is 1882, the year when the English Society for Psychical Research (S.P.R.) was founded. Parapsychology is above all the *scientific* study of so-called occult phenomena. It is a fact that there have been persistent reports throughout the centuries of cases of telepathy, clairvoyance and second sight, of predictions, of *Poltergeister* and of various appearances, together with the great interest in the latter part of the nineteenth century in the practice of spiritualism. All this gave rise to the need for serious research into these occult or parapsychological phenomena. There was, in the reports of such phenomena in more recent times and even more in the

1 B 269, 1952, p. 294.

2 1923, 2nd edn., 1955; B 268.

3 B 268, p. 69; see also Dr. Walther's autobiography, *Zum anderen Ufer*, 1960, pp. 152, 255.

4 See B 184, I, p. 388.

possibly tenable results of serious "psychical research", an element of criticism of one of the affirmations of the radical Enlightenment, which insisted that such phenomena did not exist except perhaps as illusions of self-deception. Gradually, however, as theoretical conclusions have been drawn from the possible results of this parapsychological research, a perceptible change has taken place in man's view of the world and himself and we have, for some time, now, been partly reconsidering the Enlightenment in the light of this evidence.¹

The subject dealt with in this chapter is of special importance to us, because, as I remarked in the preface to this, volume, I have for a long time intended to discuss the question of the truth of hylic pluralism—which forms the main theme of this last part of my work—in close association with another, related task, that of seeking a "foundation theory" for parapsychology, even though this would take us outside the context of a pure discussion of the sense of hylic pluralism alone.²

It is necessary to say once again here and to establish from the outset quite firmly that occult phenomena and hylic pluralism are in no sense identical. In the first place, this is because the existence on a wide scale of fine materiality and of rarefied worlds is a theory, whereas occult phenomena, it is claimed, are facts of human experience. In the second place too, it is because—although some occult or parapsychological phenomena may well point quite clearly to the correctness of the theory of hylic pluralism, they obviously cover a far wider field. The question is therefore, to what extent can hylic pluralism serve as a theory to explain a relatively large number of parapsychological phenomena even all such phenomena in those cases where the connection between parapsychology and hylic pluralism is less obvious? As this question will be discussed at some length in Volume IV of this work (Section 113 ff), we have no need to consider it seriously here.

What has to be done now, however, in this historical part, is to look briefly at the work of a number of parapsychologists who have, either involuntarily or else more consciously, moved in the direction of hylic pluralism in the attempts to interpret such occult phenomena, even though they may not always have declared themselves to be fundamentally and profoundly in favour of the hylic pluralistic explanation. It certainly cannot be denied too that there are also other parapsychologists, quite a large number of them, who refuse to have anything to do with hylic pluralism.

1 See above, p. 141.

2 See above, p. 1-2.

In this context too, it has to be remembered that those German scholars who can be regarded as the precursors of parapsychology—on the one hand, some of the pneumatologists such as J. Kerner¹ and, on the other, various romantic philosophers such as the younger Fichte, Perty, Ulrici, von Hellenbach and du Prel²—were generally speaking rather favourable in their attitude to the meta-organism of man.

As far as "psychical research" proper is concerned, it should not be forgotten that this was in fact a product of spiritualism (see section 83). William Crookes and the founders of the English S.P.R. were, in the narrowest sense of the word, precursors of "psychical research". Before the S.P.R. was founded and Crookes and the other founder-members took part in its activities, these men were deeply impressed by the claims made by the spiritualists and had already decided to repeat these spiritualist séances in a more serious, scientifically controlled manner and to verify objectively the value of the phenomena which occurred in them.

Ideas such as the "perisprit" and the incomplete immateriality of spirits were frequently employed among spiritualists and it is consequently not surprising that the first parapsychologists—to use this term which has become more and more current³—were very influenced by this terminology or at least that their thought ran parallel with that of the spiritualists.

An example of this is a speech made by Sir William Crookes (1832-1919)—who incidentally conducted serious parapsychological investigations, for instance, with the medium D.D. Home, even before the foundation of the S.P.R.—when he was President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In this speech, he discussed man's "spirit-body" which, he claimed, was continuous with the ordinary body, but "raised to an indescribable number of vibrations".⁴

One of the men who played an important part in the founding of the English S.P.R. and in the development of the society in the early years of its existence was F.W.H. Myers (1843-1901). His work shows distinct evidence of hylic pluralistic ideas. For example, he accepted what he called the "metetherial"⁵ and spoke of an "actual spatial material world". In this connection, Tyrrell, who did not agree with

1 See above, p. 160-161.

2 See above, Section 82; see also p. 175.

3 The word "parapsychology" was used as early as 1889 in the journal *Sphinx* by M. Dessoir, but it was not until the period between the two world wars that it came to replace "psychical research".

4 See above, p. 139; B 97, p. 573.

5 See his *Human Personality* (B 230); this word will be found in the index.

him here, commented that Myers was clearly of the opinion that the spatial aspect, which was in this case obviously not the ordinary material aspect, also belonged to the qualities of the "metetherial".¹ It should also be noted that another pioneer member of the S.P.R., E. Gurney also disagreed with Myers here. "We exist", Myers said, "also in a world of ether", which was, he believed, "at the foundation of our physical being". The "etherial vibrations . . . far transcend our capacity of response". This he regarded as ordinary physics. The "world of spiritual life", however, had "in some way" to be "continuous with the world of ether" and this "world where life and thought are carried on apart from matter" (that is, from ordinary matter) "must certainly rank again as a new, a metetherial environment". This "lies after or beyond the ether, as metaphysics lies after or beyond physics" and there must be "countless stages" of this "in the infinity of things".² It is clear, then, that Myers accepted the existence another environment, spatially and independently real and consisting of many different levels.

In this context, it is natural to consider the origin of the term "ether" (and "etheric" or "ethereal"). The Greeks thought of the *aithēr* as a higher, more rarefied air than *aēr*.³ This idea is present in the frequent use of "etheric" for a more subtle body.⁴ Furthermore, just as a vague or supposed similarity with ordinary electro-magnetism led to the term "animal magnetism",⁵ so too did the Greek word "ether" ("aether") come to be used for a specific concept in modern physics. This usage has completely disappeared now—this meaning of the word "ether" is not even mentioned, for example, in the 1947 ff edition of the standard Dutch encyclopaedia Winkler Prins—but nineteenth century physics were full of it. The elusive character of ether in nineteenth and early twentieth century physics and the same character of the etheric body of, for example, the romantic thinkers was clearly the point of agreement between the two concepts. These early parapsychologists therefore linked together the ether of physics and the supposed etheric body or the world of ether in which the etheric body was found.

This is also the case with Sir Oliver Lodge (1851-1940). On the one hand, he admitted that he spent his whole life studying the "ether of space", in other words, the "ether" accepted in the physics of the period, and everything that was connected with this subject. On the other hand, however, he became convinced, through "psychical

1 See B 266, p. 46.

2 See B 230 (1918), p. 166.

3 See above, p. 29-30.

4 See Part I, p. 16-17.

5 See above, p. 160.

research", of the existence of a "pneumatical body, used by spirit and made of "X". This "X" was, in his opinion, ether! This is the "intervening mechanism, the etheric or spiritual body".¹ One is inclined to say in this context that this "X", of which the subtle body, in Lodge's view, consisted, might be in fact very different from the ether which has since disappeared from modern physics.²

Dr. K. H. E. de Jong (1872-1960), who followed Dr. P. A. Dietz (1932-1940) as lecturer in parapsychology at the University of Leiden, certainly attached value to what I have called hylic pluralism—this is borne out, for example, by his book *Die andere Seite des Materialismus* (1932; B 76). He himself always said that du Prel had stimulated his interest in these problems.

The professor in parapsychology at the University of Utrecht, W.H.C. Tenhaeff (born 1894) gave the sub-title of "The Astral Body" to his first work, a concise manual of psychical research (*Beknopte Handleiding der Psychical Research*, 1926). But as late as 1962, he declared "that it must be regarded as very likely that continued research will eventually do justice to this age-old 'belief'" (in the existence of a body of fine matter).³

One earlier parapsychologist who must be mentioned is the physiologist and Nobel prize winner Charles Richet (1850-1935), whose book *Notre sixième sens* (1927) is especially memorable, especially because it leads us to another aspect of our subject. It is a very ancient idea that man possessed, in addition to his ordinary senses, other, usually latent senses and that some or even most unusual phenomena were attributable to them. Democritus discussed the existence of several kinds of perception.⁴ The idea of *iddhis* or *siddhis* is met with in Indian philosophy.⁵ Lessing wrote an essay on the possible existence of more than five senses in man ("Dass mehr als fünf Sinne für den Menschen sein können").⁶ This idea is, in my opinion, undeniably hylic pluralistic. Our ordinary human senses receive stimuli from our ordinary material environment, but possibly additional senses,⁷ which do not function in the case of every one of us, receive stimuli from another environment which consists of finer matter. It would, of course, be foolish to claim that all

1 See O. Lodge, *My Philosophy*, 1933, p. 221 ff.

2 For Lodge, see also J. Langdon-Davies' article in *Tomorrow* (B 264), VI, 3, p. 83 ff.

3 B 265, 1962, p. 119; see also above, p. 15.

4 See above, p. 31.

5 See above, Vol. I, pp. 236, 238-239, 240, 243.

6 See above, pp. 146, 153.

7 Both in the East and in the West, in this context, a theory postulating a central organ of perception or *sensorium commune* which is, in this case, active as a whole and of which the specialised senses, whichever they may be, are particularisations.

parapsychologists are in agreement with this idea. but it is nonetheless not without a certain inner logic. Richet was very sensitive to this reasoning and even quite recently there have been publications by authors who have tended in this direction.¹ Briefly summarised, his argument is as follows: just as we have become aware of the existence in modern physics (the argument, of course, was based on the physics of the earlier part of this century and would be even more applicable now) of numerous rays which are not directly perceptible and have learnt how to use them, so too is it reasonable to assume, in Richet's opinion, that even finer radiations cause clairvoyant perceptions, telepathic impressions and so on, which can be received by a "sixth sense".²

This has, of course, brought us to the so-called theory of *radiation* in parapsychology. It undoubtedly has certain advantages. It provides an explanation which is continuous with the similar situation in physics. It also postulates a link between the two people who are telepathically in contact with each other, so that there is less or no need for action in distance. Certain parapsychologists, such as the Italian F. Cazzamali and the Russian B. B. Kazhinsky,³ have given a special form to this theory, namely that it is the brains that send out these unusual and apparently electromagnetic waves and it is, of course, an established fact that weak electric currents do emanate from the human body or the brains (electro-encephalography). There are, 'however, definite objections to this theory. If I were to discuss the various theories put forward to explain parapsychological phenomena, I should, of course, have to consider the arguments for and against the radiation theory, but here I must confine myself simply to saying that, among parapsychologists themselves, there are far more who oppose this theory than there are supporters of it. J. B. Rhine, for example, was fundamentally against it,⁴ and so were F. W. H. Myers,⁵ H. Driesch—although he admitted that, from the point of view of its method, it was the best theory⁶—R. Tischner, W. H. C. Tenhaeff, P. Ringger and G. Zorab. K. H. E. de Jong, on the other hand, gave it a fair trial, H. Berger, who was a pioneer in the field of electro-encephalography, at least considered

1 R. Heywood, *The Sixth Sense*, 1959; H. G. Heine, *The Vital Sense*, 1961.

2 See *Notre sixième sens*, p. 18; see also Part I, p. 33.

3 See B 220, V, 2, p. 225; 231.

4 See his *Extra-Sensory Perception* (19 35; B 247), p. 118 ff. It should be noted that the author's position is defined by his use of the term "extra-sensory perception" (ESP), which is, as a theory clearly opposed to the idea of our senses being extended and is therefore opposed to the theory of radiation.

5 B 230 (1906), I, p. 245.

6 B 209, p. 104 ff.

it reasonably¹ and so did the Dutch parapsychologist S. W. Tromp² and the Swede J. Björkhem.³ There was obviously very little agreement about this problem, then.

What must be pointed out, however, is that there are two aspects to this theory of radiation or vibration. Two people are involved and one sends out a communication or a picture, while the other receives it. There has, however, been frequent disagreement about the division of the roles. Certainly a large number of cases have been reported⁴ of what Driesch has called "clairvoyance on call", in which a person in distress has communicated something to another person who enjoys a close relationship with him. This has sometimes been called "crisis telepathy".

This motory factor can be thought of as being even stronger. C. D. Broad investigated the extent to which parapsychological discoveries were in conflict with universally accepted principles (Broad called these "basic limiting principles").⁵ One case of this, for example, is that knowledge is normally only acquired via the senses, the brains and the consciousness. Another case is that no change is achieved except through the use of the physical body, that is, by innervation the movement of the limbs, gestures, the voice and so on. The reception and sending out of communications by telepathy is in conflict with this. It is, however, possible to go further than simply sending out communications and presuppose the coming about and the use of unusual limbs and so on. If this is carried to its logical conclusion, then we are brought to the question of materialisations during séances. This question was discussed much more during the nineteenth century and at the turn of the present century than it is now, which is, in my opinion, a pity. It is clear, however, that it is not possible to speak of *fine* materiality in the case of a possible *complete* materialisation. It is, on the other hand, different if full materialisation does not come into play at an earlier stage. Mattiesen considered this question⁶ and, during certain experiments conducted by E. Osty, the director of the Institut de Metapsychique International at Paris, with the medium R. Schneider a "substance X" was successfully demonstrated and a

1 See B 219, XXIV, June 1960, p. 142.

2 *Grundbeginselen der psychische physica* (1951).

3 *Nervenstrainingsens problem* (1940).

4 See, for example, Visser (B 267), see also above, p. 488 (Section 49, China).

5 "The Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy" (B 196): *Philosophy* XXIV, 91, Oct. 1949, p. 291 ff; see also his *Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research* (1953).

6 See above, p. 181.

beam of infra-red rays was interrupted.¹ Clearly, some such preliminary stage was at work here, a kind of transition² from ordinary to unusual rays. If the radiation theory is in any way correct, we may conclude, then parapsychology does contain an element of hylic pluralism.

This theory of radiation is not, however, the only place where hylic pluralism occurs in later parapsychology. The more fully developed question of a body or *ochēma* that was not the ordinary body was discussed. In this connection, we must first consider the ideas of the Dutchman, Dr. Frederik van Eeden (1860-1932). Van Eeden was not only a poet and novelist, but also a physician and a member of the English S. P. R. On 22 April 1913, he gave a lecture to this Society entitled "A Study of Dreams", which was published in the *Proceedings* XXVI-LXVII. What is more, he also kept a note of his dreams for a number of years and classified them under nine headings (see the table on pp. 436-437). What is of special interest to us is his category E, "lucid dreams", in which the dreamer preserves the memory of his daily life, remains conscious of himself and can carry out "different acts of free volition" (p. 446). In these dreams, the ordinary body continues to sleep, but the dreamer is conscious of his own actions and of the passivity of his ordinary body. Van Eeden, who made a note of 352 cases of these "lucid dreams", observed that the dreamer had a kind of double memory: "It is so indubitable that it leads almost unavoidably to the conception of a *dream-body*" (van Eeden's italics). In his novel, *De Nachbruid* ("The Bride of the Night", 1909), similar themes are included, but these go back to the author's own experiences (p. 432).³

Experiences of this kind attracted rather little attention during the years when van Eeden was writing about them, but they have excited more interest later, when the problem came to be known as "excursion". I shall be returning to this problem later in another section.⁴ What is particularly striking, however, is that van Eeden's interpretation of this phenomenon is that there are two bodies present, the ordinary body and a dream-body, and not one body in which the dreamer remains while dreaming that he has another body, but another "dream"

1 See E. Osty, *Les pouvoirs inconnus de l'esprit sur la matiere* (1932). In this context, the term "pseudopods" is sometimes used (see B 196, p. 308); insofar as pseudo-limbs are involved there is no real *telekinesis*.

2 See also, in this connection, my article on "The Feeling of Being Stared At" in the *Journal of the English S.P.R.* (B 221), Vol. 40, Part 699, March 1959 (also included in B 277).

3 See also W.H.C. Tenhaeff, "Dr. Fr. van Eeden als parapsycholoog", B 265, II, p. 131 ff (see XXV, p. 142) and van Eeden's *Studies* IV

4 See below, Section 100.

body, in which the "dreamer" is active and conscious and can look at the other "ordinary" body. This is, of course, something that is regularly encountered in later writings about this subject, for example, those by Muldoon (B 229) and Crookall (B 202). I shall do no more here than simply to point to the research work carried out by Hornell Hart (born 1888 and now professor emeritus in sociology). Hart made a special study of this supposed phenomenon of excursion, conducted a small-scale enquiry about it, gave a report of his findings at the Parapsychological Congress at Utrecht in 1953 and refers to it repeatedly in his book, *The Enigma of Survival* (1959, B 214).

A typical case is the "Wilmot Case".¹ Wilmot and Tait were two travellers sharing a cabin in a ship on the way to New York. Tait saw an apparition of a young woman in the cabin, Wilmot woke up and said that he had dreamed that his wife had visited him. When he arrived in the United States, Mrs. Wilmot asked him if he had noticed that she had visited him on the evening concerned, when she was very uneasy. The important aspect of this account is that Mrs. Wilmot said that she had seen another occupant in the cabin and had hesitated before going up to her husband and that Tait had in fact noticed this hesitation—he had also teased Wilmot about the visit later.

There are other cases too—for example, the case of the appearance of someone from Florida on a ship that was at a distance of a thousand miles, in which two letters about the case crossed²—in which verifiable communications have been made. This phenomenon is known as "travelling clairvoyance"³ and, at the time of writing this present book, experiments are being carried out with hypnotised persons in the stimulation of clairvoyance (M. Ryzl).⁴ Hart's conclusions, however, were as follows. If the apparition goes to work "purposefully" and brings something about such as a definite contact or a verifiable perception, then it is possible to speak of an "apparitional body, a projected body"⁵ which serves as a "vehicle" for the purpose of bringing something about. An objection that can be made to this is that this body does not show the stability that we are accustomed to expect in an ordinary body, but, on the other hand, it should not be forgotten that, as we have seen, matter, including fine matter, is precisely everything that

¹ Hart, B 214, p. 183; Visser, B 267, p. 164; Tyrrell, B 266, p. 116; *Proceedings of the S.P.R.* (B 244), 1891.

² See above, Part I, pp. 104-105; B 264, II, p. 81 ff.

³ See, for example, Tyrrell, B 266, p. 120.

⁴ See B 219, Dec. 1961, p. 237; Sept. 1962, p. 153; Dec. 1962, p. 237; June 1963, p. 73.

⁵ See B 214, p. 160, 183, 225.

acts or has an effect.¹ The "etheric or astral body" which Hart felt obliged to accept,² may be permanently present, but is only in rare cases active and effective as an apparition. Hart's ultimate conclusion, then, was that "the dream body is an objective reality".³

Whatever may be the case here, this projected subtle body is clearly one of the forms under which the existence of an *ochēma* of the soul is being considered by contemporary parapsychologists, many of whom are, it should be noted, averse to hylic pluralism.

It is moreover very interesting that two well-known parapsychologists, who were at the same time philosophers, of the twentieth century have evidently been quite conscious of the possibilities of hylic pluralism. It would have been quite possible to deal with this in the next section, but it seemed better to let the parapsychological aspect predominate. Both these Englishmen, Charlie Dunbar Broad (born 1887) and Henry Habberley Price (born 1899) were academic philosophers with a lively interest in parapsychology (and in the English S. P. R., over which each of them presided).

In his discussion of the conflict between parapsychological investigations and the "basic limiting principles", Broad noted that, if psychokinesis—the unusual movement of objects by a supposed psychic agency—was a fact, this could in the first place be seen as being influenced directly by the will, independently of the ordinary body. But, Broad said, "an alternative possibility would be that each of us had a kind of invisible and intangible, but extended and dynamical 'body', beside his ordinary".⁴ Osty's experiments pointed in that direction (p. 308) and it was most important to have as little action as possible at a distance. As far as hylic pluralism in general is concerned, Broad said, in another place, "Of all the hundreds of millions of men in every age and clime who have believed . . . in human survival, hardly any have believed in survival without a body".⁵ In this, it should be noted that Broad was forgetting the Thomists.⁶ Broad's own theory about continued existence after death was quite detailed. His doctrine concerning the relationship between the mind the body is "an emergent materialism", a "compound theory" of a "psychic factor" and a "bodily factor" together.⁷ After death, something of this bodily factor continues to

¹ See above, pp. 7-8, 171 ("action-body").

² See B 214, pp. 116, 142.

³ See B 214, p. 225.

⁴ See B 196, p. 307; see also above, p. 200.

⁵ *Personal Identity and Survival*, 1958; see B 214, p. 224.

⁶ See above, p. 98-99.

⁷ See B 144: Sassen and Delfgaauw (1957), p. 351; B 219, XXV, March 1961, p. 35.

exist: "I see no reason why this persistent factor should not be extended and in a sense located, and why it should not have certain physical properties".¹ This is evident hylic pluralism.

The second of these two English philosophers, H. H. Price, is more inclined to see these parapsychological problems in rather a cosmological context. As president of the S. P. R., he gave a speech in 1939 entitled "Haunting and the Psychic Ether".² The images that a person has in the case of apparitions were, in Price's opinion, not completely private—they seemed to come from something that he called the "psychic ether". What is more, Price thought that "a man's psychic atmosphere" was "a kind of secondary body".³ In a discussion of a book by C. J. Ducasse,⁴ Price observed: "It is logically possible that sometimes I have several bodies at once". In the same article, he said: "A thing extends to wherever it can act directly" (p. 131). In another context, that of an address, entitled "Survival and the Idea of 'Another World'",⁵ Price went into the cosmological aspect in greater detail. This was not, however, simply a question of the "beyond"—Price thought that we are "with some stratum in it living now" (p. 25).

It is therefore the philosophers who have been especially concerned with the consequences and implications of the results of parapsychological investigations—Broad with his "Relevance of Psychical Research to Philosophy" (B 196) and Price with his conviction that what was necessary was a "conceptual framework" for parapsychology.⁶ This is, of course, what one would expect of professional philosophers, but what is remarkable is the ease with which both these scholars inclined towards hylic pluralistic ideas.

86. PHILOSOPHERS OF THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

As far as those *philosophers* who have shown any interest in hylic pluralism in the modern age are concerned, we have so far dealt with the philosophers of the Renaissance (Section 75), the philosophers of the Enlightenment (Section 79) and the philosophers of romanticism

1 "Physicality and Psi: A Symposium", B 219, XXV, March 1961, p. 23.

2 *Proceedings of the S.P.R.* (B 244), XLV, p. 160; a summary of this address has also been published in *Tomorrow* (B 264), V, 3, p. 107 ff.

3 B 264, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

4 B 219, June 1952, p. 137, on "Nature, Mind and Death" (1951). The American philosopher C. J. Ducasse (born 1881; see B 264, IX, 4, p. 33) was also open to these ideas; see his book above, p. 401—"Mind as a Substance"—and p. 411—"The Location of Minds in Psychical Space and Time".

5 *Proceedings of the S.P.R.* (B 244), CLXXXII, Jan. 1953.

6 In his lecture to the Parapsychological Congress at Utrecht, 1953. Tyrrell had a similar view (see B 266, p. 14).

(Section 82). We must now conclude our survey of philosophers by saying something about those of the last hundred years, that is, roughly speaking from 1860 until 1960.

The thinkers of this period have certainly not shown a great interest in our subject. The influence of the opponents of hylic pluralism—that of Descartes with his anthropological dualism (see Section 76), of Kant with his unknowable things in themselves (see Section 80) and that of the monistic materialism and positivism of the radical Enlightenment—has been very powerful and has gradually permeated all spheres of thought. Reactions have followed all these philosophical movements, but either they have not reached academic circles to any noticeable extent or else they have assumed forms which have not, or have not yet, given rise to a reassessment of hylic pluralism. Thus, the so-called philosophy of life and irrationalism in the twentieth century have been to a great extent in opposition to nineteenth century materialism and existentialism—insofar as one can speak of any unity of thought in this movement—has been directed against Cartesian dualism, but none of these philosophical movements have approached our special subject very closely at all. Wherever modern philosophers have concerned themselves with psychical research or parapsychology, they have quite strikingly been led, in certain cases at least, in the direction of hylic pluralism. Broad and Price are two outstanding examples of this.¹ In other cases, however, this has certainly not happened. W. McDougall (1871-1938),² Henri Bergson (1859-1941)³ and Hans Driesch (1867-1941)⁴ were all extremely interested in parapsychology, but none of them reached the point where they were able to appreciate fine materiality in this context,⁵ that is, for example, the context of the radiation theory.⁶

The same applies to an important, though rather earlier philosopher, Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), who was certainly interested in occult phenomena—it was he who said that a possible explanation of telepathy and clairvoyance was “being connected by telephone to the Absolute” which is omniscient—but who, unlike du Prel for example,

1 See above, p. 201-202.

2 See B 184 II, p. 94. It was McDougall who gave an impetus to the setting up of the Parapsychological Institute at Duke University, Durham, N. C.

3 See my article, “H. Bergson en de Parapsychologie”, B 265, XIII, p. 51 ff and in B 237, p. 38 ff.

4 See, for example, B 209.

5 As far as Bergson is concerned, it is possible to point to a statement in his *Matière et Mémoire* of 1896, p. 245: “We can unhesitatingly attribute some element of the extensiveness of matter to perception”.

6. See above, p. 197.

was not favourably disposed towards the presuppositions of spiritualism and even less sympathetic towards fine materiality.¹

We are therefore only able to point to a few rather isolated figures who were active during the period under discussion here, although there are several striking cases among them.

R. Grassmann (1815-1901) of Szczecin (Stettin) taught an atomic theory—"every atom has an etheric sheath", including man whose "spiritual being forms a spiritual basket with his spiritual sheath".²

The well-known philosopher Samuel Alexander (1858-1938), who was born in Sydney and taught at Manchester, was of the opinion that "the mind is extended in Space-Time". Not only ordinary things, but also the ideas of the imagination and the memory, fictions, concepts and so on were, according to Alexander, all real in time and *space* (my italics).³

The private scholar—who was also a member of the German Union of Monists—Bruno Wille (1860-1928) taught the existence of an "action-body" and was, in this, clearly influenced by Fechner.⁴

Psychohyilism—the idea that the soul is always accompanied after death by some material body—was one of the doctrines of the E. Douglas Fawcett (1866-1960),⁵ an English philosopher of life.

We must also return to consider the ideas of G. Heymans (1857-1930) in this chapter. As I have already observed,⁶ Heymans was one of the founders of the Dutch S. P. R. in 1920. He also published certain views about psychical energy in the following year which I am inclined to interpret in the hylic pluralistic sense.⁷ Heymans was what might be called a "psychophysical parallelist". In other words, his indisputable psychical monism was an idealistic parallelism—this seems to be the most tenable form of the various forms of psychophysical parallelism. In this context, I demonstrated in considerable detail on 1932 that a theory of interaction is more suitable to parapsychology than a parallelism.

Bergson and McDougall also opposed the theory of psychophysical parallelism.⁸ Unlike Fechner,⁹ whom he regarded as his teacher in

1 S. von Gleich (B 54, p. 95) has said that, according to von Hartmann, the "world of the beyond" also had spatiality. There is, however, little evidence in von Hartmann's writings to support this statement.

2 See B 38, p. 212.

3 See B 144 (1957), p. 222.

4 See B 36, p. 668; B 173, p. 326.

5 See B 237, p. 314.

6 See above, p. 176.

7 See above, p. 188 ff.

8 See "Is de Parapsychologie gebaat bij een psychophysisch parallelisme of bij een wisselwerkings-theorie?" B 265, IV, p. 214 ff; B 115, p. 47 ff; B 277, p. 89 ff.

9 See above, p. 171 ff.

many respects,¹ Heymans was not very inclined to accept hylic pluralism. He was not very inclined to accept it, but he did accept it to a certain degree. There is a remarkable passage in an article that he wrote on psychical monism, "Psychischer Monismus und 'Psychical Research' ",² which I have already mentioned in Part I of this work (p. 57-58). He was discussing man's possible continued existence after death and suggested that man's personality would continue to exist as a kind of complex of memories of the world mind or consciousness, just as *our* memories, if they are not in our central consciousness, remain, he believed, in our peripheral consciousness. He also said, however, "What we may ultimately expect is that a perfected natural science can establish parallel physical appearance for the memory complexes in the world consciousness as it can for individual memories".

As I observed earlier, in Section 16 of this work, in view of the fact that Heymans was here discussing a state after death, in which the ordinary body and brains would have ceased to exist, it is possible to say that this statement is made in the light of hylic pluralism. Heyman's "physical parallel appearances" must therefore be physically different from the ordinary appearances. In this connection, it is, of course, important not to forget that Heymans was a convinced psychical monist, with the result that this different physical nature would not, in his opinion, exist as such, but only appear. I think we are bound, therefore, to conclude that, insofar as Heymans shows himself here to be a hylic pluralist this can be classed—like Berkeley's last work *Siris*—under the heading of the zeta standpoint. It will be remembered that, according to this standpoint, matter does not exist in itself, but different species of purely apparent matter, both coarser and finer matter, do exist, so that this standpoint is to that extent certainly a form of hylic pluralism.³

As far as Heymans himself is concerned, I freely admit that such statements—which can, in my opinion, only be interpreted in themselves in a hylic pluralistic sense—are very few and far between in his work. There is also a further complication, namely that, as a psychical monist, Heymans placed a rather forced construction on the nature of existence, teaching that ordinary matter did not exist in itself (which is, in my opinion certainly the case *within* the plurality of nature), but simply appeared.⁴ And how are we to account for a possible distinction between psychical existence and a "physical parallel appearances" in connection with the state after death?

1 See above, p. 176.

2 *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, 1913, p. 1 ff; B 69, I, p. 341 ff.

3 See Part I, Section 16.

4 See B 114, p. 346.

The doctrine of subjective idealism is, I believe, to be blamed, for this *impasse*. One of the supporting pillars of psychical monism is the Kantian view—often called subjective idealism—that things are not as they appear to us to be. To this extent, Heymans followed Kant, with the exception that what exists in itself was, in his opinion, the psychical element, hence his “psychical” monism. It is, however, much easier to assume that things are in general as they appear to us (“neo-realism”¹) and, applied to a possible “other world”, this means that the contents of that other world could be fine matter and could present themselves to us as such (and no longer as a “parallel appearance”)—in other words, as an unusual form of light, for example, and not as the appearance of something else which presents itself to us as light. (I have discussed these and other objections to psychical monism in detail in my *Tweërle Subjectiviteit*.) In the last resort, however, they can be attributed to the fact that Heymans, as far as spatiality is concerned, regarded the individual subject or the infra-subject *a priori* as the bearer or the “law giver of nature”, whereas, in my opinion, only the one supra-subject can be thought of as having this function.² In other words, it would seem to be Kantianism once again, and in this instance Kantian subjective idealism, which denies elbow room to hyllic pluralism. If spatiality is regarded as a subjective form of the ordinary individual subject, it can hardly be attributed to the things of another world. We have already seen that this was a handicap in the thought of Schopenhauer³ and that other thinkers, such as Renouvier⁴ and du Prel⁵ objected to these consequences of Kantianism.

Felix Ortt (1866-1959), who was in himself a sympathetic figure, expounded views which were similar to those of Heymans—and which were favourably received by Heymans⁶—in his books, *Inleiding tot het Pneumat-energetische Monisme* (1917, 2nd edn. 1934) and *De Superkosmos* (1940). Spiritualism, or rather, parapsychological phenomena played a part in Ortt's ideas, but it is not at all clear whether he was for or against hyllic pluralism either in these books or in his other writings. He was, in fact, self-contradictory and I believe that his views give such an impression of confusion because he became so involved in subjective idealism.⁷

1 See B 114, 37 ff.

2 Just as Heymans looked for the cause origin of the causal *a priori* in the “world being”. If he had applied this to the spatial *a priori* as well, his psychical monism would have become superfluous. See, for example, B 237, p. 111 ff.

3 See above, p. 154.

4 See above, p. 155.

5 See above, p. 155.

6 See B 169, July 1919.

7 See *De Superkosmos*, Chap. V; see my discussion in B 169, Jan. 1950.

We can therefore only reap a rather lean harvest of hylic pluralistic ideas over the last hundred years, although it is, of course, quite possible that I have overlooked various indications of it. It is, however, true to say that very little indeed is to be found in manuals, lexicons and similar books on hylic pluralism in recent years, although more attention has been given to it in the German-speaking countries than in the English or French-speaking zones.

Apart from the two English philosophers, S. D. Broad and H.H. Price (see above, Section 85), we can, however, still point to the following thinkers of this period as men whose work provides striking evidence of hylic pluralism.

Wilhelm S. Haas (born 1883)¹ published a book entitled *Die psychische Dingwelt* in 1921, when he was teaching at the University of Cologne.² This is a very important book in connection with our special subject, because Haas is virtually the first writer to have introduced a clear element of the theory of knowledge into the study of hylic pluralism. It would seem as though he had only one predecessor in this—Czolbe.³

In the first place, Haas discussed the "psychical body" and the "inter-connection of the physical and the psychical body" (p. 145 ff). On the one hand, the individual's "psychical things" were continuously changing, whereas, on the other hand, there were also constant factors. The individual's "psychical body" was formed, Haas taught, of these constant factors and the "psychical things" that had been properly appropriated. Haas was also concerned with the question of "marking off the psychical body, as the psychical aspect which really belongs to the ego" from the psychical world surrounding it. He explained that a psychical world existed at the same level as the physical world. Whether it was perceived or not, its existence was independent of that of the physical world. It also consisted of a psychical matter. Haas was therefore able to say, as it were, although we tend to believe, in a rather primitive way, that there is very little indeed to choose between the subject with his ideas on the one hand and the real psychical aspect on the other, this view is quite wrong and has in fact caused a great deal of harm—"we are in the psychical aspect—it is not in us".⁴

This is, in my opinion, an extremely important idea, although it is possible that Haas himself was not sufficiently aware of its full implications. Ziegenfuss has said that Haas was here trying to indicate the

1 See B 173, p. 67; B 184, I, p. 435; B 39, under "Leib".

2 Haas went to Teheran in 1933 and later, in 1952 to New York.

3 See above, p. 174.

4 See *op. cit.*, (B 61), p. 42; B 114, p. 303, 322, note 1.

reasons "why (the psychical world) does not present itself as such to human perception".¹ This is precisely the difficulty. The only possible answer, I think, is that we have to learn very gradually to distinguish between the impulses which proceed from ourselves, from our own psychical bodies and those which are reflected in them from the psychical world outside us. Clairvoyants maintain that their primary task is to learn how to keep separate what is their own activity in their inward perception and what is not and which visions are not the result of subjective imagination, but of an objective happening. Haas clearly tended in this direction too, but he was at the same time also very close to spiritualistic and to Eastern ideas.² Obviously, he was behaving very courageously to take this point of view at a German university between the two world wars, but I think that he should have affirmed it much more fundamentally. All the same, the statement is much more revolutionary than it may at first sight seem to be. In any case, we may conclude that his arguments and ideas are very remarkable.

Another author who must be specially mentioned in this chapter is the perspicacious phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966),³ whose works are now attracting more and more attention. In several of these works, she expresses quite positively hylic pluralistic views. I have already indicated that she was of the opinion that Plato "had the truly 'spatial' aspect of the psychical element in mind" in his *Timaeus*.⁴ Here too, she also speaks about the "fundamental spatial structure of the spiritual soul" and elsewhere, in a treatise on the "basic structures of the relationship between the body and the soul"⁵, she declares herself to be opposed to Cartesian dualism and also to what is often put in its place nowadays and is frequently given the rather high-sounding name of the "polar coexistential unity" (p. 78). In Buytendijk and Plessner, for example, this simply amounts, in her opinion, to a "failure to differentiate".

She, unlike these thinkers, believes that there are two separate, distinct and independent spheres here—ordinary space and an "absolute interior soul-space" (p. 112). "A complete ontology of the psychical aspect has still to be developed and studied here. Whoever undertakes

¹ See B 184, I, p. 253.

² See also his *Kraft und Erscheinung*, 1922, p. 48, 102 ff and his *Das Problem des Mediumismus*, 1923, p. 40. In this context, too, it is worth considering the distinctions made by Gerda Walther in her *Phänomenologie der Mystik* (B 268); see also above, p. 194.

³ See B 144 (1957), pp. 170, 181.

⁴ See above, p. 35; see also her *Die Zeit*, 1954 (B 200), p. 111.

⁵ "Grundstrukturen des Leib-Seele-Verhältnisses", in *Bios und Psyche*, 1949 (B 197).

this will have to discuss not only a psychical 'space', but also a psychical matter, a psychical *hyle*" (p. 110). She goes on to say that adjectives like soft, hard, elastic, rigid, tough and so on are more than simply images when they are applied to the psychical aspect. They then refer to qualities of psychical matter. It is also not purely by chance when a person's stomach is upset when he experiences violent emotions or that a person believes that he thinks with his head. He has something in mind in such cases that is different from the ordinary organs, but at the same time connected with them.¹

It is scarcely surprising, then, to find H. Conrad-Martius writing also about an "apparent body". It is probable, she says, that "the psychical self that is free from the body either possesses or retains a kind of etheric apparent body" after death. This, however, is no more than a "provisional, intermediate stage". (It is clear that our author is tending here in the direction of the "intermediate corporeality" of the theologians whom we discussed in Section 72.) "The soul's real ultimate means of realising itself", she was convinced, was the "resurrection body" (p. 121). Finally, she comes to the point where she is able to formulate what I have called psychohylism in the form of a question: "It is very questionable whether these immortal spirit-souls should not be thought of with a kind of apparent body. Are there *pure* souls?"² In a digression at the end of her book *Die Zeit*, she also provides a brief theory of "temporal clairvoyance" (p. 289 ff). In conclusion, however, it should not be thought that her philosophy is restricted to what I have taken from her writings to illustrate her interest in hylic pluralism.

I myself drew up the following formula in my *Tweeërlei Subjectiviteit* of 1929 (B 114): "Noic (and not psychical) monism plus hylic pluralism" (p. 310). I began to elaborate this hylic pluralism in the first (Dutch) volume of *Ochēma*, published in 1954.

We may therefore conclude this section on the philosophy of the last hundred years by saying that hylic pluralistic problems have aroused rather little interest in this period. Far more interest was shown, for example, by the philosophers of romanticism and by the third group of occultists who were reacting against the prevailing tendency in the nineteenth century. All the same, a beginning has been made by several thinkers between approximately 1860 and 1960 in the

¹ This can be compared with the *chakras* of Indian psychology (see above, Part I pp. 228, 267 and below, Part III p. 47-48 and H. Conrad-Martius' own passage in *Die Zeit*: "The soul has its own, most distinctive and indeed psychical 'spatiality'. There are genuine analogies between the physical and the psychical aspects" (p. 110).

² *Die Geistesseele des Menschen*, 1960 (B 198), p. 26, note 3; see also above, pp. 11-12.

study of hylic pluralism. It is, after all, quite possible that a neo-romantic movement will develop in due course and that this movement will be not only literary, but also philosophical in character.

87. DUTCHMEN

It is perhaps worth while to give a brief survey here of those Dutchmen in whose writings there are signs of a response to hylic pluralistic ideas. By response I mean something more than simply being aware of their occurrence. An awareness of the existence of hylic pluralism has not been rare in the literature of the Netherlands. I have already quoted, for example, D. Vzn Coornhert (1522-1590) and his translation of Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae* (*Van de Verstroosting der Wijsheid*): "On the consolation of wisdom".

"Thus, Lord, thou leadest kindly
The souls and smaller members/
In chariots light/to highest heaven's peace".¹

Coornhert translated Boethius' *leves currus* of the soul (III, 9) by "light chariots" and this is clearly a hylic pluralistic theme.² Despite the fact that Coornhert was undoubtedly interested in the Stoic philosophy, with its dualistic materialism, there is nothing to indicate whether he also accepted hylic pluralism himself.

We are also bound to come to a similar conclusion in the case of J. Oudaan (1628-1692), who translated a passage by Cornelius Agrippa in which the classical author referred to the soul as the finest of bodies.³

Joost van den Vondel (1587-1679) was also familiar with the idea. He wrote, for example, that the Roman poet Lucretius

Embodies the human soul and lets it perish
And, without a residue, die like a body.⁴

But what was Vondel's own view of this question? All that we can say with certainty is that he did not so far in the direction of hylic pluralism as his English contemporary, John Milton.⁵ His position seems to have been that of pure Thomism or anthropological dualism. This is borne out, for example, by another quotation from the work already quoted above:

"The soul is spirit, not a body
Fashioned in the dust of the earth."⁶

1 Amsterdam, 1616, p. 111; see also Part I, p. 144.

2 See above, p. 54.

3 See above, p. 132.

4 *Bespiegelingen van Godt en Godsdiens*, IV, p. 43; see above, p. 43.

5 See below, p. 223.

6 *Bespiegelingen*, III, p. 959.

When, however, he came to speak about the world of spirits and angels, we read:

Whether they made their appearance in the light
Created without their bodies or together
With their bodies, from element or something celestial. . . .¹

Vondel's commentator, B. H. Molkenboer O. P., has this to say about the above quotation: "Not only pagan authors, but also many Christian writers have been very uncertain as to whether the angels were pure spirits or whether they had subtle bodies. Most have been in favour of the second view". Clearly, Vondel was leaving both possibilities open here.

In another place in the same poem, in which he was discussing "God's works", he made an explicit distinction between ordinary air and ether:

If I fly through the air, which is coarse,
To the finest of all air on high, my breath
Will fail, since the fine air cannot support
A wing or breath, is pure,
A neighbour of the fire that sets my spirit flaming.²

Vondel was here referring to the ancient elements. He also refers to the ancient teaching of the *spiritus animales* in the same poem:

. . . the living fires

Of the spirits, which whirl through blood and vein and sinew.³
In this, he was doing no more than simply reflecting the common, shared opinion of his own period.

Unlike Vondel, his contemporary Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) seems to have been very well informed about what I have called hylic pluralism and unmistakably took sides in this question, although he was principally known in his own life time as a jurist with theological interests. (His theological works are still widely read today.)

Grotius was, for example, acquainted with the term *psuches lekton ochēma*, or *tenuē vehens animam*,⁴ the subtle vehicle of the soul. Among other things he quoted Homer's *eidolon* or *simulacrum* and Paul's "treasure in earthen vessels", that is, in easily broken vessels, of 2 Cor. 4. 7, in contrast to the *leptotaton soma*⁵ and the *vehiculum animae* of Augustine in his Letter 218. In his polemics with the Huguenot A. Rivet (1572-1651), he also referred to Cardinal Cajetan's opinion, which

1 *ibid.*, III, p. 185.

2 *op. cit.*, III, p. 811.

3 *op. cit.*, III, p. 721.

4 *Opera Theologica*, II, p. 284.

5 *op. cit.*, II, p. 146.

I have already quoted.¹ He also said that he believed that bodies had to be attributed to the angels, because he had read the "Greeks", by whom he meant the Greek Fathers of the Church, and they were in the habit of saying that only what was not created was without a body. He appealed, for example, to Origen's contention that only God was without a body and to Bernard of Clairvaux, who held the same view later.² It is clear, then, that Grotius own point of view was that of the gamma standpoint. Like many other philosophers of the Renaissance,³ Grotius also accepted an *anima sensitiva* as well as an *anima rationalis*, in other words, he believed in a trichotomy. He too based his teaching about the bodies of the angels —*esse angelis corpora, sed subtilissima*—as many others had done, on Psalm 104.⁴

These views are, of course, very reminiscent of those of the so-called Cambridge Platonists.⁵ Cudworth, however, lived and published his works rather later. There were certainly contacts between the Arminians or Remonstrants, among whom Grotius can be included, and the English School of Cambridge Platonists.⁶ On the other hand, however, I have been unable to find any indication of hylic pluralism in the ideas of J. Arminius or P. van Limborch.

As we have seen, the well-known physicians who lived in the southern Netherlands, J. B. van Helmont (1577-1644) and his son F. M. van Helmont (1618-1699) were followers of Paracelsus, even accepting, for example, his doctrine of the *archeus* or life-spirit.⁷

The philosopher Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669),⁸ who taught both at Louvain and at Leiden, was an "occasionalist" as far as the problem of the body and the soul is concerned. It was Geulincx who used the example of the bell—on the occasion of a physical stimulus, God takes care of the accompanying psychical process. He clearly went further than Descartes here, since Descartes accepted an interaction at one point at least, namely the pineal gland.⁹ All the same, Geulincx believed that the angels had etheric bodies.¹⁰ Were the souls of men therefore purely spiritual although the angels had bodies of fine matter? The

1 See above, p. 101.

2 *op. cit.*, IV, p. 767 (edn. 1732); the Latin text is given in Part I, p. 40, note 1.

3 See above, p. 117 ff.

4 *Annotationes in Vetus et Novum Testamentum*, p. 221.

5 See above, pp. 119-120; 133.

6 See R. L. Colie, *Light and Enlightenment. A Study of the Cambridge Platonist and the Dutch Arminians*, 1957.

7 See above, p. 132.

8 See B 172, p. 263; B 184, I, p. 384; B 250, p. 154 ff.

9 See above, p. 123.

10 *Opera philosophica*, II, p. 282.

bodies of the angels clearly stuck in the throats of philosophers and theologians of that period.

An interesting figure who lived in The Hague during the eighteenth century was François Hemsterhuis (1721-1790). He belonged to the so-called *Raad van State*, a government body consisting of fifteen members, to whom all propositions made by the Crown to the States General or vice versa and all governmental measures of a general nature had to be submitted. It was, however, as a writer that he was best known and, as such, enjoyed a greater fame abroad—he wrote mostly in French—than in the Dutch Republic. From 1782 onwards, his “miscellaneous philosophical writings” (*Vermischte philosophische Schriften*) were published and, via F. H. Jacobi and J. G. Herder, these constituted an important contribution to the philosophical foundation of German romanticism.¹ D. Baumgardt has said that Baader found Hemsterhuis’ ideas attractive.² In connection with our special subject, one of his ideas, a doctrine concerned with organs of the soul, is particularly striking, namely “that various organs, with which the soul is provided even in this present life, will perform better services for the soul in the future”.³ Even though what Hemsterhuis had principally in mind here, when speaking of these organs, was the “moral instrument”,⁴ we are certainly entitled to ask whether he did not at the same time mean something related to Lessing’s several senses—“that man might have more than five senses”.⁵ Hemsterhuis was in contact with most of the ourstanding Germans of his period, including, for example, Goethe, Herder and Hamann.

Another eighteenth century figure in the Republic of the Netherlands was Elisabeth Maria Post (1755-1812), a pietist and the writer of, among other things, sentimental verses.⁶ In her publication entitled “for the lonely” (*Voor Eenzaamten*) of 1789, we read the following thoughts about death: “Then I arise. But no longer with that awkward, deficient body that I had on earth . . . behind in the grave. The natural body, stripped of all superfluous, useless parts, will appear as a spiritual body, quick as the angels, rapid as the light . . . a heavenly body” (p. 147). It is obvious that this Dutch poetess was strongly influenced here by J. K. Lavater, whose *Aussichten in die Ewigkeit*, first published in 1768 ff, had appeared in a Dutch translation in 1779.

1 See F. Sassen, B 250, p. 259.

2 B 10, p. 106.

3 *Vermischte philosophische Schriften*, I, p. 315; see B 10, p. 109.

4 See B 250, p. 263.

5 See above, p. 146.

6 See B 179, XV, p. 579.

It will be remembered that Lavater's work, "Views into Eternity", was deeply concerned with the finer body that man would have after death.¹

Lavater and his circle of kindred spirits, all late pietists, were also of importance to the Dutch poet Willem Bilderdijk (1756-1831). I have already discussed Bilderdijk's hylic pluralistic convictions earlier in this work and in greater detail elsewhere.² In his poem on the "world of spirits", *De Geestenwaereld* (1811), he spoke of "a pure and finer matter which" surrounded "the fluent soul" and called the *ochēma* of the soul the "vehicle" or "coach" "of pure light" in which the spirits surround the living and come forward to meet the dead. This shows a clear influence not only of Lavater, but also of Jung-Stilling.³

Lavater's ideas also had a powerful influence on a third Dutchman. I have already drawn attention to the fact that the ideas of J. H. Gunning jnr. (1829-1905) were in many respects related to those of certain Protestant theologians, namely the "Christian theosophists" with whom I dealt in Section 72.⁴ Gunning's work on "Glimpses into Revelation"—*Blikken in de Openbaring*, 1866 ff—is reminiscent of Lavater's similarly entitled "Views into Eternity", which I mentioned above. In the concrete, Gunning, who had studied under J. T. Beck⁵ at Tübingen, taught that man carried the spiritual body of the resurrection around with him here.⁶ In clairvoyance, the soul projects itself, as it were, as an entirely new system of organs, an "interior body" (*ibid.*). Gunning also quoted G. H. von Schubert, I. H. Fichte and Fechner. All the same, Gunning was very much alone among Dutch theologians in holding these views.

Another Dutchman who was also a lonely figure in the Netherlands of his own period was Hessel Mozes Duparc (1817-1905), a physician in Amsterdam. He wrote an encyclopedia of philosophy—*Encyclopaedie der Wijsbegeerte*, 1859, 2nd edn., 1871—but, even more relevant to our special subject, he was also the author of a book on the "materiality of the soul". This book, *Voorstelling van een stoffelijkheid der ziel*,⁷ which was very short, gives at first sight—judging from its rather striking title—an impression of materialism, but this was not the author's intention. He says explicitly, on p. 46, that the spirit, which is related to the deity, is above the soul. His position is therefore more

¹ See above, p. 108.

² See above Part I, p. 143-144 see also B 261, LIV, p. 86 ff; B 237, p. 320 ff.

³ See above, p. 108; see also M. van Rhijn, "Jung-Stilling en Nederland", *Ned. Arch. voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, XLV, p. 4.

⁴ See above, p. 110-111.

⁵ See above, p. 110.

⁶ *Blikken in de Openbaring*, III, p. 165.

⁷ Loeuwarden, 1845, 64 pp; B 34; see also Part I, p. 63.

than of the delta standpoint than of the beta standpoint. Nonetheless, he insisted that the soul existed in space (p. 2), consisted of matter of "etheric nature" (p. 7), was a "fine corporeal being"¹ and that an "etheric body" was situated above the visible, perishable body (p. 30). Hylic pluralism is clearly present in the Duparc's ideas. We may also mention, in passing, that Duparc, who referred to a number of German authors, was well aware of the bad influence exerted by Descartes on this psychology or doctrine of the soul (p. 9).

No account of hylic pluralistic thinking in the Netherlands would be complete without mentioning K. H. E. de Jong (1872-1960), who took up the cudgels for fine materiality, often in a historical context—for example, in connection with ancient philosophers—but also in the context of the radiation theory of the parapsychologists.² He did this not only in his important book on the "other aspect" of materialism, *Die andere Seite des Materialismus*, 1932 (B 76), but also, for example, in various articles which he wrote for *De Nieuwe Gids* and the *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*. One of de Jong's favourite themes was the "spherical shape of the soul".³ Nonetheless, it must be said that de Jong had simply dualistic materialism in mind, in other words, his standpoint was the beta standpoint—he was not interested in distinguishing other forms of hylic pluralism which might possibly and in fact do arise.

De Jong referred quite often to the religious materialism of H. Thoden van Velzen (1842-1927) and declared that his own ideas were very closely related to van Velzen's.⁴ I am convinced, however, that van Velzen was not a *dualistic* materialist and was consequently not a hylic pluralist.

C. H. van Os (born 1891), who was for a long time professor of mathematics at Delft and who had made a detailed study of Swedenborg,⁵ certainly gave very serious attention to hylic pluralism.⁶ He was, however, aware of certain serious difficulties and one is bound to agree with him in his assertion that to accept a link of fine matter between the immaterial spirit and the ordinary body simply changes the difficulty.⁷

¹ *Encyclopedie*, § 8.

² See his *De Parapsychologie*, 2nd edn. 1954 (B 218), p. 115. For an account of de Jong's life work, see the *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlands Letterkunde*, 1960-1961, p. 89 ff.

³ See B 76, p. 20. ff.

⁴ See B 113, p. 378; *System des religiösen Materialismus*, (1876), 1909.

⁵ See above, p. 132.

⁶ "De astrale wereld," B 265, 1949, p. 22 ff; "Parapsychologische perspectieven", *De Gids*, 1952, II, p. 455; "De ijere gegieden", B 227, 1956, p. 145 ff.

⁷ *Moo-Moo*, 1951, p. 117; see B 114, p. 366.

L. Hoyack (1893-1967) was also convinced of what I have called *hylic pluralism*.¹ This is clear from repeated comments in his numerous books and articles.

I do not need to repeat here what I have said previously in this work about the ideas of van Eeden (see above, p. 199 ff). Heymans (see above, pp. 187 f, 204 ff), Tenhaeff (see above, p. 196 f) and Tromp (see above, p. 198). In the works of all these writers, as well as in my own works, of course, *hylic pluralism* is encountered, sometimes extensively and sometimes less extensively. I should, however, like to conclude with the following remark, which is relevant in this context.

It has been said that the Dutch are a nation of theologians. Whether this is true or not, it is true that they have far less interest in philosophy than, for example, their German neighbours. Yet I think that it *is* a fact that there is a predominantly religious attitude in the Netherlands—this is borne out by the relatively large number of Dutch people who take part in new religious movements outside the Church, such as theosophy, anthroposophy, the Sufi movement, the Rosicrucians and so on. Anyone visiting such establishments as Dornach near Basle or Suresnes near Paris out of interest is quite likely to be welcomed on the doorstep by a Dutchman. If, then, this is true,² we may certainly draw one conclusion with regard to *hylic pluralism*. We have discovered, in our examination of the occurrence of *hylic pluralism* among the various tendencies grouped under "Occultism III" in Section 83, that there were probably more people who adhered to *hylic pluralism* in the Netherlands than in many other countries. It is therefore probable that there are similarly more people who are convinced of *hylic pluralism* in general, not simply in connection with "occultism", in the Netherlands than elsewhere.

88. POETS

We have now come almost to the end of our survey of the occurrence of *hylic pluralistic* themes and ideas in the *history* of human thought. In Chapter 90, I shall begin to discuss the *content* of a number of these themes. This historical survey has taken up a good deal of space, but the reason for this is that the originally planned Volumes III, IV and V

¹ See above, p. 115.

² Apparently, the percentage of Dutchmen among the bishops and others who took part in the Second Vatican Council was also very high. The Dutch prelates—including those who were working outside the Netherlands—came together regularly among themselves. This is a further proof of the strongly religious character of the Dutch people, although we are not concerned here exclusively with theologians in the narrower sense of the word.

of the Dutch edition of *Ochēma* were only available in the form of notes when I came to write the Dutch Volume VI, with the result that it would not have been possible to refer to them as it was to refer to the material in the already written and published Dutch Volume II (the second half of the English Volume I). I am convinced that it is necessary to provide both a *chronological* survey and a *phenomenological* survey of the content of the themes before discussing the *sense* of hylic pluralism. As a consequence, I have given the first of these in Sections 55—89 and the reader will find the second, phenomenological survey in Sections 90-112.

We have, however, completely neglected one aspect of the question. It is this. We have dealt with philosophers, psychologists, theologians and physicians, occultists and parapsychologists in this historical survey, but not the artists, poets and novelists. It is very probable that, in examining the work of members of these groups, we shall encounter hylic pluralistic ideas, firstly among the poets and novelists and secondly among the pictorial and sculptural artists.¹ Unfortunately, but necessarily, we shall have to stride with seven league boots through the centuries and simply point to the occurrence of some hylic pluralistic ideas in the work of poets and other writers in this chapter and in that of painters and sculptors and similar artists in the next. It is obvious that only a few selections can possibly be made from this enormous field.

As far as literature is concerned, one perhaps rather obvious comment must be made at the outset. The use of fiction is justified in this sphere in order to achieve an effect of, for example, mystery, horror or sublimity. When a poet or novelist writes that he is ardently convinced that man will have a different form of body after death, this is quite different from when a philosopher or theologians writes this. There are three possible reactions to this objection.

Firstly, I shall hardly discuss at all the quite widespread type of "occult" novel. (One reason for this is that it has not always been a very successful *genre*.) What does it mean to us, for example, if Zanoni in the novel of that name by E. Bulwer Lytton (1803-1873) addresses his soul in this way: "Soul of mine, the luminous, the Augoeides, why descendest thou from thy sphere. . . ?"² We may presume that this idea meant something to the author at least and this suspicion is undoubtedly borne out by the addition of the word "Augoeides". In other words, and in the second place, we have to rely on the author

1 For music and musicians, see below, Section 103.
2 (1845), edn. 1891, p. 61; see also B 99, p. 75.

himself and his convictions.¹ We know, for example, that van Eeden thought of the "dream-body" that occurred in his novel, *De Nachbruid*, as literal and real and that he based this conviction on his own experiences and notes.² This reliance on the writer's own convictions is, however, not always possible. It would seem that the writer of literature often deliberately leaves the reader in a state of uncertainty about his real intention, perhaps because he wants to stimulate him aesthetically or perhaps because his aim is to communicate mere conjectures which he does not need or wish to justify. In such cases, we can safely let the matter remain in abeyance, because we do not mean to compile a list of suppositions here—we are above all concerned to investigate whether our theme is true or not.

In the third place, the situation with regard to *poets* is rather different and I shall consequently limit myself principally to them in the rest of this section. Poets above all wish to express truths or views presumably or probably containing a certain element of truth, in spite and by means of poetic form. In this, they attempt to formulate and record perhaps primitive, but deeply rooted convictions, reflections of a universal validity and individual thoughts which occur in moments of quietness and introspection. This sententious character of poetry may well be more typical of writers of verse than the poetic form that is tied to rules. The presence of hyllic pluralistic ideas also becomes, to this extent, more interesting.

There is, however, still an element of uncertainty which is difficult to resolve. It is this. Some passages in poetry undoubtedly give an impression of hyllic pluralism. But may these passages not have a primarily metaphorical significance? This, is of course, a question of with far wider implications and I shall be returning to it later.³ But obviously we are bound to ask where the dividing line can be drawn between symbolism and realism in the individual artist or poet.⁴ It would, however, be begging the question to say that in every case it amounts to symbolism or imagery, because we must be concerned with whether the artist's or the poet's intention was perhaps *literal* when he represented or described the state of the soul after death as, for example, a flight upwards. We are bound to give this literal intention a change at least and assess it at its merits. Generally speaking, we may point in this connection to an affirmation made by, among others, W. B. Kristensen,

1 See also B 115, p. 165.

2 See above, p. 199.

3 See below, Section 89.

4 See Part I, pp. 104, 138.

namely that the ancient writers at least, unlike many modern authors saw the relationship as consisting of more reality and less symbol.¹ The "primitive" peoples also saw things in this light and so do poets. Is it that poets are really "primitive"² or is it that they are closer to the heart of things? It may be that the idea of transcending the whole plurality of the natural world or of creation tends to escape both the primitive peoples and poets,³ but that they are all the closer to the "next world" or to what they regard as the "next world".⁴

We must now briefly consider Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, two of the best known epics in history (8th century B.C.). I have already pointed out that he regarded what might be called factors of the soul as "something vaporous".⁵ B. Révész has said that "a definitely materialistic view prevails in Homer", that the *psuche* "is a breathlike, etheric body in the material body, a living breath . . ." which "can leave the body and continue to live as an *eidolon* . . . in Hades".⁶ In the context of the continued existence after death, this "materialism" of which Révész speaks must be seen as "dualistic materialism". Homer's standpoint was undoubtedly one of materialism, because there is no evidence in his work of any understanding of what is really transcendent. What we have here is the beta standpoint. This is, however, hylic pluralism and to that extent we may say that fine materiality—since everything was meant in the literal and realistic sense—occurs in the writings of Homer.

As I have demonstrated in Volume I of the English version of the present work (Volume II of the Dutch original), hylic pluralism also occurs in that other very well known and equally great epic, the Indian Mahābhārata. For example, the *vimāna* or "celestial car" as used by the gods and by Arjuna⁷ is clearly the *ochēma*, the higher vehicle of the soul consisting of fine matter. The Mahābhārata contains a great deal of theory and argument, more than, for example, the Old or New Testaments. A good example of this is the section known as the Bhagavadgītā. It also contains much poetry, such as the legend of Sāvitṛī, the woman who follows Yama, the god of death to get her husband back—Yama having taken her husband's soul out of his body as "a

1 See "Symbool en Werkelijkheid", *De Gids*, July 1931; see also Part I, p. 138.

2 See above, Part I, p. 210-211.

3 The standpoint of both is the beta standpoint; to this extent both contain something primitive.

4 See above, Part I, p. 95.

5 See above, pp. 22-23, (Onians)

6 B 128, p. 4.

7 See above, Part I, p. 205-206.

person of the measure of the thumb" and taken it away with him.¹ The soul as a little man, a "thumbling" or an *eidolon* is, of course, a very typical theme and I shall have to return to it later.

Several remarkable passages can be found in another ancient Greek author of the eighth century B.C., who was apparently a little earlier than Homer. I am, of course, referring to Hesiod, who, in his *Works and Days*, used the term *zera hessamenoi*² in reference to *daemons* and gods and what can consequently be translated as "surrounded by a cloud". Svoboda³ regarded this as an example of the view that was universally held in the ancient Greek world, namely that the *daemons* possessed an "aerial body". H. d'Arbois de Jubainville⁴ has formulated this as "the air which serves as their garments" (p. 13). Coverings or garments—this is a very typical hylic pluralistic theme⁵ and the *daemons* or gods are clearly regarded by Hesiod in far from an immaterial.

The Greek dramatist Euripides (ca. 480-406 B.C.) said, in his tragedy *The Suppliants*, that the body returned to the earth, but the soul went to heaven, the "ether".⁶

Virgil's (70-19 B.C.) description of Aeneas's descent into the underworld in book VI of his *Aeneid* has always attracted a good deal of attention. According to Überweg and Prächter, the basis of this view of the under-world was a Stoic cosmology.⁷ The soul lives in a kingdom of air or *aeris campi* (VI, 887). It is probable that ancient man had a far more realistic view of all this than the modern high school pupil imagines.

Cosmological views also occur in the *Divine Comedy* by Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), where they occupy a much more central place. The poet's principal theme is the journey via hell and the mountain of purification to paradise. It is obvious, however, that the content of the *Divine Comedy* is much more than simply cosmological—it is also psychological, symbolic and much else besides. I believe that a general distinction has to be made in works of poetry of this kind between the historical and empirical aspect, the mythical and fantastic aspect, the cosmic and metaphysical aspect and the personal and mystical aspect. This is all the more important because the poet almost always merges all these aspects together into a single whole (and one or two of them

1 III, p. 296; see also Part I, 165, 197-198, 199.

2 V, pp. 125, 255.

3 B 159, p. 19.

4 See above, Part I, p. 15, 128-129.

5 See below, Section 93.

6 1148; see B 123, II, p. 257; B 237, p. 248.

7 B 170, p. 588.

may be even be left out altogether).¹ It is also very important to make these distinctions if we are to understand what the poet is saying.

It is, of course, impossible to deny that Dante's *Divine Comedy* is also what J. D. Bierens de Haan² has called a "mystical journey, a descent into the poet's own soul", but it also has, in my opinion, an empirical and realistic aspect. Medieval man believed in the other world and the survival of the human individual with all his uncertainties in that world. We are therefore bound to ask to what extent hylic pluralism occurs in Dante. In accordance with my original intention.³ I shall not discuss the cosmological aspect of the question here. The question which most concerns us is to what extent did the human psyche have a material aspect for Dante, that is, of fine matter?

E. R. Dodds, whom I have quoted several times in this work, had this to say: "The astral body . . . remains a familiar idea throughout the Middle Ages.⁴ How deeply it impressed the imagination of Dante may be seen from Purgatorio XXV, 88 ff".⁵ Here we read:

The surging of the ether assumes the form
Which the soul imposes on it by inner force
Where it is drawn along.
Just as the single flame follows
The fire which is carried on,
The form will never be separated
From the spirit which holds it captive.
The soul is thus made visible
And we call it a shadow.⁶

The soul which takes on a visible form was regarded by Dodds as a survival from the late classical doctrine of the astral body. "Will never be separated" is also reminiscent of "psychohylicism".

The theme of *Beatrice's carriage* plays a very remarkable part in Canto XXIX, 32, in the same part of the *Divine Comedy*, the Mountain of Purification. Towards the end of this part, Beatrice, who is to accompany Dante through paradise, rides up in her carriage, but is not recognised at once. These passages make a very strong impression of being allusions, through the medium of the theme of the vehicle, to a higher or finer body of the soul. In these contos, Dante comes back again and again to this carriage and refers both to Moses and

1 B 237, XVIII, p. 160 (under "sleutelpluralisme" or "key pluralism").

2 See B 237, p. 170; according to C. G. Jung, this is at the "level of the subject" (p. 279).

3 See above, pp. 11-12.

4 See above, p. 91, note 1.

5 B 33, p. 186.

6 XXV, 94-101; see also B 174, p. 210, note 21.

Elijah, in other words to the transfiguration on Mount Tabor (32, 27, 2),¹ and to the well-known vision in Ezechiel 1.5 ff (29, 34, 1). William Blake's representation of Beatrice's chariot is shown on Plate 4.²

There is also a third place in the same part, the mountain of Purification, which is of interest to us in connection with our special theme of hylic pluralism:

Do you not observe that we are only caterpillars

From which the butterfly of heaven unfolds its wings?³

The image of the butterfly for the soul that has been liberated from the ordinary body is a very old one. Apart from meaning breath and soul, the word *psuchē* also means butterfly. It is noteworthy that C. G. Carus quoted this passage in Dante referring to the "*angelica farfalla* or heavenly butterfly" in a chapter in which he had been discussing the "etheric body" and the "spiritual organism."⁴ According to Carus, is this to be interpreted hylic pluralistically in Dante—or this is at least part of its meaning.

Since the whole subject of hylic pluralism is so extensive in the field of literature, it is wise to examine the question from the point of view of several great figures in this field and to ascertain whether or not this or similar themes occur in their writings. What is the situation with regard, for example, to William Shakespeare (1564-1616)? A tremendous amount has been written about him, of course, but two particularly useful books in connection with our special subject are P. Gibson's *Shakespeare's Use of the Supernatural* (1908) and B. Münz's *Shakespeare als Philosoph* (1918). The first of these books makes clear what in fact we already know, namely that Shakespeare made very frequent use of the theme of spirits, ghosts, witches, premonitions and so on, Shakespeare himself has summarised this in his own words:

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,

Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.⁵

But, if these things in his opinion included bodies of fine matter, Gibson has not mentioned this.

In the *Merchant of Venice*, we read:

Such harmony is in immortal souls;

But whilst this muddy vesture of decay

Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.⁶

1 See above, pp. 70-71.

2 See A. Blunt, *The Art of William Blake*, 1950, p. 91.

3 X, 124-125.

4 *System der Physiologie*, 1838, p. 372; see above, p. 163.

5 *Hamlet* I, 5.

6 V, 1.

This is also negative, since it may be that there are other, *non-muddy* vestures (the theme of the garment) which include the underlying harmony *not* grossly, but perhaps subtly. This is, however, not made explicit.

There is also the well-known passage in *The Tempest*:

We are such stuff

As dreams are made on, and our little life

Is rounded with a sleep.¹

Is human life then perhaps limited—pre-existentially and post-existentially!—by an existence which resembles the one that is led in dreams and to dreams then consist of some species of matter or “stuff”? Did Clifford think of this passage perhaps when he used the term “mind-stuff”?²

These are, of course, rather far-fetched ideas and we may conclude that the result of any investigation of possible hylic pluralism in Shakespeare is bound to be negative. Yet there is another aspect to this problem. Quite a large group of scholars used to think—and many still believe—that the man who wrote under the name of Shakespeare was in fact the philosopher, scholar and statesman Francis Bacon. Hylic pluralism is, however, clearly present in the works of Francis Bacon, according to whom and several other Renaissance philosophers man had not only a rational soul, but also an animal soul (*anima sensitiva*), which consisted of fine matter (in other words, a trichotomy existed).³ If Bacon was really the author of Shakespeare's works, then, we should expect to find hylic pluralism expressed rather more clearly in the dramas.

As I have already said, the Dutch poet Vondel was acquainted with the idea of hylic pluralism, but, although he seems to hesitate about whether to accept it or not in the case of the angels, we are bound to conclude that he was not a hylic pluralist.⁴

The situation is to some extent different with regard to Vondel's English contemporary John Milton (1608-1674), although it is certainly rather complicated. The well-known French literary critic, Denis Saurat (1890-1958) specialised in Milton and in William Blake (1757-1827) and one of his best known books was *Milton et le matérialisme chrétien en Angleterre* (1928, B 146).

Milton did not believe in the existence of the soul in itself. Saurat therefore thought that there was a connection between him and the English sect known as the “mortalists” who taught that the soul no longer

1 IV, 1.

2 See above, p. 185.

3 See above, pp. 117-118.

4 See above, p. 43, 210 ff.

existed after death and that it was not until the resurrection that the whole man, soul and body, appeared again.¹ Saurat said that, as far as the first half of this doctrine is concerned, this was an anticipation of the more complete materialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, however, Saurat pointed to many different links between Milton and the Cabbala and R. Fludd.² This was, of course, fully in accordance with the great interest that Saurat took in occult traditions throughout the centuries.³ Both the Cabbala and Fludd, however, accepted a continued existence after death and, if their ideas about the soul were materialistic, they were certainly dualistically materialistic or rather, hylic pluralistic.⁴

I am of the opinion, however, that Saurat was not sufficiently aware of the whole question of *fine* materiality and this is regrettable because he might otherwise have noted all kinds of facts and data connected with this in all the many texts that he investigated in his career. As far as Milton is concerned, it is possible to indicate various elements of this kind without searching very deeply. For example, in *paradise Lost*, he writes that the angels tell men.

Your bodies may at last run all to spirit,
Improv'd by tract of time, and wing'd ascend
Ethereal as we...⁵

Food is taken in paradise as well:

and food alike those pure
Intelligential substances require...⁶

The poet thought of this food as refined—*amrita* or the food of the gods.⁷

Milton also had this to say about "spirits" and their "airy purposes":

and as they please,
They limb⁸ themselves and colour shape or size
Assume as likes them best coddense or rare.⁹

1 This certainly resembles the view of certain Protestant theologians, notably G. van der Leeuw, who insist that there is no immortality, but that there is a resurrection (see above, p. 73, note 1). Van der Leeuw also quotes Saurat: B 90, p. 295-note 1.

2 See above, p. 133.

3 See, for example, Saurat's *La littérature et l'occultisme*, 1929, (B 145), English version 1930, and the table on pp. 82-83 of this book; see also my "Deus Saurat en het occultisme", B 261, 1952, p. 169 ff.

4 See above, p. 66, Part I, 76.

5 V, 736.

6 *Ibid.*

7 See below, Section 101. K.H.E. de Jong (B 76, p. 33) has pointed to this "rather material idea" of Milton's with regard to the angels who had not fallen, but who even felt hungry.

8 See above, p. 198.

9 VI, 350.

We may therefore conclude that Milton's attitude towards hylic pluralism was much more positive than Vondel's. Saurat, for example, was able to say this of Milton: "Christ is therefore materially in us, probably in the spirit of Milton in a very subtle substance . . ." ¹ but he did not look at this in a wider context.

We must now consider the eighteenth century. Although he was primarily a writer of literature G. E. Lessing (1729-1781) was also active in other spheres and we have seen elsewhere that he believed that it might be possible for man to have more than five senses. ²

F. von Schiller (1759-1805) wrote about "the life-spirit an infinitely fine and simple extremely dynamic psychical being". ³

What was J. W. von Goethe's (1749-1842) position with regard to hylic pluralism? Above all, we have to bear certain facts in mind when considering Goethe. The attention of the average reader—or even of the literary critic—is likely to diminish when he reads something like "ethereal" or "etheric sphere" in a text by Goethe. He may not say it aloud, but he will probably think that the expression is just a poetical hotch-potch. But was it simply poetical diction for Goethe himself? Secondly, it should be remembered that however useful it may be hylic pluralism is not the only possible standpoint. It is also possible for example to look at everything rather more or even predominantly from the point of view of *life* itself. ⁴ Thirdly, it is certain that Goethe who was extremely widely read and lived in the second half of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries must have known the theme of hylic pluralism if only because of his relationships with men such as J. C. Lavater ⁵ and C. G. Carus. ⁶

A great deal has of course, been written about Goethe. I shall therefore only mention one or two points. In his book on Goethe's attitude towards immortality (*Goethes Stellung zur Unsterblichkeit*, 1921) R. Petsch said that Goethe's view was one of "immaterial materiality" (p. 517). This is certainly not a very clear statement! On the other hand quoting from Goethe's own *Faust* Part I, F. Koch said in his *Goethes Stellung zu Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (1932) a book written about very much the same theme as Petsch's that we must be ready

To take a new path through the ether

To new spheres of pure activity. ⁷

¹ See B 146, p. 189.

² See above, p. 146, 153, 197. The idea of metempsychosis or reincarnation is also encountered in Lessing. Unfortunately, we cannot go into this here. See, for example, B 271, IX, 2, p. 151.

³ See B 54, p. 87.

⁴ See Part I, pp. 8-9; see also below, Section 134. ⁵ See above, p. 108.

⁶ See above, pp. 162-163.

⁷ *op. cit.*, p. 1.

For Goethe as for Plotinus life and death were "a flowing out and a flowing back of divine fluid" (*op. cit.* p. 193) and Goethe himself wrote about death as "losing oneself in the etheric space" (see *op. cit.*, p. 225; cf. p. 295). He was also interested in alchemy—see, for example, R. D. Gray's *Goethe the Alchemist* 1952. C. G. Jung has said that Faust was seeking the "incorruptible", making this statement in the same book in which he maintained that one aspect of the alchemist's activity was "to establish a *corpus subtile*".¹

To what extent does hylic pluralism occur in Goethe's *Faust*? Part II of the work is certainly full of hylic pluralistic metaphors and images, but Goethe may also have been aware of the mystery of a subtle reality behind this imagery. For example, in the important final scene of *Faust Part II* Gretchen says:

"See how he tears from himself
All earthly bonds of the ancient husk
and how from the etheric garment
the first strength of youth emerges!"²

We are already very well acquainted with this "etheric garment", which is not necessarily intended to be purely symbolic here.

Goethe's work forms a transition to the work of the romantics and we have already seen that taken in the broadest sense,³ these writers were very interested in hylic pluralism. We must now consider the romantics in the narrower sense, that is as writers of literature rather than as philosophers and so on.

Ricarda Huch has observed in the chapter devoted to man in the romantic view of the world ("Der Mensch in der romantischen Weltanschauung") in her well-known book on romanticism (*Die Romantik*)—in which she considers romanticism as something broader than simply a literary movement but as less broad than in the sense of "romantic philosophers"—that according to this view man possesses an "etheric body".⁴

Despite the fact that romanticism flourished widely in other countries there were very few romantic writers of any importance in the Netherlands which was passing through an uneasy period. We have already spoken about the most important W. Bilderdijk (1756-1831).⁵

1 *Psychologie und Alchemie*, B 78, pp. 42-43; see also above, p. 189. The reference to Faust's quest for the "incorruptible" is on p. 639.

2 12088-12091; see also A. Rosenberg, B 135, p. 216.

3 See above, pp. 157, 163.

4 B 215, II, p. 116.

5 See above, p. 214.

The work of the preromantic writer E. M. Post (1755-1812) was had a strongly religious flavour.¹

Among the English romantics we must include E. Bulwer Lytton² as well as W. Wordsworth (1770-1850) and many other poets. In his "Intimations of Immortality", Wordsworth had this to say about pre-existence:

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:

and that is

... that imperial palace whence he came.

In itself however this is not clear hylic pluralism.

Among the English romantics a very remarkable figure was William Blake (1757-1827) who was both an artist and a poet. There is a strong suggestion of the new man who emerges after death—and not only on resurrection—in Blake's "Blair's Tomb" (Plate 16). What about Blake's poetry? I have already commented that it is regrettable that Saurat who made a detailed study of Blake as not more alert to hylic pluralism in Blake's writings although he did in his *Blake and Modern Thought* (1929) write about Blake's "soul or spiritual body" (p. 126).

Jacques Roos a professor at Strasbourg has also written an interesting book about this period with the lengthy title *Aspects littéraires du Mysticisme philosophique au début du Romantisme et l'influence de Boehme et de Swedenborg: W. Blake, Novalis, Ballanche* (1951). This work is remarkably similar to Saurat's. What they have in common is that they both refer to occult, neo-Platonic and Christian themes in the figures dealt with and that both also completely overlook hylic pluralism. Roos, however, does say that all of these writers (including Boehme and Swedenborg) were concerned with what happened at the fall. When man fell, "the divine image automatically became blurred in him and his spiritual, radiant and immaterial body³ disappeared and gave way to a coarse, corruptible body" (p. 89). It would, however, be useful to learn something about the opposite direction.

A very characteristic romantic writer who died young and was sensitive to the "nocturnal aspect" of life and the invisible world (for which Fechner would have used the term "diurnal aspect"⁴) was Novalis

¹ See above, p. 213.

² See above, p. 217.

³ This is apparently intended to be understood relatively; see above pp. 8-9.

⁴ See above, p. 171.

(F. von Hardenberg, 1772-1801). In Novalis' view, everything could become a sacrament.¹ He was intensely aware of the contrast between the two worlds and expressed this, for example, in the following way: "It is only to the wise man, who is transfigured in this world, that embodied spirits appear".²

Hylic pluralism is found more clearly in the work of Jean Paul (F. Richter, 1763-1825), another important literary figure in Germany at this time. R. von Koeber has pointed out, in his book on this writer's psychology, *Jean Pauls Seelenlehre* (1893), that Jean Paul accepted the existence of an "etheric atmosphere" and of an "etheric subject" which was active during magnetic sleep. Jean Paul also admitted that Lessing was right to maintain that man had more than five senses and had recourse to Bonnet and Platner³ for the "invisible organs of the soul". There may be very many aspects of hylic pluralism to be found in the sixty volumes of his "Collected Works".

We must also briefly refer to two very well-known French romantics, Balzac and Hugo. Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850) was above all a very famous and fertile novelist whose books are strongly tinged by naturalistic psychology. All the same, the romantic and occult element is not absent in his works. This is especially clearly expressed in his novel *Histoire intellectuelle de Louis Lambert* (1833), which Bertault has called an "autobiography in the form of a novel".⁴ Both the author, Balzac, and the leading character, Lambert, experience an "outburst of mystical exultation".⁵ Both study Boehme, Swedenborg and other mystical writers. Balzac probably became initiated into the thought of Saint-Martin.⁶ What is, however, of importance in connection with our special subject is that Balzac's novel, *Louis Lambert*, contains several statements such as "Did thought not appear as an entirely physical power?" (p. 142).⁷ Man is situated in a "fluid environment" (p. 118). "Anger is an electric current. Electric shock acts on the people present when the current is set free, although it does not concern them. Fanaticism and all collective feelings are streams of will, overturning everything" (p. 258). "Almost everything is a phenomenon of the etheric substance, which forms the basis of electricity. This is the principle behind all transformations of the same

1 See G. van der Leeuw, B 90, p. 348 and B 255, p. 167.

2 *Schriften*, ed. Minor, III, p. 62; see also B 157, p. 59.

3 See above, pp. 137-138.

4 See P. Bertault, *Balzac, Phomme et l'oeuvre* (1946), p. 90.

5 *op. cit.*, p. 5.

6 *op. cit.*, p. 94, appealed to by M. van Rijnberk; see above, p. 159.

7 See Bertault, *op. cit.*, p. 100: "the materiality of thought and will".

matter" (p. 269). Similar ideas occur in Balzac's other works—an example is the theme of mesmerism in *Ursule Mirouët* (p. 66 ff).

Victor Hugo (1802-1885) is usually called the greatest of the French romantics, even though he was active long after romanticism has ceased to be the predominant current in literature. Although he was above all a poet, whose verses sometimes strike us as too facile, there is a "doctrine" in the background¹ which has been overlooked by many people. He also moved from magnetism to spiritualism—when his daughter died, partly out of grief he became deeply interested in spiritualism during his exile in Jersey. He was also, generally speaking, open to all the various neo-Platonic and occult tendencies which I have mentioned previously in this book and which were so characteristically expressed in romanticism.²

We also have the problem with Hugo that we had with Goethe—how much realism and how much imagery (Hugo was notoriously exuberant!) is there in his poetry? A promise of a literal ascent on the part of the liberated soul is not necessarily contained in Hugo's lines:

complaining creature,

Do you feel that you have a captive wing in you?

Hugo once said, in a funeral oration for a well-known person: "You will see all those great flaming hearts in the radiant form which death has given them".³ We may ask how many of those present took the phrase "radiant form" literally. But when we read elsewhere in Hugo's works: "Shall we have a body in the other life? . . . Why should one not have a subtle and etheric body of which our human body is no more than a coarse outline?"⁴ we can see such passages in a very different light. It is evident that Hugo had hylic pluralism quite clearly in mind.

In the world of literature especially, there is a recognised movement known as neo-romanticism, under which heading writers such as F. van Eeden and R. M. Rilke are classified. We have already seen that van Eeden himself acknowledge that he included experiences of his own which, in his opinion, related to a "dream-body" in his novel *De Nachtbluid*.⁵ In this case, then, it is the author himself who points

¹ See D. Saurat, *La religion de V. Hugo* (1929), p. VIII. See also C. Renouvier, *V. Hugo, le philosophe* (1900).

² See A. Viatte, *V. Hugo et les Illuminés de son temps* (1942); *ibid.*, *Les sources occultes du romantisme* (1928; B 175) see also my "Het occultisme van V. Hugo", B 261, 1952, p. 129 ff.

³ See Renouvier, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁴ *Oeuvres posthumes*, IV, p. 175; see also Viatte, *op. cit.*, 1942, p. 238.

⁵ See above, pp. 199-200.

out that the fiction in the novel was based on an inner experience that he himself had.

The idea of the "interior space of the world" is encountered in the somewhat obscure but very highly regarded works of Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926). In his book on this aspect of Rilke's thought, *Weltinnenraum. Die Dichtung R. M. Rilkes* (1952), W. Günther maintained that Rilke was looking for the "depths of human consciousness". Rilke asked: "Am I in myself not in the greatest?"¹ Günther has observed that "Rilke calls the place where this highest intuition of being that can be experienced the 'interior space'" (p. 39) and Rilke himself said: "The *one* space extends throughout all being—the interior space of the world".

What is striking is that this most interior element is regarded as a *space* and we are bound to ask whether there is not something else that is above it, something immaterial, just as, in Plotinus, the "one" transcended the psyche and all worlds and bodies. Be this as it may, there is certainly an interior space in Rilke's thought. This is very reminiscent of what G. R. Heyer said about "psychical spaces"² (Heyer may have been extending Rilke's idea here) and there are also other analogies, such as Augustine's "interior space".³ In any case, the idea of a second interior space is clearly hylic pluralistic.

This concludes my brief survey of the occurrence of hylic pluralism in literature. It is clear that hylic pluralism certainly had some significance for a number of poets and novelists and my examples have been rather arbitrarily chosen and very few. How many passages with a hylic pluralistic content would be brought to light in a really systematic investigation of literary works?

89. THE VISUAL ARTS

Do hylic pluralistic themes also occur in the visual arts? In this chapter, we shall make a brief survey of this field, bearing in mind that, as in the case of literature, there have been so many different ways in which the visual arts have been expressed that no survey could ever hope to be complete.

The problem is, however, very similar in principle to that facing us in the field of literature—where is the dividing line between symbolism and realism in the case of each artist?⁴ Just as the poet uses meta-

1 *Gesammelte Werke*, III, p.8.

2 See above, p. 191-194.

3 B 290, p. 535; see above, p. 90.

4 See above, pp. 218-219.

phorical language, so too does the painter (or the sculptor) make use of the image in a more concrete sense, of figures which make a direct appeal to the eye.

The question of the relationship between idealism and realism has been much discussed by those specialising in the visual arts. In connection with sepulchral art, Dr. Henriette s'Jacob has dealt at some length with this question.¹ She has said, for example: "To what extent do sepulchral monuments express a symbolical meaning, to what extent to they depict what we are wont to call 'reality'?"² In this, the authoress believes, one enters the sphere of guesswork—there is a "difference of outlook separating us from past epochs". Sometimes the artist has preferred to represent what we can see with our eyes and at others he has tended to emphasise "the recording of impressions from the mind or the unconscious". Then a "fusion of belief and intuition" occurred together with an intention of expressing certain ideas.³

It is therefore not at all easy to draw a clear dividing line between idealism and realism in the visual arts, although it is often quite clear in which direction the emphasis lies. Sometimes the dead person—in the case of sepulchral art—is depicted as closely as possible to reality and provided with signs of his earthly dignity, whereas at other times the artist draws attention primarily to "the soul's journey to the beyond".⁴

There is, however, also the possibility of *extending ordinary realism*. In other periods of history, people also had a more "realistic" attitude and were less inclined towards symbolism.⁵ Although she was not particularly alert to this extension of realism in her book, Dr. s'Jacob does make a few involuntary remarks which point in this direction. In the ancient world, a distinction was made between the soul and the "shade": "The shade . . . , according to a tradition which is lost in the dim past, leaves the body in the shape of a miniature image or 'eidolon', still retaining a thin material envelope and identical in appearance with the deceased". This double was seen as a semi-substance with fewer qualities than the earlier body, but certainly not entirely immaterial. This view was not in any sense restricted to classical antiquity: "This theme flourished in the Middle Ages, though with the changed significance of the soul reborn in a new body. In other words, the miniature soul-creature, frequently observed on slabs, etc., is

¹ *Idealism and Realism. A Study of Sepulchral Symbolism* (1954, B 216).

² *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ p. 114 ff.

⁵ See above, p. 218-219.

nothing less than a fusion of the spiritual soul and the reduced material eidolon".¹

In other words, the obvious intention of the artists concerned can be represented in this way. This should be sufficient for us at the moment. We are not concerned here with the truth of the ideas represented, but simply with what was the intention of the artists in representing these ideas in this way and what did those who looked at their work believe that they could see in them? I have therefore included a number of illustrations of such works of art in this book with this in mind. It was not my intention to try to prove hylic pluralism by these illustrations, of course—the very opposite is true. If other sources should show that there is truth in hylic pluralism, then these works of art would be given a further dimension.

All the same, it is not entirely a vague supposition that certain works of art may have a hylic pluralistic intention in the background, as it were. They are often the products of a certain "climate" of opinion and this has sometimes been overlooked. A writer who was very sensitive to this, although he did not draw any very clear hylic pluralistic conclusions, was Walter Nigg, a professor at Zürich University (born 1903). I discuss some of the questions raised in his book *Maler des Ewigen*² below. There are, however, also definite themes which reveal the close link between certain types of art and hylic pluralism. Examples of these themes are the theme of the vehicle, that of the unusual light (or halo) and that of the little person or *eidolon* leaving the ordinary body.

I have already devoted a special section to the theme of the vehicle in the first volume of this work, entitled "Digression. The Vehicle Theme".³ What is more, the title of this whole work, *Ochēma* (or vehicle"), is derived from that theme,⁴ mainly because the theme of the vehicle is so characteristic of hylic pluralism, despite the fact that hylic pluralism contains more than simple the vehicle theme. It is, for example, certain that the neo-Platonists—and especially Proclus—were in the habit of speaking about the *leptoteron soma*, the finer body of the soul as its vehicle or *ochēma*.⁵ In the same section earlier in this work, on the "Vehicle Theme", that is, Section 26, I argued that, if it cannot be disputed that the image of the vehicle was used in this significance in one environment or society, should we not ask ourselves whether

¹ p. 114.

² I, 1951 (B 232); the Dutch translation appeared in 1952.

³ Section 26, p. 224 ff.

⁴ See Part I, p. 8.

⁵ See above, p. 50 ff.

its use in a different environment does not also imply an acceptance of fine materiality? The vehicle theme occurs, after all, quite regularly, either in the visual arts themselves or else simply as a mention in literature. The chariot or carriage was more prominent in antiquity than it is in our society and it was a sign of power and honour.¹ What is particularly striking, however, is the number of times that the chariot of the gods is mentioned (in the Old Testament, we read of the *merkābhāh* of Yahweh²) and that there is reference to a chariot in connection with the soul, which is or becomes separate from the body. If an ear-ring dating back to ca. 350 B. C. depicts Psyche, the soul, riding on a carriage and pair (see Plate 3, Volume I), is it not possible to make a connection between this and, for example, Plato's *Phaedrus*, in which the soul is illustrated by the image of a chariot drawn by two horses, the driver of which has one horse well in hand and the other not (247B)? It should also be remembered, in this context, that the neo-Platonists commonly appealed to the *Phaedrus* in their use of the *ochēma* and that we now think of Plato and the neo-Platonists as being much closer in their views than we did in the past.³ It is therefore not so very exaggerated after all to assume that both the artist and the person looking at an object such as this particular ear-ring had the idea of a soul consisting of fine matter at the back of their minds.⁴

When I was discussing Indian thought, I also drew a parallel between ideas of this kind in Plato's *Phaedrus* and similar Indian ideas. The *vimānas* or chariots of the gods occur frequently in the *Mahābhārata*, for example, as a theme and what is remarkable is that, through his personal merits, Arjuna is given the use of one. It would seem as though the image of the chariot was also used in Indian thought for the finer body of the soul.⁵

If this is true, we may go a step further. In the Old Testament, we read of chariots of fire drawn by horses of fire taking Elijah up to heaven (2 Kings 2. 11-12). The text does not say whether Elijah was in fact sitting in the chariot, but Christian iconography has always depicted it thus. (See Plate 4 in Volume I and Plate 3 in this volume, which is a reproduction of an eighteenth century icon from Dr. S. Amberg's collection.) Between the "doings" of the elevated soul and the image of the vehicle or chariot there seems to have been a definite link.

1 See Part I, p. 132.

2 See above, pp. 62-63.

3 See above, p. 33-34.

4 See above, p. 224 ff.

5 See Part I, p. 204 ff.

I would refer the reader back to Section 26 of this work, in which I have discussed the vehicle theme at some length, but I should like to supplement what I have said there with this observation. In Ps. 104.3, Yahweh "who makest the clouds thy chariot" is addressed.¹ For the *merkābāh* or mystical chariot of the soul, Deut. 32 and Exod. 19 should be consulted. There are also frequent references in the Old Testament to wheels (e.g. Ezek. 1. 15) or to "wheels of burning fire" (Dan. 7.9). R. Eisler has discussed all this, including the *merkābhāh*, in his *Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt*.² The Old Testament "wheels" inevitably remind us, of course, of the *chakras* or "wheels" in Indian philosophy, to which I shall be returning.³

Returning for the moment to the visual arts, however, we note that the theme of the *winged* soul occurs frequently for the soul which is separated from the terrestrial body or has set itself temporarily free from the body. This is depicted in the frontispiece of Volume I, which shows a sideview of the chariot of Monteleone. As in the case of the Phaedrus and in the illustration in this volume of the ascension of Elijah, the horses which bear the soul on high are also winged.⁴ This theme occurs again and again. Whenever this or a similar theme or image has been used—as, for example, the (celestial) horse as the bearer of the soul—this has generally been depicted as winged.⁵ It would seem as though what Victor Hugo called the "captive wing"⁶ was waiting to be unfolded.

Similar images are the *garuda*, the celestial bird (see Plate 3, Volume I⁷) as well as other bird themes,⁸ the dragon in Chinese art⁹ and the celestial butterfly.¹⁰ It is, I believe, necessary to ask in every case whether the artist or the person looking at the work of art had more than simply a poetic image in mind and whether the work of art did not refer to a fine materiality which was regarded as real.

A second theme in which the connection between the visual arts and hylic pluralism is possibly very typically expressed is that of light. I

1 See above, p. 220; Hesiod: "surrounded by a cloud"

2 1910 (B 210), p. 497 ff.

3 See below, Section 96.

4 See Part I, p. 135, 142-143.

5 See F. Cumont, B 53, p. 288 and Part I, p. 144, note 3. Mohammed's "heavenly steed"—see above, p. 113-114—can also be considered within this category. Do "flying carpets" perhaps also contain a reminiscence of the finer body of the soul?

6 See above, p. 229.

7 See Part I, p. 230.

8 See the index under the word "bird".

9 See Part I, p. 284.

10 See H. s'Jacob (B 216, p. 65) for the stele of Antonia Panace, where the soul leaves the body in the form of a butterfly. For this image in Dante, see above, p. 222.

shall deal with this in more detail in a later chapter,¹ discussing there the apparent fact that several people have accepted the existence of an unusual non-terrestrial light or have said that they have experienced such a light. I have mentioned this several times in passing in the course of this work.² It also occurs again and again in the visual arts. A very important part is played for example in the ikons of Eastern Christianity by the idea of this supernatural light which is reminiscent of the light on Mount Tabor (Matt. 17.2).³ This has however also to be taken into account in other works of art. Walter Nigg to whom I have already referred⁴ was very conscious of this. In a chapter in his book devoted to the "metaphysics of light" (p. 251 ff) he considers Rembrandt especially. Rembrandt (1606- 1669) was doing more in depicting a contrast between light and dark than simply striving to achieve an effect. A traditional mysticism of light is expressed both in the New Testament and in for example Plotinus and Eastern Christianity (p. 254 ff) and it has often been forgotten that Rembrandt as a man living in a seventeenth century Protestant environment belonged to this movement. As Nigg says (p. 255): "It was not a terrestrial light that Rembrandt painted". The light of John 1.4 rose for the miller's son from Leiden—he saw this supraterrestrial light. "Rembrandt" says Nigg "is one of the greatest light metaphysicians of all time" (p. 256). His paintings make it possible for the viewer to believe in the supernatural. Nigg thought that there was quite possibly a connection between Rembrandt and his rather older contemporary Jakob Boehme (1575-1624) whose works were published in Dutch (1634-1642) and widely read in the Netherlands. Whether or not there was a direct link between them there was a very great affinity—this has been established by several scholars who have studied this period. "Rembrandt is the painting Boehme" Nigg has affirmed "and Boehme is the writing Rembrandt" (p. 259).

This then is Nigg's rather general observation. I shall be returning to a particular case of light painted by Rembrandt later in this section. but apart from Nigg and Rembrandt I must now point to a special case in which light has been used from ancient times and even up to the present almost as a cliché in art and certainly as an apparently hyllic pluralistic theme. I am referring here to the use of the *halo* surrounding the heads of important persons in the sphere of religion.⁵

1 See below, Section 104.

2 See the index, under the heading "light".

3 See above, pp. 70, 102 ff; see also Plate 2; see also B 232, p. 198.

4 See above, p. 232.

5 See B 179, XIV, p. 543.

This is such a wide-ranging subject that it is quite impossible to deal with it exhaustively here. It can be found even in classical antiquity—Onians for example has written about “Head in Fire” (B 233 p. 158 ff). The author of the Iliad mentioned a flame around Achilles’ head (XVIII, p. 207 ff) and Julius Caesar and Augustus were imagined as having “a crown with rays (*corona radiata*) as a sign not of kingship but of deity” (p. 166).¹ It is also extremely well known that the halo usually in the form of a semicircle and gold in colour encircling the head of Christ Mary or the saints was a universal feature in Christian iconography. This practice became so popular indeed that when the Olympic Games were held in Rome in 1960 the illustration on the front cover of *Punch* (24 August 1960) was of five priests with the five Olympic circles like halos above their heads!

We must now consider the possible perception of the *aura* of persons in occultism. In this case we may point to what Rudolf Steiner and Gerda Walther among others² have said about their experiences. When Dr. Walther read Steiner’s book *Theosophie* she declared that what she herself had experienced and had been unable to explain had also been Dr. Steiner’s experience.³ If these experiences are in any sense based on reality we are bound to ask whether the use of the halo in iconography does not go back to the clairvoyant experience that a radiance of unusual non-terrestrial light emanates especially from the heads of important religious figures. If this is the case then the themes of *garlands* and *crowns* both in art and in religious literature may be connected with this radiance.⁴

We must now consider another theme in the visual arts that is the form or figure in miniature the *eidolon* which also occurs as the *mannikin*,⁵ the homunculus or the thumbling.

It is of course obvious when ideas such as the bird the butterfly or the horse⁶ are used in art or literature that these will contain a good deal of imagery or symbolism with the result that all that can be recognised in them are at the most indications of hyllic pluralism. (It should be noted in this connection that being winged points more clearly to a different more rarefied state⁷ where movement is easier.) The situation is different in the case of the human form. One is almost inclined

1 See also A. Dieterich, *Nekyia* (1913), p. 40 ff.

2 See also C. W. Leadbeater, *Man Visible and Invisible* (1902).

3 See her *Zum andern Ufer*, p. 254; see also above, p. 192.

4 See Part I, p. 206.

5 See the index, including Vol. I, under “mannikin”.

6 See above, pp. 233-234.

7 The bird or the aeroplane move through the relatively rarefied state of aggregation in the normal environment.

to say that the first ideas are better classified under the delta standpoint according to which the soul itself is immaterial but *makes use of* a vehicle of some kind perhaps a chariot perhaps an animal. The theme of the human figure used to represent man's existence after death is closer to the beta standpoint according to which the soul *is* of fine matter.

However this may be the human figure is certainly used for this purpose in art but usually with certain deviations from the normal. One example of this is the use of the halo or radiant garland surrounding the head. In other cases the human body is distorted in some way or made greater or smaller than usual.

In his book Walter Nigg also dealt with the well-known painter El Greco (ca. 1540-1614), who had the nickname of the "seer of ghosts" in Toledo.¹ Nigg entitled a section of his chapter on El Greco "heavenly bodies" (p. 209 ff). This does not mean that Nigg has worked out a complete theory of hylic pluralism, of course, but it is true to say that, in feeling his way towards a formulation of the intention of El Greco, he comes very close to expressing hylic pluralism. He follows a brief note of El Greco himself, in which the artist said that he wanted to paint "heavenly bodies" (p. 220). In this context, Nigg is also reminded of Paul's spiritual (pneumatic) body, but confesses that we do not know how El Greco became acquainted with this idea of "spiritual corporeality"—it may, he suggests, have been via the Cabbala, which was probably well-known in the Jewish quarter of Toledo. The aim that El Greco set himself was a fantastic one, indeed an aim that only a "seer of ghosts" could have thought of. "It is, however, precisely in this fantasy that the authentic El Greco can be found" (p. 221). What is particularly remarkable is that El Greco made use—although not entirely without exception—of *elongated* figures of men to represent ecstasies such as Francis of Assisi and Andrew, thus breaking through the usual pattern (p. 216). This was one manner of expressing "spiritual corporeality". El Greco's paintings were also icons—he was a natural Byzantine—but, because the figures in them are stretched out (p. 196 ff), they are above all living icons.²

Whereas El Greco's human figures were often elongated, other artists have depicted the soul, especially at or after death, as a very *small* human figure. This is indeed such a common theme that one is inclined to say that it is something that has been used simply because there is nothing

¹ See B 232, p. 177.

² See our Plate 13—El Greco's *St Andrew*.

better available. But who is to say whether the intention has been to represent fine materiality by this miniature human figure in art? A distinction has to be made between ascertaining that this theme occurs frequently and making the use of this theme plausible in order to indicate something of fine matter. In reproducing a number of examples of *eidola* in the history of art in this work, I am bound to repeat my previous warning¹ that I have no intention of trying to prove the truth of hylic pluralism by these few examples. Nonetheless, they do, I think, cause us to reflect. It should be borne in mind, for example, that it has clearly emerged in the course of this work that the soul has very often indeed been regarded as consisting of fine matter. In classical antiquity, the beta standpoint, according to which everything is thought to consist of matter or of fine matter, occurred very frequently.² In the first centuries of Christianity, the gamma standpoint is encountered again and again—everything, except God himself (*nisi Deus ipse*) was regarded as material or of fine matter. Not only Origen, but also Ambrose and Bernard, for example, were of this opinion.³ We have also encountered the view that the angels were not purely immaterial, but had (permanent) bodies of fine matter at their disposal as well as the acceptance of a *materia spiritualis*.⁴ It is therefore, in my opinion, not so very far-fetched to suppose that the artists who have introduced *eidola* frequently into their work were thinking of something real consisting of fine matter and were not simply using a symbol. Once again, it is because of the anthropological dualism—the epsilon standpoint—of those interpreting these pictures that we find it difficult to accept this view of fine materiality.

Some art critics, then, have come involuntarily to accept a different explanation. Yet we read, for example, in the ordinary Greek dictionary that, according to the ancients, the *psyche* went down into the underworld together with a shadow-body.⁵ O. Benndorf wrote about the “incorporeal corporeality” of the “small winged figures” which are found on Attic vases and boxes containing oil or ointment in his book *Griechische und Sizilische Vasenbilder* of 1869 (p. 33). We have, of course, heard elsewhere about this immaterial materiality.⁶ It might well be clear enough to be fine materiality.

Dr. s'Jacob wrote in her book about the eidolon as “retaining a thin material envelope” and about a “semi-substance” and “the reduced

1 See above, pp. 231-232.

2 See above, p. 55.

3 See above, p. 6.

4 See above, p. 86 ff, 91 ff.

5 See above, p. 24.

6 See above, p. 225-226.

material eidolon".¹ In writing in this way, she was dealing with the phenomenological data—she certainly had no conscious intention of putting forward a theory of hylic pluralism in her book.

I should now like to discuss briefly a few typical examples of these *eidola* as they occur in the history of art and include them partly as illustrations. It is clear from the idea depicted on an amphora of about 510 B.C., at present in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York² (see Plate 1), that the theme was present in Greek antiquity. There are also three fluttering *psyches* depicted above three dead bodies on a fresco of the synagogue of Doura Europos (ca. 250 A.D.), at present in Damascus Museum. The theme of the *eidolon* was extremely common in medieval Christianity. One of the illustrations in the "art of dying" shows, for example, a dying man on his death bed and his soul as a little person being received by angels.³ There is also a very beautiful icon showing the death of Mary, stretched out on her death bed with Christ above her holding her soul in his hand as a very small doll⁴ (Plate 12). The soul of Doña Sancha, surrounded by two angels, can be seen on her sarcophagus and that of her sisters at Jaca,⁵ depicted in a mandorla. Several dead bodies are painted at the bottom of the fresco, 11 *trionfo della morte*, 1360, in the Campo Santo Pisa (see Plate 10) and an *eidolon* is emerging from the mouth of one these figures.

It is a remarkable fact that, whereas he was generally inclined to paint very extended figures, the soul of the dead count is depicted by El Greco in his *Funeral of Count d' Orgaz* in the Santo Tomé at Toledo, not as an extended figure like the others in the painting, but as a small, rather vague *eidolon* carried by an angel bending forward just above the centre of the picture.⁶ This is yet another case of a little person representing the soul of someone who has just died. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the widespread and persistent idea of the *eidolon* carried away by angels at death has been provided by Dr. s'Jacob's photographs of a funeral hearse (a motor car!) used by the Maronite church at Aleppo (see Plates 3 and 3a). These photographs were taken as recently as 1963!

My plate 8 illustrates an *eidolon* not after death, but before life on earth. I discuss this further in Section 97, where I shall also deal with

1 B 216, p. 114; see above, p. 231-232.

2 See S. Reinach, *Répertoire des vases peints grecs et étrusques* (1923): "The *eidolon* of death flies away between two warriors" (I, p. 347); see also Bulletin, Metropolitan Museum, New Series, Vol. XV, p. 172.

3 See Fig. 10, B 216, p. 74; Lionel Cust, *The Master E. S. and the Ars Moriendi* (1898), Plate VI.

4 From Dr. S. Amberg's collection; Byzantine icon of the fifteenth century.

5 See B 216, pp. 119-120 and Dr. s'Jacob's Plate VIII.

6 See B 232, p. 209 and Fig. 31; B 216, p. 135.

several other illustrations included in this work, because they belong more properly to the theme of "birth". (see also the index under "illustrations".)

We must, however, now consider the question of the figure of the girl in Rembrandt's *Night Watch* (see Plate 6). Historians of art are frank in their admission that they do not know the precise meaning of this little figure, which is in such contrast with the solid figures of the men, the armed companions of Frans Banning Cocq. W. Nigg has written, for example, about the "problem of this painting, that of the remarkable figure of the girl" (p. 281) "which no one has so far been able to explain satisfactorily" (p. 282). Nigg is, however, convinced that it cannot have found its way into the painting because of a whim on Rembrandt's part—it must have a profound meaning. This significance can only be that "the holy is made visible in the midst of the profane" in the figure of the girl. Paul Claudel also saw a messenger from the other world in this radiant little figure (*ibid*).

I do not think that this explanation is incorrect, but I do believe that it is much too vague. My own hypothesis is that Rembrandt represented, in his own way—in contrast to the Catholic ideas, which he must have known—an *eidolon* of the soul in this little figure of the girl in the *Night Watch*. One factor which must be borne in mind here is that Rembrandt painted this picture at the time of the death of his beloved wife Saskia (14 June 1642). She did not die suddenly or unexpectedly, but her health began to fail after the birth of Titus in 1641. The painting, which was delivered just before Saskia's death, did not satisfy the men who had commissioned it. "Saskia's illness was undoubtedly partly to blame for the artist's negligence".¹ Rembrandt was preoccupied with the danger of Saskia's approaching end and is it surprising that he should have painted an "elflike little being", as Nigg has called it (p. 282), on the canvas that he was at that time working on? We may even say that the little figure represents a "heavenly bride" and it cannot be denied that the girl's face features which are similar to those of Saskia in *Saskia as Flora*² or *Saskia with the Red Flower*.³ Did Rembrandt perhaps know about the *dotes* or bridal gifts which, according to the Church Fathers, the glorified body possessed—the clarity or gleam of light and the subtilty or fineness of that

1 B 179, XV, p. 202. It is, however, a controversial question whether the picture did not find general favour. What is beyond dispute is that the artist was painting it at the time of Saskia's illness.

2 A. Bredius, Rembrandt, Plate 103; C. Hofsteds de Groot Verzeichnis 205.

3 *ibid.*, 108 and 609.

body and so on?¹ We may assume that Vondel and Grotius² knew about them and probably Rembrandt did too. He believed that Saskia was about to become a heavenly bride instead of his terrestrial bride and it is here that his "mysticism of light"³ breaks through. Saskia was on the point of being received into the supraterrrestrial light.

There are several reasons why this explanation has never occurred to critics and others before. In the first place, this *eidolon* has, as it were, strayed in among the militiamen of Amsterdam. There is no question of any death scene in the picture. This may have been something that Rembrandt deliberately avoided because he wanted to hide his fear of Saskia's imminent death. In the second place, the resemblance to Saskia—something about which Nigg, for example, is quite silent—has not struck many observed because the figure in the picture is so small. It is, on the other hand, this very small size which provides such a strong argument in favour of my thesis. All *eldola* in iconography are small, as a sign that what is being represented is the soul. Rembrandt certainly followed this tradition, although in other respects he did not.

There are therefore good reasons for speaking about hylic pluralistic themes in the visual arts. I should like to conclude this chapter by mentioning two more points. In his book on sacred art in the world. *Vom Wesen heiliger Kunst in den Weltreligionen* (Zürich, 1955), Titus Burckhardt wrote about a mandala with eighty-one fields (p. 37), saying that this was "in accordance with the representation of the body of fine matter of the *puruṣa*", which is clearly directly connected with hylic pluralism.

Finally, there have been regular films during the present century in which spirits, ghosts or dead people have moved among the living. There have, of course, been several comic films with this theme, such as the well-known *The Ghost Goes West*, but in addition to this there have been more serious films, featuring life after death in one form or another. The fact that these film ghosts can penetrate ordinary objects may or may not be the result of occult influence (see Section 83), but one cannot help asking whether this does not perhaps contain a vague memory of the subtlety of the "higher body".

1 See above, p. 70 ff, 100.

2 See above, p. 210-211.

3 See above, p. 235-236.